Mamsi Life & Health Insurance v. Kuei-I Wu

GREENE, J. We have before us a question of law certified by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, Md.Code (1973, 2006 Repl.Vol), § § 12-601 to 12-613 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article and Maryland Rule 8-305. We are asked to decide whether Md.Code (1995, 2006 Repl.Vol.), § 19-507 of the Insurance Article restricts the ability of health insurers and HMOs to provide in group or individual contracts that health benefits may be secondary to Personal Injury Protection (“PIP”) benefits under an automobile insurance policy. We shall conclude that it does not. Our interpretation is informed by the legislative subtitle to sections of the Insurance Code governing the requirement of PIP coverage in auto insurance policies, including § 19-507, enacted by the 1972 Comprehensive Act amending the Insurance Code, Chapter 73 of the Acts of 1972.

Further, our interpretation of Maryland law rests on the text and location of § 19-507, within the statutory scheme, as well as the existence of separate portions of the Maryland Code that specifically govern non-duplication or coordination of benefits by health insurers and HMOs. ¹⁶⁸ /. We adopt the facts as set forth by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. The court stated: The instant case arises out of a class action complaint filed by Plaintiff Kuei-I Wu (‘Wu”) on September 24, 2004 in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County against her healthcare provider, MAMSI Life and Health Insurance Co. (“MLH”), and MLH’s parent companies, Mid-Atlantic Medical Services LLC and Mid-Atlantic Medical Services, Inc. (“MAM-SI”) for breach of contract (Count I), breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing (Count II), and civil conspiracy (Count III). On September 26, 2001, Wu was involved in an automobile accident while she was a full-time student at the University of Maryland.

At the time of the accident, Wu carried at least two insurance policies — (1) a health insurance plan issued by MLH; and (2) an automobile policy issued by GEICO. Wu’s health insurance plan was not governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 , et seq. Wu sought treatment with participating healthcare providers under the Preferred Provider Option (“PPO”) plan to which she belonged. In exchange for providing medical care to MAMSI members, participating healthcare providers were paid at a negotiated rate and agreed not to balance, bill, or collect any other amount from members for whom they provided “Covered Services.” Wu’s contract with MAMSI contained a Coordination of Benefits provision that explicitly excluded any no-fault automobile insurance payments, such as PIP, from being considered in the application of the Coordination of Benefits procedures.

Wu alleges that, “in a separate document known as the Provider Manual for Physicians and Practitioners, MAMSI illegally directs all providers within its healthcare plans that when a patient has been involved in an automobile accident, the providers must collect PIP benefits from the patient’s automobile insurer first, before submitting any claims to MAM-SI for payment.” ¹⁶⁹ Thus, according to Wu’s Complaint, MAMSI paid the participating healthcare providers for services rendered to Wu only after her PIP benefits were exhausted. This scheme, Wu contends, is in direct violation of section 19-507 of the Insurance Article of the Maryland Code, which provides that PIP benefits “shall be payable without regard to ... any collateral source of medical, hospital, or wage continuation benefits.” On April 5, 2007, approximately thirty months after Wu filed her Complaint, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County certified a class consisting of “all owners of MAMSI healthcare plans since September 23, 2001 that also have automobile insurance policies, have had an automobile accident, and whose mandatory PIP coverage was partially or entirely exhausted prior to the use of any MAMSI healthcare benefits.” The class certification order on April 5, 2007 brought into the case for the first time class members with employee health plans governed by ERISA. On May 3, 2007, Defendants timely filed a Notice of Removal, having done so within thirty days of the introduction of a federal question based on ERISA preemption. After this Court denied the Plaintiffs Motion to Remand by Order dated October 29, 2007, Plaintiffs proceeded with discovery pursuant to this Court’s Scheduling Order.

After a discovery dispute was brought to this Court’s attention during a telephone conference on May 7, 2008, the parties were permitted to brief issues relating to the size of the class. The parties filed cross motions, Defendants’ Motion for Clarification of Class Membership and Plaintiffs’ Cross Motion for Clarification of Class Definition, both of which were fully briefed. The motions were framed as requests to modify the size of the class certified by the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, but the Defendants also called into question whether section 19-507 of the Insurance Article of the Maryland Code regulated health insurers. Although the class certifi ¹⁷⁰ cation order from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County was amended slightly, this Court did not amend the class certification order to exclude ERISA plan members because Defendants’ “argument appear[ed] intertwined with a more fundamental question that reaches the crux of the entire case,” and that “[rjesolution in favor of Defendants on this issue could prevent any claim by Plaintiffs under 19-507, whether by a member of an ERISA plan or not.” The United States District Court concluded that the issue before it presented an “issue of first impression in Maryland law” and that it was more appropriate for the issue to be resolved by this Court. 1 Accordingly, the District Court certified the following question of law to this Court: Does Maryland Code, Insurance Article § 19-507 prohibit or restrict a Maryland health insurer or a Maryland health maintenance organization from providing in its group or individual contracts of insurance or membership contracts that its contractual health benefits may be secondary to Personal Injury Protection (“PIP”) benefits under an automobile liability insurance policy where the automobile liability insurer is legally obligated to provide benefits for healthcare expenses?[ 2 ] ¹⁷¹ II.

