Maryland Overpak Corporation v. Mayor of Baltimore

HARRELL, Judge. This case requires us to explore once again what constitutes a “zoning action,” as that term is used in Md.Code (1951, 2003 RepLVol., 2005 Suppl.), Art. 66B, § 2.09(a)(1)(h), 1 taken by the ²¹ Mayor and City Council of Baltimore. A “zoning action” is subject to judicial review by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and, if further review is sought in timely fashion, by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. 2 Judicial review proceeds as directed by Title 7, Chapter 200 of the Maryland Rules. 3 If the action taken in the present case is determined not to be a “zoning action,” we alternatively are asked to consider whether other modalities of legal process are available for judicial scrutiny of the action taken in this case. Engaging in this inquiry, we do not write on an entirely clean appellate slate.

See, e.g., Armstrong v. Baltimore City, 390 Md. 469 , 889 A.2d 399 (2006) CArmstrong II) (holding that the Court of Special Appeals possessed jurisdiction to consider an appeal from the Circuit Court’s dismissal of a petition for judicial review, filed under Art. 66B, § 2.09, complaining about an ordinance permitting an accessory parking lot in Baltimore); Wesley Chapel Bluemount Ass’n v. Baltimore County, 347 Md. 125 , 699 A.2d 434 (1997) (reviewing the holding of Stephans II, infra, in determining the scope of “any other zoning matter” under Md.Code (1974, 1995 Repl.Vol.), State Gov’t Art. § 10 — 503(b)); Bd. of County Comm’rs of Carroll County v. Stephans, 286 Md. 384 , 408 A.2d 1017 (1979) (Stephans II) (holding that the legislative history of § 2.09 contemplates that a “zoning action” means “zoning reclassification” and not legislative-type actions), rev’g, 41 Md.App. 494 , 397 A.2d 289 (Stephans I); Armstrong v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 169 Md.App. 655 , 906 A.2d 415 (2006) CArmstrong III) (2006) (holding that a parking lot ordinance ²² qualified as a conditional use or its equivalent such that its issuance was a quasi-judicial act subject to judicial review under § 2.09 and disapproving contrary language in MBC Realty, infra); Cremins v. County Comm’rs of Washington County, 164 Md.App. 426 , 883 A.2d 966 (2005) (holding that a planned unit development granted in Washington County under its zoning regulations amounts to a “zoning reclassification” for purposes of judicial review under Art. 66B, § 4.08, the companion section to § 2.09 for non-charter counties); MBC Realty, LLC v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 160 Md.App. 376 , 864 A.2d 218 (2004) (holding that local ordinance permitting specific conditional uses and making text amendments to zoning ordinance were not “zoning actions” under § 2.09); Gregory v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Frederick County, 89 Md.App. 635 , 599 A.2d 469 (1991) (holding that a piecemeal zoning action is appealable under § 4.08, but adoption of an amendment to county’s comprehensive water and sewage plan was not a “zoning action”). These decisions are instructive in that they delineate general analytical contours for determining whether a governmental action concerning a type of land use decision amounts to a “zoning action” and thus is eligible for judicial review in accordance with Title 7, Chapter 200 of the Maryland Rules. These precedents, however, leave some portion of tabula rasa open on the narrow question presented by this case, given the somewhat unique character of zoning processes in Baltimore City and the particular facts of the controversy before us. We must decide here whether an amendment of a previously approved planned unit development (“PUD”) 4 granted to Canton Crossing, ²³ LLC, by the Mayor and City Council, via City Ordinance 04-873, amounted to a “zoning action” under Md.Code, Art. 66B, § 2.09(a)(1)(h), thus bestowing upon the Circuit Court for Baltimore City jurisdiction to consider on their merits neighboring landowners’ petitions for judicial review of that amendment approval.

