Martin v. Michaels

³⁴⁸ Digges, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal comes to us from the Circuit Court for Allegany County, which at the conclusion of the complainant’s case granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss a complaint for specific performance. Assuming the truth of all the evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the complainant, Maryland Rule 535, the following facts emerge. On November 12, 1968 the complainant, Delbert Martin, entered into an oral agreement with the defendants, Wilbert Michaels and his wife, to purchase a garage and land located in Allegany County, supported by the following writing: “Nov. 12,1968 Received of Delbert Martin $150.00 for garage & ground on Main (Rt. 36) St., Mt.

Savage, Md. /s/ Mrs. Wilbert Michaels, Jr.” There is no dispute as to the occurrence of this transaction or that Martin took immediate possession of the garage. There is a dispute, however, as to the extent and boundaries of the land contracted for, especially since it is only a part of a larger tract owned by the Michaels. The defendants admit the agreement, but assert that it was for the garage and only the ground on which it sits. The complainant contends that the contract not only encompassed this but also additional land agreed to at the time of purchase.

Judge Naughton granted the motion to dismiss, finding 1) that enforcement of this agreement was barred by the Statute of Frauds, and 2) that specific performance could not be granted because of the uncertain and vague description of the property. Since under our view of the case specific performance can only be authorized as to the garage and ground on which it rests, the Michaels’ answer to the bill of complaint is in itself sufficient to obviate the necessity of sat ³⁴⁹ isfying the Statute of Frauds. The very first paragraph of their answer states: “They admit that the Plaintiff paid the sum of $150.90 to the Defendants for a garage located on Main Street in Mt. Savage, and received a receipt therefor . . .

Similarly, in paragraph seven, “. . . they deny that any land other than the land on which the garage is located was sold to the Plaintiff.” (Emphasis added.) It is well settled in this state that: “The court will enforce the specific performance of a contract within the statute, not in writing, where it is . . . confessed by the answer of the defendant and the statute is not relied upon as a defence. In such a case relief is granted upon the ground that as the statute was intended to prevent fraud and perjury, there can be no danger of either where the contract is . . . confessed in the answer; or upon the ground that the defendant has waived the benefit of the statute.” Miller, Equity Procedure, § 701; Trossbach v. Trossbach, 185 Md. 47 , 42 A. 2d 905 (1945); Hensel v. Calder, 135 Md. 487 , 109 A. 195 (1920). While the answer in this case does mention the Statute of Frauds as a defense, the defendants restrict its use to an attack on the allegations seeking property beyond the garage and the land on which if rests. The more substantial question, therefore, deals with the problem of trying to specifically enforce a contract which may be uncertain in its description.

It is well settled in this and other jurisdictions that a bill for specific performance can be successfully maintained as long as: “ ‘the description [of the land used in the contract] ... be such as to enable the court to determine with certainty, with the aid of such extrinsic evidence as is admissible under the rules of evidence, what property was intended by the parties to be covered thereby. The description ³⁵⁰ need not be given with such particularity as to make a resort to extrinsic evidence unnecessary. Reasonable certainty is all that is required.’ (Citations omitted.)” Powell v. Moody, 153 Md. 62, 66 , 137 A. 477, 478 (1927). Sears v. Polan’s, 250 Md. 525 , 243 A. 2d 602 (1968) Grooms v. Williams, 227 Md. 165 , 175 A. 2d 575 (1961) ; Baker v. Dawson, 216 Md. 478 , 141 A. 2d 157 (1958); Neuland v. Millison, 188 Md. 594 , 53 A. 2d 568 (1947) Brockmeyer v. Norris, 177 Md. 466 , 10 A. 2d 326 (1940); Loughran v. Ramsburg, 174 Md. 181 , 197 A. 804 (1938).

This is true whether the agreement is written or oral. Lorenzo v. Ottaviano, 167 Md. 138, 146 , 173 A. 17 (1934). The question before us then is whether the agreement set out in the evidence describes the property with enough certainty to ascertain its boundaries and to authorize the granting of specific performance. Martin offered the only evidence to show that the agreement was for more than the garage and the land it sits on.

The several descriptions which he provided, however, simply add to a maze-of fact and only aid in clouding rather than clarifying-this dispute. Initially Martin relates the discussion which occurredi at the time the contract was consummated: “ ‘I’ll give you $150.00 for the garage and ground.’ ‘Well’, he said, ‘okay’. I said, ‘How big is the ground?’ He said, ‘Debs’, he said, T think there’s ten-tenths of an acre there.’ I said, ‘Now, Tim, there can’t be no ten-tenths of an acre’, I' said, ‘that’s a whole acre of ground.’ I said, ‘That’s more ground than you got.’ ‘Well’, he-said, ‘maybe it’s one-tenth of an acre.’ I said, ‘Well how big is it?’ ‘Well’, he said, ‘it runs from' the cement steps over to Tom Hughes and up to-the top of the hill.’ So that’s all there was anything said about it.” Later Martin modifies this description. “Q. How far back from the highway did youi ³⁵¹ clear the