Marquardt v. Papenfuse

CATHELL, Judge. Chief Judge Wilner, in our recent case of Baker v. State, 89 Md.App. 564, 566-67 , 598 A.2d 851 (1991), in describing the complaint forming the substance of that action, stated: The English language, blending and building upon the vocabulary of its Latin and Germanic roots, is a marvelous and omnificent language, offering a rich variety of words and expressions to describe or explain a single thought. And so, in characterizing the complaint made in this appeal by Mr. David Bruce Baker, we have much to choose from — ludicrous, preposterous, silly, asinine, ridiculous, absurd, nonsensical, frivolous, outrageous, unreasonable, laughable, foolish, unsound, and incongruous come to mind, but there may be others. Meritless and erroneous are partly descriptive, but somehow they don’t seem to capture the full flavor of the thought.

In other words, we propose to affirm. ⁶⁸⁷ Our initial thought in resolving the instant appeal was to cite the above passage as authority and simply affirm. On reflection, that action would be inappropriate as the above quoted material does not adequately convey the egregiousness of what appellants have done in the case sub judice in attempting to utilize the legal process to appropriate 1 property belonging to others. This is the third occasion since 1987 on which we have been called upon to address the Marquardts’, appellants’, claims that trial courts have erred in determining that they are not the owners of the property at issue. 2 By per curiam opinion, we affirmed the Circuit Court for Calvert County’s opinion that the appellee there, irrespective of the fact that she and her predecessors had record title, had held the property at issue by adverse possession dating back to at least 1882. Marquardt v. Walters [No. 220, 1987 Term, filed Oct. 26, 1987].

In our decision, we chose not to address the matter of record title because the trial court’s adverse possession finding was being affirmed. Thereafter, in utter disregard of our above decision, when the property described therein was being probated as a part of the estate of Evelyn Parrón Mackall, appellants again claimed the property by challenging its inclusion in that ⁶⁸⁸ estate asserting, in the orphans’ court, that the prior decisions of the circuit court and of this Court were erroneous. 3 When the orphans’ court made its determination, which was consistent with our prior ruling, appellant then appealed to us. We said, in affirming the orphans’ court, that the actions of appellants were “not only a vexatious harassment of appellee, but [constitute] a pattern of contemptuous harassment of the judicial authorities of this State.” Marquardt v. Walters [No. 912, 1990 Term, per curiam, filed April 25,1991], slip op. at 11, cert. denied, 323 Md. 186 , 592 A.2d 178 (1991). We there held that that action was filed and maintained in bad faith and was “totally and completely lacking in any justification or legal basis,” and we imposed sanctions.

Id. at 12. 4 Appellants’ briefs and arguments in this case are virtually incomprehensible, as was true of the briefs in the appeals preceding this one. Additionally, the appeal is untimely as to the major issue, i.e., the affirmance of the Land Commissioner’s decision. Nevertheless, we shall address it for three reasons: (1) should we grant the motion to dismiss the appeal, we have no doubt that the appellants would not recognize it as a final decision on the merits and additional suits would follow leading to further harassment of the appellees; (2) in this appeal, appellants attempt to base their ownership on patents and repatents of land, and, even though their claims are equally frivolous, the patent claims have not heretofore been addressed; and (3) in this appeal, the appellee, Commissioner Edward C. Papenfuse, has rendered an opinion that is absolutely clear in its findings and ⁶⁸⁹ conclusively determines that appellants’ claim to title is completely spurious. We do not believe it would be useful, even if it were possible, to restate the caption of appellants’ argument in more comprehensible terms.