I. The operative facts in this case are largely undisputed. On 21 June 2001, the City Council passed, and the Mayor signed into law, Ordinance 01-192 granting Appellee, Canton Crossing, LLC, inter alia, an industrial PUD and approving a development plan for a 67 and one-half acre 5 parcel of land in the Canton area of Baltimore City. The property previously was placed solely within a Euclidian 6 — 3 Industrial District, which is “designed for industrial, manufacturing, and related activities generally known and described as ‘heavy industry.’ ” Baltimore, Md., Zoning Code § 7-401. A PUD was necessary to accommodate the various residential and commercial uses, ²⁴ not permitted ordinarily in the M-3 zone, proposed in Canton Crossing’s development plan. 7 The PUD, thereafter, was amended by City ordinances on three subsequent occasions as a result of changes in the development plan initiated by Canton Crossing.

The first amendment occurred on 1 July 2002, via Ordinance 02-369, permitting Canton Crossing to “increase parking and square footage use on each parcel [designated for development within the 67 acres encompassed by the development plan], to increase the size of the proposed hotel, and to change the location of certain proposed structures.” The second amendment, approved on 22 December 2003 by Ordinance 03-641, allowed an “increase [in] the number of hotel rooms permitted, to change the location of certain proposed structures, and to modify the uses permitted and off-street parking requirements.” The last amendment, the one at issue in this case, approved by Ordinance 04-873 on 2 December 2004, authorized an “increase [in] the number of residential dwelling units permitted and [a] modif[ieation] [of] the uses and buildings permitted and their locations and size.” 8 It was upon the approval of this last amendment that Appellant here, Maryland Overpak Corporation, filed on 28 December 2004 in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City its petition for judicial review. The petition alleged that Maryland Overpak was aggrieved by the PUD amendment approval because it interfered with Appellant’s leasehold interest in and use of Danville Avenue as a staging area for its operations. 9 ²⁵ Within two weeks of Maryland Overpak filing its petition, two other landowners adjoining the PUD, South Highland Avenue LLC and Canton Railroad Company, joined Appellant in praying for judicial review of Ordinance 04-873. Neither of these latter entities, however, are parties to the present appeal. Maryland Overpak and the other abutting land owners believed that the City’s action in approving the amendment to the PUD encroached on their interest in the roadway.

Specifically, Maryland Overpak and South Highland Avenue LLC each pled in their one paragraph petitions that they maintain a leasehold interest in Danville Avenue as well as in property abutting the PUD which would be adversely affected by the approved PUD. Canton Railroad Company, for its part, averred in its petition that it “owns and operates” Danville Avenue and that the ordinance constituted a violation of the Railroad’s procedural and substantive due process rights, as well as interstate commerce clause principles. The City Council filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal and Request for Hearing, which was joined by Canton Crossing, LLC. Both argued that judicial review of the latest amendment to the PUD, under Art. 66B, § 2.09, was not proper and that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction over the case.

After a hearing on the motion, the Circuit Court dismissed the petitions on 16 March 2005. The motions judge relied on ²⁶ MBC Realty in reasoning that the PUD granted to Canton Crossing did not qualify as a “zoning action” under Art. 66B, § 2.09(a)(1)(ii) because it did not amount to a reclassification of the zoning district of the subject property. Maryland Overpak filed a timely appeal in the Court of Special Appeals. We, acting on our initiative, issued a writ of certiorari before the intermediate appellate court could consider the matter. 389 Md. 398 , 885 A.2d 823 (2005).

II

Baltimore City is governed by a unique procedure and body of law in many respects regarding its zoning procedures. The potential for uniqueness is facilitated not merely because of the statutory grant under Art. 66B, Boitnott v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 356 Md. 226, 238-39 , 738 A.2d 881, 888 (1999) (“[A]rt. 66B, § 2.01(a) provides the general authority for the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore to adopt zoning regulations as necessary .... ”), but also because of the general principle that zoning is an exercise of governmental authority that generally falls squarely within the province of the political subdivisions of the State. Superior Outdoor Signs, Inc. v. Eller Media Co., 150 Md.App. 479, 494 , 822 A.2d 478, 506 (2003) (citing Art. 23A, § 2(b)(36)(ii)) (“It is fundamental that zoning concerns the regulation of land use; and it is the policy of this State that such regulation will occur at the local level.”); see also Mayor & Council of Rockville v. Rylyns Enters., Inc., 372 Md. 514, 542 , 814 A.2d 469, 486 (2002). 10 Each jurisdiction in the State owes its zoning authority to delegations found in various provisions of the Maryland Code. We observed in Rylyns that ²⁷ [tjracing the entire panoply of related enabling statutes in Maryland is a tad complex.

