Mateen v. Galley

⁶³¹ ADKINS, Judge. Muhsin R. Mateen, appellant, has been incarcerated on a first degree murder conviction since September 9, 1972. In a 1997 petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Mateen presented what we view as two distinct grounds for habeas relief: (1) that his 50 year sentence for first degree murder was illegally increased to life with all but 50 years suspended, and (2) that he has been and is now being denied meaningful consideration for parole, pre-release security classification, work release, and family leave, as a result of what has become known as Maryland’s “life means life” policy. 1 In this appeal, Mateen asks us to hold that the Circuit Court for Baltimore City erred in denying his habeas petition because he stated cognizable claims for relief based on both his “sentence increase” and “meaningful consideration” complaints, and because he was entitled to, but did not receive, a hearing on those habeas claims. We conclude that the change in Mateen’s sentence was a permissible correction of an illegal sentence, but that this correction should have been made on the record after notice to Mateen.

Nevertheless, we also conclude that the failure to hold a sentence correction hearing was harmless in the unique circumstances of Mateen’s case. As to the “meaningful consideration” claims, we hold that Mateen has not stated any cognizable claim on which he would be entitled to habeas relief. ⁶³² FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS On November 17,1972, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City convicted Mateen of first degree murder in a bench trial. 2 He was sentenced to a life term with the possibility of parole, and committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections (“DOC”). On October 20, 1981, however, a post conviction court ordered that Mateen be re-sentenced, because the sentencing judge had failed to consider suspension of a portion of that sentence as an another sentencing alternative. We affirmed the post conviction order.

On March 19, 1982, Mateen appeared for re-sentencing before Judge Marshall A. Levin, the same judge who imposed his original sentence. Mateen’s habeas petition focuses on what happened at this re-sentencing hearing. There is no transcript of the hearing. The court’s commitment record of March 19, 1982, however, states that the announced sentence was “Fifty (50) years.” Similarly, the DOC’s “Sentence And Detainer Status Change Report” dated April 6, 1982, states: “Sentence reduced on 3-19-82 to 50 yrs. from Life[.]” Enter the Maryland Parole Commission.

More than seven months after the re-sentencing hearing, by letter dated October 28, 1982, the chairman of the Parole Commission wrote to Judge Levin, requesting clarification as to whether this commitment [record] is correct since the Annotated Code of Maryland mandates [that] if a person is found guilty of First Degree Murder the sentence must be life imprisonment. Was it your intention to sentence [Mateen] to life imprisonment and suspend-all but 50 years or was [Mateen] found guilty of a lesser count and sentenced to 50 years incarceration? By letter dated November 3, 1982, Judge Levin responded as-follows: “Please forgive my inartistic sentencing. It was my intention to sentence him to life and suspend all but fifty ⁶³³ years.” On November 16, 1982, the DOC issued another sentence change report, stating that Mateen’s “sentence now reads: Life — suspend 50 yrs.” In the remarks section, it explained why: “Enclosed you will find copy of letter rec’d from Judge Levin explaining change of sentence.” From that point in time, the DOC and the Parole Commission treated Mateen as a “lifer,” which, as detailed below, has had significantly negative consequences for Mateen’s efforts to obtain parole and a pre-release security classification, and to participate in work release and family leave programs during his incarceration.

Pointing to these consequences, Mateen seeks habeas relief against the Governor, the Secretary of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, the Commissioner of Correction, the Chairperson of the Maryland Parole Commission, and the Warden of Western Correctional Institution. 3 DISCUSSION Before addressing the merits of Mateen’s habeas petition, we must resolve two threshold issues. First, the State argues that “Mateen’s claims were not cognizable under the circuit court’s limited habeas corpus jurisdiction.” It contends that Mateen instead must pursue his “sentencing ambiguity” claims through a motion to correct illegal sentence under Md. Rule 4-345, in which the State’s Attorney has the opportunity to participate. In addition, the State asserts, Mateen’s appeal should not be considered be ⁶³⁴ cause no appeal lies from the denial of a habeas petition challenging the legality of a sentence. We disagree with the State’s narrow reading of appellant’s habeas petition.

