Marsheck v. Board of Trustees

HARRELL, Judge. Charlotte Marsheck, Petitioner, applied to the Fire and Police Employees’ Retirement System of the City of Balti ³⁹⁸ more, Respondent, for special disability benefits under Baltimore City Code (1983 Repl.Vol. & 1995 Supp.), Article 22, § 34(e) for a work-related injury. Pursuant to Baltimore City Code (1983 Repl.Vol. & 1995 Supp.), Article 22, § 33(1), an administrative hearing was held on her application before a hearing examiner, who determined that Petitioner was ineligible for special disability benefits because she failed to file her application timely. Petitioner sought judicial review in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.

The Circuit Court held that the hearing examiner correctly determined that Petitioner’s application was untimely. Petitioner then appealed to the Court of Special Appeals which affirmed. We granted Ms. Marsheck’s petition for writ of certiorari. Marshek v. Board of Trustees of the Fire and Police Employees’ Retirement System of the City of Baltimore, 355 Md. 610 , 735 A.2d 1105 (1999).

She presents us with the following questions, which we rephrase as follows: I. Did the Court of Special Appeals err, in affirming the Circuit Court’s ruling that the hearing examiner properly denied Petitioner’s application for special disability, by construing the term “injury”, as used in Article 22, § 34(e) of the Baltimore City Code, to begin at the time Petitioner originally sustained her work-related back injury on 13 February 1992?

II

Did the Court of Special Appeals err in failing to apply the “substantial compliance” standard to Petitioner’s untimely filing of her special disabilities benefit application? We affirm the judgments of the Court of Special Appeals and the Circuit Court. STATEMENT OF FACTS The facts of this case are not in dispute. Petitioner began her employment as a Baltimore City police officer on 15 August 1985.

On 13 February 1992, she sustained a work-related back injury while on duty. Despite the injury, she continued to serve with the police department, at times as a full duty police officer and at other times, due to the injury, on light duty status. Throughout her service, she underwent ³⁹⁹ medical treatment and physical therapy. In September 1996, her back problems worsened and she became unable to return to work with the department in any capacity.

Until that point, by all indications, Petitioner made every effort to continue her employment with the police department until she could no longer serve physically. Petitioner acknowledged that she did not sustain a subsequent injury to her back following the 13 February 1992 work-related injury. After a three year period during which Ms. Marsheck endured several surgeries on her back, multiple epidural injections and steroid blocks, and severe depression, her physician opined, on 6 February 1997, that Petitioner was one hundred percent disabled from performing her duties with the police department. On 12 February 1997, Petitioner’s then attorney sent, via first-class mail, an application for special disability benefits to Respondent.

Respondent replied, by letter dated 19 February 1997, informing Petitioner that her application was received by it on 18 February 1997 and, furthermore, that the application was not notarized as required. The application was returned via first-class mail to Petitioner on 19 February 1997. Petitioner then sent a properly notarized application which was docketed as received by Respondent on 25 February 1997. On 22 May 1997, at an administrative hearing before the Respondent’s examiner, Respondent argued that Petitioner did not file her application within five years of her 13 February 1992 injury, as required by § 34(e) of Article 22 of the City Code. 1 Petitioner contended that the applicable date of ⁴⁰⁰ injury under § 34(e) is the date when she became permanently disabled or incapacitated and unable to work and, therefore, the five year statute of limitations did not begin to run until September 1996.

The hearing examiner agreed with Respondent and denied Petitioner special disability benefits under § 34(e) and awarded her only ordinary disability benefits pursuant to § 34(c). 2 Petitioner filed a timely petition for judicial review of the hearing examiner’s decision in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. 3 In an order dated 4 February 1998, the Circuit Court affirmed the hearing examiner’s decision. Petitioner then filed an appeal of the Circuit Court’s decision to the Court of Special Appeals which affirmed the Circuit Court’s judgment. I. Petitioner asks us to equate the term “injury”, as it is used in § 34(e), to mean the date a police officer becomes permanently disabled and incapacitated from being able to perform police duties and, thus, forced into retirement. Based on this argument, Petitioner’s “injury” would occur sometime in September 1996, the earliest date her health deteriorated to the point that she permanently became unable to perform any police duties.