Section 19-507 of the Insurance Article 3 provides: Same — When benefits payable; coordination of policies; surcharge; subrogation. (a) When benefits payable. — The benefits described in § 19-505 of this subtitle shall be payable without regard to: (1) the fault or nonfault of the named insured or the recipient of benefits in causing or contributing to the motor vehicle accident; and (2) any collateral source of medical, hospital, or wage continuation benefits. (b) Coordination of policies. — (1) Subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection, if the insured has both coverage for the benefits described in § 19-505 of this subtitle and a collateral source of medical, hospital, or wage continuation benefits, the insurer or insurers may coordinate the policies to provide for nonduplication of benefits, subject to appropriate reductions in premiums for one or both of the policies approved by the Commissioner. (2) The named insured may: (i) elect to coordinate the policies by indicating in writing which policy is to be the primary policy; or (ii) reject the coordination of policies and nonduplication of benefits.

(c) Surcharge prohibited. — An insurer that issues a policy that contains the coverage described in § 19-505 of this subtitle may not impose a surcharge for a claim or payment made under that coverage and, at the time the policy is issued, shall notify the policyholder in writing that a sur ¹⁷² charge may not be imposed for a claim or payment made under that coverage. (d) Subrogation. — An insurer that provides the benefits described in § 19-505 of this subtitle does not have a right of subrogation and does not have a claim against any other person or insurer to recover any benefits paid because of the alleged fault of the other person in causing or contributing to a motor vehicle accident. Id. MAMSI argues that § 19-507 of the Insurance Article applies only to automobile insurers 4 and thus, does not prohibit benefits coordination by health insurers and HMOs.

MAMSI contends that its position is supported by: (1) the location, title, and language of § 19-507, (2) the existence of distinct sections of the Health Insurance Title of the Insurance Article and the Maryland HMO Act that specifically govern non-duplication or coordination of benefits by health insurers and HMOs, and (3) an understanding of the basic characteristics of health insurance, particularly group health insurance. In relation to the latter contention, MAMSI asserts that health insurance and automobile insurance are fundamentally different and that these differences provide evidence that § 19-507(b) applies only to automobile insurance. The gist of MAMSI’s assertions are that subsection (b) of § 19-507 only “prescribes the limited terms on which an automobile insurer can make PIP benefits secondary” and “does not impose the same restrictions on approved contracts making health insurance or HMO benefits secondary.” Wu asserts that the legislative design and purpose of § 19-507, as well as this Court’s interpretation of the statute in Dutta v. State Farm, 363 Md. 540 , 769 A.2d 948 (2001), support the opposite conclusion. Wu posits that these authorities clearly establish that “PIP benefits cannot be coordinated by an auto insurer or health insurer unless the insured has given clear and unequivocal permission to do so in accordance ¹⁷³ with the provisions of § 19-507.” Furthermore, Wu asserts that the failure to apply § 19-507 to health insurers would render segments of that statute meaningless and lead to illogical and unreasonable results.

Specifically, Wu asserts: [MAMSI’S] contention that § 19-507 only governs motor vehicle insurance ... would make entirely superfluous those provisions of § 19-507 that PIP benefits “shall be payable without regard to any collateral source of medical, hospital, or wage continuation benefits.” Similarly, such an interpretation would make entirely irrelevant those provisions in subsection (b)(1) and (b)(2) of § 19-507 that expressly set forth the manner in which a health care provider and PIP insurer may legally coordinate their respective policies to provide for the non-duplication of benefits. Since a reduction in premiums can only be implemented upon the insured’s coordination of her respective “policies,” where an auto insurance policy exists, the other policy must be the healthcare insurance policy. There simply cannot be two auto insurance policies that would require coordination by the insured. Wu directs the Court’s attention to the administrative decision, Maryland Ins.

Admin, ex rel. G.P., Jr. v. MD-Individual Practice Ass’n, OAH No. MIA-INS-34-200100024 (May 29, 2003), which she contends provides guidance as to how this Court should apply § 19-507 of the Insurance Article to health insurers. 5 III. Subtitle 5 of the Insurance Article “sets forth the kinds of primary coverages that motor vehicle insurers are required to ¹⁷⁴ offer in Maryland policies.” MAIF v. Perry, 356 Md. 668, 671 , 741 A.2d 1114, 1115 (1999). One of the primary coverages is PIP benefits, as provided for in Md.Code (1995, 2006 Repl.