We thus include it as stated in their brief. 1. THE COMMISSIONER OF LAND PATENTS DOES NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO DENY A STATE OP MARYLAND PATENT WHERE THE LAND, WET AND/OR DRY, FOR THE PATENT REQUESTED OF THE STATE, WAS ENCLOSED BY BOUNDARIES OF THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF SURVEY, THAT WAS PATENTED TO AN INHABITANT OF MARYLAND BY CHARLES CALVERT, ESQUIRE, CAPTAIN GENERAL & CHIEF GOVERNOR OF THE PROVINCE OF MARYLAND, WHERE THE LANDS HAVE NOT ESCHEAT, AND THE APPLICANTS FOR THE PATENT ARE PROVEN SU CCESSORS- IN-INTEREST TO THE SURVEYOR’S CERTIFIED PLAT THEREOF. THE FOREGOING IS ESPECIALLY TRUE WHERE THE STATE OF MARYLAND DOES NOT ADD ANY SURPLUS LAND TO THE PATENT. We presume that appellants’ primary complaint is an assertion that the decision of the Commissioner of Patents was in error.

Thus, we shall address that opinion. Before doing so, however, we shall include here that portion of the Commissioner’s opinion in which he discusses the history of the patent process and that process itself. 5 Land Patents are the first link in the chain of title of ownership of land in Maryland. Maryland began in 1632 as the private and exclusive property of the head of one family, the Calverts, Irish Barons of Baltimore. When the King granted Maryland to Lord Baltimore on June 20, 1632, making him the Lord Proprietor of Maryland, he did so absolutely and without qualification with regard to ⁶⁹⁰ the right to grant and, as in this case, regrant land.

That power has passed undisturbed to the Commissioner acting on behalf of the State. The language of the Charter of Maryland is archaic but clear with regard to Lord Baltimore’s right to grant and regrant land as he saw fit[.] ****** Prior to 1776, the only serious challenge to Lord Baltimore’s rights with regard to the issuance of land patents came in 1689 in the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution when Maryland became a Royal Colony. At that time Lord Baltimore’s political power, such as the right to appoint the Governor of Maryland, was taken away, but not his power to grant Land Patents. In 1692, after one Royal Governor attempted to usurp Lord Baltimore’s right to grant lands by forcefully removing all of his records, the Solicitor General of England, Thomas Trevor, argued persuasively that the governor had no right to do so: I think it may be just & reasonable that [the records] should be restored to his Lo[rdship] again, and I do not see any prejudice can thereby happen to the parties by whom such Bills or Bonds [for land] were given, though they have not Executed their Warrants, nor had Certificates [of survey] return’d, for ye bonds canot be put in Suit till the Ld Baltimore hath p[er]formed the Condition on his p[art] [to grant the lands for which the bonds had been given and the warrants issued].

Between 1776 and 1781, the political powers of Lord Baltimore, which had been restored in 1715, and all of his rights relating to land in Maryland, were taken over by the State. The heirs of the last Lord Baltimore (among whom was the wife of the last Proprietary governor, Sir Robert Eden) attempted to wrest compensation for their losses from the State after the American Revolution, but without success. From 1781 onward the powers over land matters that were once held by Lord Baltimore were ⁶⁹¹ vested in the judges of the Land Office, a position that today is titled Commissioner of Land Patents. As John Kilty amply demonstrates in The Landholder’s Assistant by asking the Commissioner of Land Patents for a warrant of resurvey and pursuing the patent process to its conclusion, the Applicants, like all applicants before them, are in effect vacating any claim to a title they may have and placing that claim in the hands of the Commissioner for adjudication.

The process is not unlike that experienced by a Gaelic chief of Ireland in the 16th century who was induced to sign an “indenture to recognize the king as his liege lord, [and then had] to apply for a crown grant of his lands____ This indenture comprised the first stage of what historians have called the policy of surrender and regrant.” Once an application for a resurvey Patent is made to the Commissioner, it is then up to the Commissioner to determine the validity of the claim and to sanction the issuance of a new patent if he should find the claim meritorious. If the applicants should disagree with the decision of the Commissioner, their only recourse is to appeal the decision in accord with the provisions set forth in the Real Property Article. The Applicants openly and under oath acknowledged the risk they were taking. That they did not take that risk lightly is evidenced by their eleven-year delay (1978-1989) in seeking the opinion of the Commissioner. [Footnotes omitted, bracketed material in original.] The early Maryland case of Cunningham v. Browning, 1 Bland 299 , 310-12 (1827), described the various types of warrants associated with the land patent process and explained how they were issued: There were under the Proprietary’s government, and still are, five different modes of beginning to obtain a title to lands, or, in other words, five several kinds of warrants....

