Madrid v. State

Darwin Naum Monroy Madrid v. State of Maryland, No. 50, September Term, 2020 KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY WAIVER OF RIGHTS UNDER MIRANDA v. ARIZONA – VOLUNTARINESS OF CONFESSION – COMMON LAW OF MARYLAND – DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO CONSTITUTION OF UNITED STATES – ARTICLE 22 OF MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS – DEFENSE OF DURESS – Court of Appeals held that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and that defendant’s confession was voluntary under common law of Maryland, Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment to Constitution of United States, and Article 22 of Maryland Declaration of Rights. Court concluded that circumstance that defendant was sixteen years old, immigrant to United States, and not given Miranda advisement in writing did not render Miranda advisement given verbally by detective in defendant’s first language, Spanish, insufficient and did not render defendant’s waiver of rights involuntary. Detective’s statement to defendant, prior to advisement of Miranda rights, that he knew defendant was in United States illegally, and later, statements to defendant that he was in danger from gangs did not render defendant’s waiver of rights involuntary. As to common law of Maryland, Court held that State met its burden to prove by preponderance of evidence that defendant’s confession was not product of promise of special consideration from a prosecuting authority or other form of assistance.

As to Due Process Clause and Article 22, Court determined that State has met its burden to prove by preponderance of evidence that defendant’s confession was voluntary under totality of circumstances and was not result of police conduct that overbore his will and induced him to confess. Court of Appeals also held that trial court was correct in determining that giving jury instruction on duress was unwarranted as there was no evidence of present, imminent, and impending threat. Court concluded defendant intentionally or recklessly placed himself in situation in which it was reasonably foreseeable that he would be subjected to coercion and was therefore as matter of law not entitled to defense of duress. Circuit Court for Prince George’s County Case No. CT16-0618B Argued: May 7, 2021 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 50 September Term, 2020 ______________________________________ DARWIN NAUM MONROY MADRID v. STATE OF MARYLAND ______________________________________ Barbera, C.J. McDonald Watts Hotten Getty Booth Biran, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Watts, J. ______________________________________ Filed: July 9, 2021 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2021-07-09 13:30-04:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk In this case, we are asked to determine whether a defendant’s confession was obtained in compliance with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and voluntary under the common law of Maryland, the Due Process Clause, and Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

We are also asked to determine whether the trial court correctly declined to instruct the jury on the defense of duress. In the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, the State, Respondent, charged Darwin Naum Monroy Madrid, Petitioner, with multiple offenses, including the murder of Gamaliel Nerio-Rico and the attempted murder of Carlos Tenorio-Aguirre. Prior to trial, during custodial interrogation in connection with the investigation of the offenses, Madrid made a statement advising a law enforcement officer that he shot Nerio-Rico, the deceased, and shot at Tenerio-Aguirre, the person who survived the shooting, i.e., Madrid confessed. At trial, the State offered evidence that Madrid was a member of the gang Mara Salvatrucha, better known as MS-13, and that a higher-up in the gang ordered him to kill Tenorio-Aguirre, the surviving victim, who was a member of a rival gang known as 18th Street, and evidence of Madrid’s statement.

Madrid gave the statement while being interviewed by Detective Luis Cruz of the Homicide Unit of the Prince George’s County Police Department and was sixteen years old at the time. During the interview, before administering the Miranda rights, among other things, Detective Cruz told Madrid that, although he was not in the country legally, he still had legal rights. Detective Cruz advised Madrid of his Miranda rights and asked whether he understood his rights, and Madrid responded affirmatively. During the interview, Detective Cruz mentioned to Madrid that he was in danger from his own gang, MS-13, and the rival 18th Street gang.

Madrid ultimately confessed. Before trial, Madrid moved to suppress the statement. The circuit court denied the motion to suppress, determining that Miranda had been complied with and that Madrid’s confession was voluntary. At trial, as a witness on his own behalf, Madrid testified that that he had been involved with MS-13 and performed various tasks on behalf of the gang.

On the night of the murder and attempted murder, Madrid went to a nightclub that members of MS-13 frequented. While at the nightclub, Madrid telephoned a higher-up in MS-13, who was said to be located outside of the country in El Salvador, and advised that members of the 18th Street gang were in the nightclub. Madrid testified that the higher-up called him back and gave him an order. Madrid and the other member of MS-13 ran to an apartment building in which Tenorio-Aguirre lived and were provided with guns.

The record indicates, and Madrid admits, that he fatally shot Nerio-Rico and repeatedly shot at Tenorio-Aguirre, who survived the shooting, outside of the apartment building. At trial, Madrid testified that he participated in the murder and attempted murder because, if he had not complied, he would have been punished “the following day” or “as soon as [the punishment] could possibly be done.” Madrid’s counsel submitted to the circuit court written proposed jury instructions, including an instruction on duress. After the circuit court and the parties discussed the propriety of giving a jury instruction on duress, the circuit court declined to give the instruction. The jury found Madrid guilty.

Madrid appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed his convictions. See Madrid v. State, 247 Md. App. 693, 741 , 239 A.3d 770, 798 (2020). The Court of Special Appeals held that the circuit court did not err in denying the -2- motion to suppress or declining to give a jury instruction on duress. See id. at 713, 728 , 239 A.3d at 781, 790 .

Madrid filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted. See Madrid v. State, 472 Md. 312 , 245 A.3d 991 (2021). Before us, Madrid contends that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his rights under Miranda because, among other things, he was not given the advisement of rights in writing, no attempt was made to assess whether he understood the advisement, and Detective Cruz informed him before the advisement that he knew Madrid was in the country illegally. In addition, Madrid contends that his confession was not voluntary under the common law of Maryland because during the interrogation, Detective Cruz made references to threats on his life by gangs and, according to Madrid, the only conceivable interpretation is that the references were intended to imply an offer of protection if he confessed.

Madrid argues that his confession was not voluntary under Article 22 and the Due Process Clause because of, among other circumstances, his age, inexperience with law enforcement officers, and the alleged coercion of the confession by Detective Cruz mentioning that he was in danger from gangs. Finally, Madrid insists that there was sufficient evidence to generate an instruction on the defense of duress. The State responds that Madrid freely and voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda, that his confession was voluntary in all respects, and that the evidence at trial was not sufficient to generate a jury instruction on duress. Below, in Part I, we hold that Madrid knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda.

