Maryland & Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc.

Barnes, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. After we filed our opinion in this case on May 9, 1968, (see 249 Md. 650 , 241 A. 2d 691 ) the appellants appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. (See No. 357, October Term of the Supreme Court of the United ¹⁶⁴ States, 1968.) On January 27, 1969, the Supreme Court filed its opinion in Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church (Hull), 393 U. S. 440 , 89 S. Ct. 601 , 21 L.Ed.2d 658 , and by a per curiam opinion (see 393 U. S. 812 , 922, 89 S. Ct. 850 , 21 L.Ed.2d 750 ) vacated the judgment and remanded the case to us “for further consideration in light of” Hull. After the mandate from the Supreme Court was received by us we set the case for reargument and requested additional briefs from counsel for the parties.

These briefs were duly filed and the case was reargued in due course. We have carefully reviewed the opinion and decision in Hull and we have concluded that there is nothing in our original opinion which is contrary to the decision in the Hull case. Indeed, we believe that we anticipated the decision in Hull in our original opinion in the present case, and that our original opinion properly applied the constitutional principles subsequently enunciated by the Supreme Court. The principal holding in Hull was to reaffirm as now applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment applying the First Amendment to them, the holding in Watson v. Jones, 80 U. S.

(13 Wall.) 679 , 20 L. Ed. 666 (1872), that the doctrine of an implied trust of church property in favor of those who adhered to the faith of the founders of the particular church, with its attendant required examination into, and determination of, religious doctrine and theological determinations by the Civil Courts was inconsistent with the principles underlying the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States forbidding the establishment of religion or the denial of its free exercise. In our original opinion, we relied upon, in part, the decision of our predecessors in Shaeffer v. Klee, 100 Md. 264 , 59 A. 850 (1905), which we indicated was in accord with the holding in Watson v. Jones, supra. In fact, Judge Page, for the Court, in the Shaeffer case cited Watson v. Jones with approval. ( 100 Md. at 271 , 59 A. at ¹⁶⁵ 852.) The implied trust doctrine has not been part of the law of Maryland since the Constitution of 1776, and our original opinion made this clear.

After the Supreme Court in Hull rejected as contrary to the First Amendment, the application of the implied trust doctrine by a State, it then enunciated the proper basis for determination in the State courts of disputes in regard to church property as follows: “It is obvious, however, that not every civil court decision as to property claimed by a religious organization jeopardizes values protected by the First Amendment. Civil courts do not inhibit free exercise of religion merely by opening their doors to disputes involving church property. And there are neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes, ivhich can be applied without ‘establishing’ churches to which property is awarded. But First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and, practice.

If civil courts undertake to resolve such controversies in order to adjudicate the property dispute, the hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern. * * * the Amendment therefore commands civil courts to decide church property disputes tuithout, resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine.” (Emphasis supplied.) (893 U. S. at 449, 89 S. Ct. at 606, 21 L.Ed.2d at 665) The Supreme Court further emphasizes that the State courts must not determine what is proper religious doctrine but must dispose of church property cases upon “neutral principles of law” when it stated: “Hence, States, religious organizations and in ¹⁶⁶ dividuals must structure relationships involving church property so as not to require the civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions.” (393 U. S. at 449, 89 S. Ct. at 606, 21 L.Ed.2d at 665) As we have indicated, we were required by the existing Maryland law as well as by the command of Hull, to decide the present case upon “neutral principles of law” developed for use in all property disputes and this we believe we have done. First, we inquired into the provisions of the State statutory law in regard to the holding of property by religious corporations applicable to all religious corporations without regard to the doctrine or ecclesiastical practices of any particular religious sect or denomination. We stated: “The two local churches were incorporated under the General Religious Corporation Law of this State, now Code (1957), Article 23, Sections 256 to 270. The present General Religious Corporation Law is based upon and largely follows the original legislation on this subject, i.e., the Act of 1802, chapter 111.

The present law provides in effect that in every church, religious society or corporation of whatever sect or denomination ‘protected in the free and full exercise of its religion by the Constitution and laws’ of the State there shall be power and authority in all persons above 21 years of age belonging to ‘any such church, society or congregation’ to elect certain persons, not less than four nor more than twenty-five, who when elected ‘shall be constituted a body politic or corporate to act as trustees in the name of the particular church, society or congregation for which they are respectively chosen, and manage the estate, property, interest and inheritance of the same.’ (Emphasis supplied.) By the provisions ¹⁶⁷ of Section 257, the trustees are given perpetual succession by their name of incorporation and very broad powers in regard to the corporate property. The trustees may purchase and hold the property and ‘use or lease, mortgage or sell and convey the same in such manner as they may judge most conducive to the interest of their respective churches, societies or congregations,’ with a provision that they shall not sell, mortgage or dispose of property held by the corporation under an instrument prohibiting such sale. There are provisions for election of trustees, how their succession is maintained, with a provision that the minister or senior minister shall be a member of the corporation, ex officio, as well as provisions for the arbitration of contested elections, provisions for the adoption of a plan, agreement or regulation at the first election of trustees, its acknowledgement and entry in a book required to be kept, the recording of the plan, agreement or regulation with the Department of Assessment and Taxation and the procedure for amendment.” ( 249 Md. at 656 , 241 A. 2d at 695-96 ) We also pointed out that there are special statutory provisions in regard to the government of four religious denominations, the Protestant Episcopal Church, the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America [now known as the United' Presbyterian Church in the United States of America], the Methodist Church and the Roman Catholic Church. These code provisions were adopted at the request or with the acquiescence of the denominations affected but as we observed in the original opinion “these provisions are not involved in the present case.” ( 249 Md. at 674 , 241 A. 2d at 705 ) We did make various references to these code provisions to illustrate various differences in church polity in regard to the holding of property by local churches and suggested that this was one possible method by which a parent body ¹⁶⁸ in a hierarchical denomination might maintain control of local church property.