Vol.), § § 19-505 to 19-508 of the Insurance Article. Id. The purpose of PIP benefits is described by Andrew Janquitto, in his treatise, Andrew Janquitto, Maryland Motorvehicle Insurance 478-79 (2d ed.1999). Mr. Janquitto writes: Nowhere does the State’s paramount concern with providing compensation to victims of motor vehicle accidents manifest itself more clearly and unmistakably than in Subtitle 5 of Title 19 of the Insurance Article.

That subtitle, among other things, requires that every policy of motor vehicle insurance issued, sold, or delivered in Maryland contain personal injury protection, known sometimes as “economic loss coverage” and more commonly as “PIP.” A first-party coverage, PIP plays a central role in Maryland’s comprehensive insurance scheme by providing medical, hospital, and disability benefits without regard to fault. Janquitto, supra, at 478. Indeed, this Court has declared on numerous occasions that it is clear that PIP legislation was enacted in Maryland in order “to assure financial compensation to victims of motor vehicle accidents without regard to the fault of a named insured or other persons entitled to PIP benefits.” Dwayne Clay, M.D., P.C. v. GEICO, 356 Md. 257, 265-66 , 739 A.2d 5, 10 (1999) (quoting Pennsylvania Nat’l Mut v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 154 , 416 A.2d 734, 736 (1980)); see also Dutta, 363 Md. at 547-48 , 769 A.2d at 952 (explaining that the purpose behind the passage of PIP legislation in Maryland is to provide prompt financial compensation to victims of motor vehicle accidents “without regard to the fault of the named insured or other persons entitled to PIP benefits”). In Dutta , this Court examined § 19-507 of the Insurance Article, focusing primarily on subsection (a) of the statute.

In that case, the petitioner, Dutta, filed a PIP claim for reimbursement of medical expenses that stemmed from injuries he incurred in an automobile accident. Dutta, 363 Md. at 544 , 769 A.2d at 950-51 . Dutta’s PIP insurance carrier refused to ¹⁷⁵ pay the reimbursement on the grounds that the bill was previously paid by the petitioner’s HMO. Dutta, 363 Md. at 545 , 769 A.2d at 951 .

Legal action ensued. Id. When this Court considered the matter, we held that the PIP insurer was “statutorily mandated by section 19-507 to provide PIP benefits to petitioner regardless of the fact that [the petitioner had] also received health insurance benefits from his HMO....” Dutta, 363 Md. at 554 , 769 A.2d at 956 . The Dutta Court stated: The Legislature could not have expressed its intent any clearer — an insurer must pay PIP benefits regardless of any collateral source of benefits — i.e., regardless of whether a health insurance provider, HMO, or other collateral source provides benefits____ If the Legislature had meant to exclude members of HMOs that provide collateral benefits from PIP coverage, language to that effect would have been included in either section 19-505, section 19-507, or section 19-513. [The PIP Insurer’s] argument that [Dutta] cannot recover both PIP benefits and collateral medical and hospital benefits demonstrates complete disregard for the plain language of section 19-507. [A]utomobile insurers who provide services in Maryland are mandated to provide coverage for the medical, hospital, and disability benefits for individuals identified as first named insureds on their policies except if waived by the insured.

The Legislature included mandatory language to require insurers to at least offer PIP coverage to potential insureds. The intent of the Legislature is clear — that unless waived by the insured, PIP benefits are to be provided to cover appropriate expenses arising out of a motor vehicle accident, which are incurred within a certain time period. Dutta, 363 Md. at 551, 555 , 769 A.2d at 954, 956-57 . The holding in Dutta makes clear that § 19-507 governs automobile insurers and that PIP benefits must be paid ¹⁷⁶ when incurred, regardless of whether an insured has a collateral source of benefits.

Id. This Court’s opinion in Dutta , however, concerned only what § 19-507(a) requires of automobile insurers providing PIP coverage. See Dutta, 368 Md. at 549-51, 769 A.2d at 953-56 . This Court in Dutta , did not address, and has not yet addressed, whether § 19-507(b) restricts or prohibits a health insurer or HMO from providing by contract that its health benefits are secondary to PIP benefits.

Because the answer to the question before us is not provided by precedent, the issue before this Court is an issue of first impression that requires us to construe § 19-507(b); hence, we are guided by the rules of statutory construction, which are well settled in Maryland. Carroll v. Konits, 400 Md. 167, 191 , 929 A.2d 19, 34 (2007). We enumerated the rules in Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563, 571-73 , 911 A.2d 427, 431-32 (2006), where we stated: The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. As the Court has explained, to determine that purpose or policy, we look first to the language of the statute, giving it its natural and ordinary meaning.

