Martin v. Allegany County Board of Education

HOTTEN, J. Appellants, Linda Martin and other similarly situated parents, filed a petition for judicial review of the Maryland State Board of Education’s (“State Education Board”) determination, which affirmed the decision of appellee, the Allegany County Board of Education (“Allegany Education Board”). At issue was the termination of an agreement between the Allegany Education Board and the Washington County Board of Education (‘Washington Education Board”), which provided approximately forty students, who resided in Allegany County, the opportunity to attend schools in Washington County. Appellants allege that the Allegany Education Board’s decision violated the Md.Code (1978, 2008 Repl.Vol., 2012 Cum. Supp.), § 4-121 of the Education Article 1 [hereinafter “Edu ⁶⁰⁰ cation Article § 4-121”].

The Circuit Court for Allegany County affirmed the State Education Board’s ruling. Appellants noted an appeal, and present two questions for our consideration: I. Was the decision of the Allegany County Board of Education in violation of § 4-121 of the Education Article, and thus properly subject to reversal by the State Board and/or the lower court?

II

Was the decision of the Allegany County Board of Education arbitrary or capricious and violative of sound educational policy, thereby mandating reversal by the State Board and/or the lower court? For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On August 1, 2000, the Allegany Education Board voted to close a school in the most eastern region of its county, 2 and to consolidate students from the closing facility to nearby institutions. 3 To address the parents’ apprehension regarding the consolidation, the Allegany Education Board and the Washington Education Board entered into an agreement, which allowed students, who resided in Little Orleans, Allegany County, Maryland to attend secondary schools in either Cumberland, Maryland in Allegany County or Hancock, Maryland in Washington County. Many students opted to attend school in Allegany County, while others decided to attend the Washington County schools. “The students who ⁶⁰¹ attended school in Washington County were counted as Washington County students for the purpose of calculating state aid to schools.

The Allegany [Education Board] paid the transportation costs for all of said students.” 4 On February 28, 2011, the superintendent of Allegany County Public Schools, David Cox (“Mr.Cox”), drafted letters to the parents whose children opted to attend school in Washington County, stating (parenthesis omitted): ... For the 2011-2012 school year[,] Allegany County Public Schools face a reduction in state funding of over $6.5 million due to our declining enrollment and loss of state revenues. As a result, we must consider the termination of our contract with Washington County Public [S]chools to continue providing some $191,000 of Allegany County revenue for approximately 40 students to attend Washington County Public Schools. This arrangement also costs Allegany County Public Schools about $400,000 in lost state revenue.

As you can see, this arrangement costs [Allegany County Public Schools] about $600,000 per year. We recognize the impact that this consideration would have on your child(ren) and on students who are in their secondary years of study, and do not take that lightly. We wish that this consideration were [sic] not necessary. The cuts in state funding will all be finally determined by the General Assembly, and the final impact and recommended arrangements will not be known until then.

Thereafter, the Allegany Education Board extensively debated the issue, and held a public hearing for parents, students, and the community to assert their viewpoints regarding the possible termination of the agreement, answer countless questions, and provide information to impacted families. On ⁶⁰² June 3, 2011, Mr. Cox again corresponded with the parents via letter, indicating: At the June 1, 2011 meeting of the Allegany County Board of Education, the Board voted to phase out the tuition support program that currently supports residents in the Little Orleans community to attend middle and high school in Washington County. Allegany County residents who are students in the 10[th]—12[th] grades at Hancock High School in the 2011-2012 school year will receive tuition support. It is the intent of the Board to allow these students to complete their high school experience at Hancock High School over the next three years, contingent on available funding.