In addition, we hold that Madrid’s confession was voluntary under the common law of Maryland, the Due Process Clause, and Article 22. We conclude that the -3- circumstances that Madrid was sixteen years old, an immigrant to the United States, and not given the Miranda advisement in writing did not render the advisement given verbally by Detective Cruz in Madrid’s first language, Spanish, insufficient and did not render Madrid’s waiver of rights involuntary. In addition, we determine that Detective Cruz’s statement to Madrid, prior to advisement of his Miranda rights, that he knew Madrid was in the country illegally and statements made later that Madrid was in danger from gangs did not render Madrid’s waiver of rights involuntary. As to the common law of Maryland, we conclude that the State has met its burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Madrid’s confession was not the product of a promise or implication of special consideration from a prosecuting authority or other form of assistance.

As to the Due Process Clause and Article 22, the State has met its burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Madrid’s confession was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances and not the result of police conduct that overbore his will and induced him to confess. In Part II, we hold that the circuit court was correct in determining that a jury instruction on duress was unwarranted as there was no evidence of a present, imminent, and impending threat. Moreover, the defense of duress was unavailable as a matter of law because any potential threat to Madrid arose because he intentionally or recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was reasonably foreseeable that he would be subject to coercion. -4- BACKGROUND Motion to Suppress At the hearing on the motion to suppress, without objection, the circuit court admitted into evidence a videotaped recording and a transcript of Madrid’s interview with Detective Cruz. Although Detective Cruz and Madrid spoke Spanish during the interview, the transcript includes an English translation.

A review of the transcript reveals the following. Detective Cruz began the interview at 11:52 p.m. on April 18, 2016, by asking Madrid: “Are you awake man? What’s your full name man?” (Italics omitted). Madrid indicated that he was born on August 21, 1999, that he was from Guatemala, and that he had been in the United States for nearly two years.

Although Madrid said that he had been expelled from school, he did not indicate how far he had gotten in school. Madrid indicated that he worked, that he was paid $1,400 every other week, and that he gave half of his pay to his mother. After asking questions that did not pertain to the murder and attempted murder, which Madrid answered, Detective Cruz advised Madrid of his Miranda rights by stating: Well, ah, the most I know right now, I know you’re not legal, legally here in the country of America, right? Even though that’s the situation, you still have rights under the law here in, in the United States.

O.K.? Just U/I[1] I’m gonna advi[s]e you of your rights ah, then we’re gonna get into why you’re here right now, understand? O.K. I’m Officer Cruz you told me U/I ah, I work with the Prince George’s County Police. O.K. You have the right to remain silent, if you decide to waive this right, anything you say can be presented as evidence a.., against you in court.

Ah, you have the right to talk to an attorney before being interrogated, and you also have the right to have an attorney present w.., while you are being interrogated O.K.? If you want an attorney but you don’t have the economic means to pay, to pay for one, 1 The first page of the transcript indicates that “U/I” stands for “Unintelligible[.]” -5- an attorney will be provided without cost O.K.? Ah, if you want to answer questions now without the presence of an attorney, you have the right to stop answering these questions at any time, O.K.? Do you understand, do you understand the rights?

Yes? Yes? O.K. [NOISE] How long have you been working with the company? (Ellipses and last brackets in original) (paragraph breaks omitted).

On brief in this Court, Madrid acknowledges that, although the transcript does not indicate so, he said: “Sí”— which means “yes” in English—after Detective Cruz asked: “Do you understand, do you understand the rights? Yes? Yes?” Likewise, at the hearing on the motion to suppress, Madrid’s counsel stated: “I think [Madrid] does say yes, although the transcriber wasn’t so sure and does not attribute yes to [Madrid] in the description.” After advising Madrid of his Miranda rights and asking more questions, Detective Cruz said: “Um-hum, U/I say something kid, [NOISE] I can play this game with you all night if you want, but I’m not in that kind of, of, of, I don’t wanna waste time, understand?” (Brackets in original). During the interview, Detective Cruz referred to the surviving victim (Tenorio-Aguirre) and the gang to which he belonged (18th Street), stating: “[D]o you understand that the guy who was shot, not the, not the one who was shot in his head, the one who survived, Carlos, that he went to Eighteen (18) understand?” Later, the following exchange occurred, during which Detective Cruz referred to the gang that sent Madrid and the 18th Street gang: [DETECTIVE CRUZ]: [A]re you ready to spend your whole life in jail?

Because you know that there, there’s where you’re gonna go today. I’m not here to judge you, O.K.? My job as a detective is to clarify what happened, because I see a young guy, hard worker who maybe made a mistake. I’m telling you something right now, your life’s in danger, not from us, but from the very gang that sent you to do this, yes or no, you don’t believe it? -6- [MADRID]: I don’t know. [DETECTIVE CRUZ]: I’m telling you, you are, I’m telling you, you are, I’m telling you right now, this very moment, the Eighteen (18) already has the word out there.

As an investigator I knew that information. After that, Detective Cruz stated: “Now I’m not here to judge you and say hey, you’re a bad person because you did this and this, and this, understand? We’re human and we make mistakes. But honestly are you ready to lose your life in a jail?” (Paragraph break omitted).

Later, during the following exchange, Madrid confessed: [DETECTIVE CRUZ]: I’m telling you that you’re in this now understand? Now if you decide, it’s your life, I’m not here to beat you up or, or to, to be disrespectful to you, because you’re human, you’re a y.., a young man, understand? But I’m saying, are you ready to spend your life like that, understand? Right now you run a risk, because you all left a lotta information out there.

So, the one who’s in El Salvador, or the one who gave the word, are at risk too, understand? Stuar[t], you know him right? He’s, he’s at risk right now, what do you think the gang’s gonna do when they find out you all already fell? [MADRID]: I don’t know. [DETECTIVE CRUZ]: They’re gonna kill you, because that’s what they do right? Easy to send the word and sent you all to do that to, to those guys, right?

Easy right? What does a call cost, what does a call cost? Nothing. Unfortunately you have family that really loves you, your sister is out there crying right now.