The provisions empowering municipal corporations in Maryland are contained in Maryland Code (1957, 1998 RepLVol.), Article 23A, and with regard to home rule powers specifically, Art. 23A, § 9. Similar provisions detailing the powers for non-charter counties are found in Maryland Code (1957, 1998 RepLVol., 2002 Supp.), Article 25. Further complicating the matter, the authority of the counties of Montgomery and Prince George’s are controlled by Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl. Vol., 2002 Supp.), Article 28.

The land use provisions of Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl.Vol., 2002 Supp.), Article 66B pertain primarily to Art. 23A municipalities and Art. 25 non-charter counties, although certain provisions apply to Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl.Vol.), Art. 25A charter counties, as well as to Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties, Art. 66B, §§ 1.02 and 7.03, and also to the City of Baltimore, Art. 66B, §§ 2.01-2.13 and 14.02. 372 Md. at 528 , 814 A.2d at 476-77 . Of course, in this case we are concerned only with Article 66B, which provides for judicial review of “zoning actions” taken by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore. Md.Code, Art. 66B, § 2.09(a)(1)(h). A. Baltimore City, in Title 9 of the Baltimore City Zoning Code, has developed a scheme for evaluating, approving, and administering PUDs.

The process of obtaining a PUD is initiated by a mandatory conference between the developer and the Planning Commission to discuss the scope and nature of the PUD. Baltimore, Md., Zoning Code § 9-105(a). The developer is required to create a detailed development plan, id. § 9-105(b), which must include, at a minimum: a map indicating accurate boundary lines and the project area in relation to surrounding properties; the placement of roadways and parking facilities; the use, size, and location of existing and proposed buildings and landscaping; architectural drawings of proposed structures; the location of existing and proposed sewer and water facilities; the existing storm drain ²⁸ age pattern along with proposed drainage system; the location of recreation and open spaces; statistical data on size, density, and proposed number of residential units; a copy of property owners’ association documents and protective covenants; and a detailed time schedule for start and completion of the PUD. Id. § 9-107.

The application is then submitted to the Council in the form of a proposed ordinance (a bill, in legislative vernacular) for approval of the development plan. Id. § 9-106. Once a bill proposing a PUD has been submitted to the Council, it must be reviewed by the Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals, the Planning Commission, and any other agencies deemed relevant by the President of the City Council. Id. §§ 9-111, 16-301.

These reviewing entities apply a multitude of governing standards that essentially ensure that the proposed PUD will conform with the surrounding area in terms of contemplated development; topography; value of surrounding areas; availability of light, air, open space, and street access; and risks of public and health hazards. Id. § 9-112. If the Council is satisfied with the development plan and reports from the reviewing agencies, it may approve the PUD in the form of an ordinance. Id. § 9-113.

Upon approval, the approved PUD is designated on official zoning maps “for informational and reference purposes” and a copy of the development plan is kept on file by the Zoning Administrator. Id. § 9-116. Frequently, the approval expressed in the ordinance contains conditions. The PUD designation, acting as an overlay for a specific parcel or assemblage of properties, is placed on top of the underlying zone or zones, in the present case a Euclidian zone.

The underlying zone remains and is retained on the official Zoning Map for the City even after the PUD is approved. With the exception of minor changes to the interior features of buildings and the time schedule of completing the PUD, id. § 9-118(c), (d), amendments to an approved PUD are achieved only through an application process as in the case of a new PUD application. Id. § 9-118(a). Because the development plan and its authorizing ordinance serve as a binding agree ²⁹ ment between the developer and the City for the development of the affected property, id. § 9-117, deviation from that plan or the requirements of Title 9 may result in revocation of the PUD. 11 Id. § 9-119(a).