We do so on the tacit theory that the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant. When the statutory language is clear, we need not look beyond the statutory language to determine the Legislature’s intent. If the language of the statute is ambiguous, however, then courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of the enactment under consideration. We have said that there is an ambiguity within a statute when there exist two or more reasonable alternative interpretations of the statute.

When a statute can be interpreted in more than one way, the job of this Court is to resolve that ambiguity in light of the legislative intent, using all the resources and tools of statutory construction at our ¹⁷⁷ disposal. If the true legislative intent cannot readily be determined from the statutory language alone, however, we may, and often must, resort to other recognized indicia— among other things, the structure of the statute, including its title; how the statute relates to other laws; the legislative history, including the derivation of the statute, comments and explanations regarding it by authoritative sources during the legislative process, and amendments proposed or added to it; the general purpose behind the statute; and the relative rationality and legal effect of various competing constructions. Id. (citations omitted).

Applying the rules of statutory construction to this case, we hold that § 19-507 of the Insurance Article does not prohibit a health insurer or HMO from providing in its group or individual contracts of insurance or membership contracts that its contractual health benefits may be secondary to PIP benefits under an automobile insurance policy. We begin our analysis by looking, first, at the plain language of § 19-507 of the Insurance Article. Section 19-507(a) clearly provides when an auto insurer must pay the PIP benefits enumerated in § 19-505 of the Insurance Article. Section 19-507(b)(l) provides for the coordination of the required PIP benefits and collateral sources of benefits among “the insured,” “insurers,” and “policies” to provide for nonduplication of benefits.

Section 19-507 does not define the terms “insured,” “insurers,” or “policies,” nor does Md.Code (1995, 2006 Repl.-Vol.), § 19-501 of the Insurance Article, which provides definitions for the relevant subtitle. Section 19-507(b) enumerates the right of the “named insured” to reject coordination of policies and nonduplication of benefits. Section 19-501(d) of the Insurance Article defines “named insured” as “the person denominated in the declarations in a motor vehicle liability insurance policy.” (Emphasis added.) The Legislature’s use of the term “insured,” unmodified, along with the plural terms “insurers” and “policies” in § 19-507(b)(1) and use of the defined term “named insured” in ¹⁷⁸ § 19—507(b)(2), invites the question of whether the statute restricts only automobile insurers or restricts collateral insurers also, such as health insurers and HMOs. 6 Because we conclude that this aspect of § 19-507 is ambiguous, we seek to ascertain what the Legislature intended when enacting the statute. See Stachowski v. Sysco, 402 Md. 506, 517 , 937 A.2d 195, 201 (2007) (“A statute is ambiguous where two or more reasonable interpretations exist.”).

Chapter 73 of the Acts of 1972, which contained the section that was subsequently recodified as § 19-507 of the Insurance Article, enacted comprehensive amendments to the Insurance Code. The amendments included the addition of §§ 538 to 546, requiring mandatory PIP coverage for automobile insurance policies, in this State, under the subtitle “Motor Vehicle Casualty Insurance — Required Primary Coverage.” Chapter 73 of the Acts of 1972 (“... to add new Sections 538 to 546 inclusive to said article and title under the new subtitle 35. Motor Vehicle Casualty Insurance — Required Primary Coverage” ...).' The subtitle provides evidence that the Legislature, when enacting the new sections, intended to create obligations and restrictions on motor vehicle insurance carriers when providing casualty insurance, specifically the ¹⁷⁹ required primary coverages, one of which is PIP. See Moore v. State, 388 Md. 623, 635 , 882 A.2d 256, 263 (2005) (“[T]he title of an enactment is an important indication of the General Assembly’s intent.”); Kushell v. DNR, 385 Md. 563, 577 , 870 A.2d 186, 193 (2005) (explaining that when determining legislative intent, we “analyze [a] statutory scheme as a whole and attempt to harmonize provisions dealing with the same subject so that each may be given effect”).

Chapter 73 of the Acts of 1972, § 540 was originally codified at Md.Code (1957, 1979 Repl.Vol.), Article 48A, § 540, and subsequently recodified without substantive change at § 19-507 of the Insurance Article by Chapter 11 of the Acts of 1996. Subtitle 5 of Title 19, in which § 19-507 is contained, “was [written as part of] a comprehensive [1972] law that, among other things, ... required [motor vehicle insurance] policies to contain ... PIP coverage.” Perry, 356 Md. at 674-75 , 741 A.2d at 1117-18 (noting that “[t]he thrust of the 1972 law was to extend ... insurance protection, especially a limited amount of primary, no-fault benefits for wage loss and basic medical expenses.”). In addition, the first section of Subtitle 5, § 19-501, provides definitions for the subtitle and defines the “named insured” referenced in § § 19-505 and 19-507 as “the person denominated in the declarations in a motor vehicle liability insurance policy.” § 19-501(d) of the Insurance Article (emphasis added).