Because for her you’re everything, she told me when her mom left, left Guatemala, you stayed with her taking care of her, right? And today what, where’s the person she looked at and was everything in her life? Really a father to her, your mom who struggled to bring you here, what happened with all that? You don’t think you came here to do something stupid like that, right?

Your, your objective wasn’t that. You[r] mom even though she says this last year you lost it somewhat, she says you’re a hard worker, but that you spend too much time on the street. I know it’s, it’s easy to get lost in this country, this country’s damned, understand? But that doesn’t mean or indicate you’re a bad person, understand?

Now [NOISE] I don’t know what got into your head the night this happened. That’s something you can tell me, were you threatened or what? Or did you want to do this, what was it? -7- [MADRID]: I did it. [DETECTIVE CRUZ]: Sorry? [MADRID]: Just that I did it. (Ellipsis and sixth brackets in original) (paragraph breaks omitted).

Detective Cruz and Madrid then began discussing the circumstances leading up to and surrounding the murder and attempted murder. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, as a witness for the State, Detective Cruz testified that, when he was growing up, Spanish was the language that he used to communicate with his family. Detective Cruz indicated that the interview took place in an interview room and that although the interview began with Madrid’s head on the table, Madrid was “was awake and responsive.” Detective Cruz described Madrid’s demeanor as “[a] bit apprehensive, but cooperative.” Detective Cruz testified that he did not suspect that Madrid was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Detective Cruz testified that, during the interview, he read aloud verbatim (in Spanish) from a card on which the Miranda rights are printed in Spanish.

Detective Cruz testified: “When I read the card to him, this is from viewing the video, after every line that I read to him I said okay, looked at him for reassurance and he shook his head like a nod like yes.” During the interview, Detective Cruz was unarmed and wearing plainclothes. As a witness on his own behalf, Madrid testified that, before his arrest in this case, he had not had any interactions with law enforcement officers other than one with immigration officers near the border. Madrid testified that, when he was in high school in -8- the United States, he took classes in science, algebra, history, and English as a second language. According to Madrid, when he entered the interview room, he “was sort of disoriented because it was so cold.” Madrid explained that “[t]he room was very cold” and that he was wearing only a shirt, pants, and sandals.

Madrid testified that he slept between the time that he was brought to the room and the time that Detective Cruz came in and that he did not remember whether he had woken up by the time Detective Cruz entered the room. Madrid testified that he did not remember Detective Cruz telling him about his rights. After hearing testimony, the circuit court heard arguments by the parties. Madrid’s counsel acknowledged “that the Miranda rights were read in sufficient form to [Madrid] in Spanish in language that he understands.” Nonetheless, Madrid’s counsel contended that, instead of orally advising Madrid of his rights in Spanish, Detective Cruz should have allowed Madrid to read the written form.

Madrid’s counsel stated that Detective Cruz verbally advised Madrid of his rights in thirty-six seconds. When addressing the voluntariness of the confession, Madrid’s counsel did not mention either Detective Cruz’s statement about Madrid being in the country illegally but still having rights or his statements about Madrid being in danger from gangs. After the circuit court heard argument by the prosecutor, the following exchange occurred, during which the circuit court denied the motion to suppress: [MADRID’S COUNSEL]: Very brief, Your Honor. We’re talking about 36 seconds.

And I don’t know if the average law student can understand being read their rights in 36 seconds. But, we’re talking here about a juvenile who is cold, confused, disoriented. This waiver was not knowing[]. -9- THE COURT: He didn’t seem disoriented on the video. Did you see anything in his demeanor on the video? [MADRID’S COUNSEL]: Well, Your Honor, it was his testimony that he felt disoriented.

THE COURT: I know. But, you can’t tell it in his demeanor, so therefore it’s very hard for me. And I’m just asking did you see anything. [MADRID’S COUNSEL]: No, I did not. THE COURT: I’m not saying it wasn’t cold in there because they might have had the air on and he only had a shirt.

A lot of people don’t like air. I believe he was cold. [MADRID’S COUNSEL]: All right. So, we do know that it was late at night. He was sleeping when he had the opportunity.

And I don’t think a 16 year- old at that time can understand enough, and I don’t think he did. THE COURT: It is not a blanket for any juvenile. It has to be case by case as to what occurred with this particular juvenile and the next juvenile, et cetera. [MADRID’S COUNSEL]: Right. And this juvenile came from another country, where he hasn’t heard about Miranda before or he hasn’t had any interaction with the police before.

THE COURT: That’s a fact that sometimes you don’t believe when someone gets on the stand and says they’re not familiar because they’ve watched lot of TV, et cetera. And I understand that, but that doesn’t negate whether or not, in fact, Miranda was provided in the manner it was supposed to be provided. That’s what I have to look at as well, right? [MADRID’S COUNSEL]: Right. And that part I agree.

But, he didn’t understand, that’s my whole point. THE COURT: He said he did. He said yes. No one else said yes but him.

I mean I watched him in the video. I have to say that his mannerism in the video is very similar to his mannerism as he testifies on the stand. He’s very soft spoken. He doesn’t speak up.

And I think that he exhibited -- it so much mirrors his behavior. That’s just his personality, period. I don’t think he’s a big -- you know, just sitting, but he conveys. I mean I accepted his answers under oath today.

Why would I not accept it in the Miranda giv[ing] of the - 10 - rights? I’m not sure why not. It is the same to me. He acted the same.

To be honest with you, I thought Detective Cruz was a 16 year-old [sic]. I thought he was very calm and very methodical about how he went about asking the questions and what he did with your client. I thought he, you know -- because I’ve seen some videos. I have to be honest with you.

I thought some detectives were off the hook in terms of their mannerisms. I did not see that. I think that you take that into account when you have a 16 year-old in front of you as well. But, you keep going I mean if you still see some violation of the Miranda.

I don’t think he has a choice, card or form. Yes, it may be in Spanish, but even if you have one in Spanish, if a person doesn’t have higher grade of reading level, they might not understand reading in Spanish. I mean you just never know. But, if you do it verbally, then you have that face-to- face. [MADRID’S COUNSEL]: Right.

And I do agree that the detective had a choice about what mechanism to use. THE COURT: Right. [MADRID’S COUNSEL]: But, they have to choose one that actually conveys the meaning to the person that has to hear it. That’s not what happened here. THE COURT: Not from the video.