There exist additional standards for Industrial PUDs, such as the one at issue sub judice. The first set of standards concern the effects of: noise; vibration; smoke and particulate matter; toxic matter; odorous matter; and glare. Id. §§ 9-216; 12-102. There are also additional sections of Title 9 governing the permissible uses and acreage required for Industrial PUDs.

Id. § 9-501 et seq. Notably, an Industrial PUD may carry out the uses permitted in the underlying zoning district, as well as whatever conditional uses that are designated for that district as specified in the development plan. Id. § 9-502. The provisions of Title 3, which set out the generally applicable zoning rules for use and bulk, also govern Industrial PUDs.

Id. § 9-501. B. Just as Baltimore City has a distinct scheme for PUDs, it so too has one for conditional uses, 12 a concept that deserves a proper introduction. The conditional use, which is not to be confused with conditional zoning, see Rylyns, 372 Md. 514 , 541 n. 16, 814 A.2d 469 , 485 n. 16, is a zoning mechanism which provides a greater degree of flexibility to land owners and developers who wish to utilize their property in ways that ³⁰ ordinarily and inherently would conflict with the zoning district in which their property is placed. See Rylyns, 372 Md. at 541-43 , 814 A.2d at 485-86 .

The universe of allowable conditional uses for a given zoning district is designated by the legislative body at the time it establishes in the text of the zoning regulations the various zoning classifications and uses permitted in that zoning district. Rylyns, 372 Md. at 541 , 814 A.2d at 485 . If a land owner wishes to establish a conditional use he, she, or it must petition the relevant local governmental body, which, in turn, makes a determination of the acceptability of the proposed use, weighing, among other things, its putative unique adverse effects on the surrounding community and zoning district. Mossburg v. Montgomery County, 107 Md.App. 1, 5-6 , 666 A.2d 1253, 1257 (1995).

The regulations governing the consideration of conditional uses in Baltimore City is found in Title 14 of the Baltimore City Zoning Code. The Zoning Code provides that the Mayor and City Council may approve a request for a conditional use by ordinance and, additionally, may impose conditions on its approval. §§ 14-102, 103. Bills that would create conditional uses by ordinance must satisfy the requirements of Title 16. Id. §§ 14-208; 16-101(b)(2).

These requirements mandate that the conditional use applicant present to the City Council and the public a statement of intent with respect to the property, which must be posted on the property in question in a specified manner and for a specified time. Id. §§ 16-202, 203. The bill is then referred to the Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals and the Planning Commission and also may be referred to other relevant agencies. Id. § 16-301.

Following a bill’s second reading, it is subject to a public hearing before the committee to which the bill was originally referred with 15 days prior notice thereof. Id. §§ 16-401, 402. The intersecting standards and characteristics of conditional uses and PUDs in the Baltimore City zoning regulations informs the conclusion that, by analogy, a PUD partakes more of the characteristics of a conditional use than any other zoning construct or mechanism recognized in Baltimore City. One particularly telling similarity is that PUDs in the City are ³¹ first evaluated under the very same “governing standards” applied to conditional uses.

Only after that are additional criteria considered. Id. § 9-112(a). Also, the zoning regulations state that changes to a PUD seeking a use that is designated already by regulation as a possible conditional use for the underlying zoning district does not require a new application, but are reviewed under a more deferential process. Id. § 9-118(b).

A similar provision elsewhere in Title 9 of the zoning regulations provides that an Industrial PUD may carry out the uses permitted in the underlying industrial district classification, as well as whatever conditional uses are designated for that district. Id. § 9-502. Although the Baltimore City zoning regulations undeniably set PUDs and conditional uses apart as distinct branches of the land use array, see id. tits. 9, 14, the regulations consistently employ the conditional use as a means of both understanding and administering the PUD. Also, as we have discussed previously, PUD proposals arise as a result of an individual owner or developer petitioning the City to provide for uses not yet permitted “as of right” in the underlying district.

Id. § 9-105. The hallmarks examined for their approval generally are compatibility with a Master Plan, conformance to regulatory criteria, and an examination of potential deleterious effects vis-a-vis adjacent property and uses. Proposed conditional uses call for a similar analysis, but are designated by the text of the zoning regulations, and require an individual to seek permission to use his or her parcel in accord with a particular conditional use. Rylyns, 372 Md. at 541 , 814 A.2d at 485 .