The text of § 19-507 of the Insurance Article references § 19-505, which provides in pertinent part: Personal injury protection coverage — In general. (a) Coverage required. — Unless waived in accordance with § 19-506 of this subtitle, each insurer that issues, sells, or delivers a motor vehicle liability insurance policy in the State shall provide coverage for the medical, hospital and disability benefits described in this section for each of the following individuals: (1) except for individuals specifically excluded under § 27-606 of this article: (i) the first named insured, and any family member of the first named insured who resides in the first named insured’s ¹⁸⁰ household, who is injured in any motor vehicle accident, including an accident that involves an uninsured motor vehicle or a motor vehicle the identify of which cannot be ascertained; and (ii) any other individual who is injured in a motor vehicle accident while using the insured motor vehicle with the express or implied permission of the named insured. § 19-505(a)(1) of the Insurance Article (emphasis added). While motor vehicle insurance is mentioned throughout §§ 19-505 and 19-507, neither section mentions health insurers nor HMOs. Accordingly, we discern that the title of the overall comprehensive Enactment and text of § 19-507, specifically its repeated cross-references to § 19-505, its use of the defined term “named insured” when enumerating the restrictions on coordination of benefits in § 19-507(b)(2), as well as its location within the Insurance Article, demonstrates that the Legislature intended the restrictions contained within subsection (b) of the statute to apply only to motor vehicle insurers, the named insured, and persons entitled to PIP benefits.

In our view, the statute mandates that a motor vehicle insurance policy containing PIP benefits is the primary source of coverage for a person injured in an automobile accident. If, however, the insured agrees in writing to permit the motor vehicle insurer to coordinate with the insured’s collateral insurers, the insurers may arrange for the motor vehicle policy to serve as a secondary source of coverage. See § 19 — 507(b)(i) of the Insurance Article. 7 ¹⁸¹ Furthermore, other aspects of the legislative history of § 19-507(b) of the Insurance Article support our interpretation that the Legislature intended to establish a mechanism to allow insureds to make PIP benefits secondary to a collateral insurer. See Walzer, 395 Md. at 573 , 911 A.2d at 432 (identifying legislative history as one of the “resources and tools of statutory construction”).

Chapter 73 of the Acts of 1972 enacted the statutory framework for PIP coverage. Section 540 of Chapter 73 provided that PIP coverage is payable regardless of fault or of any collateral sources of medical, hospital, or wage continuation benefits. Thus, the Legislature established that PIP is the primary source of recovery where an expense is incurred, regardless of fault, arising out of a motor vehicle accident. Chapter 771 of the Acts of 1973 amended § 540, adding the coordination of benefits language. 8 Where the insured has coverage for both the benefits required under Section 539 and the collateral benefits, the insurer or insurers may coordinate the policies to provide for non-duplication of such benefits; subject, however, to appropriate reductions in premiums for one or both of said coverages approved by the Insurance Commissioner, and the named insured shall have the right to elect or reject the coordination of policies and non-duplication of benefits.

If the insured elects to coordinate, he shall indicate in writing which policy is to become primary. Id. This language addresses the fact that some insureds have alternative medical, wage replacement, and hospital benefits available and thus do not require the mandatory PIP benefits. The coordination of benefits language allows the PIP carrier to pay its benefits secondary to another line of insurance if the ¹⁸² insured so desires, thus potentially availing the insured a discount on one or both lines of insurance.

In the absence of such an agreement between the named insured of an automobile policy and the PIP carrier to make another insurance primary, the PIP coverage remains primary to the collateral insurance as required by the language of § 19-507(a). Section 19-507(b)’s language requiring the insured’s consent to the coordination of policies and the non-duplication of benefits applies only when the insured seeks to make a collateral benefit primary to PIP coverage. As we explain here and have explained previously, § 19 of the Insurance Article focuses on automobile insurance carriers and their insureds, not HMOs or other insurance carriers. See Perry, 356 Md. at 674-75 , 741 A.2d at 1117-19 .

Section 19-507(b)(2) established conditions that an automobile insurer must meet before the insurer can agree to make its statutory obligation to pay PIP benefits secondary to benefits provided by a collateral source. The PIP carrier’s obligation under § 19-507(a), as the primary payor of benefits, prevents the carrier from unilaterally refusing to pay benefits unless the “named insured” consents under § 19-507(b)(2). See Dutta, 363 Md. at 549-551, 554 , 769 A.2d at 954-55 . Section 19-507(b) does not, however, restrict the efforts of health insurers or HMOs to coordinate benefits or otherwise avoid duplicate payments.