( 249 Md. at 663 , 241 A. 2d at 699 ) We did not intend, however, to express any opinion in regard to the validity of any of these special provisions in the light of the requirements of the First Amendment, or otherwise, inasmuch as none of these provisions was involved in the present case, as we observed above. The Maryland Religious Corporation Law is a general law for all religious corporations and has no reference whatever to doctrine. It, therefore, meets the requirement of a “neutral principle of law.” Secondly, we considered the express language of the deeds by which the properties in question were conveyed to local church corporations. We stated : “Nor do the deeds for the properties of the local churches provide for their reverting to the Md. & Va.

Eldership if the congregation withdraws from that Eldership. The deed to the Sharpsburg church recites in the habendum clause that it is held by the trustees and their successors ‘in trust for the use of the congregation of the Church of God at Sharpsburg, Maryland/ and— ‘* * * in the event the congregation of the Church of God at Sharpsburg, Maryland, ceases to function as a church organization, then all right, title and interest in the hereinabove described property shall immediately vest in the Maryland and Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God in North America, a body corporate, its successors or assigns.’ (Emphasis supplied.) “One of the Indian Springs deeds has a provision that if the church should become extinct or cease to be the property reverts to the Md. & Va. Eldership; the other Indian Springs deed (for the parsonage) contains no reverter clause whatever.” ( 249 Md. at 665 , 241 A. 2d at 700 ) ¹⁶⁹ We observed that there is no provision in the respective deeds for a reverter to the general church upon a departure or deviation from doctrine or upon a withdrawal by the local church from the Eldership. There is only a reverter in the event the local church should become extinct or cease to be, and this contingency did not occur in the present case.

It seems clear that a consideration of the language of the deeds and the necessary interpretation of that language was an application by us of a “neutral principle of law.” Thirdly, we considered the language of the charters of the two local church corporations involved. We stated: “The charters of the respective local churches plainly confer the ownership, use, management and sale of the property of the local churches on the corporations and their trustees, subject to the provisions of the local by-laws. The stated purposes of the corporations are to ‘form a church organization or congregation to bring to the people of the community a vital knowledge of Jesus Christ as Lord and Savior and to promulgate the Gospel of the New Testament Scriptures’ (Sharpsburg) and ‘to provide its members (of the corporation) with the preaching of the Word of God, the administration of the ordinances, the facilities for public worship and the exercise of Christian discipline and to adopt and prosecute from time to time new measures as are in harmony with the spirit and teaching of the Word of God as shall tend to promote the Kingdom of God in this World’ (Indian Springs). ‘The business and property of the Corporation shall be conducted and managed by a Board of not less than five * * * Trustees * * *’ (Sharpsburg) and ‘the Trustees shall, in conformity to the law, control all property belonging to said congregation’ (Indian Springs). In Section Three, subsection (e) ¹⁷⁰ of the Sharpsburg Charter appears the following: ‘The Corporation shall have all the General Powers conferred by Chapter 334 of the Laws of the General Assembly of Maryland, Acts of 1924, or any amendments thereto, and the enumeration of specific powers in this Certificate of Incorporation are in furtherance of and not in limitation of the General Powers conferred by law.’ In Section 3 of the Charter of Indian Springs, it is provided : ‘The congregation of this Church shall be and remain an independent congregation and may own and dispose of property, both real and personal, as said congregation in accordance with its By-Laws and ordinances shall deem proper.

This congregation and church may from time to time as may be deemed fit associate itself with such church denomination as it may deem desirable but such association shall in no wise effect this Corporation in its ownership and control of its real and personal property, which shall be and remain in the properly constituted officers of this Corporation.’ (Emphasis supplied.) “In neither charter is the Md. & Va. Eldership or the General Eldership mentioned.” ( 249 Md. at 658-59 , 241 A. 2d at 696-97 ) These charter provisions make it plain that it was never contemplated that the property of the local churches should be subject to the control of the Elder-ship. It can only be concluded from the examination of the language of these charters that the local church corporations own and control their local property. Here again, this consideration of the corporate charters is the application of another “neutral principal of law” with ¹⁷¹ out any requirement upon us to engage in any theological or ecclesiastical speculation or determination.

Fourthly, we considered the provisions of the Constitution of the General Eldership and of the Md. & Va. Eldership. We stated: “In the Constitution of the General Eldership there is no statement in regard to the ownership or control of church property. Apparently any such provision was