Martin Marietta Corp. v. Leius

Hammond, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The Medical Board for Occupational Diseases found that the appellee, Jacqueline Leius, had suffered an occupational disease, dermatitis, resulting in a permanent partial disability to the extent of five per cent loss of use of each hand. The Compensation Commission held that Mrs. Leius had not sustained an occupational disease and, on appeal, Judge Cardin, sitting without a jury, reversed the Commission and reinstated the finding of the Medical Board. The claimant argued below and argues here that the constant use, in the course of her work, of a special ink which was part of a duplicating and copying process, and of a detergent to re ²¹⁹ move the ink from her hands, produced the dermatitis.

The employer and insurer contend, first, that Mrs. Leius’ dermatitis was not a compensable condition because she had not met the burden a claimant has, under Code (1957), Art. 101, Sec. 23 (c), and decisions of this Court, such as Mutual Chemical Co. v. Thurston, 222 Md. 86 , of showing that it was characteristic of and peculiar to her employment, and, second, that even if the dermatitis could be said to be an occupational disease there was legally sufficient evidence to support the finding of the Commission to the contrary and, therefore, the lower court, on appeal, could not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative body. We shall assume, without deciding, that the claimant’s dermatitis could properly have been found to be an occupational disease, since we think there was legally sufficient evidence before the Commission to support its finding that Mrs. Leius did not, as a fact, sustain an occupational disease arising out of and in the course of her employment and, this being so, the action of the lower court, in reversing that finding, was impermissible. Under the law as it now is and was before June 1, 1951, the finding and report of the Medical Board is subject to review by the Commission, and “finality, in so far as the legislature can make final the decision of an administrative tribunal, attaches to the decision of the Commission, not to the decision of the Medical Board.” Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard, Inc. v. Bishop, 189 Md. 147, 154 . Between June 1, 1951, and June 1, 1955, the Legislature gave almost complete finality to the finding of the Medical Board by providing (in Sec. 28 of Art. 101 of the Code of 1951) that upon review by the Commission “* * * the findings of the Medical Board upon all medical questions shall be presumed to be correct and such findings shall not be set aside or reversed if there is legally sufficient evidence in the record to support such findings.” But, as was said in Duncan v. McNitt Coal Co., 212 Md. 386, 395 , as to the ultimate