In Part I, we conclude that it is an appeal-able habeas challenge on both claims raised in the habeas petition. Second, Mateen argues that this Court must vacate the habeas court’s order denying his petition because he was entitled to, but did not get, a hearing on the petition. We disagree, and explain why in Part II of this opinion. In Parts III and IV, we address the substance of Mateen’s habeas claims.

I. Propriety Of Habeas Relief A. Confinement Under An Increased Sentence Md. Rule 4-345 limits the court’s revisory power over legal sentences, but preserves plenary power over illegal sentences. (a) Illegal sentence. The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. (b) Modification or reduction — Time for.

The court has revisory power and control over a sentence upon a motion filed within 90 days after its imposition ... (2) in a circuit court, whether or not an appeal has been filed. Thereafter, the court has revisory power and control over the sentence in case of fraud, mistake, or irregularity.... The court may not increase a sentence after the sentence has been imposed, except that it may correct an evident mistake in the announcement of a sentence if the correction is made on the record before the defendant leaves the courtroom following the sentencing proceeding....

(d) Open court hearing. The court may modify, reduce, correct, or vacate a sentence only on the record in open ⁶³⁵ court, after healing from the defendant, the State, and from each victim or victim’s representative who requests an opportunity to be heard.... If the court grants the motion, the court ordinarily shall prepare and file or dictate into the record a statement setting forth the reasons on which the ruling is based. An inmate’s claim that his sentence is illegal as a result of substantive legal errors by the sentencing court should be redressed through a direct appeal or a motion to correct the sentence on the grounds of illegality. 4 See State v. Kanaras, 357 Md. 170, 185 , 742 A.2d 508 (1999).

In contrast, an inmate’s claim that his incarceration is illegal because of the illegal actions of the Commissioner of Corrections or the Maryland Parole Commission may be redressed in a civil habeas corpus proceeding. See id. The State asserts that “Mateen’s claims were not cognizable under the circuit court’s limited habeas corpus jurisdiction” because “[a]n inaccurate commitment record does not require release on habeas corpus, it only requires correction of the commitment record.” In support, it cites Lewis v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 209 Md. 625 , 120 A.2d 194 , cert. denied sub nom. Lewis v. Pepersack, 351 U.S. 911 , 76 S.Ct. 706 , 100 L.Ed. 1445 (1956); Carter v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 210 Md. 657 , 124 A.2d 574 , cert. denied, 352 U.S. 900 , 77 S.Ct. 136 , 1 L.Ed.2d 89 (1956); and Md. Rule 4-621 ⁶³⁶ regarding correction of clerical mistakes in records of a criminal proceeding.

These authorities, however, address only what a court may do when a commitment record contains a clerical error. Without a transcript of the March 19, 1982 re-sentencing hearing, there is no documentary basis upon which the habeas court or this Court could possibly make a finding that the “Fifty (50) years” sentence stated in the March 19, 1982 commitment record was merely a clerical error by the courtroom clerk in recording the sentence, rather than an error of law by the judge in pronouncing it. Given this uncertainty, we cannot ignore the latter possibility. For the reasons set forth in Part III, we therefore assume that the 50 year sentence was the product of judicial error.

The State also argues more generally that Mateen’s habeas petition and appeal improperly challenge the legality of his sentence, rather than the legality of his confinement. We disagree with that characterization. Mateen specifically asserts that his sentence was improperly increased as a result of the “illegal” actions of the Parole Commission and the DOC— i.e., corresponding with the sentencing judge and then altering his sentence on the basis of the judge’s off-the-record, post hoc explanation of his subjective sentencing “intention.” He points to the DOC’s 1982 sentence change report, which cites the sentencing judge’s response to the Parole Commission’s request for “clarification,” and the DOC and Parole Commission’s subsequent treatment of him as a lifer without affording him notice or a hearing regarding the sentence change, as proof that he is being confined illegally by the DOC and the Parole Commission, under a sentence that was illegally increased. In these circumstances, we conclude that Mateen has challenged the legality of his incarceration under an increased sentence, rather than merely challenging the legality of the sentence itself.

