Matter of Alexander

Menchine, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Lamont Monday Alexander was found to be a delinquent child after a hearing in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, Division of Juvenile Causes, under a petition charging him, as a juvenile offender, with a violation of Article 27, § 32. This appeal suggests error because of: insufficiency of evidence; error in ruling on evidence, and improper use of prior juvenile history. The issues raised will be discussed here in reverse order.

Improper Use of Prior Juvenile History The trial judge took the position that at an adjudicatory hearing where the juvenile took the stand in his own defense, the prior record of the respondent could be examined collaterally by the court. The trial court’s position is shown in the following dialogue between court and counsel after testimony had been concluded: Counsel: “* * * I wasn’t aware that you were aware of the record. I would certainly object on that ground.” The Court: “I brought it up after I made my finding.” Counsel: “True, Your Honor. You obviously knew his past record during the case.” The Court: “No, I didn’t.

I knew it when he took the stand to testify in his own behalf.” Counsel: “This is what I mean. I mean before the end of the case.” ⁴¹⁸ The Court: “I will overrule the objection. When the respondent takes the witness stand his past record is admissible.” The trial judge apparently acted in reliance upon the rule authorizing evidence of conviction of crime to impeach credibility, and extended it to apply to prior determinations of delinquency in the juvenile court. There is no doubt that Maryland adheres to the “conviction of crime” rule.

In Burgess v. State, 16 Md. 162 , 169, 155 A. 153, 156 (1931), it was stated: “It is established in this State that in criminal cases, where the defendant is a witness in his own behalf, he thereby puts his character in issue, and may be asked on cross-examination if he has been convicted of crime.” This impeachment rule itself arose in substantial amelioration of the former common law rule barring as a witness any person convicted of infamous crime. Compare: Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., § 520 and § 980. The rule, in its general application in Maryland, has been given a somewhat more limited relevance. Thus, in Linkins v. State, 202 Md. 212, 220 , 96 A. 2d 246, 250 (1952), it was said: “It has been held in this State that while evidence of defendant’s prior convictions of crimes, other than that charged, need not be restricted to infamous crimes or crimes involving moral turpitude to be admissible, such convictions should be for law violations which may have some tendency to impeach defendant’s credibility as a witness.

No rigid classification of crimes seems possible. The court must exercise discretion and its decision will not be interfered with on appeal, except when the evidence is so clearly irrelevant that its admission could not be said to be within the discretion of the trial court.” ⁴¹⁹ In the particular, that is, with respect to prior findings of delinquency by a juvenile court, the rule has been held to have no application. Thus, in