Maryland Chemical Co. v. Monn

Oppenheimer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Wade A. Monn, Jr. (Monn), one of the appellees, was driving his automobile west on Eastern Avenue, a four lane dual highway, in the fast lane of traffic; Luther Redd (Redd) was driving a truck of the Maryland Chemical Company (Maryland) in the slow lane; Monn was overtaking the truck and intended to pass it, when, he contends, Redd started to change lanes. Monn applied his brakes, his car skidded across the concrete divider and collided with a car driven by the appellee, Albert S. Thompson, Jr., who was going east in the fast lane of traffic on the other side of the divider. Thompson and Gibson Coyle, a passenger in the Monii car, were injured and brought separate suits in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County against Monn, Redd and Maryland.

The cases were consolidated for trial and were tried before the late Judge Lindsay and a jury. The jury returned verdicts against Redd and Maryland in favor of Thompson and Coyle and in favor of Monn. Redd and Maryland filed a motion for a new trial but Judge Lindsay died before the motion could be heard. It was heard by Judge Men- ¹²⁹ chine, who denied it.

This appeal by Redd and Maryland followed. At the trial, Redd testified that he was considering changing lanes and getting ready to do so by turning his wheels but that he did not actually leave the slow lane of traffic. Coyle, Monn and David Evans, an eye-witness, all testified that Redd moved his truck from the slow lane into the fast lane, cutting off Monn’s car. There was no physical contact between the Monn and Redd vehicles.

Judge Lindsay instructed the jury at the close of the case that they could find a verdict against either Redd and Maryland or against Monn, accepting either Monn’s theory of the accident, that he was forced across the center of the road by Redd’s truck, or, accepting what he characterized as Redd’s theory, that he had not changed lanes and thal Monn’s vehicle jumped the center divider for no apparent reason. The court specifically instructed the jury that if they found that Redd had changed lanes, the matter of speed on the part of Monn was not material. The Judge denied the appellants’ requested instructions to the effect that if both Redd and Monn were guilty of negligence and that the negligence of each contributed to the accident, a verdict against both should be brought in. Judge Lindsay also specifically rejected an instruction that evidence of speed on Monn’s part could be considered as evidence of negligence.

Judge Lindsay instructed counsel for the appellants that he could not argue the theory of concurrent negligence to the jury. The appellants contend that Judge Lindsay’s instruction to the jury, to the effect that speed on the part of the driver, Monn, was immaterial, was erroneous, and that the judge erred in denying the appellants’ requested instruction that evidence of speed on Monn’s part could be considered as evidence of negligence. In his memorandum giving his reasons for denying the motion for a new trial, Judge Menchine said: “I conclude that the Charge was correct. It is clear in principle that joint and concurring negligent acts of multiple defendants requires a verdict against all defendants whose act is a probable cause of the result complained of.

This does not mean that joint verdicts ¹³⁰ are permissible in every action instituted against multiple defendants. “The Jury was very plainly and positively told that they could not render a verdict against Maryland if they found that he remained at all times in the right hand lane (as Maryland’s driver testified he did). The Jury’s verdict against Maryland constituted a finding of fact that Maryland did move from the right to the left hand lane and was a complete rejection of that Defendant’s affirmative position. A negligent defendant cannot be permitted to suggest the liability of a co-defendant by the expedient of requesting the rejection of its own version of an event.” It is true, as the appellants contend, that, generally, excessive speed can be considered by the jury as evidence of negligence, if it directly contributed to the accident. Miller v. Graff, 196 Md. 609, 618 , 78 A. 2d 220 (1951) and cases therein cited.

It is also generally true that the jury is free to believe only a portion of the testimony of each side. Ferguson v. Wootten, 240 Md. 186 , 213 A. 2d 498 (1965); Welsh v. Porter, 231 Md. 483 , 190 A. 2d 781 (1963). However, these general principles, in themselves, are not determinative of this case. The appellees contend that, even though Monn had been speeding, the evidence is insufficient to -support a finding that such speed was a proximate cause of the accident.

They argue that, in order for there to have been concurrent negligence in this case, there would have