He answered. He said yes, and then he kept talking. He provided the Miranda in the way it calls for under the law with respect[ t]o the voluntariness, and that one statement, we are not going to play all night, that just to me is just statement that, look, we are not going to be here all night. You either talk or you don’t talk.

It’s really up to you. Is that the statement where you say it is not -- [MADRID’S COUNSEL]: Yes. I agree with Your Honor up to point -- THE COURT: I don’t get another statement. I didn’t hear anything in terms of him saying you are going to have to talk tonight.[2] I didn’t hear that on the video.

I’m sorry. 2 Madrid testified that, before he was transferred to the room in which Detective Cruz would interview him, Detective Cruz told him: “[I]t is better for you if you talk.” On cross- examination, Detective Cruz denied making such a statement to Madrid. Before us, Madrid does not make any arguments regarding the alleged statement. - 11 - [MADRID’S COUNSEL]: That’s page seven.[3] Page seven is the one I was talking about. THE COURT: All right. So, I deny your motion with respect to the suppression of the statement both on the grounds of Miranda violation and voluntariness.

Trial Testimony At trial, as a witness for the State, Manuel Alexander Beltran-Cazun, who was eighteen at the time of trial, testified pursuant to a plea agreement with the State. Beltran- Cazun testified that he was a member of MS-13 and had been for approximately a year and a half, that he knew Madrid, and that he had been with Madrid on the night of the offenses. Beltran-Cazun indicated that MS-13 is divided into cliques and that each MS-13 member has a rank. According to Beltran-Cazun, “esquina” is the lowest rank, and “homeboy” is the highest rank.

Beltran-Cazun testified that the homeboys control the cliques. When Beltran-Cazun joined MS-13, he was an esquina. When Beltran-Cazun met Madrid, he (Madrid) was a member of MS-13 and was an esquina. Initially, Beltran-Cazun and Madrid belonged to different cliques.

At some point, Madrid was asked to join the clique to which Beltran-Cazun belonged, which was based in Langley Park. According to Beltran-Cazun, in April 2016, the homeboy of the clique was a man from El Salvador known as “Delincuente.” Beltran-Cazun had a friend who lived in Newbury Square Apartments, which he called “the 410 apartments.” Tenorio-Aguirre also lived in Newbury Square Apartments. 3 Page seven of the transcript of the interview includes a statement by Detective Cruz to the effect of “I can play this game with you all night if you want[.]” - 12 - Tenorio-Aguirre was a member of 18th Street, a rival gang to MS-13. Beltran-Cazun knew that Tenorio-Aguirre was a member of 18th Street because Tenorio-Aguirre told him so and because there were photographs on Facebook of Tenorio-Aguirre showing 18th Street gang signs. Members of MS-13 refer to members of 18th Street as “chavalos” or “chavalas.”4 When asked what members of MS-13 were supposed to do with members of 18th Street, Beltran-Cazun responded: “Kill them before they kill us.” On April 16, 2016, at approximately 11 p.m., Beltran-Cazun, his girlfriend, and a friend of hers went to the Galaxy Nightclub.

There, Beltran-Cazun saw Madrid. While Beltran-Cazun was at the nightclub, a member of MS-13 known as “Hellboy” told Beltran- Cazun that members of 18th Street were in the nightclub and stated that: “We have to go and get the chavalo in 410.” Beltran-Cazun understood that Hellboy was telling him to kill Tenorio-Aguirre. Beltran-Cazun and Hellboy walked from the nightclub to a dumpster near the Newbury Square Apartments, where they met Madrid and a person known as “Stuart.” According to Beltran-Cazun, a bag was on the ground near the dumpster and Madrid told him: “Here’s your gun in the bag.” Beltran-Cazun retrieved a gun from the bag. Madrid and Stuart also had guns, but Hellboy did not.

Madrid and Stuart were waiting for someone known as “El Carta” to send them a text message indicating that Tenorio-Aguirre had left the nightclub. After the text message was received, Beltran-Cazun and Madrid went to the 4 “Chavalo” and “chavala” are colloquial Spanish terms for “kid[.]” Chavala, WordReference.com, https://www.wordreference.com/es/en/translation.asp?spen= chavala. - 13 - front of the apartment building. As Tenorio-Aguirre began walking down the sidewalk, Beltran-Cazun looked at Madrid, who “raised his head, like to say, yeah.” Beltran-Cazun shot Tenorio-Aguirre once. Beltran-Cazun tried to shoot Tenorio- Aguirre a second time, but his gun “locked.” While Beltran-Cazun was looking at his gun, he heard a second shot.

Madrid ran toward Beltran-Cazun, who told him (Madrid) that his gun was locked. Madrid then ran after Tenorio-Aguirre. Beltran-Cazun and Hellboy ran toward 23rd Street. While he and Hellboy were running, Beltran-Cazun heard more shots.

When Beltran-Cazun and Hellboy got close to 23rd Street, they saw Madrid and Stuart running toward them. The four of them met near some apartment buildings where Beltran- Cazun, Madrid, and Stuart put their guns back in the bag. Beltran-Cazun went home. On April 17, 2016, at approximately 12 p.m., Beltran-Cazun and Madrid met and spoke to Delincuente on the phone.

Delincuente asked: “Did you guys carry out the mission[?]” Madrid advised that he had shot Nerio-Rico—i.e., the person who died. As a witness for the State, Detective Cruz testified that, on April 17, 2016, he began investigating a murder and an attempted murder that had taken place that day near the Newbury Square Apartments, approximately one mile away from Galaxy Nightclub. During Detective Cruz’s testimony, the circuit court admitted into evidence the videotaped recording of his interview of Madrid. Parts of the recording were played for the jury, and Detective Cruz interpreted what he and Madrid said.

Detective Cruz testified that Madrid admitted that he shot the person who died—Nerio-Rico—in the head once and that he fired the rest of his bullets at Tenorio-Aguirre. As a witness for the State, Sergeant George Norris of the Gang Intelligence Unit of - 14 - the Prince George’s County Police Department was accepted by the circuit court as an expert in gangs generally and MS-13 specifically. According to Sergeant Norris, “an unofficial motto” of MS-13 is “kill, rape and control.” Based on his review of information related to the case, Sergeant Norris opined that Madrid was a member of MS-13. Sergeant Norris opined that Tenorio-Aguirre was a member of 18th Street and that it would be very dangerous for a member of 18th Street to go to the Galaxy Nightclub, which members of MS-13 frequent.

