Maloof v. DEPT. of ENVIRONMENT

HOLLANDER, Judge. In this case we must analyze the scope of authority conferred by statute and regulation upon the Maryland Department of the Environment to regulate the disposal of solid waste, particularly land clearing debris. The matter arises from a dispute between Naji P. Maloof and Parkers Wharf, LLC, 1 appellants, and the Maryland Department of the Envi ⁶⁸⁷ ronment (“MDE” or the “Department”), appellee, concerning appellants’ operation of a landfill on their Calvert County farm, without a permit, allegedly in violation of Md.Code (1982, 1998 Repl.Vol., 2000 Supp.), § 9-204(d) of the Environment Article (“E.A.”), and the Code of Maryland Regulations (“COMAR”). The landfill contained land-clearing debris that commercial excavators transported to appellants’ farm for a fee.

According to Maloof, the purpose was to create additional pastureland for his livestock. On July 80, 1999, MDE filed suit in the Circuit Court for Calvert County against Maloof, seeking injunctive relief and civil penalties based on his operation of a landfill without a permit. The suit was amended to add Parkers Wharf as a defendant. The dispute led to an evidentiary hearing on September 1 and 15, 1999, as well as a site visit by the court, and culminated in a Memorandum and Order dated October 8, 1999 (Chappelle, J.), granting a preliminary injunction that enjoined Maloof from operating “an open dump, land clearing debris landfill, or refuse disposal system.” Appellants timely noted their appeal and present two questions for our review, which we have rephrased: I. Did the circuit court properly determine that appellants violated the laws and regulations governing solid waste disposal by operating the landfill without a permit?

II

Did the lower court err or abuse its discretion in granting injunctive relief? For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm. FACTUAL SUMMARY Maloof operates a farm at 6755 Parker’s Wharf Road in Calvert County. The land is owned in fee simple by Parkers Wharf, LLC.

Maloof contends that by filling several areas on ⁶⁸⁸ his farm with stumps, limbs, rubble, and cither land-clearing debris, he sought to create additional flatland on his farm to use as pasture for his livestock. He obtained the land-clearing debris from various commercial excavators who paid fees to him to dump their debris. On February 22, 1999, an anonymous phone call alerted MDE to Maloofs activities at his farm. A representative of the Department then made an unannounced visit to Maloofs property on February 24, 1999, but was not permitted to enter the premises.

MDE inspectors were also denied access to the property on March 25, 1999. On April 14, 1999, MDE agents observed activities on the Maloof property from outside its gates, noting at least three trucks entering the property hauling land-clearing debris and departing the premises without the debris. Ground level photogrpahs were also taken. On July 7, 1999, MDE took aerial photographs of the Maloof property, which showed land-clearing debris, as well as vehicles “approaching and moving away from the debris pile.... ” On July 30, 1999, MDE filed a complaint for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief and civil penalties, alleging that appellants’ landfilling practices posed significant health and environmental risks, and violated Maryland statutory and regulatory law.

Additionally, MDE filed a motion seeking immediate access to appellants’ property. The court granted that motion and, on August 4, 1999, MDE conducted an on-site inspection of Maloofs property. The Department ascertained that appellants’ property was divided into three parts: Area A; Area B; and Area C. Area A totals four to five acres in size. In a three-acre section of Area A, MDE observed piles of land-clearing debris on top of buried land-clearing debris.

The óombined height of the two piles reached approximately twenty feet. Area B is about one and a half acres in size, and a one-acre section of it contained land-clearing debris covered with soil. Additionally, the edge of Area B sloped off, and a section of exposed land-clearing debris had been put into a ravine. Area C appeared to have been recently filled with landfill debris, but it had no soil ⁶⁸⁹ cover.

