Martin v. State

DAVIS, J. Appellant, Quinnel Martin, was tried and convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (Dugan, J.) of robbery. On November 17, 2005, the court sentenced appellant to eight years imprisonment, suspending all but eighteen months, accompanied with three years of supervised probation. Appellant noted a timely appeal, presenting the following questions for our review: 1 1. Was the evidence legally sufficient to sustain a conviction for robbery where the prosecution failed to show that appellant used threat of force to obtain property? 2.

Did the trial court err when it refused to clarify and supplement a jury instruction upon a critical issue? 3. Did the trial court err in its jury instructions that excluded a defense at issue? 4. Did the trial court err when it substituted an erroneous statement of the law in the jury instructions? FACTUAL BACKGROUND During the course of the trial, the alleged victim, Eric Turner, testified that, on May 1, 2005, he left his home at 422 Ritchie Parkway, Rockville, Maryland, to walk his pit bull dog.

Pausing to speak to one of his neighbors, Alfred Smith, Turner stated that appellant jumped out from behind a parked car wielding a baseball bat. Appellant accused Turner of ⁵¹⁴ stealing $150 from him in a botched drug buy and demanded that his money be returned. Turner informed appellant and Smith that they had the wrong person. Appellant told Turner that he would strike him with the bat if he did not give him the money.

This exchange continued for approximately ten minutes until Turner eventually relented, surrendering all of the approximately $100 he had in his pocket. Turner testified that appellant, not satisfied with the amount taken, demanded to be paid the balance of the alleged $150 debt. Turner thereupon told appellant that he had more money at his house that he could give him. Accompanied by appellant and Smith, Turner returned to his home, where he instructed his wife, Gail Turner, to “[s]end me down some money!

Send me down some money!” According to Turner, while he waited for his wife to have his son bring the money to him, appellant stood in the front yard of the home and Smith stood on the porch with him. Gail Turner testified that she was bringing dishes in from their barbecue dinner when her husband yelled to her that he needed the money. She was not made aware of the seriousness of the situation until her husband indicated that there were two men with him, one with a bat and the other with a knife. At her husband’s direction, she called 911 and told them that two men were trying to beat up her husband. 2 Appellant and Smith left the residence after receiving the additional $50.

Appellant’s version of the events differed sharply from that of Turner. He testified that Turner had stolen $150 from him in a sham drug transaction. He attempted unsuccessfully' to recover the money from Turner. Consequently, appellant and Smith walked to Turner’s house to retrieve the money.

En route, they saw Turner walking his dog in the neighborhood. Frightened by the dog, appellant broke off a branch from a nearby tree to protect himself from the dog. He stated that he requested that Turner return the “stolen money.” Appel ⁵¹⁵ lant testified that he stated, “If you don’t give me my money, I’m going to hit you with this stick.” 3 Turner gave appellant approximately $100 and all three men returned to Turner’s home, where Turner gave appellant an additional $50. Appellant’s counsel had contemplated raising as a defense to the charges that appellant lacked the intent to steal from Turner because he was recovering his own money, ie., the claim of right defense.

Appellant’s counsel proposed jury instructions to support this claim, which were summarily rejected by the court. During deliberations, the jury sent several notes to the court. One note asked, “Does it matter whether the victim felt threatened for there to be a threat of force?” The court declined to answer the question, instead instructing the jury to rely on the instructions previously given. LEGAL ANALYSIS I SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE Appellant contends that the State failed to satisfy the burden of proof necessary to establish a robbery conviction.

Specifically, appellant contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to intimidate or intimidated Turner, which is a prerequisite of a robbery conviction. In his brief, appellant attempts to rationalize the jury verdict and any implications arising therefrom by commenting on what testimony the jury found more credible. We disagree and explain. “Generally, if there are evidentiary facts sufficiently supporting the inference made by the trial court, the appellate court defers to the fact-finder instead of examining the record ⁵¹⁶ for additional facts upon which a conflicting inference could have been made, and then conducting its own weighing of the conflicting inferences to resolve independently any conflicts it perceives to exist. The resolving of the conflicting evidentiary inferences is for the fact-finder.” State v. Smith, 374 Md. 527, 547-48 , 823 A.2d 664 (2003).

We must observe three important principles in our analysis: (1) we must give great deference to the trier of facts’ opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence, and resolve conflicts in the evidence, (2) circumstantial evidence alone can provide a sufficient basis upon which a trier of fact can rest its determination of guilt, even for first degree murder, and (3) we do not re-weigh the evidence or substitute our own judgment, but only determine whether the verdict was supported by sufficient evidence to convince the trier of fact of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Pinkney v. State, 151 Md.App. 311, 329 , 827 A.2d 124 (2003). Robbery has been defined “as the felonious taking and carrying away of the personal property of another, from his person or in his presence, by violence or putting in fear ... or, more succinctly, as larceny from the person, accompanied by violence or putting in fear....” West v. State, 312 Md. 197, 202 , 539 A.2d 231 (1988) (internal citations omitted). The “putting in fear” aspect of that definition is of particular relevance to the instant case.