If it be his object ... to obtain a certain quantity of vacant land any where, without regard to any particular space, or tract, ... the register of the land ⁶⁹² office gives him a common warrant, directed to the surveyor, commanding him to lay out the specified quantity of land---- But if required by the applicant, ... the register will insert a particular description of the land ... in the warrant itself; which specification gives to it the denomination of a special warrant____ But, if the applicant had already obtained a title ... and only wished to add to it some contiguous vacancy, he may obtain ... a warrant of resurvey____ [I]f any one had caused a particular tract of land to be surveyed, but had failed to comply with the conditions ... and ... to take out a patent ... any one else ... may obtain ... a proclamation warrant authorizing the applicant to take up the same lands____ And finally, any one by ... setting forth that a ... tract of land had actually escheated by the death of the ... owner intestate and without heirs, may obtain immediately ... an escheat warrant____ After the applicant has procured any one of these five kinds of warrants, his next step is to have the land surveyed ... after which [the survey] must be lodged in the land office within eighteen months from the date of the warrant---- If the certificate [of survey] is approved by the examiner-general, it is then taken to the treasurer, who, upon payment ... endorses upon it a receipt ... after which the certificate is received into the land office ... ready for a patent, if not opposed by a caveat. [6] [Emphasis added, citations omitted.] For additional historical comment on Maryland’s patent system, see Maryland Coal and Realty Co. v. Eckhart, 25 Md.App. 605 , 337 A.2d 150 , cert. denied, 275 Md. 753 (1975). ⁶⁹³ In the case sub judice, the Commissioner first ascertained that appellants were aware that in order to repatent the land they must surrender or vacate any rights they had in the property as a result of any previous patent. Then, the Commissioner commented: Sorting out the Applicants’ claims is no easy task. They have persistently blended conjecture and allegations with uncontested fact. They have submitted transcripts or facsimiles of documents, some of which they admit they have intentionally altered to ‘clarify’ the intent of the originals.[ 7 ] Their submittals are replete with anachronistic, extraneous, and, at times, erroneous, references to persons, places, and documentary sources.

Often matters of fact are unnecessarily obscured by a rhetoric that would seem to exceed the normal bounds of propriety and reason.[ 8 ] [Footnote omitted.] Thereafter, the Commissioner identified the two questions relative to appellants’ application for repatents: 1) as private individuals, do the Applicants have the right to claim either or both of the areas of submerged land under the two coves shown on maps and plats as adjoining the Cape Leonard Subdivision, and 2) is there sufficient justification for the Applicants or anyone else to apply for a patent for any of the fast land (land above mean high tide) between the water’s edge and the lot lines shown on the various recorded ⁶⁹⁴ plats of the Cape Leonard Subdivision. [Footnote omitted.] I The Commissioner Did Not Err When It Concluded That Appellants Had No Claim To The Submerged Land The Commissioner noted that the appellants claim to title is traced to an 1869 deed from Joseph Sellers to James King and/or a deed to King from Henry Williams. Joseph Sellers received the land subsequently conveyed to King by a deed from Charlotte Stanforth. The Stanforth deed stated, as relevant to this case, the following property description: Beginning at a stake in Veitches Cove & running South ... West ... leading to the dwelling house, then South ...