Sergeant Norris explained that MS-13 members are divided into the following ranks, in ascending order: esquina, paro, observacion, paisa, chequeo, homeboy, second word, first word, palabrero, and corredor. Sergeant Norris explained that, although an esquina is not “a graduate of [] the gang program[,]” an esquina is still a member of MS- 13. Usually, palabreros and corredores are in El Salvador, Honduras, or Guatemala. Sergeant Norris opined that Hellboy was a homeboy and that the person named Delincuente was either a palabrero or a corredor.

On cross-examination, Sergeant Norris testified that MS-13 members can be punished for not doing what they are told. For example, a “13” is a punishment in which an MS-13 member is beaten for thirteen seconds. According to Sergeant Norris, an MS- 13 member could also be killed as punishment. Sergeant Norris explained that gangs use the term “green light” to refer to “a death warrant” or “a hit on somebody[,]” whether on a member of the gang, a member of a rival gang, or someone else.

Sergeant Norris opined that Madrid would have been punished if he had not done “the mission,” but explained that the possible punishments varied, and which one Madrid would have received depended on - 15 - his history with MS-13, whether he was liked, and whether he had an excuse for not doing the assignment. Referring to MS-13, Sergeant Norris testified: “You don’t leave the gang. . . . When you join, it’s for life.” On redirect-examination, Sergeant Norris provided additional testimony about getting out of a gang during the following exchange: [PROSECUTOR:] Have you ever had individuals approach you about getting out of gang because they don’t want to do a mission? [SERGEANT NORRIS:] Yes. [PROSECUTOR:] Describe what that is like. What is it like when somebody approaches you about not wanting to do mission? [SERGEANT NORRIS:] I mean for me, it’s a nightmare because it’s almost an impossible task to get people out of MS-13 unless they completely cooperate with you, which is, you would have to basically relocate them to new location somewhere far away.

They would have to start a new life. They would have to have federal involvement. [PROSECUTOR:] Have you assisted with that though? [SERGEANT NORRIS:] Yes. [PROSECUTOR:] And has that occurred prior to that person actually doing the mission? [SERGEANT NORRIS:] Yes. As a witness on his own behalf, Madrid acknowledged that he had been involved with MS-13 and that he had been an esquina but testified that, to be a member of MS-13 or belong to the gang, a person must hold a higher-up rank, such as homeboy. Madrid testified that he first got involved with MS-13 in late 2015, when one day a group of people tried to rob him in a bathroom at his high school and members of MS-13 helped him.

From - 16 - then on, whenever members of MS-13 asked Madrid for help, he complied. For example, Madrid complied with requests by members of MS-13 to give them money for lunch or cigarettes once or twice a week. Madrid also complied with orders to walk around areas where members of MS-13 hung around and report it if he saw members of other gangs. In addition, Madrid complied with orders to “pick up rent”—i.e., collect money that certain individuals paid members of MS-13.

Madrid testified that he was once punished for giving excuses and not answering phone calls. Madrid testified that the punishment consisted of being beaten by three people for thirteen seconds. Madrid testified that he had to obey orders from Delincuente, or else Delincuente would call homeboys and chequeos and tell them to punish him. According to Madrid, he once told the homeboys that he “wanted to calm things down[,]” but he was told that he “couldn’t because they were the ones who gave the orders.” On April 16, 2016, Madrid went to Galaxy Nightclub and met up with his friends Beltran-Cazun and Hellboy.

While Madrid was at the nightclub, Delincuente telephoned him to determine whether any members of 18th Street were in the nightclub. Madrid called Delincuente back and said that members of 18th Street were in the nightclub. Madrid was told to wait a few minutes. Madrid went outside the nightclub and waited.

While Madrid was waiting, Stuart came out of the nightclub and joined him. Afterward, Delincuente telephoned Madrid and gave him an order.5 Madrid and Stuart ran to the Newberry Square apartments. At the time, neither 5 The circuit court precluded Madrid from testifying about the content of the order but allowed him to testify about what he did as a result of receiving it. - 17 - Madrid nor Stuart had a gun. Shortly after Madrid and Stuart reached the area of the apartments, a car drove up.

Stuart went to the car and got a backpack, which contained three guns. Next, Beltran-Cazun and Hellboy arrived. Later, members of 18th Street drove up, parked, and got out of their car. In Madrid’s words: “We made the attack.

We tried to carry out the order we were given.” Madrid testified that he remembered admitting to Detective Cruz that he participated in the murder and attempted murder. Madrid testified that he did not know whom he shot. Madrid’s counsel asked him: “[W]hen somebody in MS-13 commits a gang infraction, how quickly do they get punished?” Madrid responded: “That I know of, as soon as possible. The following day.

As soon as it could possibly be done.” Madrid’s counsel asked him why he participated in the murder of Nerio-Rico and the attempted murder of Tenorio-Aguirre. Madrid responded: “Because it was a major order coming from someone that gives the word. And it was given that there was a green light. And if I didn’t carry out, that green light would have been for me.” Madrid’s counsel asked why he had not given an excuse when he received the order.

Madrid responded: Because since I was already at the club with the rest of them, I just couldn’t really give them an excuse. Perhaps if I would have been like at my house or somewhere else, or I wasn’t close by, I would have been able to give them an excuse, but being there with them, I just don’t know what excuse I could have given them. Discussion of Jury Instruction on Duress and Verdicts Madrid’s counsel submitted to the circuit court proposed jury instructions, including one on duress. Before closing arguments, during a bench conference, the circuit court asked Madrid’s counsel whether the jury instruction on duress should be given in light of - 18 - this Court’s holding in McMillan v. State, 428 Md. 333 , 51 A.3d 623 (2012).6 Madrid’s counsel responded that the evidence showed that there was “no getting out of the gang” and that Madrid was “terrified” and “did this because he knew what would happen if he didn’t.” Madrid’s counsel contended that McMillan and other relevant cases did not state that “the harm that’s anticipated by the person experiencing duress has to occur that day.” The prosecutor contended that Williams v. State, 101 Md. App. 408 , 646 A.2d 1101 (1994), cert. denied, 337 Md. 90 , 651 A.2d 855 (1995), stands for the proposition that a duress defense is unavailable where the defendant has joined a criminal organization and placed himself in a position of being subjected to coercion.