Maryland Correctional Inst. v. Lee, 362 Md. 502 , 766 A.2d 80 (2001), supports our conclusion. Lee contested a commitment record indicating that she had been sentenced to eight ⁶³⁷ consecutive three-year terms, totaling 24 years of incarceration, to be served concurrently with a previous five year sentence. She alleged that the sentencing judge had sentenced her to eight concurrent three-year terms, totaling only three years of incarceration, to be served concurrently with the five year sentence. In an effort to persuade the DOC that her new sentences were to run concurrently rather than consecutively, Lee presented the DOC with a transcript of her sentencing hearing.

She argued that the sentencing judge’s comments indicated that all of her sentences were to be served concurrently. The DOC’s “commitment manual” provided that “[sjince Maryland Law provides that ambiguous sentences must be construed in favor of the inmate, when a sentence is found to be ambiguous, commitment staff shall seek clarification from the sentencing judge. Upon receipt of a transcript indicating a different sentence than the one recorded on the commitment record, staff shall immediately request an amended commitment from the court of jurisdiction. When the foregoing action cannot be accomplished, then the [DOC] should obtain necessary documentation and defend the [DOC’s] action before the appropriate court.

However, in all cases, the [DOC] will exercise good faith efforts to calculate sentences in accordance with applicable policy and available information.” Id. at 507 , 766 A.2d 80 . In accordance with that policy, a member of the DOC’s commitment staff contacted the sentencing judge. The judge confirmed his intent to impose a 24 year term, to be served concurrently with the five year term. The DOC accepted the sentencing judge’s interpretation of his oral sentencing pronouncement, and revised its sentence report accordingly.

Lee argued that the DOC’s decision to confine her for consecutive terms was illegal, because it violated the DOC’s own policies and pushed back her parole eligibility date. She filed an inmate grievance, arguing that the DOC was obligated to follow its policy of resolving ambiguous sentences in favor ⁶³⁸ of the inmate. The DOC dismissed that grievance on the ground that “interpretation of a sentencing transcript is an issue for the court, rather than the DOC.” Id. at 508, 766 A.2d 80 . Lee appealed the dismissal.

The circuit court affirmed, holding that the proper means of redressing Lee’s complaints was via a post conviction proceeding. Accordingly, Lee filed a habeas petition asserting that “the DOC had failed to apply its policies concerning the interpretation of ambiguous sentences.” Id. at 509, 766 A.2d 80 . Agreeing with Lee, the hearing court concluded that regardless of the sentencing judge’s subjective intent, the effect of his words had been to order that the three-year terms would be served concurrently. The DOC’s decision to follow the sentencing judge’s post hoc, off-the-record interpretation of his oral pronouncement, rather than his actual words at the sentencing hearing, effectively “modified] the ... sentence upward and thus render[ed] it illegal.” Id.

In doing so, the court ruled, the DOC also had failed to abide by its own procedure for resolving ambiguous sentences, and consequently had denied Lee her due process and equal protection rights to be considered for parole upon reaching one fourth of the five year sentence, an eligibility date that had already passed. See id. at 509-10, 766 A.2d 80 . The hearing court ordered that Lee’s new sentences were to be served concurrently, and that her commitment period and parole eligibility date must be recalculated accordingly. The DOC appealed.

Lee moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that it was not allowed because the allegedly “illegal confinement, based upon an illegal sentence contained in [the] commitment record, falls squarely without the language of the exception” in section 645A. Id. at 510, 766 A.2d 80 . The Court of Appeals rejected that argument, finding that the habeas petition properly challenged the legality of Lee’s continued confinement under an allegedly ambiguous sentence. See id. at 522, 766 A.2d 80 .

The Court concluded that Lee did not contest the validity of her conviction, nor the authority of the sentencing court to render consecutive sen ⁶³⁹ tences; “her only contention has been that the court did not, in fact, do so, which is what makes her confinement unlawful.” Id. at 515, 766 A.2d 80 . “Because the habeas corpus petition did not challenge the legality of the sentence, rather only the propriety of the DOC’s actions with respect to [her] commitment and confinement,” Lee was “entitled ... to seek relief by way of habeas corpus.” Id. at 517, 522, 766 A.2d 80 . The DOC, in turn, was entitled to appeal the decision on that petition. See id. at 522, 766 A.2d 80 . We find Lee analogous to this case, even though Mateen has not distinguished between challenges to the legality of a sentence and challenges to the legality of confinement under an ambiguous sentence, as Lee did in her habeas petition.

