Maryland Pharmacists Ass'n v. Office of Attorney General

HARRELL, Judge. The Maryland Pharmacists’ Association (the “local Association”) appeals the dismissal of its Petition for Judicial Review (the “Petition”) by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The local Association filed the Petition after the Attorney General denied its “Claim Pursuant to [Md. State Gov’t Code Ann. (S.G.) § 10-224] for Reimbursement of Expenses, Etc.” (the “Claim”) seeking reimbursement of expenses it incurred responding to a Civil Investigative Demand (the “CID”) issued pursuant to Md. Comm. Law II Code Ann. (C.L.) § 11-205.

It also sought reimbursement for monitoring expenses incurred during the underlying state antitrust investigation of an alleged violation of C.L. § 11-204 1 . We shall affirm the judge’s order dismissing the Petition and all then pending motions. FACTS Allegedly at the behest of the Hallmark Card Co., Inc. (“Hallmark”), the Attorney General’s Antitrust Division (“the Division”) began an investigation of a 27-31 October 1991 ⁶⁵³ Baltimore, Maryland convention of the National Association of Retail Druggists (the “national Association”). The Division apparently attempted to ascertain if certain pharmacists, or trade organizations of pharmacists, cared enough to boycott the very best.

During that convention, an exhibit, entitled the “Hallmark Hall of Shame”, was established. The purpose of that presentation was to reveal that Hallmark endorsed mail-order prescription plans over retail pharmacies for its employees’ usage in their medical benefits plan. Incongruously, those same pharmacies, the “Hall of Shame” insisted, served as the centerpiece of Hallmark’s system of greeting card distribution. The local Association disclaimed substantive connection to the convention or the “Hall of Shame”.

The local Association maintained that any involvement on its part, limited to certain social events, was due solely to the convention’s Baltimore location. On 3 August 1993, the Division sent a letter to the local Association requesting certain documents concerning, inter alia, the “Hall of Shame”. That communique requested compliance with the CID. It seems that the Attorney General for Maryland, and his counterparts in Ohio and Texas, initiated antitrust enforcement investigations.

The Maryland investigation was initiated, and a CID was issued pursuant to C.L. § 11-205. That statute states, in pertinent part, that if the Attorney General believes that a person may be in possession, custody, or control of any original or copy of any ... tangible document or recording, wherever situated, which he [or she] believes is relevant to the subject matter of an investigation of a possible violation [of the Maryland Antitrust Act, C.L. § 11-201 et. seq.], he may serve on the person before the institution of a civil proceeding for the violation a written civil investigative demand [or CID] which requires him to produce the documentary material and permit inspection and copying. In compliance with the CID, the local Association delivered to the Division a notebook of documents and a written denial of involvement in the “Hall of Shame” exhibition. A few weeks later, on 4 November 1993, an “uncivil” protracted ⁶⁵⁴ stationery battle began.

The local Association fired twelve volleys at the Division seeking information and closure of the investigation. The Division returned fire, with seven missiles of its own, refusing to share information regarding the progress or status of the investigation. Finally, the stonewall barriers of the Division tumbled when, on 2 February 1996, the Division returned the notebook of documents to counsel for the local Association. 2 Recognizing the significance of that action, the local Association confirmed that the investigation was “closed”. That “closure” resulted in the inception of the current case.

The local Association sought reimbursement for the expenses it incurred during its compliance with, and monitoring of, the CID. That request was made pursuant to S.G. § 10-224. The relevant portions of that statute are set forth below. § 10-224. Litigation expenses for small businesses and non-profit organizations. * * * * * # (c) Reimbursement authorized. — Subject to the limitations in this section, an agency or court may award to a business or nonprofit organization reimbursement for expenses that the business or nonprofit organization reasonably incurs in connection with a contested case or civil action....

(d) Claim required in contested case.— (1) To qualify for an award under this section when the agency has initiated a contested case, the business or nonprofit organization must make a claim to the agency before taking any appeal. (2) The agency shall act on the claim. Appellant filed a claim with the Attorney General for certain expenses it incurred in responding to the CID request and ⁶⁵⁵ attempting to monitor the investigation. The Attorney General denied that claim by stating, inter alia, that the CID did not initiate a “contested case or civil action” within the meaning of S.G. § 10-224.

The local Association filed the Petition in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City that was ultimately dismissed along with all pending motions. It is that dismissal that the local Association now appeals. QUESTIONS We shall focus our analysis on four questions raised, at least inferentially, by appellant. We have restructured those issues below to facilitate better our analysis.

I. Under what types of proceedings may a party seek reimbursement under S.G. § 10-224?

II

Is the local Association entitled to seek reimbursement under S.G. § 10-224 for expenses it incurred in a “contested case”?

III

Is the local Association entitled to seek reimbursement under S.G. § 10-224 for expenses it incurred in a “civil action”?

IV

Did the trial court err by dismissing a motion to compel compliance with Md. Rule 7-206 coincident with its dismissal of the Petition? ANALYSIS I. In order to invoke the provisions of S.G. § 10-224, there must be a “contested case or civil action”. This prerequisite to reimbursement is clear from the plain language contained in the statute. “An agency or court may award to a business or nonprofit organization reimbursement for expenses that the business or nonprofit organization reasonably incurs in connection with a contested case or civil action----” S.G. § 10-224(e). Simply put, either a “contested case or civil action” must be linked to the expenses in order for a party to sustain a claim for reimbursement. ⁶⁵⁶ If the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, our search for its meaning may begin and end with their plain meaning.

See e.g., Board of Trustees of Md. State Retirement and Pension Sys. v. Hughes, 340 Md. 1, 7 , 664 A.2d 1250 (1995) ; see also Long v. State, 343 Md. 662, 667 , 684 A.2d 445 (1996) (citing In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 94 , 646 A.2d 1012 (1994)); Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 145 , 626 A.2d 946 (1993); Mustafa v. State, 323 Md. 65, 73 , 591 A.2d 481 (1991). Where language is plain and unambiguous, and expresses a definite meaning consonant with the statute’s purpose 3 , courts must not insert or delete words to make it express an intention different from its clear meaning. See e.g., In re Adoption / Guardianship No. A91-71A, 334 Md. 538, 557-59 , 640 A.2d 1085 (1994); Department of State Planning v. Mayor of Hagerstown, 288 Md. 9, 15 , 415 A.2d 296 (1980). We conclude that the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous regarding the “contested case or civil action” prerequisite.

There simply is no provision, contained in S.G. § 10-224, for recovery of expenses, unless those expenditures stem from a “contested case or civil action”. II. “Contested case”, as that term is used in S.G. § 10-224, is defined, in pertinent part, as: (1) ... a proceeding before an agency to determine: (i) a right, duty, statutory entitlement, or privilege of a person that is required by statute or constitution to be determined only after an opportunity for an agency hearing. S.G. § 10-202(d). In Modular Closet Sys., Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 315 Md. 438 , 554 A.2d 1221 (1989), the definition of “contested case” was further refined to include only those disputes that, by their nature, entitle a party to an agency hearing, regardless of whether a hearing was in fact held.

Id. at 444 , 554 A.2d 1221 . The entitlement to an agency ⁶⁵⁷ hearing does not arise from the Administrative Procedure Act (S.G. § 10-101, et seq.), but must originate from another source such as a statute, regulation, or due process principles. Sugarloaf Citizens Ass’n v. Northeast Md. Waste Disposal Auth., 323 Md. 641, 652 , 594 A.2d 1115 (1991); North v. Kent Island Ltd. Partnership, 106 Md.App.