Matter of Anderson

Smith, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitions were filed at various times in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, Division for Juvenile Causes (Juvenile Court), charging that William Anderson, Michael A. Epps, Larry Smith, and Donald Brady (the juveniles) were delinquents. See Maryland Code (1957, 1973 Repl. Vol.) Art. 26, § § 51-71 for the statute then applicable.

A “delinquent child” was defined in § 70-1 (h) as “a child who commits a delinquent act and who requires supervision, treatment, or rehabilitation.” A “delinquent act” was defined in § 70-1 (g) as “an act which is in violation of Article 66V2 of [the Maryland] Code, any other traffic violation, or an act which would be a crime if done by a person who is not a child.” 1 Pursuant to the provisions of Maryland Rule 908 e 1, testimony was presented to a master in each case. In each instance he submitted a recommendation to the judge presiding in that court that an order be entered dismissing the petition. The State’s attorney, as authorized by Rule 908 e 2, filed written exceptions to the master’s recommendation on behalf of the petitioner in each case. Rule 908 e 3 provides: “In the absence of exceptions, the master’s findings and recommendations shall promptly be confirmed, modified or remanded by the judge.

If, within the specified time, exceptions are filed, the ⁸⁷ judge shall hear the entire matter or such specific matters as set forth in the exceptions de novo.” The juveniles challenged the exceptions. They contended that the provision for a hearing de novo was in conflict with the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The trial judge (Hammerman, J.) made a finding favorable to them. The State appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.

In Matter of Anderson, 20 Md. App. 31 , 315 A. 2d 540 (1974), that court reversed the lower court and remanded the cases with directions that the petitions be heard de novo by the juvenile judge. We granted certiorari in order that we might consider the contentions of the juveniles (1) that the State had no right of appeal, (2) that the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment is applicable to juvenile proceedings, and (3) that Rule 908 e 2, “to the extent that it permits the State to except to a master’s finding of non-delinquency and obtain a de novo trial, violates the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.” I The juveniles urge here, as they did in the Court of Special Appeals, that the State has no right of appeal. They base this contention upon their reading of Code (1957, 1973 Repl. Vol.) Art. 26, §§ 70-1 (e) and 70-25, in effect at the time the orders for appeal to the Court of Special Appeals were filed in these cases.

Provision is made for appeal in § 70-25. It states in pertinent part: “An aggrieved party may appeal from any final order, judgment, or decree of the juvenile court to the Court of Special Appeals in the manner prescribed by the Maryland Rules.” “Party” is defined in § 70-1 (e) as “a child named in a petition, or his parent, guardian or custodian.” Although not mentioned by the juveniles, reference to Chapter 432 of the Acts of 1969, completely revising the juvenile law in ⁸⁸ Maryland and providing the statutory base for § 70-1 and § 70-25, reveals that as originally introduced in the General Assembly no definition of ‘“party” appeared. It was introduced in the form in which it came from a special subcommittee of the Legislative Council. See 1 Legislative Council of Maryland, Report to the General Assembly of 1969, at 131-42 (1968).

The present definition was added by amendment in the General Assembly. Chapter 2 of the Acts of 1973 of the First Extraordinary Session of the General Assembly enacted new provisions of the Maryland Code dealing with courts and the judiciary, being now codified as Code (1974) Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Matters dealing with appeals were placed in Title 12 of that article. Sec. 12-301 provides, with exceptions not here pertinent, that “a party may appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by a circuit court.” “Circuit court” is defined in § 12-101 (d) as including the Circuit Court of Baltimore City.

The appeals to the Court of Special Appeals in these cases were taken prior to the effective date of the new code. The right of appeal must be determined under the law in effect at the time of the appeals. Chief Judge Orth pointed out for the Court of Special Appeals that in Welch v. Humphrey, 200 Md. 410 , 90 A. 2d 686 (1952), this Court said: “It is true that a codification of previously enacted legislation, eliminating repealed laws and systematically arranging the laws by subject matter, becomes an official Code when adopted by the Legislature, and, since it constitutes the latest expression of the legislative will, it controls over all previous expressions on the subject, if the Legislature so provides. However, the principal function of a Code is to reorganize the statutes and state them in simpler form.

Consequently any changes made in them by a Code are presumed to be for the purpose of clarity rather than change of meaning. Therefore, even a change in the ⁸⁹ phraseology of a statute by a codification thereof will not ordinarily modify the law, unless the change is so radical and material that the intention of the Legislature to modify the law appears unmistakably from the language of the Code. Welsh v. Kuntz, 196 Md. 86, 97 , 75 A. 2d 343, 347 .” Id. at 417. Judge Orth then concluded that the State had the right to appeal from the orders dismissing the charges against the juveniles, saying: “There being no limitation on the meaning of ‘party’, and the State as a party in juvenile causes not being within the exceptions designated in § 12-302, the State may appeal from a final judgment entered in a juvenile case by a circuit court.