Notwithstanding the differences in pleading, there are sufficient factual similarities in the habeas challenges made by Mateen and Lee. Like Lee, Mateen offered documents to show that after the sentencing hearing, without notice or hearing, the sentencing judge interpreted his oral sentencing pronouncement by explaining his subjective intent to impose a sentence that differed from the sentence set forth in the commitment record. See id. at 506 , 766 A.2d 80 . Like Lee, Mateen also alleged and established, through the DOC’s sentence change reports and Parole Commission documents, that the DOC and Parole Commission relied on the sentencing judge’s post hoc, off-the-record explanation of his subjective sentencing intent in treating Mateen’s sentence as a life sentence instead of a 50 year sentence.

See id. at 509, 766 A.2d 80 . We conclude that Mateen, like Lee, effectively contends that the court did not sentence him to the life term recognized by the DOC and Parole Commission, which is what makes his continued confinement under the life sentence unlawful. See id. Thus, his petition challenges the legality of his confinement by the DOC, and of his parole consideration by the Parole Commission, under an allegedly ambiguous and illegally increased sentence, rather than merely challenging the legality of the life sentence itself.

See id. at 515, 766 A.2d 80 . For the same reasons the DOC prevailed in obtaining an appeal in Lee , we conclude that Mateen was entitled to ⁶⁴⁰ petition for habeas relief and to appeal the denial of such relief. In doing so, we also reject the State’s contention that the State’s Attorney must be a party to this litigation in order to resolve the sentencing question raised by Mateen. The interpretation of Mateen’s sentence requires an objective inquiry into the sentencing record.

The State’s Attorney cannot change or add to that record in order to “explain away” any holes, discrepancies, or ambiguities. Moreover, for the reasons set forth in Part III, we conclude that no argument offered by the State’s Attorney was necessary to resolve this issue. B. “Meaningful Consideration” Claims As to Mateen’s separate claims that, even if he- is a lifer, he is being denied meaningful consideration for parole, pre-release, work release,.and family leave, we conclude that these claims also may be redressed in habeas proceedings. As explained in Part IV, the inherent purpose of these “meaningful consideration” claims is to challenge the legality of confinement, not the legality of a conviction or sentence. “The relief under a petition for habeas corpus is not limited to the release of the prisoner. ‘Habeas corpus actions may be maintained where the relief available is the ordering of a proceeding or hearing which may lead to the petitioner’s release.’ ” Pollock v. Patuxent Inst.

Bd. of Review, 358 Md. 656, 668 , 751 A.2d 496 (2000) (quoting Lomax v. Warden, Maryland Correctional Ctr., 356 Md. 569, 575 , 741 A.2d 476 (1999)). When an inmate has been denied parole, allegedly as a result of the ex post facto application of a law, habeas relief may be appropriate in the form of an order for a new parole hearing. See, e.g., id. at 669, 751 A.2d 496 (ordering new hearing regarding parole revocation); Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 664 , 574 A.2d 898 , cert. denied sub nom. Henneberry v. Sutton, 498 U.S. 950 , 111 S.Ct. 369 , 112 L.Ed.2d 331 (1990)(ordering new parole hearing). ⁶⁴¹ II.

Denial Of Habeas Petition Without A Hearing Mateen’s habeas petition did not travel the usual path through the courts. He filed his pro se petition on October 30, 1997. It was not until August 1, 2000, 5 however, that the Circuit Court for Baltimore City issued a show cause order requiring the Governor to respond to the petition. That show cause order mistakenly reversed the dates for service of the order and filing of the State’s response to the petition, requiring the State to file a response on August 31, before October 1, the date by which Mateen was required to serve the show cause order.

Mateen had the right to serve and “file a reply to the response within 30 days after service of the response[.]” On September 7, 2000, the State filed a motion to extend time for its response, pointing out the apparent inversion of the service and response dates in the show cause order. The court granted the motion, extending the State’s response time until October 15, 2000, and giving Mateen 30 days thereafter to file his reply. On October 17, 2000, the State filed a response, but the caption of that response listed the case number incorrectly. That error was remedied by an October 20 filing of a “corrected copy” of the response.