East ... to a stake in the valley, then North ... East ... to a stake on St. Leonard’s Creek, then with St. Leonard’s Creek & Veitches Cove to the beginning____ The Williams’ deed also did not include the coves at issue and contained virtually the same description as the Stan-forth deed only rephrasing one course: “thence with the meanderings of Quarter Cove, St. Leonard’s Creek and Veitch’s Cove____” In reference to the patents from which the King deeds come, the Commissioner found that at “no time prior to 1862 did either the Lord Proprietor or the State of Maryland issue a still valid patent encompassing the land under the two coves claimed by Applicants.” The Commissioner found, and we agree, that even if descriptions in prior “Brewhouse” 9 patents had encompassed the water of the two coves at issue that right had been surrendered when the land was repatented in 1748/9. That repatent stated that the land was bound “with the said Cove and Saint Leonard’s Creek.” The surveys upon which the repatent was based also excluded the two coves. From 1749 until approximately 1986, when the appellants began for ⁶⁹⁵ mally to claim title, 10 no claims to the water of the coves were made by appellants’ predecessors in title. 11 The Commissioner found that the property descriptions in these source deeds did not include the coves at issue.

The circuit court affirmed. We agree and explain. We shall first address the nature of the proceeding and the standard of review under the Administrative Procedure Act of a decision of the Commissioner of Land Patents. 12 The Maryland Real Property Article, section 13-410(a)(l) (1988) provides that the “final judgment of the Commissioner may be appealed as provided by the Administrative Procedure Act.” Section 10-215(g)(3) of the State Government Article (1984) states that in order to reverse or modify the decision of an agency the trial court, and ultimately this Court, must find that a substantial right of the Marquardts may have been prejudiced because an agency finding, conclusion, or decision “(i) is unconstitutional; (ii) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; (iii) results from an unlawful procedure; (iv) is affected by any other error of law; (v) is unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in light of the entire record as submitted; or (vi) is arbitrary or capricious.” As in most administrative appeals, the crux of the issue is the substantial evidence test. ⁶⁹⁶ The cases in which the standard of judicial review of administrative decisions is applied are legion. We relied on them extensively in our case of Terranova v. Board of Trustees of Fire and Police Employees Retirement System, 81 Md.App. 1 , 566 A.2d 497 (1989), cert. denied, 319 Md. 484 , 573 A.2d 808 (1990).

We said: The substantial evidence standard of review requires only that the reviewing court examine the agency’s decision to determine whether reasoning minds could reasonably reach that conclusion by direct proof or by permissible inference from the facts and the record before the agency. In determining whether reasoning minds could reasonably reach the conclusion, we must view the Commission’s decision in a light most favorable to it. The Commission’s decision should be viewed as “prima facie correct” and it carries with it the presumption of validity. This Court may not substitute its judgment for the expertise of the Commission, [citations omitted.] Id. at 8 (quoting Vavasori v. Commission on Human Relations, 65 Md.App. 237, 251 , 500 A.2d 307 (1985), cert. denied, 305 Md. 419 , 504 A.2d 1152 (1986)).

The Court of Appeals in Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apartments, 283 Md. 505, 512-13 , 390 A.2d 1119 (1978), stated: “Substantial evidence,” ... has been defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” In applying the substantial evidence test, we have emphasized that a “court should [not] substitute its judgment for the expertise of those persons who constitute the administrative agency from which the appeal is taken.” We also must review the agency’s decision in the light most favorable to the agency, since “decisions of administrative agencies are prima facie correct,” and “carry with them the presumption of validity.” Furthermore, not only is it the province of the agency to resolve conflicting evidence, but where inconsistent inferences from the same evidence can be drawn, it is for the agency ⁶⁹⁷ to draw the inferences. [Emphasis in original, bracketed material in original, citations omitted]. In assessing the credibility of a witness, the conduct and the testimony of the witness directly reflect on the believability of that witness especially when contradictory and altered evidence are part of that testimony. “When a witness says in one breath that a thing is so, and in the next breath that it is not so, his testimony is too inclusive, contradictory, and uncertain, to be the basis of a legal conclusion.” Slacum v. Jolley, 153 Md. 343, 351 , 138 A. 244 (1927). In the case at bar, the appellants’ attempts to alter ancient official records to strengthen their case is at the minimum a severe limitation on any favorable assessment as to their credibility. 13 Among the thousands of pages of briefs, extracts, appendices, and exhibits filed in this case, we shall only address the key evidence upon which the Commissioner’s decision was based. The pre-1749 patent to “Brewhouse” (formerly “Ordinary”) described it as being “bounded” by the creek and, thus, it conveyed no part of the coves of the creek.