Transportation will be provided to Hancock High School at least for one more year. Students who are in grades Pre-K through 9[th] grade for the 2011-2012 school year who live in the Little Orleans community are districted to attend Flintstone Elementary, Washington Middle School, and Fort Hill High School, as some have chosen even while we have supported the Washington County choice. We welcome all the children of Little Orleans to Washington Middle and Fort Hill High School and will plan an orientation session for a better transition experience.... [5] On June 29, 2011, appellants requested that the State Education Board review the Allegany Education Board’s decision pursuant to the Code of Maryland Regulations (“CO-MAR”) 13A.01.05.02. 6 ⁶⁰³ On July 27, 2011, the Allegany Education Board filed a motion for summary affirmance, 7 requesting that the State Education Board summarily affirm its decision pursuant to COMAR 13A.01.05.03D. 8 Thereafter, a “Save Orleans Students” group requested that the Circuit Court for Allegany County issue a temporary restraining order and an interlocutory injunction, which would permit Little Orleans residents to continue schooling in Washington County. The court ruled in favor of the Allegany Education Board, denying both the temporary restraining order, as well as the injunction on August 23, 2011.

The group noted an appeal to our Court, but the action was dismissed. On October 25, 2011, the State Education Board granted review and determined that (1) Education Article § 4-121 ⁶⁰⁴ included the word “may,” so there was no requirement of a cross-boundary school attendance and (2) “[i]t [was] incumbent on local boards when making decisions to consider the validity of all expenditures and to weigh and balance the needs of all students in th[o]se tough fiscal times.” On November 22, 2011, appellants filed a petition for judicial review. On November 29, 2011, the Allegany Education Board filed its response. On February 24, 2012, both parties filed a joint motion for extension of time to file their briefs, which was granted.

On March 23, 2012, appellants filed an appeal in the Circuit Court for Allegany County pursuant to Md.Code (1984, 2009 RepLVol., 2012 Cum.Supp.), § 10-222(a) of the State Government Article, for judicial review of the State Education Board’s decision. 9 On April 13, 2012, the Allegany Education Board filed its response. Following a hearing on June 21, 2012, the trial court issued a memorandum and order on July 9, 2012, affirming the State Education Board, where it concluded that appellants did not support their assertion that Education Article § 4-121 was not discretionary, and that the State Education Board did not err in finding that the Allegany Education Board’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious. Appellant noted a timely appeal. STANDARD OF REVIEW The doctrine that an individual has a Maryland constitutional right to judicial review regarding an administrative action is mostly predicated on Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of ⁶⁰⁵ Rights. 10 Jackson v. Dackman Co., 422 Md. 357, 378 , 30 A.3d 854 (2011) (citing State v. Bd. of Educ., 346 Md. 633, 647 , 697 A.2d 1334 (1997)) (additional citation omitted).

It provides: That every man, for any injury done to him [or her] in his [or her] person or property, ought to have remedy by the course of the Law of the [L]and, and ought to have justice and right, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay, according to the Law of the [L]and. Id. at 376, 30 A.3d 854 . In examining the propriety of a trial court’s consideration of a petition for judicial review, we analyze the agency’s decision, not the trial court’s ruling. Venter v. Bd. of Educ., 185 Md.App. 648, 664 , 972 A.2d 328 (2009) (quoting Days Cove Reclamation Co. v. Queen Anne’s County, 146 Md.App. 469, 484 , 807 A.2d 156 (2002)) (quoting Gigeous v. E. Coir.

Instit., 363 Md. 481, 495-96 , 769 A.2d 912 (2001)). In this regard, we examine “the materials that were in the record before the agency at the time it made its final decision.” Bd. of Educ. of Talbot County v. Heister, 392 Md. 140, 146 , 896 A.2d 342 (2006) (citing Chertkof v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 43 Md.App. 10,17 , 402 A.2d 1315 (1979)). We review the agency’s determination to consider whether such a ruling was “ ‘in accordance with the law or whether it [was] arbitrary, illegal, and capricious.’” Venter, 185 Md.App. at 664-65 , 972 A.2d 328 (quoting Maryland Dep’t of the Env’t v. Ives, 136 Md.App. 581, 585 , 766 A.2d 657 (2001)).