In its response, the State asked the court to summarily deny and dismiss Mateen’s petition without a hearing, pursuant to Md. Rule 15 — 303(e)(2)(A), which provides that the court may deny a habeas petition without a hearing if “the judge finds from the petition, any response, reply, document filed with the petition or with a response or reply, or public record that the individual confined ... is not entitled to any relief.” The State cited a number of reasons that Mateen “ ‘is not entitled to any relief • The date of Mateen’s release to mandatory supervision was not until May 22, 2008. ⁶⁴² • The matter of the change in Mateen’s sentence “should be addressed ... to the sentencing court in a proceeding in which the State’s Attorney has the opportunity to participate.” • The matter of his removal from the pre-release system has been resolved by Lomax v. Warden, 356 Md. 569 , 741 A.2d 476 (1999), and State v. Kanaras, 357 Md. 170 , 742 A.2d 508 (1999). • The matter of Mateen’s security classification, and any change in classification policy, falls within the DOC’s discretion, according to Maryland Code (1999), section 9-103(b)(1) of the Correctional Services Article (“CS”), and cannot be challenged as an ex post facto violation because such policies are not “laws” and the changes were not imposed to punish inmates. • The matter of Mateen’s denial of parole despite the Parole Commission’s 1994 recommendation requires judicial review. • Mateen’s challenge to his removal from work release and family leave programs is without merit because such a matter “is entrusted to the sound discretion of the Commissioner of Correction,” under CS section 3-801. • Mateen did not exhaust his administrative remedies against the DOC through the Inmate Grievance Office, as required by CS sections 10-206 and 10-210(a), and Maryland Code (1974, 1998 RepLVol.), section 5-1003 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”). On October 31, 2000, before Mateen’s 30 day opportunity to reply had expired, the court denied the petition and dismissed the action, “pursuant to Rule 15-303(e)(3)(A), on the basis that ‘the individual confined or restrained is not entitled to any relief.’ ” The record does not reveal why the court ruled prematurely on Mateen’s petition. Without knowledge of the court’s order, on November 15, 2000, Mateen, now represented by counsel, filed his reply to the State’s response. The State then filed a sur-reply on November 27, 2000, also without knowledge of the order. ⁶⁴³ By letter dated July 31, 2001, Mateen’s counsel wrote to the judge who denied and dismissed Mateen’s petition.

Counsel explained that he had “received on July 11, 2001, from the Office of the Attorney General, a copy of the ... Order den[ying]” Mateen’s petition. “The Office of the Attorney General advises that it received the Court’s Order on December 13, 2000, but we never received a copy from chambers or the Clerk’s Office.” He asserted that “we are aggrieved” by the order because the court did not consider Mateen’s timely reply, which was filed after the order, and Mateen lost his right of appeal due to the lack of notice. He asked the court to exercise its revisory powers under Md. Rule 2-535(b) by reissuing and refiling its order nunc pro tunc so that Mateen could appeal. The Attorney General did not oppose the request.

The court granted the request for limited relief, by order dated September 28, 2001. Mateen, once again acting pro se, filed this timely appeal, raising the same grounds asserted in his habeas petition and reply. Mateen argues that he was denied due process because his habeas petition was denied without a hearing. We disagree.

Although the court erred procedurally in initially denying the petition before considering Mateen’s response and the State’s reply, it corrected that procedural error, with the agreement of the parties, by reconsidering the pleadings and issuing a new order denying the petition. Moreover, because we conclude that the pleadings and record show that Mateen was not entitled to any relief (see infra Parts III and IV), the court’s premature denial of the petition did not harm Mateen. Thus, the court did not err in denying his habeas petition without a hearing.

III

Sentence Increase Claim A. The Sentence Pronounced On March 19, 1982 Mateen contends that he is being wrongfully confined as a “lifer” and wrongfully considered for parole as a lifer, ⁶⁴⁴ because the sentence of 50 years that was announced at the March 19, 1982 re-sentencing was increased illegally through the improper actions of the DOC, the Parole Commission, the sentencing judge, and the court. Mateen argues that the sentence that Judge Levin actually pronounced on March 19, 1982 was 50 years, as reflected in the commitment record that his court clerk created on that date. Alternatively, he argues that there is such uncertainty as to the announced sentence that he is entitled to the benefit of that ambiguity under the rule of lenity. Mateen points to the following documents to support his claim: ■ • The commitment record made on the day of the March 19, 1982 re-sentencing hearing.