In any event, it was conceded that “Brewhouse” was repatented in 1749. In order to repatent the land, the owner must have vacated his claim to the title of the original “Brew-house.” Even if the original patent had included lands under the coves they were surrendered to the State. See generally, Ramsay v. Butler, Purdum & Co., 148 Md. 438, 441 , 129 A. 650 (1925) (“The question is solely one of vacancy____ If there has been one grant of it, and the land has already passed from the State, then until it shall have returned to the ownership of the State ..., there can be no question of another grant.”); Linthicum v. Shipley, 140 ⁶⁹⁸ Md. 96, 100, 116 A. 871 (1922) (“The State cannot grant ... a patent, under a special warrant ... to land of which he [the appellant] is already the owner.”); Stallings v. Ruby, 27 Md. 149, 155-56 (1867) (“[T]he assignment of Thomas Ruby having operated as a surrender to the State of all his title ... enabled the State to grant a fee simple title in the whole.....”) Under the doctrine of surrender and regrant, we, therefore, are concerned only with the description in the 1749 repatenting of “Brewhouse.” That description provides in pertinent part that the land begins at a marked oak and runs to a cove, and it is bounded “with the said Cove and Saint Leonard’s Creek.” The certificate of survey upon which the repatent was based clearly shows that it does not include the area of the cove. 14 Thus, the patent to Brewhouse does not convey the coves. Appellants claim that their title source to the coves traces back to deeds from their predecessor in title, James King.

As we have indicated, James King got title from two deeds: (1) a deed from Joseph Sellers dated October 20, 1866, and (2) a deed from Henry Williams, Trustee, dated March 13, 1869. The Sellers’ deed described the property it was conveying in part as: Beginning at a stake in Veitches Cove & ... East ... to a stake on St. Leonard’s Creek, then with St. Leonard’s Creek & Veitches Cove to the beginning____ The Williams’ deed described the property in pertinent respects as: [Beginning at a stake on the South side of Veitch’s Cove ... thence with said valley and a small branch the following courses____ [TJhence with the meanderings of Quarter Cove, St. Leonard’s Creek and Veitch’s Cove____ ⁶⁹⁹ Both deeds call to the boundaries of the creeks, i.e., the bank or shorelines, not into the creek. “As a general canon of boundary law, it is well-settled that a call to an adjoining boundary takes precedence over a metes and bounds description in the same instrument.” Ski Roundtop, Inc. v. Wagerman, 79 Md.App. 357, 367 , 556 A.2d 1144 (1989). Thus, to the extent that any conflict exists by reason of course and distance descriptions, in the absence of any evidence of contrary intention, the calls control.

See Delphey v. Savage, 227 Md. 373, 378 , 177 A.2d 249 (1962) (calls to monuments given precedence over courses and distances); Zawatsky Constr. Co. v. Feldman Dev. Corp., 203 Md. 182, 187 , 100 A.2d 269 (1953); Dundalk Holding Co. v. Easter, 195 Md. 488, 495 , 73 A.2d 877 (1950); Wood v. Hildebrand, 185 Md. 56, 60-61 , 42 A.2d 919 (1945); Conrad v. Williams, 121 Md. 35, 40 , 88 A. 36 (1913) (“[W]here the courses and distances in a grant do not agree with the call, the call will prevail and the courses and distances will be rejected.”); Stewart v. May, 111 Md. 162, 174 , 73 A. 460 (1909); Houck v. Loveall, 8 Md. 63, 69 (1855). For other cases where early patents referred to lands bounding on and/or running with water courses, see Thomas v. Godfrey, 3 G. & J. 142 (1831); Chamberlaine v. Crawford, 1 H. & McH. 355 (1770); Digges v. Coomes, 1 H. & McH. 81 (1729).

