Marshall v. Dir. of Fin., Pr. Geo's Co.

⁴³⁶ Cole, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. We shall decide in this case whether the State’s Attorney for Prince George’s County is entitled to an increase in salary when the legislation authorizing such increase was enacted after his term had begun. The facts are not disputed. Arthur A. Marshall, Jr. was elected to the office of State’s Attorney for Prince George’s County in November, 1978 and his term began on January 1, 1979.

At that time his salary was $45,510.00, as determined by Maryland Code (1957, 1981 Repl. Vol.) Article 10, § 40 (q), which directs that the salary of the State’s Attorney for Prince George’s County shall be equal to that of the circuit judges of the eight judicial circuits. In July, 1980, the circuit judges received a salary increase, which ostensibly increased Marshall’s salary to $52,500.00. In March, 1981, the County Executive for Prince George’s County, Lawrence J. Hogan, notified Marshall that he would instruct the Director of Finance for Prince George’s County, William R. Brown, Jr., to reduce Marshall’s salary to the $45,510.00 that he was receiving at the beginning of his term.

Understandably unsettled by this action, Marshall sought an injunction from the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County to prevent the reduction of his wages, naming Hogan and Brown as defendants. Hogan and Brown first demurred, which response was overruled. They then filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that there was no genuine dispute as to the facts involved and that Article III, § 35 of the Maryland Constitution forbade the salary increase involved. The Circuit Court, after hearing argument from counsel, granted the motion for summary judgment.

Marshall appealed this decision to the Court of Special Appeals and, before consideration by that court, this Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutional question presented. ■ Article 10 § 40 (q) (1) of the Code, at the time pertinent herein, provided that: The State’s Attorney’s salary shall be equal to the salary of the circuit judges of the several courts of the eight judicial circuits. The State’s Attorney, ⁴³⁷ during his term of office, shall not, except in connection with and in the performance of his duties as such State’s Attorney, appear as counsel or represent any party professionally before any court, board, commission, or agency of this State or any county or political subdivision of this State. It is intended by the provisions herein that the State’s Attorney shall not engage in the private practice of law in any matter whatsoever. [Emphasis supplied.] Thus, Marshall contends that his salary is inextricably linked with the salary of circuit court judges and whenever the judges enjoy an increase in salary so does he. Nevertheless, Hogan directed Brown to reduce Marshall’s salary to the figure at which it was fixed on January 1,1979 on the advice of the County Attorney who suggested that the July, 1980 increase Marshall received violated the restrictions of Article III, § 35 of the Maryland Constitution, to wit: Extra compensation may not be granted or allowed by the General Assembly to any public Officer ... after the service has been rendered, . . . nor may the salary or compensation of any public officer be increased or diminished during his term of office except those whose full term of office is fixed by law in excess of four years.

We have had occasion in the past to interpret this constitutional provision. In Anne Arundel County v. Goodman, 172 Md. 559 , 192 A. 325 (1937), we decided that Article III, § 35 forbade the County Commissioners from reducing the salary of the State’s Attorney during his term of office and that even an agreement by a public officer to accept less than his statutory salary was void and against public policy. In Pressman v. D'Alesandro, 211 Md. 50 , 125 A.2d 35 (1956), we held that the Mayor of Baltimore City, the City Comptroller, and the President and Vice-President of the City Council, as well as the Council members, are public officers within the meaning of Article III, § 35 and ⁴³⁸ thus are prohibited from raising their salaries during their terms of office. Earlier in Calvert County v. Monnett, 164 Md. 101 , 164 A. 155 (1933), we determined that Article III, § 35 is applicable to offices created by the legislature as well as the Constitution and held that this section prevented a reduction in salary of the county treasurer.

In Comptroller v. Klein, 215 Md. 427 , 138 A.2d 648 (1958), we held that a public officer who was appointed to fill out an unexpired term was entitled to receive an increase in salary which was provided for after the appointment of his predecessor but before the appointment of the incumbent. We further recognized in Klein that the basic purpose of § 35 of the Article is to preserve integrity in government. We said [t]he second clause was intended to prevent a public officer from using his office for the purpose of putting pressure upon the General Assembly or other authorized agency to award him additional