That record, signed by the court clerk who was present at the sentencing, states that Mateen was sentenced to “Fifty (50) years.” • The April 6, 1982 “sentence and detainer status change report” issued by the DOC, stating that Mateen’s sentence had been “reduced on 3-19-82 to 50 yrs. from Life.” • The October 28, 1992 letter from the then chairman of the Maryland Parole Commission to the sentencing judge, pointing out that the 50 year term is less than the statutory minimum life sentence for first degree murder, and asking the judge to clarify whether he intended to impose a life sentence with all but 50 years suspended. • Judge Levin’s response letter, dated November 3, 1982, to the Parole Commission: “Please forgive my inartistic sentencing. It was my intention to sentence him to life and suspend all but fifty years.” • The November 16, 1982 “sentence and detainer status change report” issued by the DOC, stating that Mateen’s sentence “now reads: Life — suspend 50 years” and citing Judge Levin’s letter “explaining [the] change of sentence.” • An April 4, 1984 revised commitment record, stating that Mateen’s “SENTENCE CHANGED TO READ: Balance of Natural Life and all but Fifty (50) years suspended.” ⁶⁴⁵ • An April 6, 1984 letter from Judge Levin to Mateen responding to an April 1, 1984 letter from Mateen to him regarding the sentence change, in which Judge Levin explained that “[ujnder Maryland law when a person is found guilty of first degree murder the judge must sentence him to life imprisonment. However, the judge can suspend part of that sentence, which I did in your case. Your commitment order has been rewritten by the clerk’s office in order to reflect what I stated above[.j” Mateen contends that as a result of his wrongful confinement as a lifer, he has been declared either ineligible or unsuitable for parole, pre-release security classification, work release, and family leave.

The State’s response to Mateen’s argument is that the sentence announced on March 19, 1982 was “unambiguously” life with all but 50 years suspended. In support of that position, it relies exclusively on the “operative facts ... from a single ‘Commitment Record’ issued on April 4, 1984[.j” Without acknowledging or addressing the significance of the March 19, 1982 commitment record, it asserts that Mateen’s complaint that he is being unlawfully confined as a lifer should be rejected because it is “without a proper basis in the record.” We find the State’s argument disingenuous. Given the March 19, 1982 commitment record, and Mateen’s focus on it in his habeas petition (and during his years of effort to clarify his sentence), we may not simply ignore that commitment record in favor of the revised April 4, 1984 commitment record. 6 The 1982 commitment record constituted the. official notice of the sentence imposed at the re-sentencing hearing. ⁶⁴⁶ See CS § 9-103(a)(2). The 1984 commitment record was not created until more than two years later; in fact, it was issued just three days after Mateen wrote to Judge Levin about the matter and two days before the judge’s reply to Mateen.

Moreover, the 1984 record explicitly acknowledges that Ma-teen’s 50 year sentence was “CHANGED TO READ” life with all but 50 years suspended. Based on the available documentary record created after Mateen’s re-sentencing, we agree with Mateen that either the sentence actually announced at the March 19, 1982 hearing was 50 years, or there is such uncertainty as to the announced sentence that the doubt must be resolved in his favor. See, e.g., State v. Sayre, 314 Md. 559, 565 , 552 A.2d 553 (1989)(un-der rule of lenity, ambiguous sentence must be construed as lesser of the possible penalties). The absence of a transcript from the March 19, 1982 re-sentencing hearing makes it impossible to review the actual pronouncement of the sentence.

We therefore conclude that, together, the March 19, 1982 commitment record and the judge’s November 3, 1982 letter raise an inference that the sentence, as it was actually but “inartistically” pronounced at the hearing, was 50 years rather than life with all but 50 years suspended. Thus, we shall proceed on the factual premise that at the March 19, 1982 re-sentencing hearing, the judge imposed a 50 year term of incarceration. We turn now to the questions raised by that sentence. B. The Sentence Correction The threshold question is whether a 50 year sentence for first degree murder was a legal sentence.