The inspectors did not observe any soil erosion or fire control measures at the site. An inspector returned to the Maloof property on August 26, 1999, and noticed that a silt fence had been placed below Area A near a stream. The fence was not adequate to prevent runoff from the landfill to prevent pollution of the stream. Based on the on-site observations, MDE filed an Amended Complaint on September 8, 1999, which added several new claims, including allegations of construction of a waterway obstruction without a permit (Count II); unlawful water pollution (Count III); failure to obtain a discharge permit (Count IV); and nontidal wetlands violations (Count V). 2 With respect to the request for a preliminary injunction, the court held an evidentiary hearing that began on September 1, 1999, and continued on September 15,1999.

We shall briefly review the evidence adduced at the hearing. Heather Nelson, an MDE employee, testified that during the site inspection on August 4, 1999, she observed land-clearing debris on the site as well as a dump truck unloading additional land-clearing debris. She also testified that, in Area A, the debris had been dumped around some free standing trees, and the area surrounding these trees served as “hot pockets,” from which heat generated by decaying debris could escape. Nelson added that the depth of the fill in Area A was approximately ten feet.

Richard Glover, a sanitarian for the State, testified that he observed trucks bring debris to the site in April 1999, and photographed the dumping during the August inspection. Glover also testified that in an aerial inspection of the property in July 1999, he observed a front end loader moving debris on the property. Several photographs were presented to support Glover’s testimony. James Grainer, an excavator who hauls land-clearing debris, also testified for the Department.

He admitted that he had ⁶⁹⁰ received an invoice from Maloof for the dumping of debris, but was unable to specify where the material had been dumped. Robert Hartlove, the Regional Forest Fire Protection Supervisor for the Department of Natural Resources, testified as an expert for MDE. In his opinion, there was a risk of subterranean fire in the filled area. In addition, the access around Area A was inadequate to accommodate fire equipment in the event of a fire.

Edward Dexter, a geologist and the Chief of the Field Operations and Compliance Division of MDE’s Solid Waste Program, testified as an expert in solid waste management, including pollution control at solid waste facilities. He indicated that material from the filled areas might leach into a downhill stream because of the lack of adequate barriers to prevent the discharge of sediment and pollutants. Dexter also stated that appellants did not have a permit to operate a land-clearing debris landfill. As no permit had been issued to appellants for a land-clearing debris landfill on the property, Dexter classified the site as an “open dump,” as defined by COMAR 26.04.07.02. 3 The defense did not dispute that land-clearing debris had been brought to appellants’ farm.

Perry Bowen III, who testified for appellants, acknowledged that Maloof received compensation from businesses that were allowed to dump land-clearing debris. He also acknowledged that appellants did not have a soil erosion plan for the site. But, Bowen claimed that the use of land-clearing debris is a traditional method of altering the existing grade or contours of land, and is done to fill in gullies or ravines in order to make the land suitable for various farm purposes, such as livestock grazing. Ward Cattington, Jr. testified as an expert in the field of fire prevention.

He denied having seen any hot pockets during his on-site inspection. But, he conceded that he was not present when the court inspected the property on September 15, 1999. ⁶⁹¹ As noted, the judge visited the property on September 15, 1999. At that time, he saw “smoke coming out of the ground,” where land clearing debris had been packed around trees. On October 8, 1999, the court issued a memorandum and order granting the preliminary injunction.

The court found that appellants operated a “refuse disposal system for public use,” as defined in COMAR 26.04.07.02B(30). It also concluded that appellants operated a land-clearing debris landfill, without a permit, in violation of E.A. § 9-204 and COMAR 26.04.07.11. The court reasoned, in part: In applying the above referenced statutes and regulations to the current case the Court concludes that as the Defendant operated a landfill, he was operating a “refuse disposal system” as Section 9-201(e) of the Environment Article indicates that a landfill is a refuse disposal system. His refuse disposal system is further a system of refuse disposal for public use as defined in COMAR 26.04.07.03(30) because the Defendant’s property was the final disposal place for solid waste that was generated by more than one individual or single corporation.

