Matter of Easton, Incompetent

214 Md. 176 (1957) 133 A.2d 441 MATTER OF EASTON, INCOMPETENT [No. 236, October Term, 1956.] Court of Appeals of Maryland. Decided June 26, 1957. The cause was argued before BRUNE, C.J., and COLLINS, HENDERSON, HAMMOND and PRESCOTT, JJ. Walter C. Mylander, Jr., with whom was Clayton C. Carter on the brief, for appellant.

Brief amici curiae for Maryland Title Guarantee Company, Title Guarantee Company and Real Estate Title Company, Inc., filed by Elbridge B. Donaldson, Paul J. Wilkinson, John J. Neubauer, J. Henry Ditto, Norman P. Ramsey and Charles C.W. Atwater. PRESCOTT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an important case. The titles to many valuable parcels of real estate in Maryland are potentially involved.

It is an appeal, taken pursuant to leave of court, from a final sua sponte decree of the Circuit Court for Queen Anne's County, in equity, which dismissed a trustee's petition for a decree for a sale of his ward's real estate. There is no question of fact involved, other than the Chancellor found, and the record fully supports such finding, that the evidence adduced showed that the reported sale would be "to the interest and advantage of the incompetent". This was necessary to comply with Code (1951) Art. 16, sec. 140 (all references to sections hereinafter made will be to Art. 16 of the same Code unless otherwise specified). ¹⁷⁹ The original petition was filed in March of 1954 by John H. Doyle, as the next friend of William Rex Easton. It alleged Mr. Easton was incapable of managing his property by reason of a mental disability, and prayed for the appointment of a trustee, etc. It was brought under section 135, and all of the jurisdictional requirements of that section were complied with.

Although the alleged incompetent was properly summoned, he failed to appear within the period prescribed by the section. Thereafter, the Chancellor decreed that Mr. Easton was incompetent and incapable of managing his property or estate. Mr. Doyle was appointed trustee, and, after duly qualifying, thence proceeded to administer the estate. After doing so for more than two years, he, in January of 1957, sought to sell certain real estate belonging to the incompetent.

He, therefore, filed a petition which contained the customary allegations, and a tentative contract of sale for the property, subject to the court's approval. No summons was requested nor issued notifying the incompetent of the proposed sale. Proof was taken, pursuant to section 140, as to the value, quantity and condition of the property and other surrounding circumstances. The Chancellor refused to ratify the sale and passed a decree which dismissed the petition.

After obtaining leave of the Chancellor, the trustee entered an appeal to this Court. Upon the above facts, we are requested to determine the following questions: I. Is the establishment of a judicial method of determining a person to be incompetent by reason of mental disability, non compos mentis, or a lunatic, a legislative function?

II

If so, does section 135 intend to confer upon equity courts the right to adjudicate a person to be incompetent by reason of mental disability without the intervention of a jury?

III

If section 135 does intend to confer such right, is the method of inquiry therein provided for sufficient to satisfy the constitutional guarantees of: (a) "justice and right" under Art. 19 of the Maryland ¹⁸⁰ Declaration of Rights, and "Due Process" under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution? (b) trial by jury under Article V of the Maryland Declaration of Rights? I The first question gives us little difficulty. While it has been held in several jurisdictions that courts of equity have inherent jurisdiction over the persons and estates of lunatics, Maryland, at an early date (1827), held that whatever such inherent jurisdiction the Chancellor possessed was quite limited and it should be exercised with great care.

Rebecca Owings' Case, 1 Bland 290 . See also Greenwade v. Greenwade, 43 Md. 313 . Neither the High Court of Chancery nor its successors, the equity courts, had inherent power to decree the sale of the property of persons non compos mentis. Hamilton v. Traber, 78 Md. 26, 31 , 27 A. 229 .

In other words, lunacy or mental incompetency alone does not originate equitable jurisdiction over the person or estate of a lunatic, except to a limited degree; consequently, if the equity courts of this State possess such jurisdiction, its source is other than the general jurisdiction of those courts. In order to comprehend fully that source, it may not be inappropriate to give a brief background concerning lunatics and their property. There seems no better way to do this than to quote from the opinion of this Court in Hamilton v. Traber, supra (1893), which relies for authority, in the main, upon Story, Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 1335, and Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 1311: "Lunacy or mental unsoundness did not give the English Court of Chancery jurisdiction over the person or estate of a lunatic until after an inquisition of a jury, adjudging the person to be a non compos mentis had been regularly found. The authority directing the inquisition to be taken did not pertain to that court, but was derived by delegation from the crown — it was a portion of the King's executive power as parens patriae, and did not belong to the ¹⁸¹ Court of Chancery by virtue of its inherent and general judicial functions.

This branch of the regal authority was delegated to the Chancellor, as the personal representative of the crown, by means of an official instrument called the `sign manual,' signed by the King's own signature, and sealed with his own privy seal, and was exercised by the Chancellor alone, and not by the Court of Chancery. * * * Anciently, in point of fact, the custody of the persons and property of idiots and lunatics, or, at least of those who held lands, was not in the crown but in the lord of the fee. The Statute De Praerogativa Regis, the 17th of Edw. II, ch. 9, gave to the King the custody of idiots, and also vested in him the profits of the idiot's lands during his life. By this means the crown acquired a beneficial interest in the lands, and, as a special warrant from the crown is in all cases necessary to any grant of its interest, the separate commission which gave the Lord Chancellor jurisdiction over the persons and property of idiots may be referred to this consideration.