Cf. Calhoun v. Hall, 2 H. & McH. 416 , 417 (1790) (describing a call including waters as “to the mouth of a small gut, and over the said gut....” (emphasis added)). Thus, we conclude that the Commissioner’s ruling, that neither the patents nor the deeds conveyed the coves, was not only supported by substantial evidence but that it was in fact dictated by the evidence. It was completely correct.

Even if the deeds contained descriptions including the coves, the descriptions would be incorrect. The King deed traced back to the 1749 patent and could not have conveyed what was not granted by the patent. The trial court’s affirmance of the Commissioner of Land Patents was proper. We shall affirm. ⁷⁰⁰ II The Commissioner Did Not Err When He Concluded That Appellants Were Not Entitled To A Patent On The Lands Lying Between Certain Platted Lots In The Cape Leonard Subdivision And The Water.

The Commissioner extensively examined the chain of title to the various lots at issue and found that, with the exception of five lots, 15 the deeds in the subdivision contained paramount descriptions that carried to the water’s edge. All of the lots containing descriptions extending to the water’s edge predate appellants’ deeds and were from a common predecessor in title. Thus, as to those lots, the Commissioner determined that they were not patentable. As to the other five lots and the area between them and the water, the Commissioner found that they were not included within the area for which a patent was sought by appellants.

The Commissioner opined: Without supporting documentation the Applicants attempted to argue that the outer lines of the Subdivision lands as shown on the Subdivision plats were not mean high tide water lines, but a static property line unaffected by the action of the water. Such an argument flies in the face [of] logic, law, topography, and a long tradition of surveying in the region, a tradition probably best documented by the Survey notes of a conscientious St. Mary’s County surveyor by the name of Benjamin Tippett. The logic of the Cape Leonard Subdivision Plats is that the land’s perimeter was first surveyed along the water’s edge by boat, indicating on the plats the approximate location of the mean high tide water line, a line that by law varies with any change in the depth and course of the water. The lots were then laid out on land according to a coordinate system that was begun at the westernmost point of the property (which fell on what later was ⁷⁰¹ recorded as a corner of Lot 13, Plat C) with lot lines generally runfning] towards the waters edge until the very steep embankment prevented the surveyor from going any farther.

Without the original surveyor’s notes, which the Commissioner tried unsuccessfully to locate, it is not possible to do more than make a reasonable conjecture as to the meaning of the perimeter as shown on the Subdivision Plats, but the topography of the Subdivision land argues strongly against any notion that some sort of reserved, permanent path of fast land along the water’s edge was intended. The earliest recorded topographical surveys of the area that became the subdivision were made in the first decades of the 20th century. They indicate high bluffs and steep embankments at almost every location along the coves and the creeks. From the photographs of the banks of the Subdivision taken by the Commissioner and the testimony of the surveyors testifying for both sides, it is also abundantly clear that in very few places could anyone comfortably walk along the banks of the coves and the creek without getting very wet.

Even then there would be many places where the incline would approach the perpendicular. [Footnotes omitted, emphasis in original.] Additionally, the Commissioner found that, even if the request for a patent had been sufficiently broad so as to include the area between the five lots and the water’s edge, the owners of the five lots had established a claim to title by adverse possession sufficient to bar the issuance of a patent to that area to appellants. “From a review of uncontested affidavits and the chain of title to the five lots, it would seem that the present owners have good grounds to claim adverse possession and that the Applicants thus would not have a supportable claim.” (Footnote omitted, emphasis added.) ⁷⁰² We have examined the objection to the issuance of patents filed by Clifford Gross as to Lot 13, section A. 16 The uncontested affidavit clearly supports the Commissioner’s finding that appellants do not have a supportable claim. Appellants have failed to identify the other affidavits, any matter contesting the Gross affidavit or any of the affidavits of the caveators. Accordingly, the Commissioner was correct in determining that the owners of the five lots had obtained title by adverse possession, further foreclosing appellants’ attempt to patent the fast land in question. We hold that appellants do not own nor do they have any claim of title to the land at issue.