Hence, our Court will affirm the agency’s decision if it was predicated on substantial evidence from the record, and not erroneous as a matter of law. Id. at 665 , 972 A.2d 328 (quoting United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. People’s Counsel, 336 Md. 569, 577 , 650 A.2d 226 (1994)). ⁶⁰⁶ “The substantial evidence standard of review asks ‘whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached,’ ” Comptroller of the Treasury v. Clise Coal, Inc., 173 Md.App. 689, 697-98 , 920 A.2d 561 (2007) (quoting Fairchild Hiller Corp. v. Supervisor of Assessments of Washington County, 267 Md. 519, 521-22 , 298 A.2d 148 (1973)) (quoting Ins., Comm’r v. Nat’l Bureau, 248 Md. 292, 309-10 , 236 A.2d 282 (1967)), and if not, we may “overrule [the] agency’s factual finding [if] the finding is ‘unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in light of the entire record as submitted.’ ” Id. at 697, 920 A.2d 561 (citing Md.Code (1984, 2009 Repl.Vol., 2012 Cum.Supp.), § 10-222(h)(v) of the State Government Article). ‘“[T]he paramount role of the State Board of Education in interpreting the public education law sets it apart from most administrative agencies.’” Montgomery County Educ. Ass’n, Inc. v. Bd. of Education of Montgomery County, 311 Md. 303, 309 , 534 A.2d 980 (1987)[hereinafter “Montgomery County Educ. Ass’n ”] (quoting Bd. of Educ. for Dorchester County v. Hubbard, 305 Md. 774, 791 , 506 A.2d 625 (1986)).

Our Courts have traditionally held that “the State [Education] Board has very broad statutory authority over the administration of the public school system in this State.” Heister, 392 Md. at 152 , 896 A.2d 342 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Prince George’s County v. Waeldner, 298 Md. 354, 359-60 , 470 A.2d 332 (1984)). This is further evidenced by Md.Code (1978, 2008 Repl.Vol., 2012 Cum. Supp.), § 2-205(e) of the Education Article, which provides the State Education Board with the authority to “explain the true intent and meaning of the [statute’s] provisions[.]” Montgomery County Educ. Ass’n, 311 Md. at 309 , 534 A.2d 980 .

We have generally described the State Education Board’s authority as follows: We think it beyond question that the power of visitation vested in the State [Education] Board is one of general control and supervision; it authorizes the State [Education] Board to superintend the activities of the local boards of ⁶⁰⁷ education to keep them within the legitimate sphere of their operations, and whenever a controversy or dispute arises involving the educational policy or proper administration of the public school system of the State, the State [Education] Board’s visitatorial power authorizes it to correct all abuses of authority and to nullify all irregular proceedings. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery County v. Montgomery County Educ. Assoc., Inc., 66 Md.App. 729, 739-40 , 505 A.2d 905 (1986) (quoting Zeitschel v. Bd. of Educ., 274 Md. 69, 81 , 332 A.2d 906 (1975)) (quotations omitted). We do recognize that the State Education Board’s authority is not unfettered, as it cannot apply its power “fraudulently, in bad faith, in breach of trust, or in direct contravention of [a] statute.” Id. at 740, 505 A.2d 905 . “Decisions of a local [education] board involving a local policy or a controversy and dispute regarding the rules and regulations of the local board shall be considered prima facie correct, and the State [Education] Board may not substitute its judgment for that of the local board unless the decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, or illegal.” 11 COMAR 13A.01.05.05(A).