Therefore, pursuant to Environment Article Section 9-204, and COMAR 26.04.07.03B, Mr. Maloof needs a permit issued by the Secretary to operate this landfill. The Court further concludes that the Defendant has operated a Land Clearing Debris landfill without a valid permit in violation of Section 9-204 of the Environment Article of the Maryland Annotated Code and COMAR 26.04.07.11. The Court respectfully rejects the Defendant’s contention that “the plain language of the controlling statute reflects, to be a refuse disposal system, the operation must be some type of ‘solid waste acceptance facility’ such as a landfill.”.... The Court determines that Section 9 201(e) indicates that a landfill is a refuse disposal system without requiring that the landfill also meet the definition of a solid waste acceptance facility.

The issue then becomes should the preliminary injunction be issued based on the above facts and statutory framework. We shall include additional facts in the discussion. ⁶⁹² DISCUSSION I. We must consider the propriety of the circuit court’s ruling granting the preliminary injunction. An “injunction” is “a 'writ framed according to the circumstances of the case commanding an act which the court regards as essential to justice, or restraining an act which it esteems contrary to equity and good conscience.” 12 Maryland Law Encyclopedia, Injunctions § 1 at 250 (1961). Maryland Rules 15-501 through 15-505, which derive from former Rule BB70, refer to three types of injunctions: the temporary restraining order, the preliminary injunction, and the injunction.

See Antwerpen Dodge, Ltd. v. Herb Gordon Auto World, Inc., 117 Md.App. 290 , 294 n. 1, 699 A.2d 1209 , cert. denied, 347 Md. 681 , 702 A.2d 290 (1997). 4 An “injunction” is defined in Md. Rule 15-501(a) as “an order mandating or prohibiting a specified act.” But, a permanent injunction is not “permanent” in the sense that it must last indefinitely. Rather, it “is one granted by the judgment which finally disposes of the injunction suit.” 43 C.J.S. Injunctions § 6 (1979). The “preliminary injunction,” which is at issue here, is defined in Maryland Rule 15-501(b) as “an injunction granted after opportunity for a full adversary hearing on the propriety of its issuance but before a final determination of the merits of the action.” The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo between the parties, pending a hearing on the merits. See Harford County Educ.

Ass’n v. Board of Educ., 281 Md. 574, 585 , 380 A.2d 1041 (1977); Kahl v. Consolidated Gas, Electric Light & Power Co. of Baltimore, 189 Md. 655, 658 , 57 A.2d 331 (1948); TJB, Inc. v. Arundel Bedding Corp., 63 Md.App. 186, 190 , 492 ⁶⁹³ A.2d 365 (1985); General Motors Corp. v. Miller Buick, Inc., 56 Md.App. 374, 386 , 467 A.2d 1064 (1983), cert. denied, 299 Md. 136 , 472 A.2d 999 (1984). In other words, this type of injunction is designed to maintain the “last actual, peaceable, noncontested status which preceded the pending controversy,” until the parties’ rights and obligations can be adjudicated at trial. See State Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Baltimore County, 281 Md. 548 , 556 n. 9, 383 A.2d 51 (1977) (quotation omitted). The difference, then, between a preliminary injunction and an injunction turns on “whether there has been a determination on the merits of the claim.

If that determination has been made, then the injunction may be final; if not, it is interlocutory.” National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Johns Hopkins University, 301 Md. 574, 580 , 483 A.2d 1272 (1984). In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party has the burden to satisfy the following four criteria: (1) there is a real probability that the party seeking the injunction will succeed on the merits; (2) the injury that would be suffered if the interlocutory injunction is granted is less than the harm that would result from its refusal (the “balance of convenience test”); (3) the party seeking the injunction will suffer irreparable injury if it is not granted; and (4) granting the injunction would be in the public interest. Fogle v. H & G Restaurant, Inc., 337 Md. 441, 455-56 , 654 A.2d 449 (1995); Department of Transportation v. Armacost, 299 Md. 392, 404-05 , 474 A.2d 191 (1984); Teferi v. Dupont Plaza Associates, 77 Md.App. 566, 578 , 551 A.2d 477 (1989). Nevertheless, “in litigation between governmental and private parties, or in cases in which injunctive relief directly impacts governmental interests, ‘the court is not bound by the strict requirements of traditional equity as developed in private litigation.’ ” Fogle, 337 Md. at 456 , 654 A.2d 449 (quoting State Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 281 Md. at 555, 383 A.2d 51 ); see Maryland Comm’n on Human Relations v. Downey Communications, Inc., 110 Md.App. 493, 517 , 678 ⁶⁹⁴ A.2d 55 (1996).