Two collateral matters remain. One involves the trial court’s injunctive order directing the expungement of certain documents from the land records and enjoining the filing of any documents in the land records by appellants without the trial court’s prior permission. The other matter is the issue of the sanctions imposed. Ill The Trial Court’s Injunctive Order The trial court ordered that several documents be expunged from the land records.

These documents include: six deeds from Bel Air Service Company to the appellants, five deeds from appellants to themselves, one “Deed Legal Supplement,” one “Chain of Title Amplification” from appellants to themselves, and one Memorandum of Forest Conservation and Management Agreement. The trial court, in its oral opinion, opined: The fact of the matter is that he has no right to the properties. He has never had any right in these properties. And no amounts of the change of title or papers which he manufactures and tries to file in Land Records ⁷⁰³ gives him any right to claim the properties to which he is attempting to claim to the detriment of the riparian rights of his neighbors and to the entire populous of the State of Maryland. ****** I doubt very seriously if there is any power on earth that is going to convince him that he does not have any legitimate claim to these rights.

He does not have any power to do the things he’s trying to do in this area. But I suppose we ought to try to do that even if we despair of succeeding in accomplishing it. The persistence and determination on his part, we think, is very well demonstrated in his conduct with respect to the markers on the Oyster Lease. ****** Our attention has been called in this case to a series of instruments which have been created by the Appellants and filed in the Land Records as a result of their claims and pretension to land and riparian rights, which it has been determined they do not have. To leave these documents in the record constitutes a nightmare for persons who are searching the title to the properties adjoining this creek and the state to the extent that it is granting oysters leases or other rights to conduct activities on the land under the tidal waters of the creek.

To say that these things are matters in the chain of title is simply another one of the statements which Appellants make and assumed to be fact and, therefore, [unassailable] simply because they say so. ****** We are satisfied that the list of matters which are represented to the Court should be expunged, are in fact not legitimate documents relating to the title of any property in this area but are in fact self serving documents created by these parties without any justification and are not appropriate to be permitted to remain in the Land Records. And, therefore, we grant the request and ⁷⁰⁴ direct the Court to expunge those listed in the written Order. * * * * * * Now, in the event that he is not persuaded that he should no longer assert claims to this ground or against his neighbors, we are going to enjoin him from making any further such claim or of interfering with the markers or other things that are properly put in this creek by the riparian owners. Piers, Oyster Lease [17] buoys or any kind of marker put there by someone else____ The trial court’s order required the removal of documents that appellants had filed in the land records in their attempt to create a basis for their claim to the land. The trial court recognized, albeit in inexplicit language, that the massive filings of misleading and/or false documents was an extraordinary abuse of the land record filing process of this State.

It also recognized that given the appellants’ history of altering records, creating misleading records, and deliberately creating clouds on the titles of others, appellants would likely continue in such wrongful conduct. The trial court, therefore, fashioned an extraordinary remedy — ex-pungement and injunction. Our function is to determine whether this action is an abuse of discretion. We note that while the remedy was extraordinary, that which was sought to be remedied was even more extraordinary.

On May 17, 1991 , several days after the trial court had rendered its final judgment in the administrative appeal affirming the decision of the Commissioner of Land Pat ⁷⁰⁵ ents, appellees filed a Motion for Injunctive and other Relief. 18 They asserted that the title to part or all of the property at issue in the case at bar had been previously litigated to final judgment and it was determined that appellants had no title to it. They further asserted that in the case sub judice the Commissioner of Land Patents had found that appellants had no title to the property and the Circuit Court for Calvert County had affirmed that decision. They also contended that the circuit court had found that appellants had acted in bad faith and without legal justification. They concluded that the “deeds and surveys, all of which they [the appellants] prepared without the assistance of either an attorney or a professional licensed surveyor, purportedly for the purpose of supporting claims to property, ... have been demonstrated to be without merit.” Appellees then requested that the court use its equitable powers to enjoin future claims by the appellants to the property and order the deeds and documents already filed to be expunged.

In their reply to the expungement request, appellants stated that