Maryland Commission on Human Relations v. Baltimore County Savings & Loan Ass'n

Moore, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. ■ In 1976 the Maryland Commission on Human Relations (the Commission), appellant, addressed a complaint to the Baltimore County Savings & Loan Association (the Association), appellee, concerning alleged unlawful employment discrimination practices. In 1981 the Commission filed a Statement of Charges against the Association. Charging that the complaint failed to meet certain statutory requirements, the Association moved to dismiss. The Commission’s hearing examiner denied the motion, and a public hearing was scheduled.

An action for declaratory and injunctive relief was then filed by the Association in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. The Commission filed a demurrer which was subsequently overruled. This appeal arises from that order of the circuit court (Haile, J.). For the reasons stated we shall reverse.

I A letter of complaint dated August 5, 1976, signed by four commissioners of the Maryland Commission on Human Relations, was sent to the Baltimore County Savings & Loan Association, stating that the Commission had evidence that the Association was engaged in unlawful employment discrimination practices against blacks and women. The Commission was acting pursuant to its authority under Article 49B, § 12 (b) (now § 9 (b)) of the Annotated Code of Maryland. Thereafter, the Commission’s staff attempted to resolve the complaint by "conference, conciliation, and persuasion.” See Md. Ann. Code art. 49B, § 10 (b) (1957, ³⁵⁹ 1979 Repl. Vol.).

No agreement was reached, however, between the Commission and the Association and a "Statement of Charges” was filed against the Association in April 1981. The Association moved to dismiss the proceedings on the ground that the complaint was invalid because it was not under oath, and generally failed to meet the requirements of § 9 (b). The Commission then filed, as an "Amendment to Commission Complaint,” sworn statements of each of the commissioners who had signed the August 1976 complaint. The examiner found that the complaint fulfilled the statutory prerequisites and, consequently, a public hearing was scheduled.

On September 2, 1981, the Association filed a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief requesting that the complaint be declared invalid and the Commission enjoined from holding a public hearing. A demurrer was filed by the Commission alleging, inter alia, that the court was precluded from exercising jurisdiction because of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The circuit court overruled the demurrer and enjoined the Commission from conducting a public hearing. On appeal, the principal question is whether the Association was required to exhaust the appropriate administrative procedures before seeking judicial review.

The secondary issue is whether the overruling of the Commission’s demurrer is an appealable interlocutory order. II In Prince George’s County v. Blumberg, 288 Md. 275, 283 , 418 A.2d 1155, 1160 (1980), the Court of Appeals observed that in the past four or five decades few legal tenets have received greater acceptance in Maryland than the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. That doctrine is stated as follows: "[A] claimant ordinarily must seek to redress the wrong of which he complains by using the statutory ³⁶⁰ procedure the legislature has established for that kind of case, if it is adequate and available, and if he is unsuccessful and wishes aid from the courts, he must take judicial appeals in a manner the legislature has specified rather than by seeking to invoke the ordinary general jurisdiction of the courts... . [Consequently, we] have held that where a special form of remedy is provided, the litigant must adopt that form and must not bypass the administrative body or official, by pursuing other remedies.”Id. at 283-84, 418 A.2d at 1160 . (Emphasis added.) (Citations omitted.) The Association argues that the doctrine is inapplicable in this case because there is no "special form of remedy.” A contrary conclusion was reached by the Court of Appeals on similar facts in Soley v. Commission on Human Relations, 277 Md. 521 , 356 A.2d 254 (1976).

We feel that Soley is dispositive. In Soley , the Commission filed an amended complaint against certain apartment owners charging them with racially discriminatory housing practices. When the owners refused to comply with the Commission’s subpoenas duces tecum, the Commission sought a court order to enforce them. 1 The apartment owners, claiming that the complaint was invalid, 2 filed a separate action for declaratory and injunctive relief to restrain the Commission from enforcing ³⁶¹ the subpoenas. The chancellor, however, sustained the Commission’s demurrers.