A PUD allows for additional uses on a property not provided for by the permitted or conditional uses designated in that underlying district, but which are adjudged, on a case-by-case basis, not to be incompatible or deleterious at a given location and within the contemplation generally of the applicable Master Plan (or other planning document) and the general purposes of the underlying zone, much like a conditional use. ³² III. Implicit in the grant of authority to jurisdictions in the State to adopt their own particular zoning regulations consistent with that statutory grant is the reality that each jurisdiction likely will vary, to some degree, one from another, in its zoning regulations. Nonetheless, no matter how a local regulation is couched, an act constituting a “zoning action” for those jurisdictions governed by Art. 66B is subject to judicial review. Until the Court of Special Appeals filed its recent opinion in Armstrong III, the prevailing rule was that only zoning reclassifications constituted “zoning actions” under § 2.09(a)(1)(ii).

Compare Armstrong III, 169 Md.App. at 674, 677-78 , 906 A.2d at 426, 428 (“[T]he final question before reaching a conclusion, is whether ‘zoning action’ is limited to reclassifications. We conclude it is not ____”), with MBC Realty, 160 Md.App. at 387, 389 , 864 A.2d at 224, 225 (including reclassifications within “zoning action,” but excluding comprehensive zonings, comprehensive rezonings, text amendments to zoning ordinances, and conditional uses). Because, as previously discussed, conditional uses and PUDs in Baltimore share strong ties, we consider the reasoning and holding in Armstrong III before proceeding with our analysis in the present case. A. In Armstrong III, the Court of Special Appeals retreated from its broad holding in MBC Realty that a conditional use granted in Baltimore City was not a zoning reclassification, and thus not a “zoning action” eligible for judicial review under § 2.09. 169 Md.App. at 677-78 , 906 A.2d at 428 .

The court also modified its approach to ascertaining the scope of review under § 2.09, 13 by first inquiring as to whether the governmental action in question was legislative or quasi-judi ³³ cial 14 in nature. 169 Md.App. at 666-73 , 906 A.2d at 422-25 . The intermediate appellate court noted that legislative actions are subjected to a more limited review by the courts than are quasi-judicial actions, 169 Md.App. at 666 , 906 A.2d at 422 (citing Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Linchester Sand, & Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 224 , 334 A.2d 514, 523 (1975) (indicating that the scope of review regarding legislative actions is whether the body was acting within its legal authority)), thus leaving only quasi-judicial actions subject to § 2.09 review. See 169 Md.App. at 666 , 906 A.2d at 422 (“[T]he first question we must resolve is whether ... the City Council was acting in a quasi-judicial, or administrative capacity, rather than in a legislative one.”); see also Gisriel v. Ocean City Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 345 Md. 477 , 490 n. 12, 693 A.2d 757 , 763 n. 12 (1997) (“Legislative or quasi-legislative decisions of local legislative bodies or administrative agencies are, of course, not subject to ordinary judicial review; instead, they are subject to very limited review by the courts.”). The outcome of the analysis of whether a given act is quasi-judicial in nature is guided by two criteria: (1) the act or decision is reached on individual, as opposed to general, grounds, and scrutinizes a single property, 169 Md.App. at 666-69 , 906 A.2d at 422-23 ; and (2) there is a deliberative fact-finding process with testimony and the weighing of evidence. 169 Md.App. at 668-71 , 906 A.2d at 423-24 .