As this was the clear legislative intent in enacting § 12-301, it was the intent of Art. 26, § 70-25.” Id. at 20 Md. App. 40 . We agree with the conclusion of the Court of Special Appeals that a right of appeal on the part of the State existed, but we reach our conclusion by a somewhat different route. Code (1957, 1968 Repl. Vol., 1973 Cum.

Supp.). Art. 5, § 6, in effect at the time of these appeals, stated in pertinent part: “Any party may appeal to the Court of Appeals from any final decree, or order in the nature of a final decree, entered by a court of equity unless the final decree or order is entered in a case or proceeding subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Special Appeals, in which event any party may appeal to the Court of Special Appeals from any such decree or order.” The parties are under the impression that the equity courts when sitting as juvenile courts are exercising “a special or limited jurisdiction” and are not acting “according to the ordinary course of the common law” as those terms are used in Simpler v. State, Use of Boyd, 223 Md. 456 , ⁹⁰ 460-61, 165 A. 2d 464 (1960), and thus that the right of appeal can come only under § 70-25. We do not see it that way. Equity has long been concerned with infants.

For instance, Barnard v. Godfrey, 157 Md. 264 , 145 A. 614 (1929), concerned what is now Code (1957,1973 Repl. Vol.) Art. 16, § 66 providing that “[t]he several equity courts of this State shall have original jurisdiction in all cases relating to the custody, guardianship, maintenance and support of legitimate and illegitimate children ... .” Judge W. Mitchell Digges there said for the Court: “This section is declaratory of the inherent power of courts of equity over minors . . . .” Id. at 267. To like effect, see, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 246 Md. 616, 619 , 229 A. 2d 131 (1967), and Coleman v. Coleman, 228 Md. 610, 613 , 180 A. 2d 875 (1962). Cf.

Montchester v. Honga River, 257 Md. 79, 84-85 , 262 A. 2d 312 (1970). We there said that Art. 15, relating to bounding lands as enacted by Chapter 33 of the Acts of 1786, probably involved “a regular exercise of the court’s general jurisdiction in the ordinary course of the common law, from which an appeal would normally lie under Article 5, Section 1.” Divorce was a subject not cognizable by our chancery courts prior to the enactment of Chapter 262 of the Acts of 1841. Rubin v. Rubin, 233 Md. 118, 124 , 195 A. 2d 696 , 99 A.L.R.2d 256 (1963); Foote v. Foote, 190 Md. 171, 176 , 57 A. 2d 804 (1948); and Emerson v. Emerson, 120 Md. 584, 589 , 87 A. 1033 (1913). Similarly, prior to enactment of Chapter 220 of the Acts of 1947, Maryland equity courts were without power, upon granting a divorce, to determine ownership of personal property of the parties and to apportion the property between them.

Gebhard v. Gebhard, 253 Md. 125, 129-30 , 252 A. 2d 171 (1969); Brucker v. Benson, 209 Md. 247, 250-51 , 121 A. 2d 230 (1956); and Lopez v. Lopez, 206 Md. 509, 515-17 , 112 A. 2d 466 (1955). Yet, it is under Art. 5, § 6, that appeals from those actions are taken. The view that creation of additional equity jurisdiction does not necessarily create “a special or limited jurisdiction” is reinforced by reference to Williams v. Williams, 7 Gill 302 (1848). By Chapter 181 of the Acts of ⁹¹ 1833 provision was made, relative to mortgages in Baltimore City, for the mortgagors to assent in each instrument to the passage of a decree for sale of the mortgaged premises and for the appointment of a trustee to make sale in the event of their default.

It was contended “that in passing decrees under this Act the Court of Chancery exercises only ‘a special and limited jurisdiction/ which in such cases excludes the right of appeal unless expressly given by the Act that creates the peculiar jurisdiction,” as in certain cases cited. Our predecessors said: “It cannot be assumed, that the Legislature thus constructively intended to abridge a right, so fully recognized within the general Chancery jurisdiction, and, as to the subject under consideration, convert that Court into one of special and limited powers; thus repealing the old and time-sanctioned provision in favor of justice and right, that ‘any person aggrieved by a decree in Chancery shall have his appeal/ 1721, ch. 14, sec. 3. The motion is overruled.” Id. at 306 . This Court commented upon § 6 as it then stood, referring to a right of appeal “by any one or more of the persons parties to the suit,” in Preston v. Poe, 116 Md. 1 , 81 A. 178 (1911),.stating: “While it has been held that this provision does not restrict the right of appeal to those who are technical parties to a suit, yet it is also well settled that an appellant must be able to show that he has a direct interest in the subject-matter of the litigation.

