Marden v. Jones

⁴⁵¹ Utsxek, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. By a, promissory note under seal, dated May 5th, 1927, the appellant promised to pay, three years after date, to the order of Thomas Cameron, $1,000 with interest. Beneath the signature and seal of the maker there was written the following statement : “If he should be dead at the expiration of this note it becomes null and void.” That notation was made by the appellant in the payee’s presence, when the note was executed. The payee died about eleven months after it matured.

During the period between the date of its maturity and the payee’s death, the appellant made seven payments of fifty dollars each on the note. These payments were duly credited on the back of the note by the payee, who retained possession of the instrument until the time of his death. Suit on the note was brought by the ancillary administrator of his estate in Maryland; the principal admirdstration being in the State of New York, where the decedent had his domicile. The trial of the suit resulted in a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $939.86.

The appeal is from that judgment. In refusing to grant certain prayers proposing a directed verdict for the defendant, the trial court made the only rulings presented for review on appeal. The grounds of action and defense in tlie case involve conflicting interpretations of the memorandum that the note was to become null and void if the payee should be dead at its “expiration.” That provision is construed by the defendant as a defeasance clause preventing the enforcement of the note if the payee should die at any time before it became extinguished by payment or barred by the statute of limitations. The opposing theory is that the term “expiration” referred to the ending of the period which must elapse before the note matured.

It is further contended by the plaintiff that the adoption of the defendant’s interpretation of the memorandum would place her in the position of relying upon a gift which was ineffectual because it was not designed to be accomplished in the donor’s lifetime. The clause which has produced this litigation, if intelligible at all, readily admits of differences of opinion as to' its ⁴⁵² meaning. Neither of the theories as to its probable intent seems to us satisfactory. The word “expiration,” as applied to the note itself, would not appropriately be used to indicate the termination of its period of immaturity.

On the other hand, the acceptance of the defendant’s view as to the significance of the term “expiration” would tend to the conclusion that the clause was superfluous. It provided that the note was to become void “at its expiration,” if the payee were then dead. A declaration to that effect would have been wholly unnecessary if “expiration” is construed as equivalent to ex-tinguishment of the