The Armstrong III court emphasized the fact-finding process as the most weighty criterion, id. at 668-69 , 906 A.2d at 423 (quoting Montgomery County v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 280 Md. 686, 712 , 376 A.2d 483, 497 (1977)). The Armstrong III court also relied on our discussion in Mayor and Council of Rockville v. Woodmont Country Club regarding the Rockville City Council’s quasi-judicial process in considering the amount to be levied for a special assessment, 348 Md. 572, 585 , 705 A.2d 301, 307 (1998), in concluding that ³⁴ the parking lot ordinance at issue in Armstrong III was also the product of quasi-judicial processes. 169 Md.App. at 668-71 , 906 A.2d at 423-24 . In Woodmont Country Club, the City of Rockville had constructed a planned road named Wooten Parkway, together with a water main. 348 Md. at 576 , 705 A.2d at 303 . The country club, along whose property part of the road and water main project ran, challenged the benefit assessment amount to be levied against it by the City for the construction project and requested on three occasions, all to no avail, that the City produce for cross-examination the appraisers who had generated the figures used by the City in determining the amount.

Woodmont Country Club, 348 Md. at 579 , 705 A.2d at 304 . At the hearing before the City Council for the proposed assessments, Woodmont presented its own witnesses: a traffic consultant, a land planner, and a land appraiser; all who disputed the City’s assessment. Woodmont Country Club, 348 Md. at 580 , 705 A.2d at 304 . Subsequent to the hearing, the City Attorney had its appraisers evaluate the appraisal offered by Woodmont at the hearing and sent correspondence to the City in defense of the assessment proposed by the City.

Id. With the City’s permission, Woodmont responded to the new information presented by the City Attorney. Id. Despite the country club’s efforts, the assessments were levied as proposed.

Woodmont ultimately appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which reversed the trial court on the rationale that Woodmont was entitled to an opportunity to cross-examine the City appraisers. Woodmont Country Club, 348 Md. at 580-81 , 705 A.2d at 304-05 . In affirming the intermediate appellate court’s judgment, we found that, because the City Council had “h[eld] a hearing, receiv[edj written and oral testimony, and considered] evidence to determine the specific amount of special benefit to a particular piece of property” being assessed by the City, the Council had, in those acts, performed in a quasi-judicial capacity, thereby entitling Woodmont to an opportunity for cross-examination. Woodmont Country Club, 348 Md. at 585, 582 , 705 A.2d at 307, 305 (emphasis added). ³⁵ The Armstrong III court drew a favorable comparison between the fact-finding process in Woodmont Country Club and that which occurred in the hearing before the Land Use and Planning Committee of the Baltimore City Council in the conditional use case. 169 Md.App. at 670 , 906 A.2d at 424 .

The court found that the testimony of several concerned community members, the questions of several Committee members directed to the developer regarding the parking lot’s economic impact, and the Council’s consideration of several “fact-intensive,” site-specific factors distinguished the proceedings as quasi-judicial in nature, similar to those in Woodmont Country Club. Id. Once the proceeding was determined to be quasi-judicial in nature, the court looked next to whether the action or decision complained of was a “zoning action” as that term is used in § 2.09. In this inquiry, the court examined precisely what decision or act by the governmental entity is the subject of the petition for judicial review.

Id. at 677-78, 906 A.2d at 428 . This step was necessary, in the court’s view, to distinguish between cases where the thrust of the attack is directed at a legislative act not fitting within the term of “zoning action” and cases where the thrust of the attack is directed at a quasi-judicial act imputing a “zoning action.” Id. Thus, Armstrong III concluded that a piecemeal application, initiated by the property owner for a specific conditional use for a specific property, is a “zoning action,” while zoning text amendments or comprehensive rezonings initiated by government are not. Id. at 673-74 , 906 A.2d at 425-26 .

B. The approach taken in Armstrong III reflects an analysis recognized in our zoning law precedent. In Stephans II, we opined that the word “action” in the phrase “zoning action” was meant to be understood more in the sense of an adversarial proceeding involving a controversy between two or more parties, rather than a legislative action such as a comprehensive zoning plan or a text amendment to a zoning ordinance or regulation. 286 Md. at 390 , 408 A.2d at 1019 . The essential ³⁶ point of this observation may be understood to distinguish an act by a legislative body that focuses on an individual property or assemblage of properties requiring particularized findings as to the circumstances of that property (or assemblage of properties) from acts that primarily have broader, community-wide implications which encompass considerations affecting an entire planning area or zoning district. Thus, when a legislative body considers a comprehensive area zoning or rezoning, the focus of its deliberations is not on a single parcel of land in a district or planning area, but rather on the entire district or area because it is the characteristics of the entire district that will inform the body’s ultimate decision.