Hall v. Jack, 32 Md. 262 ; Rau v. Robertson, 58 Md. 508 ; Grabill v. Plummer, 95 Md. 60 ; Cecil v. Cecil, 19 Md. 72 ; Johns v. Caldwell, 60 Md. 259 ; Lurman v. Hubner, 75 Md. 268 ; Haskie v. James, 75 Md. 568 ; Stewart v. Codd, 58 Md. 86 ; Frey v. Shrewsbury Bank, 58 Md. 151 ; Glenn v. Reid, 74 Md. 238 ; 2 Cyc. 628, 629. In the first of the cases just cited, which was relied upon by the appellant in this connection, the decree from which the ⁹² intervenor appealed not only dismissed his petition but concluded his rights in respect to the fund in controversy. It was held, therefore, that, while not a technical party to the suit, he had such an interest in the subject of the litigation as to entitle him to maintain the appeal.” Id. at 6. Chief Judge Bruñe fully discussed this subject for the Court in Kreatchman v. Ramsburg, 224 Md. 209, 215-17 , 167 A. 2d 345 (1961).

To like effect, see E. Miller, Equity Procedure § 354 (1897), and the recent cases of Prince George’s Co. v. Laurel, 262 Md. 171, 176-77 , 277 A. 2d 262 (1971); Planning Commission v. McCaw, 246 Md. 662, 669-72 , 229 A. 2d 584 (1967); and First Union v. Bottom, 232 Md. 292, 295-96 , 193 A. 2d 49 (1963). The interest of the State in this matter is borne out by Rule 908 e (2), providing that exceptions by a petitioner to a master’s findings or recommendations relative to delinquency “may only be taken by the State’s attorney.” The State’s position as parens patriae is deeply involved in juvenile proceedings. Accordingly, we have no difficulty in concluding that the State was a party within the meaning of Art. 5, § 6, then in effect, and, therefore, the appeal was properly filed. II Before the holding in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 , 89 S. Ct. 2056 , 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969), that the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States was incorporated into the due process clause of the Fourteeth Amendment and, therefore, applicable to the states, this Court held that the common law rule against double jeopardy in effect in Maryland did not bar prosecution of an individual in one of the circuit courts after adjudication as a delinquent in a juvenile court. 2 ⁹³ Moquin v. State, 216 Md. 524 , 140 A. 2d 914 (1958).

For the purposes of our decision today we need go no further than to assume, arguendo, that a finding that an individual is a delinquent under the terms of the juvenile act then in force, now codified as Code (1974) §§ 3-801 to 3-842 inch, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, places him in jeopardy so that a second proceeding relative to the same incident would be barred. Ill These cases arose in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City. In the 23 counties of Maryland a court “to be styled the Circuit Court for the County, in which it may be held” is created by Maryland Constitution Art. IV, § 20. It is vested with “all the power, authority and jurisdiction, original and appellate, which the . ..

Circuit Courts of this State [had and exercised in 1867], or which may [t] hereafter be prescribed by law.” This includes jurisdiction in criminal, law, and equity cases. In Baltimore City, however, a number of separate courts are created by the Constitution. By Art. IV, § 30 the Criminal Court of Baltimore is vested with the criminal jurisdiction, while by § 29 the Circuit Court of Baltimore City is granted “exclusive jurisdiction in Equity within the limits of said city.” It has shared that equity jurisdiction with the Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City since its establishment by Chapter 194 of the Acts of 1888 under the authority of Art. IV, § 39 of the Constitution. In Capron v. Devries, 83 Md. 220 , 34 A. 251 (1896), our predecessors said: “It can hardly be established that the Legislature has not the power to enlarge the jurisdiction of ⁹⁴ equity.

The system of equity jurisprudence has been of steady growth ever since its origin; sometimes by the effect of judicial decisions; and sometimes by statute law.” Id. at 224 . The juveniles in their arguments here have ignored this background of the tribunal in which their cases were docketed, a background which we recognized by implication, at least, in Matter of Miles, 269 Md. 649 , 309 A. 2d 289 (1973). Originally, juvenile matters in Maryland were not handled in equity. Provision for a special judicial officer to handle juvenile matters came into Maryland law with passage of Chapter 611 of the Acts of 1902.