The existence and location of separate portions of the Maryland Code that specifically regulate health insurers and HMOs provide additional support for the holding that § 19-507(b) of the Insurance Article does not restrict health insurers or HMOs. See Insurance Co. of N. Amer. v. Aufenkamp, 291 Md. 495, 506 , 435 A.2d 774, 780 (1981) (noting that while there is some overlap that inherently exists between the coverage provided by various types of insurance, “[t]he very structure of the insurance code leads [to the conclusion] that the various types of insurance defined there ... constitute various categories of insurance which for the most part are mutually exclusive”). Maryland HMOs are regulated by the Maryland Health Maintenance Organization Act, codified with amendments at Md.Code (1982, 2005 Repl.Vol.), §§ 19-701 to ¹⁸³ 19-735 of the Health-General Article (“HMO Act”). Section 19-706(c) of the Health-General Article states that “[ejxcept as otherwise provided in this subtitle, a health maintenance organization is not subject to the insurance laws of this State.” Section 19-706 then enumerates all the specific subsections and subtitles of the Insurance Article that apply to Maryland HMOs.

Notably, § 19-507 of the Insurance Article is not listed. The HMO Act also contains its own authorization for coordination provisions in HMO contracts. Section 19-713.1(a) of the Health-General Article provides: Nonduplication or coordination of coverage provisions — In general. — A group contract between a health maintenance organization and its subscribers or a group of subscribers may contain nonduplication provisions or provisions to coordinate the coverage with subscriber contracts of other health maintenance organizations, health insurance policies, including those of nonprofit health service plans, and other established programs under which the subscriber or member may make a claim. Id.

Sections 19-713.1(d) and (e) of the Health-General Article prohibit an HMO from subrogating PIP benefits. These subsections provide: (d) Subrogation provisions — Authorized.—Notwithstanding § 19-701(g)(3) of this subtitle, a contract between a health maintenance organization and its subscribers or a group of subscribers may contain a provision allowing the health maintenance organization to be subrogated to a cause of action that a subscriber has against another person.... (e) Same — Recovery under personal injury protection policy. — Subsection (d) of this section does not allow a contract between a health maintenance organization and its subscribers or a group of subscribers to contain a provision allowing the health maintenance organization to recover any payments made to a subscriber under a personal injury protection policy. § 19-713.1 of the Health-General Article. This prohibition appears only in the Health-General Article applicable to ¹⁸⁴ HMOs.

It is logical to conclude that had the General Assembly intended to place additional restrictions on HMO contracts, it would have done so within Title 19 of the Health-General Article, which specifically governs HMOs. Because the General Assembly chose not to do so, it is reasonable to conclude that no additional restrictions exist with respect to HMOs and coordination provisions in those policies. See Comptroller v. Science Applications, 405 Md. 185, 198 , 950 A.2d 766, 773 (2008) (“[T]he Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant.”) (quoting Tribbitt v. State, 403 Md. 638, 646 , 943 A.2d 1260, 1264 (2008)). The Health Insurance Article included within the Maryland Insurance Article also contains a specific provision relating to non-duplication and coordination provisions in health insurance policies.

Md.Code (1995, 2006 Repl.Vol.), § 15-104(b) of the Insurance Article provides: Authorized. — In accordance with regulations that the Commissioner adopts, the Commissioner shall allow health insurance policies and policies of nonprofit health service plans to contain nonduplication provisions or provisions to coordinate health benefits with: (1) other health insurance policies, including commercial individual, group, and blanket policies and policies of nonprofit health service plans (2) subscriber contacts that are issued by health maintenance organizations; and (3) other established programs under which the insured may make a claim. Id. Because the Legislature provided in this section, located in the Health Insurance subtitle of the Insurance Article, that a health insurance policy may contain nonduplication provisions and coordination provisions, it would be illogical for this Court to conclude that the Legislature intended for § 19-507(b) of the Motor Vehicle subtitle of the Insurance Article to restrict or prevent the exclusions of such provisions within health insurance policies. See Suter v. Stuckey, 402 Md. 211, 231 , 935 A.2d 731, 743 (2007) (“In the case where two statutes ¹⁸⁵ apply to the same situation, we first attempt to reconcile them, and then, if the statutes remain contradictory, the more specific statute controls.”); see also A.S. Abell Pub.