Madrid’s counsel noted that the position that participating in a gang precludes a defense of duress had not been incorporated into the Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions. Madrid’s counsel indicated that the duress instruction was warranted because higher-ranking members of MS-13, such as Delincuente, had been telephoning Madrid, and Madrid had testified “that the punishment could come within a day.” The next day, after hearing additional argument from the parties, the circuit court declined to give a jury instruction on duress, stating: All right. It’s been long argument on duress. And I mean, I’ve thought about this long and hard.

I said I reread all that you provided me last night. I read it yesterday. And in terms of the defense of duress, I do not find that that issue has been raised, and I will not give that as an instruction to the jury, not under the facts of this case where it is that he voluntarily 6 In McMillan, 428 Md. at 348 , 51 A.3d at 632 , in discussing the applicability of the duress instruction, this Court stated that, “[i]n order to constitute a defense, the duress by another person on the defendant must be present, imminent, and impending, and of such a nature as to induce well grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily injury if the act is not done.” (Citation omitted). - 19 - joined MS-13, knowing it was a violent gang. And now, according to the Williams case, you cannot use that because you know that there are penalties for your actions when you joined.

You’ve already experienced penalties. And the fact that you are now about to perhaps experience a greater penalty does not, to me, then allow you to use the defense of duress. You chose to take that path. You have to live with that path.

So I will not allow it. It’s not under the law. The jury found Madrid guilty of first-degree murder of Nerio-Rico, attempted first- degree murder of Tenorio-Aguirre, and two counts each of first-degree assault, use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime of violence, conspiracy to commit first- degree murder, and participation in a criminal gang.7 Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals On October 1, 2020, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed Madrid’s convictions. See Madrid, 247 Md. App. at 741 , 239 A.3d at 798 .

Addressing the Miranda issue, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that the recording of the interview established that Detective Cruz properly advised Madrid of his rights and that Madrid’s waiver was knowingly and voluntarily given. See id. at 716 , 239 A.3d at 784 . Addressing the voluntariness of the confession, the Court of Special Appeals determined that Madrid’s confession was voluntary and not the result of conduct by Detective Cruz that overbore his 7 Madrid was sentenced to life imprisonment for first-degree murder; a consecutive sentence of life imprisonment, with all but twenty years suspended, for attempted first- degree murder; concurrent sentences of twenty years’ imprisonment, with all but five years suspended, for the two counts of use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime of violence; a consecutive sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment, with all but five years suspended, for one count of participation in a criminal gang; a concurrent sentence of ten years’ imprisonment for the second count of participation in a criminal gang; and a concurrent sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment for one count of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. - 20 - will and induced him to confess. See id. at 726 , 239 A.3d at 789 .

The Court of Special Appeals observed that, when testifying at the suppression hearing, Madrid made no mention of Detective Cruz’s statements about him being in the country illegally or being in danger from gangs. See id. at 712-13 , 239 A.3d at 781 . The Court of Special Appeals concluded that, assuming Madrid did not forfeit appellate review of the arguments concerning the statements, neither of the statements constituted an improper inducement. See id. at 712-13 , 239 A.3d at 781 .

The Court of Special Appeals explained that the “statements were simply descriptive of the serious position in which Madrid had placed himself.” Id. at 722 , 239 A.3d at 787 . The Court of Special Appeals held that the circuit court did not err in declining to give a jury instruction on duress. See id. at 728 , 239 A.3d at 790 . The Court of Special Appeals determined that Madrid was not facing a present, imminent, and impending threat at the time of the murder and attempted murder, as shown by his testimony that MS-13 might punish him the following day for not carrying out the order to shoot Tenorio-Aguirre.

See id. at 732-33 , 239 A.3d at 793 . In addition, the Court of Special Appeals determined that Madrid was not entitled to an instruction on duress because “foreseeable coercion [] was . . . a known attribute of affiliation with the MS-13 gang[.]” Id. at 734 , 239 A.3d at 794 . Petition for a Writ of Certiorari On November 20, 2020, Madrid petitioned for a writ of certiorari, raising the following three issues: 1. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that the defense of duress - 21 - was “unavailable . . . as a matter of law” to Madrid because of his gang involvement? 2.

Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that Madrid failed to meet the threshold of “some evidence” required to generate the defense of duress? 3. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in upholding the denial of Madrid’s motion to suppress his statement to the police? a. Did the interrogating officer’s statements—“your life’s in danger . . . from the very gang that sent you to do this,” “what do you think the gang’s gonna do when they find out you all already fell,” “right now you run a risk,” “[t]hey’re gonna kill you,” and that the victim’s gang also “already has the word out there”—after which Madrid immediately confessed, constitute an impermissible inducement? b. Did the State fail to meet its burden of establishing that 16-year-old Madrid, who had no prior experience with the criminal justice system, knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights following a 40-second advisement of his rights which did not include a written waiver? c.

Under the totality of the circumstances was Madrid’s confession involuntary? (Alteration and ellipses in original). On February 8, 2021, this Court granted the petition. See Madrid, 472 Md. 312 , 245 A.3d 991 .

DISCUSSION I. Miranda and Voluntariness of the Confession The Parties’ Contentions Madrid contends that the State failed to establish that his statement was obtained in conformance with the requirements of Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 , and voluntary under Maryland common law, the Due Process Clause, and Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Madrid argues that when reviewing a statement given by a juvenile, “special care” or “heightened scrutiny” must be used in evaluating the record to assure that - 22 - the juvenile’s statements are voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. Madrid maintains that his Miranda waiver was not made knowingly and voluntarily given that he was sixteen at the time, was not presented with his rights in written form, little care was given to “assessing [his] capacity to understand his rights,” and, according to Madrid, Detective Cruz made no attempt to explain the significance of the Miranda warnings. Madrid asserts that Detective Cruz “undermined” the advisement before reading the Miranda rights by stating that he (Detective Cruz) knew that Madrid was not in the country legally.