By the same token, when a governmental body or agency undertakes the consideration of a proposal for a conditional use or a PUD, the body or agency necessarily concentrates its review and analysis on the parcel in question and the consequences of the proposed use of that parcel relative to the area more immediately surrounding the subject property. In this way, the potentially “adversarial” type proceeding alluded to in Stephans II partakes of the characteristics previously discussed as indicative of a quasi-judicial, fact-finding process: the reception and weighing of facts to arrive at a conclusion, expressed as findings required by regulatory criteria, as to a specific land use proposal, initiated by the property owner or its representative, for a specific property or assemblage of properties. 15 The appellation of “quasi-judi ³⁷ cial,” however, when assigned to governmental processes and acts, is not talismanic for declaration of a “zoning action,” obviating the need for further inquiry into whether the act in question is eligible for statutory judicial review. Rather, it simply denotes certain processes involved in an “action” as understood in Art. 66B, § 2.09(a)(1)(H). Although many relevant appellate cases refer to quasi-judicial decisions derived from pure administrative agencies, see Consumer Prot.

Div. v. Morgan, 387 Md. 125, 160 , 874 A.2d 919, 939 (2005), fundamentally legislative bodies, such as the Baltimore City Council, similarly may act in a quasi-judicial capacity. Prince George’s County v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 358 Md. 166, 175 , 747 A.2d 647, 652 (2000). The principal characteristic of a quasi-judicial proceeding is that of fact-finding by the undertaking body, even if the relevant facts are undisputed. Bucktail, LLC v. County Council of Talbot County, 352 Md. 530, 543 , 723 A.2d 440, 446 (1999); Bd. of License Comm’rs for Prince George’s County v. Global Express Money Orders, Inc., 168 Md.App. 339, 345 , 896 A.2d 432, 435 (2006).

A determination of whether a particular governmental body is conducting a quasi-judicial inquiry must address “the nature of the particular act in which [the body] is engaged.” Woodmont Country Club, 348 Md. at 585 , 705 A.2d at 307 . In the land use and zoning context, the essential questions to be asked are: what property or properties are being examined, for what reason, and at whose behest? As we have previously noted, proceedings or acts that scrutinize individual parcels or assemblages for the consideration of property-specific proposed uses, at the owner’s or developer’s initiative, ordinarily suggest a quasi-judicial process or act. The case law of this State provides many exemplars of what have been found to be quasi-judicial proceedings.

In general terms, we have said that quasi-judicial proceedings and acts are carried out largely by the exercise of discretion by a ³⁸ governmental body. City of Bowie v. Prince George’s County, 384 Md. 413, 440 , 863 A.2d 976, 991 (2004). That discretion is exercised through the holding of hearings by the body, Union Investors, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 244 Md. 585, 588 , 224 A.2d 453, 454 (1966), which then is tasked with “rendering findings of fact and making conclusions of law....” Chestnut Real Estate P’ship v. Huber, 148 Md.App. 190, 199 , 811 A.2d 389, 394 (2002). The mode of fact-finding and particular formalities observed in the process can vary depending on the nature of the matter being considered by the hearing body.

See Hyson v. Montgomery County Council, 242 Md. 55, 67 , 217 A.2d 578, 586 (1966) (holding that at least some right to cross-examination exists in Montgomery County zoning reclassification public hearings). But see Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 280 Md. at 713 , 376 A.2d at 498 (holding that no right to cross-examination exists for sectional map amendments involving comprehensive rezoning in Montgomery County, a legislative in nature process). See also Gorin v. Board of Co. Comm’rs for Anne Arundel County, 244 Md. 106, 110 , 223 A.2d 237, 239 (1966) (“While proceedings before an administrative board are informal and the strict rules of evidence do not apply, when the board is functioning in an adversary proceeding, the fundamentals applicable to the decision of adjudicative facts by any tribunal must be preserved.”). We note that the fact-finding process for piecemeal land use and zoning matters usually entails at least the holding of a hearing, the receipt of factual and opinion testimony and forms of documentary evidence, and a particularized conclusion as to the development proposal for the parcel in question.

