Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Rosenberg

Murphy, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On June 12,1974, the Maryland State Bar Association and the Bar Association of Montgomery County, pursuant to Maryland Code (1968 Repl. Vol.) Art. 10, § 13 and Maryland Rule BV3, filed separate petitions charging Harvey Rosenberg, a member of the Maryland Bar, with the commission of an act of professional misconduct, deceit, a crime involving moral turpitude, and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The petitions alleged that Rosenberg’s misconduct constituted a violation of Canon 1, Disciplinary Rule 1-102 (A) (1) through (6) of the Code of Professional Responsibility; that he was indicted on October 27, 1966, and convicted on January 31, 1972, by a jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (perjury before a Federal Grand Jury); that on November 13, 1972, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction without opinion (United States v. Rosenberg, 468 F. 2d 632 (2d Cir. 1972)); and that on April 16, 1973, the Supreme Court denied Rosenberg’s petition for a writ of certiorari (Rosenberg v. United States, 411 U. S. 932 , 93 S. Ct. 1898 , 36 L.Ed.2d 391 (1973)).

On June 19, 1974, we directed that the charges be transmitted for hearing to a three-judge panel in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Maryland Rule BV3 and 4. Rosenberg answered the charges, contending that he was not in fact guilty of perjury, deceit, or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; that even if he were guilty, he should not be disbarred; and that Maryland Rule BV4 f 1, ³⁵³ making a final judgment of conviction “conclusive proof” of guilt, unconstitutionally deprived him of due process. 1 At the hearing before the three-judge panel held on August 14, 1974, Rosenberg claimed that he had been unjustly convicted of perjury and that he had filed a motion for a new trial on grounds of newly discovered evidence. He said that the motion was set for a hearing in the District Court on December 9, 1974, and urged that the proceedings be held in abeyance pending determination of the motion.

On October 10, 1974, the three-judge panel filed its “Memorandum and Recommendation,” finding from the evidence before it that the allegations contained in the petitions had been proved. It concluded that Rosenberg had been convicted of perjury, a crime of moral turpitude by the final judgment of a judicial tribunal and, citing Rule BV4 f 1, that his conviction was conclusive proof of his guilt of the offense. The panel specifically found that Rosenberg had violated Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(1), (3), (4) and (5): 2 “DR 1-102 Misconduct. (A) A lawyer shall not: (1) Violate a Disciplinary Rule.

(3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude. (4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. (5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” ³⁵⁴ The panel recommended that Rosenberg be disbarred from the practice of law. Rosenberg filed four exceptions to the panel’s findings and recommendation, viz, (1) that Rule BV4 f 1 unconstitutionally deprived him of due process of law; (2) that the findings and recommendation were clearly erroneous and contrary to the applicable law and evidence presented; (3) that the findings and recommendation were arbitrary and capricious; and (4) that the recommendation was devoid of humanity and substantial justice.

In support of these exceptions, Rosenberg presented two arguments: first, that his conviction was not a “final judgment” within the meaning of Rule BV4 f 1, because of the pending motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, and second, that because Rule BV4 provides for a hearing, it must be.a meaningful one, and consequently the failure to hold a hearing on the “ultimate fact” — whether perjury was indeed committed — renders the hearing meaningless. This is especially true, Rosenberg contends, where the fact from which the conclusive presumption of guilt is drawn is reopened by the filing of the new trial motion. We entertain not the