Madrid contends that, among other things, Detective Cruz stated: “[Y]our life’s in danger, not from us, but from the very gang that sent you to do this,” “the Eighteen (18) already has the word out there[,]” “are you ready to lose your life in a jail[,]” and “you decide, it’s your life,” and that these statements created fear, causing him to confess. Madrid maintains that after reading the rights, Detective Cruz informed him that he could “play this game with you all night[,]” implying that Detective Cruz was willing to question him all night until he confessed. Madrid argues that the only conceivable way to interpret Detective Cruz’s reference to threats on his life is as an implied offer of protection if he confessed. Madrid asserts that he relied on Detective Cruz’s implied offer of protection, and that he confessed after Detective Cruz’s inducements, making his confession involuntary under the common law of Maryland.

Madrid maintains that under the totality of the circumstances his confession was not voluntary under the Due Process Clause and Article 22. Among other things, Madrid indicates that he was interrogated late at night in a cold room while sleep deprived. Madrid maintains that Detective Cruz pressured him by stating that his mother and - 23 - stepfather had been brought in for questioning and making the statements discussed above. The State responds that Madrid waived his contentions in connection with Detective Cruz’s statements about his immigration status and any danger that the gangs may have posed by failing to raise the arguments in the circuit court.

Insofar as the voluntariness of the confession is concerned, the State contends that Madrid’s contention that his confession was involuntary under the common law of Maryland is waived because the contention is based solely on Detective Cruz’s statements about the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs posed a danger, which, according to the State, is an argument that Madrid’s counsel did not raise at the suppression hearing. The State argues that Madrid’s contention that his confession was involuntary under the Due Process Clause and Article 22 is also waived because Madrid’s counsel did not make such an argument at the suppression hearing, and, instead, relied only on the alleged involuntariness of the confession under the common law of Maryland. With respect to the merits, the State asserts that Madrid freely and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. The State points out that Madrid was sixteen, had been in the United States for nearly two years, had completed some high school, did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and responded affirmatively to Detective Cruz’s question about understanding his Miranda rights.

The State maintains that the statement Detective Cruz made about Madrid’s immigration status prior to the advisement of his Miranda rights was intended to let Madrid know that he had such rights even though he is not a citizen of the United States. The State contends that Madrid’s confession was voluntary under the common law - 24 - of Maryland as Detective Cruz did not offer Madrid anything, such as protection or arrangements for preferential treatment by a prosecutor or a court. The State argues that Madrid’s confession was voluntary under the Due Process Clause and Article 22 because, among other things, he was advised of his rights in Spanish (his first language) in easy-to- understand words, was interviewed by only one detective, and was not subjected to a prolonged, intense, or highly confrontational interrogation.8 Standard of Review In Thomas v. State, 429 Md. 246, 259 , 55 A.3d 680, 688 (2012), this Court set forth the standard of review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress as follows: Our review of a grant or denial of a motion to suppress is limited to the record of the suppression hearing. The first-level factual findings of the suppression court and the court’s conclusions regarding the credibility of testimony must be accepted by this Court unless clearly erroneous.

The evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. We undertake our own independent constitutional appraisal of the record by reviewing the law and applying it to the facts of the present case. (Cleaned up). An appellate court reviews without deference a trial court’s ultimate determination as to whether a confession was voluntary and reviews for clear error the trial court’s underlying findings of fact.

See Gorge v. State, 386 Md. 600, 610-11 , 873 A.2d 1171, 1177 (2005). Similarly, an appellate court reviews without deference a trial court’s 8 In a reply brief, Madrid contends that the State’s arguments as to preservation are not properly before the Court because the State failed to raise the arguments before the Court of Special Appeals or in a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari. In addition, Madrid asserts that his contention that his confession was involuntary under the Due Process Clause and Article 22 is not waived because, at the hearing on the motion to suppress, his counsel noted that the same factors apply to both the question of whether he had voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and the question of the voluntariness of his confession. - 25 - ultimate determination as to whether Miranda was violated and reviews for clear error the trial court’s underlying findings of fact. See Owens v. State, 399 Md. 388, 403 , 924 A.2d 1072, 1080 (2007).

Knowing and Voluntary Waiver of Rights Under Miranda It is well known that in Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79 , the Supreme Court held that a law enforcement officer must advise a defendant of certain rights before conducting a custodial interrogation, stating: [W]hen an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, . . . [h]e must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. A trial court may not admit a confession made during a custodial interrogation unless a law enforcement officer properly advised the defendant of the defendant’s rights under Miranda and the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived those rights. See Gonzalez v. State, 429 Md. 632, 637 , 57 A.3d 484, 486-87 (2012). The State has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the defendant’s rights under Miranda.

See id. at 650 , 57 A.3d at 494 . In Gonzalez, id. at 648, 652 , 57 A.3d at 493, 495 , in examining the Miranda waiver of an eighteen-year-old who was a recent immigrant to the United States, this Court stated: First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the totality of the - 26 - circumstances surrounding the interrogation reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.

(Cleaned up). When assessing the totality of the circumstances as to Miranda, a court must consider the defendant’s age, experience, education, background, intelligence, and conduct. See id. at 652 , 57 A.3d at 495 . This Court observed that the defendant’s waiver was not rendered unknowing by the circumstance that the defendant was eighteen years old, uneducated, and a recent immigrant to the United States unfamiliar with the criminal justice system in this country.

See id. at 657 , 57 A.3d at 499 . This Court explained that these circumstances, without more, did not render the defendant unable, as a matter of law, to make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights. See id. at 657 , 57 A.3d at 499 . In Miller v. State, 251 Md. 362, 381 , 247 A.2d 530, 540 (1968), vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 934 (1972),9 this Court held that a trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in determining that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional rights.

The defendant was sixteen when he was arrested and interviewed in connection with a murder. See Miller, 251 Md. at 365 , 247 A.2d at 532 . A law enforcement officer testified about advising the defendant of his Miranda rights as follows: I [] stated the following: You have the absolute right to remain silent. The constitution requires that I so inform you of this right and you need not talk to me if you do not wish to do so.

You do not have to answer any of my questions. Should you talk to me anything you might say in answer to my questions can and will be used and introduced into evidence in court against 9 In Miller, 408 U.S. 934 , the Supreme Court vacated this Court’s judgment “insofar as it le[ft] undisturbed the death penalty imposed” and remanded to this Court for further proceedings. - 27 - you. If you want an attorney to be present at this time or any time hereafter you are entitled to such counsel. If you cannot afford to pay an attorney one will be appointed for you if you so desire.

