Maryland Hospital Laundry v. Marshall

GILBERT, Chief Judge. We iterate what the late Judge J. Dudley Digges wrote in State v. Grady, 276 Md. 178, 186 , 345 A.2d 436 (1975), aff'g Grady v. State, 24 Md.App. 85 , 329 A.2d 726 (1974): “[I]t is not always appropriate to quote from appellate decisions in jury instructions since the language employed in a particular opinion may not adequately inform jurors of their responsibility. Flohr v. Coleman, 245 Md. 254, 262 , 225 A.2d 868 (1967); Garfinkle v. Birnios, 232 Md. 402, 404 , 194 A.2d 91 (1963); Neas v. Bohlen, 174 Md. ¹⁸⁵ 696 , 199 A. 852 (1938). See generally 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial § 611 (1974).” Because that caveat was not followed in the case sub judice, we shall reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and remand the matter for a new trial.

Paul E. Marshall, the father of the appellee, had been employed with Maryland Hospital Laundry (MHL) only six weeks when he died as a result of a fatal fall from the roof of his employer’s building. The accident admittedly arose out of and in the course of employment. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission issued an order in which it found Rose, the decedent’s daughter, to be only partially dependent upon her deceased father. Rose appealed to the circuit court, where the case was tried before a jury.

The jury returned a verdict in Rose’s favor, finding that she was a “wholly dependent” person within the meaning of Md.Ann.Code art. 101, § 36(8)(a). MHL has journeyed to this Court where it posits two issues for our review. We shall, however, consider only the question: “Did the trial judge commit reversible error by instructing the jury that the Workers’ Compensation Act should should [sic] be construed as liberally in favor of injured employees as its provisions will permit in order to effectuate its benevolent purposes and that any uncertainty in the law should be resolved in favor of the claimant?” We do not consider MHL’s second issue, because it is subsumed in our response to the question addressed. The record reflects that at the conclusion of all the evidence the trial judge instructed the jury: “The Court instructs the jury that the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be construed as liberally in favor of injured employees as its provisions will permit in order to effectuate its benevolent circumstanes [sic].

Any uncertainty in the law shall be resolved in favor of the claimant. Dependency is not determined by legal or moral obligation. There must be actual support.” ¹⁸⁶ It is a well-recognized principle that “[sjince the Act is clearly social legislation, the ordinary construction is somewhat liberal in order ... that its beneficial effect upon injured workers may be achieved.” R. Gilbert & R. Humphreys, Jr., Maryland Workers’ Compensation Handbook, § 2.2-1 at 20 (1988) (footnote omitted). That principle has been consistently recognized by the Maryland appellate courts for over thirty years.

See, e.g., Shauder v. Brager, 303 Md. 140, 147 , 492 A.2d 630 (1985); Lovelette v. City of Baltimore, 297 Md. 271, 283 , 465 A.2d 1141 (1983); Bayshore Indus. v. Ziats, 232 Md. 167, 174 , 192 A.2d 487 (1963); Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard, Inc. v. Hempfield, 206 Md. 589, 594 , 112 A.2d 488 (1955); Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, Inc. v. Rosenthal, 185 Md. 416, 425 , 45 A.2d 79 (1945); Ewing v. Koppers Co., Inc., 69 Md.App. 722, 731 , 519 A.2d 790 (1987); Lucky Stores, Inc. v. Street, 63 Md.App. 664 , 493 A.2d 431 (1985); Subsequent Injury Fund v. Slater, 27 Md.App. 295, 300 ,