Rather, “ ‘[cjourts of equity may, and frequently do, go much farther both to give and -withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go -when only private interests are involved.’ ” Fogle, 337 Md. at 456 , 654 A.2d 449 (quoting Space Aero Products Co., Inc. v. R.E. Darling Co., Inc., 238 Md. 93, 127 , 208 A.2d 74 , cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 , 86 S.Ct. 77 , 15 L.Ed.2d 83 (1965)). It is noteworthy that E.A. § 9-339(a) expressly authorizes the Department to “bring an action for an injunction against any person who violates any provision of this subtitle or any rule, regulation, order, or permit adopted or issued by the Department... ,” 5 Moreover, E.A. § 9-339(c) expressly provides that the Department need not show it lacks an adequate remedy at law in order to obtain injunctive relief.

II

Appellants contend that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. They argue that they were not required to obtain a permit for their landfill operations, because they did not install a “refuse disposal system for public use,” or operate a “solid waste acceptance facility” within the scope of E.A. § 9-204(d), E.A. § 9-501(n), and COMAR 26.04.07.01 and 26.04.07 .03. Therefore, appellants maintain that the Department did not establish the likelihood of success on the merits for purposes of obtaining the preliminary injunction. MDE counters that the court properly concluded that a permit was required because appellants were operating a refuse disposal system that was a solid waste acceptance facility, it was operated for public use, and appellants’ desire, purpose, or intention to increase the amount of grazing land on their property did not excuse their obligation to obtain the permit.

Accordingly, MDE asserts that the court did not err or abuse its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction. ⁶⁹⁵ To be sure, landfill activities are subject to extensive regulation by State law. Because resolution of this case involves an understanding and application of numerous, interrelated statutory and regulatory provisions, we begin by reviewing these provisions. E.A. § 9-204 is central to this case. It imposes a permit requirement for a “refuse disposal system that is for public use,” as well as for a refuse disposal system that is a solid waste acceptance facility under E.A. § 9-501(n), if it was installed after July 1, 1998.

The statute states: § 9-204. Installing altering, or extending water supply systems, sewerage systems, or refuse disposal systems. (a) Application of section.—This section applies to any water supply system, sewerage system, refuse disposal system that is for public use, or any refuse disposal system that is a solid waste acceptance facility as defined in § 9-501 (n) of this title if the solid waste acceptance facility is installed, altered, or extended after July 1,1988. (d) Permit is prerequisite.—A person shall have a permit issued by the Secretary ... before the person installs, materially alters, or materially extends a water supply system, sewerage system, or refusal disposal system.

(Emphasis added). E.A. § 9-101(c) defines a “disposal system” as a “system for disposing of wastes by surface, above surface, or underground methods.” A “refuse disposal system” is defined in E.A. § 9-201 (e), as follows: § 9-201. Definitions. (e) Refuse disposal system.—“Refuse disposal system” includes: ⁶⁹⁶ (1) An incinerator; (2) A transfer station; (3) A landfill system; (4) A landfill; (5) A solid waste processing facility; and (6) Any other solid waste acceptance facility.