We acknowledge that “[i]f the State [Education] Board’s interpretation or application of [a statute], in a particular situation, would clearly be contrary to the statute’s plain meaning, a reviewing court must reject that interpretation.” Montgomery County Educ. Ass’n, 311 Md. at 309 , 534 A.2d 980 . However, “under its visitatorial power, the “last word” or the “final decision” rests with the State [Education] Board as to ⁶⁰⁸ any dispute concerning the administration of the public school system----” Bd. of School Comm’rs of Baltimore City v. James, 96 Md.App. 401, 418 , 625 A.2d 361 (1993) (quoting Waeldner, 298 Md. at 361 , 470 A.2d 332 ). See also Education Article § 2-205(e)(2) and (3) (“The Board shall decide all controversies and disputes under these provisions[, and] [t]he decision of the Board is final.”); New Bd. of School Comm’rs of Baltimore City v. Pub.

School. Adm’rs & Supervisors Ass’n of Baltimore City, 142 Md.App. 61, 70-71 , 788 A.2d 200 (2002) (additional citations omitted); Montgomery County Educ. Ass’n, 311 Md. at 310 , 534 A.2d 980 ; McIntyre v. Bd. of Educ., 55 Md.App. 219, 224 , 461 A.2d 63 (1983); Bd. of Educ. v. McCrumb, 52 Md.App. 507, 514, 450 A.2d 919 (1982) (“[T]he Maryland State Board of Education then is vested with the last word on matters of educational policy or the administration of the system of public education”) (additional citation omitted); Resetar v. State Bd. of Educ., 284 Md. 537, 556 , 399 A.2d 225 (1979) (“[T]he totality of the various statutory provisions concerning the State [Education] Board quite plainly ... invests the State [Education] Board with the last word on any matter concerning educational policy or the administration of the system of public education.”) (internal quotation omitted) (additional citation omitted); Wilson v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery County, 234 Md. 561, 565 , 200 A.2d 67 (1964) (additional citations omitted). DISCUSSION Whether The State Education Board Erred In Determining That The Allegany Education Board’s Decision Did Not Violate Education Article § 4-121 And Was Not Arbitrary And Capricious.

Before we analyze the statute, we explore the Court of Appeals’s discussion in Chesapeake Charter, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County Bd. of Educ., 358 Md. 129, 137-38 , 747 A.2d 625 (2000) regarding the hierarchy of Maryland’s education system, explaining as follows: ⁶⁰⁹ The State government structure for primary and secondary education is the State Department of Education, created by [Education Article] § 2-201 “as a principal department of the State government.” The Department consists of (1) the State Board of Education, which is the head of the Department [ (Education Article] § 2-102) ..., (2) the State Superintendent of Schools, who is a member of the Governor’s Executive Council [ (Education Article] § 2-303(d)) and serves, in essence, as the chief executive officer of the Department, and (3) the other professional, administrative, and clerical employees employed by the Department, who are State government employees for budgetary and personnel purposes. For each county, the [General Assembly] has created a county department of education that, in structure, generally mirrors that of the State Department of Education. The county school board is the head of the county department and is responsible for administering, in the county, the supervening State policy determined by the State Board of Education, in accordance with State Board’s directives. [12] There is, as well, a county superintendent, who is the executive officer of the county board and, in essence, the chief executive office of the county department.... The circumstances regarding cross-boundary school enrollment for non-resident students are governed by Education Article § 4-121(b) and (c), which provides in pertinent part: (b) School to be free.—A school that is in one county and near the boundary of an adjoining county is free to the children of the adjoining county as provided in this section. ⁶¹⁰ (c) Joint provision for school support and attendance policies; ...—(1) The county boards of the two counties may: (1) Provide jointly for the maintenance and support of the jointly attended school in the receiving county; and (ii) Determine the geographical attendance areas and other attendance policies of the two counties for all jointly attended schools in the receiving county.