The Court of Appeals explained the requisite level of fear in Coles v. State, 374 Md. 114 , 821 A.2d 389 (2003). In Coles , the Court was tasked with determining if there was sufficient evidence to affirm a robbery conviction of an appellant accused of robbing the same bank three different times. Specifically, the appellant claimed that his handing of notes to bank tellers demanding money did not engender sufficient fear to convict him of robbery. In neither of the incidents did the appellant brandish a weapon to coerce compliance.

In its analysis, the Court considered whether to employ a subjective standard to determine fear, “i.e. from the ⁵¹⁷ viewpoint of the teller regarding his or her fear,” or an objective standard, “i.e. from the circumstances of the robbery.” Coles, 374 Md. at 126-27 , 821 A.2d 389 . Adopting the objective standard, the Court utilized the following test to determine intimidation or putting in fear enunciated in Dixon v. State, 302 Md. 447, 458-59 , 488 A.2d 962 (1985) (quoting Lyles v. State, 10 Md.App. 265, 267 , 269 A.2d 178 (1970)): 4 [A]ny attempt to apply the least force to the person of another constitutes an assault. The attempt is made whenever there is any action or conduct reasonably tending to create the apprehension in another that the person engaged therein is about to apply such force to him. It is sufficient that there is an apparent intention to inflict a battery and an apparent ability to carry out such intention.

In the case sub judiee, appellant admitted to possessing an object — whether a bat or, as he claims, a tree branch— when he accosted Turner. He also admitted that he threatened to hit Turner with the object if he did not produce the money: [Defense Counsel]: And so tell me what you did — tell the jury what you did upon seeing [Turner]. [Appellant]: When I seen him, I seen he had his dog. You see what I’m saying? I broke a stick off the tree.

It was like a thick piece of stick, thick piece of wood, see what I’m saying? I broke it off the tree and then I started walking towards him. And my cousin [Smith] was standing there — you know what I’m saying — and they was talking. And then I walked up and was like, “Yeah, where’s my money?” And then, he was just like— [Appellant’s Counsel]: Okay.

Did — in your recollection, how close did you ever come to Eric? ⁵¹⁸ [Appellant]: I’d say like two, three feet away from him like all the time. Two, three feet away from him. [Appellant’s Counsel]: Okay. At any time during this interaction, did you tell Eric Turner that you were going to beat him up? [Appellant]: No. I told him once, because he kept saying like, you know what I’m saying, he kept telling my cousin that he wasn’t going to give me nothing. And then, you know what I’m saying, he did what he did and he’s not going to give me nothing.

So I was like, “If you don’t give me my money, I’m going to hit you with this stick.” The testimony is clearly consistent with the facts of Coles , where the threat of force was not accompanied with a weapon, as was the case here. In the instant case, context is given to the incident in light of Turner’s testimony, “[w]ell, I felt scared. I thought, you know, I just, I felt scared. I thought, you know, I was going to die right there.” It is appellant’s position that the jury rejected Turner’s testimony and “only the [a]ppellant’s testimony informed the jury what had transpired between the three men.” We need not address this claim because, “In performing this fact-finding role, the jury has authority to decide which evidence to accept and which to reject.

In this regard, it may believe part of a particular witness’s testimony but disbelieve other parts of that witness’s testimony.” Bayne v. State, 98 Md.App. 149, 155 , 632 A.2d 476 (1993) (citations omitted). The record in this case demonstrates that the applicable objective standard of fear has been satisfied because appellant’s actions could reasonably tend to have placed Turner in apprehension. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to convince the jury of appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. II JURY QUESTION Appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to answer the jury’s question: “Does it matter whether the ⁵¹⁹ victim felt threatened for there to be a threat of force?” After receiving the note, the court summonsed the parties and proposed that its response should be to rely on the instructions already promulgated.

Ultimately, the court’s response was: “You must rely on my instructions.” The State filed a motion to reconsider its jury response. Appellant’s counsel did not object to the instruction, as demonstrated by the following exchange: [The Court]: Oh, wonderful. All right, well, I guess we’re going to wait until we — What are you doing? I could see that coming a mile away.

Who are you looking at, huh? Well, we are going to have to wait until we get the jurors, but [appellant’s counsel], I see here that you have filed a motion for reconsideration. This is the first time I’ve ever seen a motion for reconsideration of a note from the jury. But I’ve looked at your motion.

Are you in agreement with this Motion, counsel? [Appellant’s Counsel]: No. [The Court]: I thought you might not be. All right. While you very well may be right, the fact of the matter is that I think that my instructions fairly reflect the state of the law. There’s no mention about a fear in the instructions.

It sets out exactly what the State has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. And so, I’m not going to re-answer the note. If they send out another note, we’ll consider any change that applies to this at that time. But the instructions, I think, appropriately covered what the law is.

My recollection is that your victim [Turner] testified, on a couple of occasions, that he was afraid in any event. So, I’m not sure what they’re a note-writing group; I will say that. I’m not — I was a little surprised to find that they needed a legal, they wanted a legal definition of threat of force. So, we may not have heard or seen our last note from them.

Maryland Rule 4-325(e), which sets forth the rules regarding objections to jury instructions, provides: No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless the party objects on the record ⁵²⁰ promptly after the court instructs the jury, stating distinctly the matter to which the party objects and the grounds of the