Affirming the chancellor’s decision, the Court of Appeals held that § 15 (now § 12) of Article 49B and § 255 (a) 3 of Article 41, part of the Administrative Procedure Act, combined to provide a "special form of remedy” within the meaning of § 3-409 (b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings article. 4 Id. at 525, 356 A.2d at 257 . In an opinion by Judge Levine, 5 the Court rejected appellant’s contention that there need be no exhaustion of administrative remedies where the act of the administrative agency is alleged to be ultra vires or illegal, and concluded: "Accordingly, we hold that the chancellor was correct in his conclusion that where a statute provides a special form of remedy for a specific type of case, that statutory remedy shall be followed in lieu of a proceeding under the declaratory judgment act.” Id. at 528 , 356 A.2d at 258 . That special form of remedy is present in § 12. The Association’s argument that Soley is distinguishable is unpersuasive.

It states that the proceedings in Soley were confined to the confidential investigative stages, 6 whereas in this case a public hearing has been scheduled. This factual distinction, however, does not extinguish the remedy contemplated in § 12. 7 ³⁶² The Association also hypothesizes that it will be deprived of a special form of remedy if the Commission, after making findings of fact detrimental to its interest, does not seek to enforce a final order 8 either because the underlying complaint was invalid, or for any other reason. First, the Association incorrectly assumes the complaint’s invalidity. See discussion infra.

Secondly, the decision whether to seek a court order, regardless of the reason, lies within the discretion of the Commission. 9 In essence, appellant’s lament concerns the nature of the statutory administrative process, and is beyond redress in this Court. The Association alternatively contends that two of the five exceptions- to the administrative exhaustion rule enumerated in Blumberg, 288 Md. 275, 284-85 , 418 A.2d 1155, 1161 (1980), are applicable. These two exceptions are: "3. When an agency requires a party to follow, in a manner and to a degree that is significant, an unauthorized procedure.

Stark v. Board of Registration, 179 Md. 276, 284-85 , 19 A.2d 716, 720 (1941).” 10 "5. When the object of, as well as the issues presented by, a judicial proceeding only ³⁶³ tangentially or incidentally concern matters which the administrative agency was legislatively created to solve, and do not, in any meaningful way, call for or involve applications of its expertise. Md.-Nat’l Cap. P. & P. v. Wash.

Nat’l Arena, 282 Md. 588, 594-604 , 386 A.2d 1216, 1222-27 (1978).” 11 Under the third Blumberg exception, the Association asserts that the Commission is forcing it to undergo public hearing without a validly issued, i.e., (sworn) complaint and this constitutes an "unauthorized procedure.” In claiming that the procedure is unauthorized, the Association has placed a disingenuous degree of reliance on Equitable Trust Co. v. Commission on Human Relations, 287 Md. 80 , 411 A.2d 86 (1980). The Court of Appeals there ordered that the Commission’s petition for a subpoena duces tecum be dismissed, on remand, because the underlying complaint was not under oath as required by Article 49B, § 9. The rationale of the decision was that the legislature intended to assure that those against whom the Commission brought complaints 12 would not be subjected to charges ³⁶⁴ lightly made or issued upon the "whim, fantasy or prejudice of certain of the commissioners.” Id. at 88, 411 A.2d at 91 . The Court of Appeals in Equitable Trust did not invalidate all unsworn complaints, but simply held that where a complaint is not issued under oath a subpoena duces tecum could not be enforced. 13 Nothing in the decision suggests that such a defect could not be cured by amendment.

Article 49B, § 11 (c) expressly permits "reasonable amendment to be made to any complaint or answer.” Furthermore, regulations adopted by the Commission specifically state that, "a complaint may be amended to cure technical defects or omissions, including failure to swear to the complaint, . .. All of these amendments will relate back to the the original filing date.” COMAR 14.03.01.02D(3) 14 (emphasis added). Sworn statements of the four signing commissioners, in this case, were added to the original complaint as an amendment. Thus, the protection afforded by the oath requirement, contemplated in Equitable Trust, was present here; therefore,