(2) If the two county boards fail to agree on a geographical attendance area or attendance policy, the State Superintendent shall decide the matter. Subsection (d) of Education Article § 4-121 addresses funding, which states: (d) Funding.—(1) For each fiscal year, the sending county shall pay the receiving county, for each student who resides in the sending county and who attends a public school in the receiving county, an amount equal to the lesser of: (1) The local current expense per student in the sending county; or (ii) The local current expense per student in the receiving county. (2) If the local current expense per student for the sending county is less than the local current expense per student for the receiving county, the difference, plus the appropriate State share of the foundation program, for each student who resides in a sending county who attends a public school in the receiving county, shall be: (i) Paid by the State to the receiving county; and (ii) Provided for in the appropriation to the State Board. We must examine whether Education Article § 4-121(b) provides an unfettered right to free public education where children in one county are so near to the boundary of an adjoining county, and specifically, whether Allegany County is obliged to continue to finance the educational expenses of its Little Orleans residents to attend schools in Washington County.

However, through analyzing this issue, we also intend to determine whether Education Article 4-121(c) compels ⁶¹¹ an agreement between adjoining counties and whether the statute provides affected students and parents the right to enforce such an agreement. Appellants assert that Education Article § 4-121 “provides that students affected by these particularly unique geographic circumstances must be afforded the ability to attend a school that is more “near” to their communities in a neighboring county free of charge as part of their right.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The Allegany Education Board maintains that Education Article § 4-121 is discretionary because it “clearly indicates that the school boards in the adjacent counties may provide for an agreement concerning cross-county attendance.” (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted) (underline omitted). The Allegany Education Board also avers that the statute neither provides students nor their parents the right to compel counties to enter into an agreement regarding cross-boundary school attendance.

A question regarding statutory interpretation is a legal question, which we review de novo. Harvey v. Marshall, 389 Md. 243, 257 , 884 A.2d 1171 (2005) (citing Mohan v. Norris, 386 Md. 63, 66-67 , 871 A.2d 575 (2005)); see also Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604 , 861 A.2d 78 (2004) (Maryland appellate courts review issues de novo to decide if the circuit court was legally correct in its interpretations of the Maryland Code.). The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly, Beka Indus, v. Worcester County Bd. of Educ., 419 Md. 194, 217 , 18 A.3d 890 (2011) (citing Stem v. Bd. of Regents, Univ. Sys. of Maryland, 380 Md. 691, 720 , 846 A.2d 996 (2004)), as well as “ ‘the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular provision!)]’ ” Whitley III., et al. v. Maryland State Bd. of Elections, et al., 429 Md. 132, 149 , 55 A.3d 37 (2012) (citing Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 172 , 935 A.2d 699 (2007)).

To construe the intent, we start by observing the plain meaning of the statutory terminology, Bornemann v. Bornemann, 175 Md.App. 716, 724 , 931 A.2d 1154 (2007) (citing ⁶¹² Reier v. State Dept. of Assessments and Taxation, 397 Md. 2, 26 , 915 A.2d 970 (2007)), so that “ ‘no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory[.]’ ” Whitley, 429 Md. at 149 , 55 A.3d 37 . “... When the plain meaning is clear and unambiguous, and consistent with both the broad purposes ... of the provision being interpreted ...,” we end our search, Assateague Coastkeeper et al. v. Maryland Dep’t of the Environment, 200 Md.App. 665, 709 , 28 A.3d 178 (2011), cert. denied 424 Md. 291 , 35 A.3d 488 (2012) (quoting Wal Mart Stores, Inc. v. Holmes, 416 Md. 346, 359 , 7 A.3d 13 (2010)) (quoting Schlosser v. Uninsured Employers’ Fund, 414 Md. 195, 203-04 , 994 A.2d 956 (2010)), except in the “interest of completeness.” See Whitley, 429 Md. at 155 , 55 A.3d 37 . If the language is ambiguous and susceptible to more than one meaning, we examine intent from the legislative history, as well as “case law, purpose, structure, and overarching statutory scheme in aid of searching for the intention of the legislature.” Id. at 149 , 55 A.3d 37 . See also Bornemann, 175 Md.App. at 724 , 931 A.2d 1154 (citing Evans v. State, 396 Md. 256, 341 , 914 A.2d 25 (2006); Allstate Ins.

