Maryland Department of Employment Security v. Werner

Hammond, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. We must decide in this case whether wages actually paid, or wages earned, within a statutory base period control eligibility ■for unemployment benefits under the Unemployment Insurance Eaw of Maryland. Code (1957), Art. 95A, Sec. 4, provides that an individual is ■eligible for benefits with respect to any week only if, inter alia, “(e) * * * (1) During his base period he has been paid wages for insured work * * *” of a specified amount, calculated in a certain manner, and “(2) During that calendar quarter of his base period in which his total wages were highest, he has been paid for insured work at least * * *” a stated minimum amount. -Sec. 20 says: “As used in this article, unless the context clearly requires otherwise: “(a) 'Base period’ means the first four of the last five completed calendar quarters immediately preceding the commencement of the benefit year as defined in subsection (q) of this section * * On January 11, 1962, Cecil E. Werner, the appellee, filed a -claim for unemployment compensation benefits for the benefit year beginning January 6, 1962. His claim was denied by a ⁴⁷⁶ claim specialist on the ground that the wages paid him for insured work during the qualifying base period — the first four of the last five completed calendar quarters preceding the start of the benefit year (from October 1, 1960 to September 30, 1961) —were insufficient.

The denial was appealed, and there was a hearing before an appeals referee at which there was shown that Werner had been paid wages of $605.00 in the fourth quarter of 1960 and of $124.95 in the third quarter of 1961. Under the specifications of Sec. 3 (b) and Sec. 4 (e) of Art. 95A, a claimant who has been paid between $600.01 and $624.00 in wages during the highest quarter of his base period must also have been paid a total of at least $828.00 in wages during the entire base period in order to be qualified to receive benefits. Werner showed he had earned $842.65 during the entire base period; but because his wages of $112.70 earned for the week ending September 30, 1961, were not paid to him until October 5, 1961, he actually received only $729.95 during the base period. The appeals referee affirmed the claim specialist, and the Board of Appeals of the Department of Employment Security upheld the referee.

Werner appealed to the Circuit Court for Garrett County. Judge Hamill held that since the Unemployment Insurance Law was remedial and intended to prevent economic insecurity and alleviate the consequences of involuntary unemployment and economic distress, it should be construed in such a way as to accomplish the purposes of the Legislature and that it would not seem a proper construction, to these ends, to deny eligibility merely because wages earned during the base period were not paid within the period. We are constrained to disagree with Judge Hamill’s views, finding a clear legislative intent to the contrary, unambiguously expressed, an intent buttressed by the legislative history of Art. 95A of the Code, and one competent to serve as a basis for legislative action. When what is now Sec. 4 (e) of Art. 95A was first enacted as a part of Ch. 1 of the Laws of the Extraordinary (December) Session of 1936, it required that the claimant, to be eligible for benefits, have “earned wages of not less than sixteen times his weekly benefit amount.” The law was amended by ⁴⁷⁷ Oh. 17 and Ch. 385 of the Laws of 1941 to substitute, among other things not immediately relevant, the word “paid” for the word “earned.” Ch. 17 of the Laws of 1941 also amended what is now Sec. 8 (a) of Art. 95A (then 7 (a)) so that it read as follows: “On and after January 1, 1936, contributions shall accrue and become payable by each employer for each calendar year in which he is subject to this Act, with respect to wages payable for employment for the years 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939 and 1940, and upon wages paid with respect to employment after December 31, 1940.

Such contributions shall become due and be paid by each