See Woodmont Country Club, 348 Md. at 585 , 705 A.2d at 307 ; see also Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Comm’n. v. Friendship Heights, 57 Md.App. 69, 82 , 468 A.2d 1353, 1359 (1984) (“Where ... the administrative tribunal is under a duty to consider evidence and apply law to the facts as found, thereby exercising some discretion, the function is quasi-judicial.”). It is primarily the emphasis that the hearing places on a particular property and the unique considerations of its proposed development that tender to ³⁹ render it quasi-judicial in nature. This emphasis is only natural. “Zoning matters ... depend upon the unique facts and circumstances of a particular location and must be analyzed individually.” Red Roof Inns, Inc. v. People’s Counsel for Baltimore County, 96 Md.App. 219, 227-28 , 624 A.2d 1281, 1285 (1993). In Woodmont Country Club, we referred on multiple occasions to the focusing of a proceeding on an individualized parcel of land as important in finding that the process was a quasi-judicial one. 348 Md. 572, 583-84 , 705 A.2d 301, 306 .

The Woodmont Country Club Court also noted its opinion in Hyson , where we found that the Montgomery County Council, in “considering and determining [ ] adjudicative facts concerning particular parties [in a zoning reclassification matter], [ ] necessarily was performing a quasi-judicial function, even though its final action, in granting or denying the reclassification which was required to be based upon its findings of adjudicative facts, was quasi-legislative in character.” 242 Md. at 65 , 217 A.2d at 584 , cited in Woodmont Country Club, 348 Md. at 584 , 705 A.2d at 306-07 . We later clarified in Bucktail that it is not a hearing’s mere focus on one parcel that is dispositive of its quasi-judicial nature, but rather that the matter taken up at the hearing is disposed of based on the unique characteristics that inhere to that parcel when considering the proposed use. 352 Md. at 545 , 723 A.2d at 447 (“This determination is not based on whether the zoning decision adversely affects an individual piece of property, but whether the decision itself is made on individual or general grounds.”) (emphasis added). Yet another of our cases demonstrates the relationship between an individualized determination and a quasi-judicial process or act. Mossburg v. Montgomery County, decided in 1993, involved a petition for a special exception (conditional use) to build a solid waste transfer station in Montgomery County.

The County Board of Appeals denied the application for the exception after a hearing at which extensive testimony was offered by concerned citizens opposed to it. 329 Md. at 496-98, 620 A.2d at 887-88. We held, in part, that the Board ⁴⁰ of Appeals’s proceeding was quasi-judicial in the sense that it evaluated “[a]n application for a special exception involving] a particular applicant’s request for administrative authorization to engage in a specific activity at a specific location.” Mossburg, 329 Md. at 506, 620 A.2d at 892 (emphasis added). It is only by looking to the particular circumstances of an affected parcel and its immediate environs that a body can make the necessary findings and conclusions called for by statute, ordinance, or regulation. These site-specific findings of fact are necessary not only to inform properly the interested parties of the grounds for the body’s decision, Mehrling v. Nationwide Ins.

Co., 371 Md. 40, 64 , 806 A.2d 662, 676 (2002) (citing Blue Bird Cab Co. v. Md. Dep’t of Employment Sec., 251 Md. 458, 466 , 248 A.2d 331, 335 (1968)) (noting that “a fundamental requirement of the due process of law in a quasi-judicial proceeding is the right of the parties to be apprised of the facts relied upon by the tribunal in its decision.”), but also to provide a basis upon which judicial review may be rendered. Pattey v. Bd. of County Comm’rs for Worcester County, 271 Md. 352, 359-60 , 317 A.2d 142, 146 (1974) (restraining judicial review of a legislative body’s zoning decision to the record); Bd. of County Comm’rs for Prince George’s County v. Ziegler, 244 Md. 224, 229 , 223 A.2d 255, 257 (1966) (“[I]t is clear that without a record of the facts on which the zoning authority acted