Co. v. Kim, 376 Md. 276, 290 , 829 A.2d 611 (2003)). The overall purpose, legislative history, and the statute’s language is analyzed in its entirety to elucidate the inconsistencies and ambiguities. Assateague Coastkeeper, 200 Md.App. at 709 , 28 A.3d 178 (quoting Wal Mart Stores, Inc. v. Holmes, 416 Md. 346, 359 , 7 A.3d 13 (2010)) (quoting Schlosser v. Uninsured Employers’ Fund, 414 Md. 195, 203-04 , 994 A.2d 956 (2010)). Furthermore, ‘“[w]hen faced with a problem of statutory construction, [the Court of Appeals] [has] show[n] great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration.’ ” Jordan Towing, Inc. v. Hebbville Auto Repair, Inc., 369 Md. 439, 459 , 800 A.2d 768 (2002) (quoting Udall v. Tollman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 , 85 S.Ct. 792 , 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965)).

The Court of Appeals has stated: [A] court’s task on review is not to substitute its judgment for the expertise of those persons who constitute the administrative agency. Even with regard to some legal issues, a degree of deference should often be accorded the position of ⁶¹³ the administrative agency. Thus, an administrative agency’s interpretation and application of the statute which the agency administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight by reviewing courts. Assateague Coastkeeper, 200 Md.App. at 709 , 28 A.3d 178 (quoting Headen v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 418 Md. 559, 570 , 16 A.3d 196 (2011)) (quoting Bd. of Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 68 , 729 A.2d 376 (1999)) (quotations omitted).

We first examine the syntax of the statute, specifically the word “may.” Our Courts have traditionally stated that “ ‘[w]hen a legislative body commands that something be done, using words such as “shall” or “must,” rather than “may” or “should,” we must assume, absent some evidence to the contrary, that it was serious and that it meant for the thing to be done in the manner it directed.’ ” Hammersla v. State, 184 Md.App. 295, 313 , 965 A.2d 912 (2009) (quoting Thanos v. State, 332 Md. 511, 522 , 632 A.2d 768 (1993)). See also Perez v. State, 420 Md. 57, 63-64 , 21 A.3d 1048 (2011) (“ When the [General Assembly] commands that something be done, using words such as ‘shall’ or ‘must’ rather than ‘may’ or ‘should,’ the obligation to comply with the statute or rule is mandatory.’ ”) (additional citations omitted); Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563, 580, 911 A.2d 427 (2006) (additional citations omitted); State v. Green, 367 Md. 61, 82 , 785 A.2d 1275 (2001) (additional citations omitted). As demonstrated, Courts often perceive that “may” is synonymous with “should,” so we examine Judge Kathryn Graeff s analysis in Miller v. City of Annapolis Historic Pres. Comm’n, 200 Md.App. 612, 639-40 , 28 A.3d 147 (2011), where regulatory guidelines pertaining to fiberglass building materials were examined.

Judge Graeff explained the difference between “should” and “shall” as follows: In comparing the definitions of should versus shall, it becomes evident that their meanings, while similar, are indeed distinct. Should is used to express duty, obligation, necessity, propriety, or expediency. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW ⁶¹⁴ INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2104 (3rd ed. unabridged 1993). Shall is used to express a command or exhortation.

WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY at 2085. Should, while definitely strongly encouraging a particular course of action, is permissive. Shall requires a particular course of action and accordingly, is mandatory. Id. at 639 , 28 A.3d 147 (emphasis added in original) (additional citations omitted).

As previously indicated, the General Assembly’s sentence structure incorporated that “[t]he county boards of the two counties may” choose to divide the funding of non-resident students, as well as decide educational policies. As denoted above, we surmise that the General Assembly desired to “confer[ ] substantial leeway” on the boards, Haynes v. City & County of San Francisco, 688 F.3d 984, 987 (9th Cir.2012), and permit the boards to exercise their own discretion in determining cross-boundary school attendance. Education Article § 4-121 permits residents who reside in one county to enroll in an adjoining county’s school, provided that the two adjoining counties reached an accord relating to joint attendance of the non-residents. Accordingly, we determine that Education Article § 4-121’s plain meaning is clear and unambiguous because the language is not susceptible to more than one meaning.

