Marshall v. State

PER CURIAM. We granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of Special Appeals, in its unreported affirmance of the revocation of Cedric Shawn Marshall’s probation, erred in applying our holding in Hersch v. State, 317 Md. 200 , 562 A.2d 1254 (1989). We conclude that it did and therefore shall reverse the judgment of that court and remand the matter for a new probation revocation hearing. In Hersch , we outlined the procedures required to insure that an admission of violating probation was knowing and voluntary.

We said: “When the immediate consequence of a violation of probation may well be imprisonment, often for a significant period of time, we believe a Johnson v. Zerbst [ 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) ] standard must apply to the waiver of the important right that the probationer has to put the State to its proof. As Chief Judge Murphy pointed out for the Court in Howlett [v. State] supra, 295 Md. [419] at 427-28, 456 A.2d 375 [ (1983) ] no particular litany is required to show a waiver of these rights by a probationer, but the record must show that ‘the charge was explained to the probationer in understandable terms and that his responses demonstrated that his actions were knowing and voluntary.’ It takes but a few moments to ensure that the probationer personally understands the nature of the charges of alleged violations; that he has an absolute right to a hearing at which the State would have to prove the