Any statement you do make here must be made willingly, freely and voluntarily, without any threats or promises of reward being made to you. In view of these facts do you wish to give a statement and answer my questions. [The defendant]’s answer was, ‘Yes sir.’ Id. at 366, 247 A.2d at 532 (internal quotation marks omitted). The defendant was initially interviewed for ninety-five minutes, during which he denied being involved in the crime. See id. at 366 , 247 A.2d at 532 .

Afterward, the defendant was given a meal, and the investigating officers left the police station with the intent to search the defendant’s home. See id. at 366 , 247 A.2d at 532 . On the way to the defendant’s home, the investigating officers were asked via radio to return to the police station, which they did, and were told by another officer that the defendant said that he wanted to tell the truth. See id. at 366-67 , 247 A.2d at 532 .

The defendant was given the same Miranda advisement as earlier and once again responded: “Yes sir.” Id. at 367-68 , 247 A.2d at 533 (internal quotation marks omitted). During a second interview, the defendant confessed. See id. at 373-74 , 247 A.2d at 536 . The defendant did not ask to speak with his parents until after an officer asked him to sign a typed statement of the questions and answers from the interview.

See id. at 376-77 , 247 A.2d at 537-38 . This Court concluded that the defendant validly waived his constitutional rights in light of him “agreeing to give a statement coupled with the attendant circumstances, that is the proper constitutional warnings at the beginning of each questioning period, no allegations of any police misconduct, and [the defendant]’s own request for the interview when he gave his inculpatory statement[.]” Id. at 379 , 247 A.2d at 539 . This Court - 28 - explained that, although “admissions of juveniles require special caution[,]” “the age of a [defendant], in itself, does not render a confession involuntary.” Id. at 378-79 , 247 A.2d at 539 (citations omitted). In Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 728 (1979), the Supreme Court held that a juvenile court correctly determined that a juvenile knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.

The juvenile was sixteen-and-a-half when he was arrested and interviewed in connection with a murder. See id. at 709-10 . At the time, the juvenile had been on probation in the juvenile court since age twelve. See id. at 710 .

During the interview, one of the officers advised the juvenile of his rights. See id. The following exchange then occurred, during which the juvenile agreed to speak with the officers: [OFFICER:] Do you understand all of these rights as I have explained them to you? [JUVENILE:] Yeah. [OFFICER:] Okay, do you wish to give up your right to remain silent and talk to us about this murder? [JUVENILE:] What murder? I don’t know about no murder. [OFFICER:] I’ll explain to you which one it is if you want to talk to us about it. [JUVENILE:] Yeah, I might talk to you. [OFFICER:] Do you want to give up your right to have an attorney present here while we talk about it? [JUVENILE:] Can I have my probation officer here? [OFFICER:] Well I can’t get a hold of your probation officer right now.

You have the right to an attorney. - 29 - [JUVENILE:] How I know you guys won’t pull no police officer in and tell me he’s an attorney? [OFFICER:] Huh? [JUVENILE:] How I know you guys won’t pull no police officer in and tell me he’s an attorney? [OFFICER:] Your probation officer is Mr. Christiansen. [JUVENILE:] Yeah. [OFFICER:] Well I’m not going to call Mr. Christiansen tonight. There’s a good chance we can talk to him later, but I’m not going to call him right now. If you want to talk to us without an attorney present, you can. If you don’t want to, you don’t have to.

But if you want to say something, you can, and if you don’t want to say something you don’t have to. That’s your right. You understand that right? [JUVENILE:] Yeah. [OFFICER:] Okay, will you talk to us without an attorney present? [JUVENILE:] Yeah I want to talk to you. Id. at 710-11 (cleaned up).

In response to questions by the officers, the juvenile made statements and drew sketches that incriminated him in the murder. See id. at 711 . The Supreme Court agreed with the juvenile court that the juvenile validly waived his Miranda rights, stating: The transcript of the interrogation reveals that the police officers conducting the interrogation took care to ensure that [the juvenile] understood his rights. They fully explained to [the juvenile] that he was being questioned in connection with a murder.

They then informed him of all the rights delineated in Miranda, and ascertained that [the juvenile] understood those rights. There is no indication in the record that [the juvenile] failed to understand what the officers told him. Moreover, after his request to see his probation officer had been denied, and after the police officer once more had explained his rights to him, [the juvenile] clearly expressed his willingness to waive his rights and continue the interrogation. - 30 - Further, no special factors indicate that [the juvenile] was unable to understand the nature of his actions. He was a 16 ½-year-old juvenile with considerable experience with the police.

He had a record of several arrests. He had served time in a youth camp, and he had been on probation for several years. He was under the full-time supervision of probation authorities. There is no indication that he was of insufficient intelligence to understand the rights he was waiving, or what the consequences of that waiver would be.

He was not worn down by improper interrogation tactics or lengthy questioning or by trickery or deceit. Id. at 726-27 . In McIntyre v. State, 309 Md. 607, 626 , 526 A.2d 30, 39 (1987), this Court affirmed a trial court’s determination that a defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. The defendant was fifteen when he was arrested while on his way to school and interviewed in connection with an alleged rape.

See id. at 609 , 526 A.2d at 31 . As officers transported the defendant to a police station, they informed him that he had been arrested for rape, told him the alleged victim’s name, and advised him of his right to remain silent, his right to speak with counsel and have counsel present during any interview, and his right to be appointed counsel if he could not afford one. See id. at 609 , 526 A.2d at 31 . The defendant said that he understood his rights and asked when he could see his mother.

See id. at 609 , 526 A.2d at 31 . One of the officers responded that the defendant could not see his mother at the time because he had been charged as an adult. See id. at 609 , 526 A.2d at 31 . At the police station, the defendant was again Mirandized, again said that he understood his rights, and signed a Miranda waiver form after making a second request to see his mother, which was denied.

See id. at 609-10 , 526 A.2d at 31 . The defendant provided a statement regarding the alleged rape. See id. at 609-10 , 526 A.2d at 31 . In the statement, although the defendant denied committing the rape,