The answer is “no,” because it is less than the minimum life sentence mandated by the General Assembly. See, e.g., Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 2001 Cum.Supp.), Art. 27 § 412(b)(“a person found guilty of murder in the first degree shall be sentenced to death, imprisonment for life, or impris ⁶⁴⁷ onment for life without the possibility of parole” 7 ); State v. Green, 367 Md. 61, 80 , 785 A.2d 1275 (2001)(“once the predicate requirements for imposition of the ... sentencing provisions have been established, a sentencing court has no choice but to impose the mandatory minimum penalty prescribed”); Shilling v. State, 320 Md. 288, 295 , 577 A.2d 83 (1990)(“a trial judge cannot impose a legal sentence less than the minimum required under the statute”); State v. Hannah, 307 Md. 390, 402 , 514 A.2d 16 (1986) (sentence of probation before judgment on handgun offense with statutory minimum sentence of 5 years was an illegal sentence). The next question is whether the court had the power to correct the illegal 50 year sentence by imposing the longer sentence of life with all but 50 years suspended. The answer is “yes.” Under Md. Rule 4-345(a), the court retained reviso-ry power to correct this illegal sentence “at any time.” Judge Levin was not required to wait for a motion to correct the illegal sentence; he was entitled to do so on his own initiative.

See State v. Griffiths, 338 Md. 485, 496 , 659 A.2d 876 (1995). The record shows that as a result of Judge Levin’s November 1982 letter and in connection with the judge’s April 1984 letter, the DOC revised its sentence change report and the court revised its commitment record. The cumulative effect of these actions by Judge Levin, the court, the Parole Commission, and the DOC was that the illegal 50 year sentence was “corrected” and Mateen’s term of confinement was increased to comply with the mandatory minimum life sentence required under Art. 27 section 412(b). Correcting Mateen’s illegal sentence was permissible under Md. Rule 4-345(a).

In Ridgeway v. State, 369 Md. 165, 171-72 , 797 A.2d 1287 (2002), the Court of Appeals recently explained that when an initial sentence is illegal, a court may correct it “at any time,” and then impose a new legal sentence ⁶⁴⁸ without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. See id. Ridgeway was charged with firing three shotgun blasts into an occupied trailer, hitting two adults and endangering, but not physically injuring, three children. The jury convicted Ridge-way of first degree assault against the adults, but acquitted him of the same charges against the children; instead, Ridge-way was convicted of recklessly endangering the children.

At sentencing, however, the court erroneously imposed three consecutive ten year sentences for first degree assault against the children, then merged the reckless endangerment counts into the first degree assault counts. The clerk’s office immediately notified the sentencing judge of the sentencing error. The court recalled the case later the same day, vacated the three assault sentences with respect to the children, and, relying on Rule 4-345(a), sentenced Ridgeway to three consecutive five year sentences on the reckless endangerment counts that it previously had merged into the illegal assault sentences. This Court rejected Ridgeway’s argument that the court had improperly increased his sentence on the reckless endangerment counts from zero to five years.

We held that the original sentences on the first degree assault counts were illegal sentences that the court could correct at any time under Md. Rule 4-345(a). See Ridgeway v. State, 140 Md.App. 49, 61-65 , 779 A.2d 1031 (2001). We also held that the subsequently imposed five year sentences on the reckless endangerment convictions did not constitute double jeopardy. See id. at 63-65, 779 A.2d 1031 .

The Court of Appeals agreed and affirmed, explaining that “[a] court cannot punish a defendant for a crime for which he or she has been acquitted.” See Ridgeway, 369 Md. at 171 , 797 A.2d 1287 . The Court emphasized the critical distinction between correcting “a mistake or a ‘slip of the tongue’ ” and correcting an illegal sentence. See id. at 172-73 , 797 A.2d 1287 . In correcting a sentence that the court mistakenly pronounced but did not intend to impose, but which otherwise was a legal sentence, the court acts within the narrow scope of ⁶⁴⁹ Rule 4 — 345(b), which prevents it from increasing the original sentence.

In contrast, in correcting the erroneous pronouncement of a sentence that is illegal (whether or not the court intended to impose that sentence), the court that re-sentenced Ridgeway acted within the broad authority of Rule 4-345(a).