E.A. § 9-501 (n) defines a “solid waste acceptance facility” as “any sanitary landfill, incinerator, transfer station, or plant whose primary purpose is to dispose of, treat, or process solid waste.” Similarly, COMAR 26.04.07.02B(29) defines a solid waste acceptance facility in almost the same way, except that it substitutes the words “processing facility” for the word “plant.” E.A. § 9-501(o) defines a “solid waste disposal system” as follows: (o) Solid waste disposal system.—(1) “Solid waste disposal system” means any publicly or privately owned system that: (1) Provides a scheduled or systematic collection of solid waste; (ii) Transports the solid waste to a solid waste acceptance facility; and (iii) Treats or otherwise disposes of the solid waste at the solid waste acceptance facility. (2) “Solid waste disposal system” includes each solid waste acceptance facility that is used in connection with the solid waste disposal system. COMAR 26.04.07.02(30) defines a “system of refuse disposal for public use” as “the services, facilities, or properties used in connection with the ... disposal of any solid waste unless these activities are limited to waste generated by an individual, a single corporation or business, or are disposed of as authorized by a permit.... ” COMAR 26.04.07.03 is also relevant. It states, in part: .03 General Restrictions and Specifically Prohibited Acts. ⁶⁹⁷ A. General Restrictions.

The Department, in exercising its authority under these regulations with respect to the granting or renewal of permits or reviewing operations of a facility, shall consider all material required to be submitted under these regulations to evaluate whether any of the following factors is likely to occur or has occurred. A person may not engage in solid waste handling in a manner which will likely: (4) Cause a discharge of pollutants to waters of this State.... (5) Impair the quality of the environment; or (6) Create other hazards to the public health, safety, or comfort as may be determined by the Approving Authority. B. Specific Prohibited Acts.

(1) Operation of a System of Refuse Disposal for Public Use Without a Permit. A person may not: (a) Construct or operate a system of refuse disposal for public use without first obtaining a valid permit issued under these regulations, or a permit issued under Environment Article, § 7-232 or 9-323, Annotated Code of Maryland; (b) Cause, suffer, allow, or permit the construction or operation of an unpermitted system of refuse disposal for public use on his or her property. (2) Operation of an Industrial Waste Acceptance Facility. A person who constructs or operates an industrial waste acceptance facility for private use is not required to obtain a permit, but shall comply with the regulations applicable to the construction, installation, and operation of solid waste acceptance facilities....

(4) Operating an Open Dump. Solid waste may not be disposed of by any person in an open dump. A person may ⁶⁹⁸ not cause, suffer, allow, or permit open dumping on his property. A land-clearing debris landfill is regulated by COMAR 26.04.07.11.

It provides, in relevant part: .11 Sanitary Landfills—Land Clearing Debris Landfills—General B. Acceptable Wastes. A land clearing debris landfill is restricted to accepting the following waste materials from land clearing operations: (1) Earthen material such as clays, sands, gravels, and silts; (2) Topsoil; (3) Tree stumps; (4) Root mats; (5) Brush and limbs; (6) Logs; (7) Vegetations; and (8) Rock. COMAR 26.04.07.11(C) establishes minimum operating procedures for land-clearing debris landfills. For example, it regulates grading and drainage requirements, and creates guidelines for supervision to minimize the environmental impact of such landfills.

COMAR 26.04.07 sets forth numerous requirements to obtain a permit to operate a land clearing debris landfill. These include a “map depicting the planned final grades of the site after completion of landfilling activities” (COMAR 26.04.07.12(5)); a “description of the types of solid waste” that will be accepted (COMAR 26.04.07.12(7)); the “anticipated quantities of solid waste” (COMAR 26.04.07.12(8)); the “[proposed means of controlling unauthorized access to the site” (COMAR 26.04.07.12(10)); operating procedures (COMAR 26.04.07.12(11)); “[p]rovisions for fire prevention and control” (COMAR 26.04.07.12(11)(e)); application of an approved cover material for exposed solid waste (COMAR 26.04.07.12(14)); ⁶⁹⁹ and the “[m]eans of preventing public health hazards and nuisances” (COMAR 26.04.07.12(11)(f)).

