Maner v. Stephenson

MURPHY, Chief Judge. In this case, Arnold and Barbara Maner filed a petition under Maryland Code (1991 RepLVol., 1995 Supp.) § 9-102 of the Family Law Article for visitation with their grandchildren, who live in Salisbury, Maryland with their mother and father, ⁴⁶³ Kita and Jim Stephenson, in an “intact nuclear family.” 1 The issue we must resolve is whether the trial court erred in denying that petition. I The grandchildren, Katie and Trey Stephenson, are ages nine and six respectively. The Maners also live in Salisbury and are Katie and Trey’s maternal grandparents.

The Maners filed their petition in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County on July 14, 1994. The Stephensons agreed, in their original answer to the petition, that “it is important for the children to maintain a relationship with the grandparents, regardless of the relationship between the parties to this proceeding” and were “willing to establish a regular and reasonable visitation schedule.” The Stephensons allowed the Maners to see their grandchildren once in August, twice in September, once in October, and on Christmas Eve of 1994. In an amended answer, filed eight months after the original answer, however, the Stephensons requested denial of the petition. On April 24, 1995, Judge Alfred T. Truitt, Jr. held an evidentiary hearing at which the Maners and Stephensons testified, in addition to Kita’s sister-in-law, grandmother, and several friends and neighbors.

After hearing oral arguments, Judge Truitt, in a written opinion, dated June 13,1995, denied the Maners’ petition for visitation. He first noted that Katie and Trey “have a loving and healthy relationship” with their parents; that this was undisputed; and that their parents “are active in the lives of the children and a very stable ‘nuclear family’ exists between the [parents] and their children.” Judge Truitt then discussed the history of tension in this family and the events that led to the Maners’ petition. ⁴⁶⁴ The evidence presented by both sides at trial establishes that the relationship between Kita Stephenson and Barbara Maner is strained. This strained relationship started when Kita was a child and continues today. The defendant’s testimony revealed that she felt as if she was always dominated by her mother, Barbara, and that her brother Mark was favored over her.

This favoritism extended to Mark’s wife, Anne, and thus led to a strained relationship between Anne and Kita. Other evidence presented by the defendants was that Barbara Maner has been critical of both Kita and Jim Stephenson (sometimes in front of the children). Kita defined her mother as a “relationship destroyer” and was not willing to let the relationship she and her husband had with their children be harmed. The Stephensons also spoke of the stress placed upon the family prior to, during and after visits with the Maners.

They testified that this stress made the children uncomfortable. The Maners themselves state that after long periods without visitation, it took a while for the children to feel comfortable around them. The Maners testified that Kita was difficult to deal with as a child and as an adult. Barbara Maner says that she loves her daughter except when she exhibits her jealousy.

The cessation of visitation followed an incident which occurred in October of 1993. The Stephensons had planned a camping trip with the children but agreed to cancel the trip because Kita’s grandmother, Beulah, was going to be in town and there would be a family gathering. The cancellation of the trip was at the request of Barbara Maner. Just prior to the family gathering, Barbara Maner called and said that the Stephensons shouldn’t come over.

The reason for this was that Anne Maner did not want Kita to be present. She was upset that the Stephensons hadn’t attended the birthday party of her daughter Nancy earlier in the year. This angered the Stephensons and regular visitation of the Maners with Katie and Trey ceased. Judge Truitt noted that the case appeared to be one of first impression, because former grandparent visitation cases did not involve intact nuclear families.

The intent of the grand ⁴⁶⁵ parent visitation statute, the court said, was, nonetheless, to permit grandparents to petition for visitation of grandchildren in both dissolved and intact nuclear families. The issue, Judge Truitt observed, was “[w]hether it is in the best interest of the two grandchildren ... to award visitation rights to their maternal grandparents ... even though such visitation is opposed by the children’s parents----” In reviewing the law, Judge Truitt said that, to be awarded visitation rights, the grandparents did not have to prove that “exceptional circumstances [existed] ... rather, the outcome of the grandparents’ petition lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, guided solely by the best interests of the grandchild.” Quoting from Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 50 , 622 A.2d 121 (1993), the court noted that “the trial court should also be alert to the psychological toll [the] visitation dispute itself might exact on a child in the midst of contesting adults.” Addressing the factors enunciated in Fairbanks, id., 2 the court found: a) the nature and stability of the children’s relationship with their parents is substantial and stable; b) even prior to October 1993, the maternal grandparent’s association with the children was at best sporadic and had no regularity; c) the potential benefits and detriments of granting visitation is at best speculative and is therefore a neutral factor; ⁴⁶⁶ d) it appears obvious from the testimony that visitation would have a deleterious effect on the nuclear family; e) having heard the testimony and judged the credibility of the witnesses, we are constrained to say that the grandmother appears to be domineering and immature and the grandfather is at best docile and subdued, which indicates some emotional instability on their part; f) the stability of the children’s living and schooling arrangements is a neutral factor since all parties live in the same community. In addition to these findings, Judge Truitt observed that “the grandchildren have ongoing visitation with their paternal grandparents, an indication that their denial of visitation with the Maners is not arbitrary.” (emphasis added). Judge Truitt accordingly found that visitation was not in the best interest of the children.

The Maners appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, but before that court heard the matter, we issued a Writ of Certiorari. II The Maners argue that, although the court’s opinion referred to the best interests standard, it improperly deferred to the Stephensons’ wishes because they are an intact nuclear family, thereby imposing a higher burden of proof on the Maners. In addition, the Maners contend that the evidence does not support the trial court’s factual findings and that it should have applied a rebuttable presumption that visitation with grandparents is in the best interests of grandchildren. The Stephensons argue that Judge Truitt applied the best interests standard and did not require the Maners to meet a higher burden of proof.

In this regard, to apply a rebuttable presumption in favor of the grandparents, as urged by the Maners, is not in accord with our cases or the plain language of the statute. ⁴⁶⁷ III Maryland Code (1991 Repl.Vol., 1995 Supp.) § 9-102 of the Family Law Article, entitled “Petition by grandparents for visitation,” provides: An equity court may: (1) consider a petition for reasonable visitation of a grandchild by a grandparent; and (2) if the court finds it to be in the best interests of the child, grant visitation rights to the grandparent. The statute in its original form was preceded by the phrase, “At any time after the termination of a marriage by divorce, annulment, or death.” See Ch. 276 of the Acts of 1981. At the time grandparent visitation rights were codified, Maryland courts already had the authority, under the common law, to award grandparents custody or visitation. See, e.g., Maddox v. Maddox, 174 Md. 470 , 199 A. 507 (1938) (custody granted to paternal grandmother over mother); Piotrowski v. State, 179 Md. 377 , 18 A.2d 199 (1941) (custody granted to maternal grandparents over father).

Thus, in Evans v. Evans, 302 Md. 334, 342 , 488 A.2d 157 (1985), we agreed with the Court of Special Appeals in Skeens v. Paterno, 60 Md.App. 48, 60 , 480 A.2d 820 , that the 1981 codification was “a mere restatement of the existing law.” Indeed, the law was adopted for the purpose of “clarifying that a court may grant