Nevertheless, to ensure that we have discerned the General Assembly’s intent, we examine the legislative history and other provisions of the statute. See Whitley, 429 Md. at 155 , 55 A.3d 37 (“ ‘Even when the language of a statute is free from ambiguity, in the interest of completeness!],] we may ... explore the legislative history of the statute under review ... [.][T]he resort to legislative history is a confirmatory process; it is not undertaken to contradict the plain meaning of the statute.’ ”) (quoting Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 131 , 756 A.2d 987 (2000)). The origin of Education Article § 4-121 is found in Senate Bill 222 of the 1978 General Assembly. 1978 Md. Laws, ch. ⁶¹⁵ 22. During this time, the statute was codified as Education Article § 4-120, as opposed to § 4-121, providing that: (c)(1) The county boards of the two counties may: (1) Provide jointly for the maintenance and support of the jointly attended school in the receiving county; and (ii) Determine the geographical attendance areas and other attendance policies of the two counties for all jointly attended schools in the receiving county.

(2) If the two county boards fail to agree on a geographical attendance area or attendance policy, the State Superintendent shall decide the matter. S.B. 819, 384th Gen Assem. Reg. Sess.

(Md.1980). In 1980, Senate Bill 819 was introduced, concerning residents in Somerset County attending school in Worcester County. Id. 42 [cjhildren who live[d] in Somerset County live[d] within 2 miles of a school in Worcester County but 15 miles for the closest school in their own county. They had been allowed to attend school in Worcester County until the Board of Education in Somerset County recently ruled otherwise.

SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE, FLOOR REPORT, S.B. 819,1980 General Assembly (Md.1980). 13 Senator Long of the 1980 General Assembly sponsored Senate Bill 819 “[t]o allow an exemption to the current Somerset County Board of Education requirement that all children in Somerset County attend school in that county. This would allow [the] small number of children near Pocomoke City to attend school in Worcester County.” Id. The introduced section read as follows: (3) The following provisions apply in Somerset and Worcester Counties: (I) A student who resides in Somerset County and is presently attending school in Worcester County may continue to ⁶¹⁶ attend school in Worcester County until graduation from high school. (II) Brothers and sisters of students described in subparagraph (I) of this paragraph may attend those same schools until graduation from high school.

(III) When the cycle described in subparagraphs (I) and (II) of this paragraph is complete, the exception described in this paragraph will end and all new students will attend school in Somerset County, unless otherwise authorized by the Somerset County Board of Education. Amendment to S.B. 819 (First Reading File Bill), 386th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., (Md.1980) (quotations omitted) (capitalization omitted) (underlines omitted).

After amendments to the language, the General Assembly decided on the current reading of Education Article § 4-121(c)(3). Recently, Delegates LeRoy Myers and Wendell Beitzel, members of the 2012 General Assembly, sponsored bills concerning Education Article § 4-121. House Bill 335, entitled “Education-Public Secondary Schools Near Boundary of Two Counties,” was recommended for the following: This bill allows a student who must travel more than 30 miles to reach the student’s assigned secondary public school to attend a public secondary school in an adjoining county, if the public secondary school in the adjoining county is closer than the assigned public secondary school and the school is below 80% capacity. The State Board of Education may adopt regulations to implement the provisions of the bill.

Dep’t of Legis. Servs., Fiscal and Policy Note, H.B. 335 (2012). House Bill 1447, entitled “Education—School Attendance in Another County” provided that: This bill allows a student to attend a public school in an adjoining (receiving) county if the county where the student resides (sending county) determines that transportation of the student to his or her assigned public school in the county is not feasible. The sending county may not be required to provide transportation of the student to a school ⁶¹⁷ in the receiving county and must make an annual determination regarding the feasibility of transporting each student to a school in the sending county.