III

It is undisputed that appellants were engaging in landfilling activity. In order to constitute a “refuse disposal system” subject to the permit requirement, appellants’ operation either had to be for public use, or it had to amount to a “solid waste acceptance facility” installed after July 1988. Appellants maintain that the permit requirements did not apply to them, because they were operating as a private landfill, rather than for public use. They also claim that they were not subject to regulation as a solid waste acceptance facility, because the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions dictate that landfills are subject to the permit requirement only if their “primary purpose” was disposal or treatment of solid waste.

Appellants contend, however, that their “primary purpose” was to create additional pastureland for their livestock. According to appellants, MDE failed to prove that their “primary purpose” was disposal, treatment, or processing of solid waste. We first consider appellants’ “primary purpose” claim with respect to the solid waste acceptance facility. As noted, the permit requirement of E.A. § 9-204 applies to a solid waste acceptance facility as defined by E.A. § 9~501(n).

That provision defines a “solid waste acceptance facility” as “any sanitary landfill, incinerator, transfer station, or plant whose primary purpose is to dispose of, treat, or process solid waste.” Appellants contend that the “primary purpose” requirement of the provision modifies not only the word “plant,” but everything preceding that word, including a landfill. Therefore, in their view, a landfill is subject to E.A. § 9-204 only if its primary purpose is disposal of solid waste. Because appellants’ primary purpose was “agricultural in nature and intent,” in order to create more pasture, and was not disposal, treatment, or processing of solid waste, appellants maintain that they “fall outside the scope of the solid waste regulatory scheme.” ⁷⁰⁰ Although appellants have not advanced an argument based on statutory construction, the well-honed principles of statutory construction are clearly important here. “ ‘The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.’ ” Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 417 , 722 A.2d 887 (1999)(quoting Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35 , 660 A.2d 423 (1995)); see Mayor of Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 128 , 756 A.2d 987 (2000); State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 717 , 720 A.2d 311 (1998); Roberts v. Total Health Care, Inc., 349 Md. 499, 523 , 709 A.2d 142 (1998); Mayor of Baltimore v. Cassidy, 338 Md. 88, 93 , 656 A.2d 757 (1995); In re Jason Allen D., 127 Md.App. 456, 475 , 733 A.2d 351 (1999); McGraw v. Loyola Ford, Inc., 124 Md.App. 560, 592 , 723 A.2d 502 , cert. denied, 353 Md. 473 , 727 A.2d 382 (1999). To determine legislative intent, we look primarily to the language of the statute itself.

Marriott Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 346 Md. 437, 444-45 , 697 A.2d 455 (1997); Catonsville Nursing Home, Inc. v. Loveman, 349 Md. 560, 570 , 709 A.2d 749 (1998); Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 256 , 674 A.2d 951 (1996); Allied Vending, Inc. v. City of Bowie, 332 Md. 279, 306 , 631 A.2d 77 (1993). In doing so, we consider “the language of an enactment” and give “that language its natural and ordinary meaning.” Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 523 , 636 A.2d 448 (1994); see Lewis v. State, 348 Md. 648, 653 , 705 A.2d 1128 (1998); Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. v. Director of Fin., 343 Md. 567, 578 , 683 A.2d 512 (1996); Carroll County Ethics Comm’n v. Lennon, 119 Md.App. 49, 67 , 703 A.2d 1338 (1998). Generally, if the statute’s language is plain and its meaning is clear, we need not look beyond the words of the statute itself.

Read v. Supervisor of Assessments, 354 Md. 383, 393 , 731 A.2d 868 (1999); Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515 , 525 A.2d 628 (1987). A statute must be considered as a whole; “all sections of the Act must be read together, in conjunction with one another, to discern the true intent of the legislature.” Philip Electronics North America v. Wright, 348 Md. 209, 216 , 703 A.2d 150 (1997). Moreover, in deciding the plain meaning ⁷⁰¹ of a statutory term, we may consult the dictionary. State Dep’t of Assessments & Taxation v. Maryland-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 348 Md. 2, 14 , 702 A.2d 690 (1997); Rouse-Fairwood Ltd. P’ship v. Supervisor of Assessments, 120 Md.App. 667, 687 , 708 A.2d 19 (1998).