It authorized the appointment in Baltimore City of a “Magistrate for Juvenile Causes” to “have exclusive jurisdiction of all cases of trial, or commitment for trial, or of commitment to any reformatory or other institution, of all minors under sixteen years of age . ...” Judge Charles E. Moylan, Sr., in Comments on the Juvenile Court, 25 Md. L. Rev. 310 (1965), states that the first juvenile court in the United States was established in Chicago in 1899. In 1940 Governor Herbert R. O’Conor appointed a Juvenile Delinquency Commission “to consider the whole field of the treatment of juvenile delinquency in Maryland, and to report its findings to the Governor and to the General Assembly at its session of 1941.” Report of Juvenile Delinquency Commission (1941) states: “Baltimore is the only large city in the United States whose Juvenile Court judges are Justices of the Peace.” Id. at 16. Accordingly, it recommended “an enabling amendment to empower the Legislature to establish a Juvenile Court in Baltimore City.” Chapter 824 of the Acts of 1941 proposed a constitutional amendment creating “[a] Juvenile Court . . . for Baltimore City” and authorizing the General Assembly to “establish a Juvenile Court for any other incorporated city or town or any county of the State.” This proposed amendment drew the fire of, among others, ⁹⁵ the late Samuel K. Dennis, then Chief Judge of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City. See S. Dennis, Criticisms and Suggestions Relating to Existing and Proposed Juvenile Courts for Baltimore and for the Counties, The Daily Record (Baltimore), Feb. 19, 1942.

The Report of the Maryland Commission on Juvenile Delinquency 71 (1943) states that the proposed amendment was defeated at the general election on November 3,1942, and that “[t]he Commission on the Judiciary Article of the Constitution of Maryland (commonly known as the Bond Commission) opposed the adoption of this Amendment in the belief that Juvenile Courts with adequate powers and jurisdiction [could] be constitutionally provided by statute, and that, therefore, there [was] no necessity of a Constitutional Amendment.” It also stated in its report: “[The Bond] Commission further expressed the opinion that, as a practical matter, in order to avoid the multiplication of courts, a juvenile court in Baltimore City should be a branch of the Supreme Bench, and that a judge of that bench qualified for such work should continue to serve in juvenile matters without rotation in order to promote the most effective administration.” Id. at 71. It said at page 73 that it “accept[ed] the view that our present courts, that is the Supreme Bench in Baltimore City and the Circuit Courts in the several counties, have inherent jurisdiction to secure to every child in the State proper care and guidance if he or she is lacking in same, whether due to neglect, dependency, delinquency, feeble-mindedness or to a combination of two or more of these causes.” It recommended: “Creation of a juvenile court in Baltimore city and in each county or at least in each Judicial Circuit, that shall have (1) original, exclusive jurisdiction, unless expressly waived by such courts in favor of the criminal courts, over children up to 16 years of age in all cases of delinquency, dependency, neglect, abandonment or feeble- ⁹⁶ mindedness; (2) original jurisdiction to determine paternity in disputed cases; (3) original, exclusive jurisdiction to try, subject to the right of trial by jury unless waived, any parent, guardian or other adult for any wilful act or omission contributing to, encouraging or tending to cause any condition bringing a child within the jurisdiction of a juvenile court, as just defined; and if found guilty, to sentence any such person for any such act or omission as a misdemeanor, to pay a fine or to imprisonment, or both, within limits to be fixed by statute; such juvenile court in Baltimore city to be a part of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, and such juvenile courts in the Counties to be parts of the existing circuit courts.” Id. at 85-86. We surmise that Chapter 818 of the Acts of 1943 was passed as a result of the recommendation of that Commission that “[i]n addition to the jurisdiction [then] possessed and exercised by the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, said Court [should] have jurisdiction in juvenile causes as [t]hereinafter defined.” That act provided for the appointment by the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, upon recommendation of the judge assigned to exercise the jurisdiction in juvenile causes, of “a suitable person to act as Master.” The master was required at the conclusion of a hearing to “transmit to the Judge all papers relating to the case, together with his findings and recommendations in writing,” with the further proviso that if no hearing were requested relative to those findings and recommendations they should, “when confirmed by an order of the Judge, .. . become the judgment of the court.” By Chapter 797 of the Acts of 1945 the General Assembly provided, in what became Code (1939,1947 Cum. Supp.) Art. 26, § § 48A-48U, for the circuit courts to sit as juvenile courts in each of the counties of the State other than Washington, Allegany and Montgomery.

The act also was not applicable to Baltimore City. One of