A student presently attending school in a receiving county may continue to do so until graduation from high school, and a sibling of the student may attend the same school. However, after all students presently attending school in a receiving county have graduated, siblings of those students may no longer attend the school in the receiving county unless the sending county determines that transportation of the student to the assigned school is not feasible and there is an agreement between the two counties for attendance in the receiving county. [14] Dep’t of Legis. Servs., Fiscal and Policy Note, H.B. 1447 (2012). The bills were not approved by the House, and were thereby not enacted.

Appellate courts analyze the statutory scheme in its entirety and “attempt to harmonize provisions dealing with the same subject so that each may be given effect.” Henriquez v. Henriquez, 413 Md. 287, 297-98 , 992 A.2d 446 (2010) (quoting Bowen v. City of Annapolis, 402 Md. 587, 613-14 , 937 A.2d 242 (2007)) (quoting Kushell v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 385 Md. 563, 576-77 , 870 A.2d 186 (2005)). The Court of Appeals has further searched the “contested provisions of Maryland’s ... Article[s] in the context of the statutory scheme as a whole and construe the plain language so that the various sections of the article do not conflict with one another.” (Ctr. Ins.

Co. v. J.T.W., 397 Md. 71, 81, 916 A.2d 235 (2007)) (citing Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 443 , 903 A.2d 388 (2006); Deville v. State, 383 Md. 217, 223 , 858 A.2d 484 (2004); Navarro-Monzo v. Washington Adventist, 380 Md. 195, 204 , 844 A.2d 406 (2004)). See also Frey, et al. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 422 Md. 111, 183 , 29 A.3d 475 (2011) (“[W]hen two provisions ‘relate to ⁶¹⁸ the same subject matter, and are not inconsistent with each other, they should be construed together and harmonized where consistent with their general object and scope.’ ”) (additional citations omitted). Education Article § 4-121(c) is entitled “Joint provision for school support and attendance policies; special provisions as to Somerset and Worcester counties.” Subsection (3) provides (emphasis added): (3) The following provisions apply in Somerset and Worcester counties: (i) A student who resides in Somerset County and is presently attending school in Worcester County may continue to attend school in Worcester County until graduation from high school. (ii) After all of the students described in subparagraph (i) have graduated, the exception described in this paragraph will end and all new students will attend school in Somerset County, unless otherwise authorized as provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection.

Possibly taking a cue from Education Article § 4-121(c)(3), it appears that the Allegany Education Board decided to provide its Little Orleans residents, who were in the 10th through 12th grades, permission to complete their high school tenure in Washington County, but not its residents from prekindergarten through 9th grade. Thereby, it was not unreasonable for the Allegany Education Board to believe that it would be complying with the General Assembly’s intent, even when faced with the decision to terminate its agreement, in light of fiscal restraints. We recognize that the subsections of Education Article § 4-121 cannot be considered in isolation, and that overall, must be examined in conjunction with other provisions. Md.Code (1978, 2008 RepLVol., 2012 Cum.

Supp), § 7—101(b)(2)(i) of the Education Article provides (emphasis added): (b) Location.—(1) Except as provided in § 7-301 of this title and in paragraph (2) of this subsection, each child shall attend a public school in the county where the child is ⁶¹⁹ domiciled with the child’s parent, guardian, or relative providing informal kinship care.... (2)(i) Upon request and in accordance with a county board’s policies concerning residency, a county superintendent may allow a child to attend school in the county even if the child is not domiciled in that county with the child’s parent or guardian. Although we could not obtain the 1957 or 1978 origins of Education Article § 7-101, we were able to obtain House Bill 364 of the 1997 General Assembly, which was enacted to “require[] a child to attend a public