Further, when analyzing a statute, “we seek to avoid constructions that are illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense.” Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137 , 647 A.2d 106 (1994); see State v. Thompson, 332 Md. 1, 8 , 629 A.2d 731 (1993) (explaining that courts must reach a statutory interpretation compatible with common sense). As the Court said in Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 146 , 626 A.2d 946 (1993), “[gjiving the words their ordinary and common meaning ‘in light of the full context in which they appear, and in light of external manifestations of intent or general purpose available through other evidence,’ normally will result in the discovery of the Legislature’s intent.” (Internal citations omitted). In construing a statute, what the Court recently said in Martin v. Beverage Capital Corp., 353 Md. 388 , 726 A.2d 728 (1999), is pertinent here. “In determining legislative intent, we must never lose sight of the overriding purpose and goal of the statute.” Id. at 399 , 726 A.2d 728 . This is because “the search for legislative intent is most accurately characterized ‘as an effort to “seek to discern some general purpose, aim, or policy reflected in the statute.” ’ ” Id.

(quoting Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 513 , 525 A.2d 628 , in turn quoting Melvin J. Sykes, A Modest Proposal for a Change in Maryland’s Statutes Quo, 43 Md.L.Rev. 647, 653 (1984)). We agree with MDE that appellants’ construction of E.A. § 9-501(n) 6 creates an “illogical result” that contravenes the Legislature’s purpose and intent. Applying the many principles of statutory construction, we believe that the qualifying ⁷⁰² phrase “primary purpose” modifies only the word “plant,” and not the other specific kinds of facilities that precede that word “plant.” We find support for our view in Sullivan v. Dixon, 280 Md. 444 , 373 A.2d 1245 (1977). In Sullivan , the Court construed Md.Code (1975, 1976 Supp.), § 5-104(b) of the Corp. & Assn’s Article (“C.A.”).

It stated, in relevant part: § 5-104. Corporation not to engage in other business; investments; ownership of property. (b) Corporate investment and ownership of property.— Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a professional corporation may invest its funds in real estate, mortgages, stocks, bonds, or any other type of investment, and may own real or personal property necessary for the performance of a professional service. (Emphasis added).

The appellant contended that the qualifying phrase, “necessary for the performance of a professional service,” modified the entire sentence. The appellant hoped to prove that the appellee’s acquisition of a mortgage and its subsequent sale was illegal, because it was not necessary for the performance of a professional service, i.e. appellee’s business. Based on principles of statutory construction, however, the Court determined that the qualifying phrase only modified the “clause dealing with ownership of property,” and was not intended “to restrict the power of professional corporations to invest their funds.” Id. at 451, 373 A.2d 1245 . In reaching that conclusion, the Court recognized that the comma after the word “investment” separated the preceding words from the qualifying phrase.

The Court said that “a qualifying clause ... is confined to the immediately preceding words or phrase-particularly in the absence of a comma before the qualifying clause ...” Id. Therefore, the Court concluded that the appellee did not violate the statute. Id.; See Beales v. State, 329 Md. 263, 271 , 619 A.2d 105 (1993)(stating that the absence of a comma before the word “or” suggests that “the language flows most naturally when read without a pause” and the qualifying clause “modifies the entire component that precedes it.”). ⁷⁰³ Here, we observe that there is a comma immediately after the words “transfer station,” followed by the word “or plant.” The word “plant,” however, is not followed by a comma. Thus, the comma after the words “transfer station” sets apart all the words preceding the comma from the subsequent qualifying language that appears immediately after the word “plant.” The absence of a comma after “plant” is also noteworthy, because the lack of a comma serves to link “plant” alone to the qualifying clause that follows the word “plant.” Thus, we believe that the qualifying phrase in issue (“whose primary purpose”) only applies to the word “plant.” It follows that a landfill may constitute a