Co. v. Mezzanote, 297 Md. 26, 40 , 464 A.2d 1068, 1075 (1983) (“Ordinarily, a specific enactment prevails over an incompatible general enactment in the same or another statute.”). Contrary to the arguments advanced by Wu, our decision that § 19-507 of the Insurance Article does not restrict or prohibit HMOs or health insurers from providing by contract that their health benefits are secondary to PIP benefits does not render superfluous those provisions of § 19-507(b) that permit an insured to elect to coordinate policies or reject the coordination of policies. For example, an individual may be covered by two or more motor vehicle policies that provide PIP coverage. See Bishop v. State Farm, 360 Md. 225, 236 , 757 A.2d 783, 789 (2000) (“A person injured in an automobile accident could be eligible for PIP benefits from two or more sources....”) (quoting Perry, 356 Md. at 676 , 741 A.2d at 1118 ); see also Janquitto, supra, at 556 (“A person may be insured by two or more motor vehicle policies.... ”).

In addition, § 19-507(b) sets forth the terms in which motor vehicle insurers may coordinate their policies with one another or with other insurance policies and provides the insured the right to agree to such coordination in writing or to reject such coordination. What § 19-507(b) does not do is restrict when a health insurer or HMO may attempt to coordinate its policy. Cf. Smith v. Physicians Health Plan, 444 Mich. 743 , 514 N.W.2d 150, 155 (1994) (concluding that under a similar no-fault automobile insurance act, that “[although] the consumer has the choice whether to coordinate coverage on the no-fault side of his [or her] insurance ... [t]here is not a corresponding guarantee that the selection of an uncoordinated no-fault insurance policy will dictate the terms of whatever other insurance one might have”).

CERTIFIED QUESTION OF LAW ANSWERED AS SET FORTH ABOVE COSTS TO BE EQUALLY DIVIDED BY THE PARTIES. BELL, C.J., Dissents. ¹⁸⁶ Dissenting Opinion by BELL, C.J. I. The majority holds that Maryland Code (1995, 2006 Repl. Vol.) § 19-507 1 of the Insurance Law Article does not prohibit a health insurer or HMO from providing, and thus requiring, in its group or individual contracts of insurance or membership contracts that its contractual health benefits are secondary to PIP benefits under an automobile liability insurance ¹⁸⁷ policy. 411 Md. at 177, 983 A.2d at 94-95 (2009). In concluding that when the General Assembly enacted § 19-507, it was only concerned with automobile insurance policies and not collateral insurance policies, the majority was persuaded by the facts that the General Assembly separately considered and codified legislation that governs automobile insurance policies and that governs healthcare providers and health maintenance organizations.

That § 19-507 is located in Title 19, “Motor Vehicle Casualty Insurance — Required Primary Coverage,” Subtitle 5, Motor Vehicle Insurance — Primary Coverage, health insurance regulation in this state is pursuant to provisions found in Title 15, “Health Insurance,” of the Insurance Article, and Maryland health maintenance organizations are regulated by the Maryland Health Maintenance Organization Act, which is located in Title 19, Subtitle 7 of the Health-General Article, it says, id. at 178-79, 182-84, 983 A.2d at 95-96, 97-98 (2009), demonstrate that the Legislature intended the obligations and restrictions it contains to apply only to automobile insurers and to the persons entitled to benefits as a result of having an insurance policy with those insurers. Id. at 178, 983 A.2d at 95. In that regard, as to the former, the majority points out, § 19-501, the “definitions” section for the Subtitle, defines “named insured,” referenced in §§ 19-505 2 and 19-507, as ¹⁸⁸ “the person denominated in the declarations in a motor vehicle liability insurance policy.” Id. It finds particularly significant, moreover, that § 19-507(b) uses that term, 3 that only motor ¹⁸⁹ vehicle insurance is mentioned in §§ 19-505 and 19-507 and that neither section mentions health insurers or health maintenance organizations.

Id. at 180, 983 A.2d at 96. Turning to the latter, the majority notes that Maryland Code (1982, 2005 Repl.Vol.) § 19-706(a) of the Health General Article states that “except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, a health maintenance organization is not subject to the insurance laws of this State.” Id. at 183, 983 A.2d at 98. Emphasizing this section and pointing out that “[s]ection 19-706 then enumerates all the specific subsections and subtitles of the Insurance Article that apply to Maryland HMOs,” id., while not referencing § 19-507 of the Insurance Article at all, the majority asserts that “it is logical to conclude that had the General Assembly intended to place additional restrictions on HMO contracts, it would have done so within Title 19 of the Health-General Article, which specifically governs HMOs.” Id. at 184, 983 A.2d at 98. As indicated, the majority also relies on the facts that the statutes regulating health insurance in this state are found in Title 15, “Health Insurance,” of the Insurance Article, id. at 184-85, 983 A.2d at 99, § 15-104(b) of which expressly addresses non-duplication or coordination of benefits by health insurers 4 and that the authority of health maintenance organizations to coordinate benefits is prescribed ¹⁹⁰ in § 19-713.1 of the Health-General Article. 5 411 Md. at 183, 983 A.2d at 98.

