Maryland case law › Marriott v. Badger

Marriott v. Badger

5 Md. 306 (1853) · Maryland Court of Appeals
Maryland Court of AppealsDisposition: ReversedEccleston✓ Good law
HoldingThis was a petition for freedom brought by a person of color (the petitioner) against William H.

Eccleston, J., delivered the opinion of this court. The first, third and fourth bills of exceptions having been abandoned, we need not examine them, and our attention will be confined to the second. The prayer granted, and which is now the matter in controversy, is, “that if the jury find from the evidence that Hess, the mother of the petitioner, was the slave of John Hammond, and was bequeathed as such by the will of said John Hammond to his son Wm. Hammond, and after the death of said Wm.

Hammond was received by William H. Marriott, (his mother Sarah Marriott being dead,) as a part of her share of the estate of said John Hammond, so bequeathed to the said Wm. Hammond as aforesaid. And shall also find, that Hess was the person named in the will of Wm. Hammond as manumitted thereby, she being at the death of said Wm.

Hammond under the age of forty-five, and able to work and gain a sufficient livelihood and maintenance, and that the petitioner 310 was born after the said Hess would have been free under the will of said Wm. Hammond, and shall further find that the petitioner is held by the defendant under the will of said William H. Marriott, and that the said William H. Marriott before the birth of the petitioner, received legacies of Wm. Hammond’s own property under the said will, then the defendant is estopped from disputing the validity of the manumission of said Hess, under the will of said Wm. Hammond.” In the argument, on both sides, it was conceded that Hess was the slave of John Hammond, who bequeathed her to his son Wm.

Hammond for life, and that after his decease, she together with other negroes passed under the will of John Hammond to his daughter Mary Marriott, and the children of his deceased daughters, Henrietta Brown and Sarah Marriott; between whom the negroes were divided, and Hess fell to the share of William H. Marriott, a son of Sarah Marriott. That after the division, and whilst Hess was held by William H. Marriott, the petitioner was born. That under the will of Wm. Hammond, a considerable sum of money, without specifying the amount, was received by William H. Marriott.

That at the time when, according to the will of Wm. Hammond, Hess would have been entitled to freedom, she was under forty-five years of age and able to maintain herself. And that the petitioner is held by the defendant under the will of William H. Marriott. Thus far the parties agree, in regard to the facts; but they differ as to whether William H. Marriott took, and held Hess, as administrator or executor of his mother, or as a distributee.

The appellant insisting it was in the former character, and the appellee that it was in the latter. Assuming the appellee to be right, still, in the view we take of the matter in controversy, he cannot succeed. In support of the prayer it is said, that William H. Marriott having taken a legacy given to him by the will of his uncle, which will manumitted Hess, he could not hold the legacy aid at the same time claim the negro as a slave, although he might have a paramount title to her, either through 311 bis mother, or in any other way, because the law will not permit him to take under the will and against il also, for if the will gives him a legacy, and likewise gives his property to another, the doctrine of election will compel him to choose which he will have, but he cannot take both. If a testator bequeaths a legacy to A, and gives his property to B, should A actually elect to take the legacy, and surrenders his property in conformity with the will, no doubt B may hold it in opposition to any subsequent attempt on the p-ait of A to regain it.

But in case A retains his own property, and takes Ihe legacy also, it cannot be said he has made an election. For having the privilege of taking either, the right of choosing is not exercised, whilst both are held and both are claimed. He may, however, be compelled to make an election; but the party insisting upon it can only obtain relief in a court of equity, a court of law having no power to compel an election where none has been made. And when a decree in equity is passed, requiring an election to be made, if A determines to claim his own property, B will then receive compensation for his loss out of the legacy given to A. The proof in this case shows that neither Hess or her son (the petitioner,) was ever permitted to go free, but on the contrary were held as slaves by William H. Marriott, to the time of his decease, and since then the petitioner has been so held by Mrs. Marriott.

The negroes could not have been free under the doctrine of election, unless

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