She reasons that Respondent’s position that any claim for special disability benefits must be filed within five years of her original injury on 13 February 1992 is illogical. Petitioner explains that an injured employee may ⁴⁰¹ not apply for special disability benefits earlier than the date of permanent disability. This being so, Petitioner reasons, disability may not evolve, in all cases, within five years of the original work-related injury. For example, an injured employee might make every effort, as Petitioner appears to have done here, to continue employment, albeit at a reduced level of activity, rather than pursue special disability benefits as the first course of action.

In choosing that praiseworthy path, an employee might pass the five year cut-off date, suffer a subsequent deterioration in medical condition to the point of total disability, and be barred from seeking special disability benefits. This, Petitioner submits, is not a just result under the circumstances. Moreover, Petitioner theorizes that Respondent’s position must be contrary to the City Council’s intent in drafting the statute because it punishes dedicated employees who endeavor to continue to work. Such a policy, claims Petitioner, encourages an employee to apply frivolously or prematurely for retirement for fear of never being able to collect special disability benefits when his or her health degenerates due to work-related injuries.

In contrast, Respondent argues that the term “injury” refers clearly and unambiguously to the original incident that causes the worker to eventually become permanent disabled, or incapacitated. Respondent states that § 34(e) requires that the application for special disability benefits be filed within five years of the injury, rather than the date of permanent disability or incapacitation that may be traced to the injury. Furthermore, Respondent asserts the public policy legitimacy of the City Council’s five year cut-off date because special disability benefits are substantially greater than ordinary disability benefits. This argument begins with the premise that the City Council provides generous benefits to reward City workers injured in the line of duty.

Tied with this generosity, however, the City Council exercised its discretion to set a cut-off date for employees hired after 1 July 1979 in order to: 1) protect against frivolous claims; and 2) supply the relatively greater certitude of objectively verifiable dates ⁴⁰² and events in lieu of potentially difficult questions of proof and causation that may be presented otherwise. This Court presumes that the decision made by an administrative body is prima facie correct. See Baltimore Lutheran High School Ass’n, Inc. v. Employment Sec. Admin., 302 Md. 649, 662-63 , 490 A.2d 701, 708 (1985). We, therefore, limit our review of a final decision from an administrative agency to determining whether the agency had before it, at the time its decision was rendered, substantial evidence to support its decision and whether the agency’s decision is free from prejudicial legal error. 4 See Baltimore Lutheran, 302 Md. at 662 , 490 A.2d at 708 .

Because of the deference courts ordinarily accord the expertise of an administrative agency acting within the sphere of its regulated activities, we refrain from making our own independent findings of fact or substituting our judgment for that of the agency when the record contains substantial evidence supporting the agency’s determination. See State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws v. Billhimer, 314 Md. 46, 58 , 548 A.2d 819, 825-26 (1988); Baltimore Lutheran, 302 Md. at 662 , 490 A.2d at 708 . Petitioner presents us with a solely legal issue, namely to determine the meaning of the term “injury” as used in § 34(e).

Our task, therefore, is the ascertainment of whether the legislative body intended the term “injury” in § 34(e) to mean the point at which a police officer becomes permanently disabled. “Fundamentally, the object of all statutory construction is to determine and effectuate the enactment’s purpose.” Briggs v. State, 289 Md. 23, 31 , 421 A.2d 1369, 1374 (1980). Generally, if the language of the statute is unambiguous and ⁴⁰³ its meaning is plain and definite, our inquiry as to the legislature’s intent will end and we will not venture outside the words of the statute. See Martin v. Beverage Capital Corp., 353 Md. 388, 399, 726 A.2d 728, 733 (1999); Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513 , 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987). If the statute’s language is ambiguous, however, we will look towards other sources, such as relevant case law and legislative history, to aid us in determining the legislature’s intentions.

See Martin, 353 Md. at 399 , 726 A.2d at 733 ; Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 515 , 525 A.2d at 632-33 . In addition, we bear in mind that our interpretation of the statute and the legislature’s intent must be examined by looking to the statutory scheme in its entirety rather than segmenting the statute and analyzing only its individual parts. See Martin, 353 Md. at 399 , 726 A.2d at 734 . By such an analytical approach, we seek to avoid illogical and unreasonable results that defy common sense.

See Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 513 , 525 A.2d at 632 . Remedial legislation, such as governs the retirement system here, must be construed liberally in favor of injured employees in order to effectuate the legislation’s remedial purpose. See Martin, 353 Md. at 400 , 726 A.2d at 734 ; Montgomery County v. McDonald, 317 Md. 466, 472 , 564 A.2d 797, 800 (1989). Such a principle, however, does not grant us license to alter the statute beyond its clear meaning and the legislature’s intent.

See id. This Court, therefore, will not add provisions or tailor existing ones to change the mandatory nature of the statute’s language in order to favor the disability claimant. See Philip Elec. North America v. Wright, 348 Md. 209, 217 , 703 A.2d 150, 153 (1997); McDonald, 317 Md. at 472-73 , 564 A.2d at 800 .

The general rule of liberally construing remedial statutes is approached with caution when the scrutinized legislative scheme contains a statute of limitations. 5 We have ⁴⁰⁴ explained, in the context of the workers’ compensation law, that: “[T]he general purpose of the applicable workers’] compensation act to compensate injured workers should not be used to interpret the limitations provision, because the very existence of a limitations provision in the act indicates that the legislature has deliberately compromised the general compensation purpose in the interests of the purposes served by a limitations provision.” McDonald, 317 Md. at 472-73 , 564 A.2d at 800 (citing Kelley, Statutes of Limitations in the Era of Compensation Systems: Workmen’s Compensation Limitations Provisions for Accidental Injury Claims, 1974 Wash.U.L.Q. 541, 603). See also Mayor & City Council of Cumberland v. Beall, 97 Md.App. 597, 600 , 631 A.2d 506, 508 (1993). “Accordingly the Courts should refuse to give statutes of limitations a strained construction to evade their effect.” McMahan v. Dorchester Fertilizer Co., 184 Md. 155, 159 , 40 A.2d 313, 315-16 (1944). Statutes of limitations are also remedial and grounded upon sound public policy. See McMahan, 184 Md. at 159 , 40 A.2d at 315 .

In addition to serving important societal benefits, such as judicial economy, they are designed to balance competing interests between potentially adverse parties. See Doe v. Maskell, 342 Md. 684, 689 , 679 A.2d 1087, 1089 (1996); Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp., 333 Md. 324, 332-33 , 635 A.2d 394, 399 (1994). On the one hand, statutes of limitations provide plaintiffs or claimants with a window of time to initiate a cause of action or assert a claim. See Masked, 342 Md. at 689 , 679 A.2d at 1089 .

As implied from its title, the time period in a statute of limitations is not infinite. Once the limitation period passed, the statute, which once provided opportunity, closes the window and the claim is barred thereafter. The legislature, in drafting such legislation, implicitly recognizes that as time passes, difficult evidentiary issues arise, such as proof of the cause of injury, faded ⁴⁰⁵ memories, and the availability of witnesses. See Hecht, 333 Md. at 332-33 , 635 A.2d at 399 ; Burket v. Aldridge, 241 Md. 423, 428 , 216 A.2d 910, 912 (1966).

Furthermore, without closure on the filing of such claims, potential defendants are often faced with uncertainty that may affect their future financial viability. See Newell v. Richards, 323 Md. 717, 727 , 594 A.2d 1152, 1157 (1991) (discussing limitation statutes and their effectiveness in preventing a crisis of stale medical malpractice claims); DeBusk v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 342 Md. 432, 438-39 , 677 A.2d 73, 76 (1996)(noting how both employers and employees benefit from workers’ compensation statutes that balance competing interests). By closing the window, the statute of limitations grants repose to potential defendants that would be disadvantaged unfairly by stale claims due to unreasonably long delay. See Maskell, 342 Md. at 689 , 679 A.2d at 1089 ; McMahan, 184 Md. at 159-60 , 40 A.2d at 315-16 .

The final result is that the “right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.” Burket, 241 Md. at 428 , 216 A.2d at 912 (citations omitted). We have further noted that there is no magic to the window of time determined by the legislature. See Maskell, 342 Md. at 689 , 679 A.2d at 1089 . “It simply represents the legislature’s judgment about the reasonable time needed to institute suit.” Id. We also recognize that “[t]he statute of limitations, as a defense that does not go to the merits, is disfavored in law and is to be strictly construed.” Newell, 323 Md. at 728 , 594 A.2d at 1157 .