I do not believe that the majority’s analysis is correct and, so, I dissent. A significant issue in this appeal, and my focus, is whether § 19-507(b)’s use of the plural terms, “insurers” and “policies,” places the same restrictions on collateral insurers, such as health insurers and health maintenance organizations (HMOs) as it does on automobile insurers. The issue in this case had its genesis in an automobile accident in which the respondent, Kuei-I Wu (Wu), was involved, and was injured, while she was a full-time student at the University of Maryland. In addition to the automobile insurance she was mandated to have, see § 19-505(a), Wu was insured by the petitioner, MAMSI Life and Health Insurance Co. (“MLH”), under a health insurance plan.

The Preferred Provider Option (“PPO”) plan, to which she belonged, paid participating health care providers, in exchange for medical care provided to its members for “Covered Services,” a negotiated rate, which the providers agreed to accept as full payment. Wu’s health insurance policy contained a Coordination ¹⁹¹ of Benefits provision. It expressly excluded consideration of any no-fault automobile insurance payments, such as PIP, in the application of the Coordination of Benefits procedures. Nevertheless, Wu alleges, “in a separate document known as the Provider Manual for Physicians and Practitioners, MAMSI illegally directs all providers within its healthcare plans that when the patient has been involved in an automobile accident, the providers must collect PIP benefits from the patient’s automobile insurers first, before submitting any claims to MAMSI for payment.” As a result, she maintains, the petitioner paid the participating healthcare providers for services rendered to her only after her PIP benefits were exhausted.

Believing the Provider Manual for Physicians and Practitioners and the policy of the petitioner reflected in it to be in direct violation of the directive in § 19-507 of the Insurance Article that PIP benefits “shall be payable without regard to ... any collateral source of medical, hospital, or wage continuation benefits,” Wu filed, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County and against the petitioner and its parent companies, a class action complaint. The case having been transferred to the Federal District Court and the dispositive issue having been determined to “center[ ] on whether the terms of section 19-507 apply only to automobile insurance carriers and whether the reasoning of Dutta v. State Farm Insurance Co., 363 Md. 540 , 769 A.2d 948 ([ ] 2001), can be extended to healthcare companies or HMOs,” the District Judge decided to certify that question to this Court. The actual question certified was the following: “Does Maryland Code, Insurance Article § 19-507 prohibit or restrict a Maryland health insurer or a Maryland health maintenance organization from providing in its group or individual contracts of insurance or membership contracts that its contractual health benefits may be secondary to Personal Injury Protection (‘PIP’) benefits under an automobile liability insurance policy where the automobile liability insurer is legally obligated to provide benefits for healthcare expenses?” ¹⁹² II A statute authorizing Personal Injury Protection coverage was first enacted by the Maryland Legislature in 1972, as a part of the Insurance Code. See Chapter 73 of the Acts of 1972, which was codified as Article 48A and, in particular, § 540 of that Article, the predecessor of § 19-507.

Its purpose was “to offer those injured in an ‘incident’ with an automobile ... ‘quick’ no-fault compensation for medical bills and lost wages up to a minimum amount....” Dutta, supra, 363 Md. at 547 , 769 A.2d at 952 . Prior to the passage of House Bill 444, the bill which was to become Chapter 73 of the Acts of 1972, and, thus, before mandatory PIP coverage became law, at a meeting of the Special Committee on No-Fault Insurance, a committee created by the Legislative Council and charged with studying and considering no-fault insurance, representatives of organized labor expressed concern with regard to the “effect of the no-fault insurance upon the [then] previously negotiated accident and health plans included in labor contracts.” They were concerned specifically that: “If the no-fault benefits were secondary to the accident and health benefits, then the worker would be paying for automobile insurance which he could never collect. If the no-fault benefits were primary, then the worker was suffering a payroll deduction with no benefit. This problem would have to be resolved before full support by organized labor could be given to a no-fault plan.” See Report of the Special Committee on No-Fault Insurance (Jan. 31, 1972).

Subsequently, when the legislation was passed, the applicable provision related to, and governing, no-fault insurance benefits and collateral benefits, § 540, provided: “The benefits required under § 539 of this article shall be payable without regard to the fault or nonfault of the named insured or the recipient in causing or contributing to the accident, and without regard to any collateral source of medical, hospital, or wage continuation benefits.” ¹⁹³ This provision has undergone a number of amendments, however, the most notable of which provided for coordination of benefits. In 1973, a second sentence was added to § 540, as follows: “Where the insured has coverage for both