This makes sense if we remember that “[statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience rather than in logic. They represent expedients rather than principles.” Maskell, 342 Md. at 690 , 679 A.2d at 1089 (citations omitted). With these concepts in mind, we turn to the statute at issue. Sections 29 through 36 of the Baltimore City Code set forth the provisions of the Fire and Police Employees’ Retirement System of the City of Baltimore.

The pertinent provisions for determining the scope of the term “injury” are found in §§ 33 ⁴⁰⁶ and 34. For the most part, § 33(1) delineates the administrative process that an applicant must traverse before becoming eligible for any disability benefits, but it also contains substantive provisions similar to § 34(e). See Board of Trustees of Fire & Police Employees Retirement System of City of Baltimore v. Kielczewski, 77 Md.App. 581, 591 , 551 A.2d 485, 490 (1989). It states in part: Any ordinary disability or special disability claimant must make proper application to the Panel of Hearing Examiners, which application shall include a medical certification of his disability and all supporting medical documentation, on a form prescribed by the Panel of Hearing Examiners, wherein the member shall state he has suffered a disability and that such disability prevents him from further performance of the duties of his job classification in the employ of Baltimore City.

If the claim is for a special disability benefit, he shall in addition, state that such physical incapacity was the result of an injury arising out of and in the course of the actual performance of his duty, without willful negligence on his part. Any member who has joined this system on or after July 1, 1979, and who makes application for special disability benefit must additionally state that the disability resulted from an injury that occurred within five (5) years of the date of his application. (Emphasis added). Section 33(1) also states the role of the Respondent’s hearing examiner as follows: The hearing examiner shall conduct hearings for all members on all matters involving ordinary disability claims, special disability claims, special death benefit claims, and any related matters arising out of said claims....

One hearing examiner from the Panel shall hear a particular claim for benefits. The hearing examiner shall conduct hearings in an informal manner with sufficient latitude to provide a fair and impartial hearing to all of the parties without requiring strict compliance with the rules of evidence. Testimony at the hearing shall be under oath and recorded. ⁴⁰⁷ The hearing examiner shall make the following determinations: (1) Whether the member has suffered an injury or illness of such a nature as to preclude the member from the further performance of the duties of his job classification in the employ of Baltimore City. (2) If the claim is for special disability benefits, whether the physical incapacity is the result of an injury arising out of and in the course of the actual performance of duty, without willful negligence on his part, and whether such disability qualifies under the provisions of Section 34(e).

If such claim is filed by a member who joined this system on or after July 1, 1979, the hearing examiner shall additionally determine whether such disability resulted from an injury that occurred within five (5) years of the date of the member’s application. (Emphasis added). Section 34, which covers the two types of disability benefits, states in pertinent part: (c) Ordinary disability retirement benefit. Any member who has acquired five (5) or more years of service and who has beén determined by a hearing examiner to be mentally or physically incapacitated for the further performance of the duties of the member’s job classification in the employ of Baltimore City, and that such incapacity is likely to be permanent, shall be retired by the Board of Trustees on an ordinary disability retirement, not less than thirty (30) and not more than ninety (90) days next following the date of filing his application for ordinary disability retirement benefits. % sfc (e) Special disability benefits.

Any member who has been determined by the hearing examiner to be totally and permanently incapacitated for the further performance of the duties of his job classification in the employ of Baltimore City, as the result of an injury arising out of and in the ⁴⁰⁸ course of the actual performance of duty, without willful negligence on his part, shall be retired by the Board of Trustees on a special disability retirement. For any employee who became a member on or after July 1, 1979, any claim for special disability benefits must be filed within five (5) years of the date of the member’s injury. (Emphasis added). We think it plain that the City Council, while not defining the terms anywhere in the City Code as they apply to §§ 33(1) and 34(e), made a distinction in meaning between the terms “injury” and “disability” or “incapacity.” First, § 33(1), in describing both the requirements for submitting a disability application to the Panel of Hearing Examiners and the role of the hearing examiner, does not use the terms interchangeably.

The applicant must state that “the disability resulted from an injury that occurred within five (5) years of the date of his application.” (Emphasis added). Section 33(1) also requires