With respect to lunatics the Statute of 17 Edw. II, ch. 10, enacted that the King should provide that their lands and tenements should be kept without waste. It conferred merely a power, which could not be considered as included within the general jurisdiction antecedently conferred on the Court of Chancery, and therefore a separate and special commission became necessary for the delegation of this new power. * * * "The existence of this vested interest in the crown is the reason that mere lunacy did not originate the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery over the persons and estates of idiots and lunatics, but the lunacy had first to be inquired of by a jury, and found of record in accordance with the rule of law, wherever a right of entry is alleged in the crown. "After this special jurisdiction conferred by the `sign manual' had been exercised in any particular ¹⁸² case by adjudging an individual to be a lunatic, and by appointing a committee of his person and property, a further jurisdiction then arose in the Court of Chancery to supervise and control the official conduct of the committee. * * * The power of the committee to deal with the estate was, at common law, very limited. * * * But the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, acquired in the manner just stated, and after the preliminary finding of an inquisition, did not include authority to decree the sale of the lunatic's real estate for his maintenance and support until that power was distinctly conferred by Acts of Parliament passed sometime after the American Revolution. * * * "The Maryland Court of Chancery did not, either under the Proprietary Government or after the Revolution, possess any greater or larger powers with respect to lunatics or their estates than the English Chancery was clothed with when the colonies separated from the mother country.

Statutes passed after Maryland became a State extended the authority of the Chancellor; and to them, but to no inherent powers of the Chancery Court, must resort be had for the origin of the jurisdiction it may now exercise to decree a sale of a lunatic's estate for his maintenance and support." The opinion then stated that the only authority under which the courts of equity derive their power to make sale of a lunatic's property for the purpose of effecting a change of investment was what is now section 137; and that this jurisdiction could only be invoked after his status as a lunatic had been established by an inquisition by a jury. See also Bliss v. Bliss, 133 Md. 61 , 104 A. 467 ; Alexander's Chancery Practice, Ch. 15, Cf. 33 A.L.R. 2d 1146 , par. 2. This was the law of Maryland with reference to the authority for, and the procedure to be followed in, making sales of lunatic's property for reinvestment in the year 1893; and it apparently remained the same until 1929, with possible changes that need not be related here. ¹⁸³ In 1929, the Legislature enacted what is now section 135, which made far-reaching and innovational changes in the law as outlined above. Acts of 1929, ch. 518.

It is our immediate inquiry to determine whether this was a proper legislative function. Indeed, the custody of the person and property of those non compos mentis has been so generally recognized and accepted as a legislative responsibility, both in this country and in England, that it is not susceptible to serious challenge. In this country, this responsibility is subject, of course, to constitutional limitations. The Legislature of Maryland began as early as 1773 (Acts 1773, Ch. 7, November Session) to exercise this function and since then has done so many times.

We have been referred to no case, and have found none, where such authority of our Legislature has been disputed. The Legislatures of our sister States have recognized and exercised these same functions, Pomeroy op. cit., supra, sec. 1313, 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons, sec. 10, and in England, Parliament has done likewise. 21 Halsbury's Laws of England, sec. 560 et seq. In this country after the Revolution, the care and custody of persons of unsound mind, and the possession and control of their estates, which in England belonged to the King as a part of his prerogative, were deemed to be vested in the people; and the people are represented by the Legislature. We have no hesitation in holding that the right to prescribe, within constitutional bounds, a judicial method of determining a person to be a lunatic or non compos mentis, and regulating the custody and control of his person and property is a proper legislative function.

Bliss v. Bliss, 133 Md. 61, 71 , 104 A. 467 ; 28 Am. Jur. Insane and Other Incompetent Persons, sec. 25. II Having made the above determination, we shall now consider what the Legislature intended by the enactment of section 135 in 1929 (Acts of 1943, ch. 480), and the subsequent amendment thereof in 1943.

This question is one of first impression. The previous decisions of this Court relating to the procedure in regard to the determination of whether or not a person was of unsound mind stated the law as it existed at ¹⁸⁴ the time of the respective decisions, and this is the first occasion where we consider the full meaning and effect of section 135. There was one other decision, In re Rickell's Estate, 158 Md. 654 , 149 A. 446 , 150 A. 25 , rendered after its enactment and effectual date, but it apparently had not been published and was not called to the attention of the Court at that time. The decision in that case makes no reference to section 135.

Such cases as Purdum v. Lilly, 182 Md. 612 , 35 A.2d 805 , dealt with petitions for writs de lunatico inquirendo. We shall briefly recapitulate what the law was just prior to 1929. As early as 1785 by what is now section 132, the equity courts were given full power and authority to superintend and direct the affairs of persons non compos mentis, with authority to appoint a trustee for such persons and to "make such orders and decrees respecting their persons and estates as to the court may seem proper". This was then section 117 of the Code (1924).

However, before this jurisdiction could be invoked by the courts, with certain exceptions named before, an inquisition by a sheriff's jury determining the person to be of unsound mind had to be returned and affirmed by the court. In 1929, the Legislature enacted what is now section 135, which, with its amendments, now reads: "The Court shall have power also to appoint a Committee or Trustee to take charge of and manage the property of any person incompetent by reason of a mental disability, and the Court may, upon application of said Committee or Trustee, order or decree the sale of any real property or any interest therein to which said incompetent may be entitled, and the proceeds therefrom to be invested or otherwise disposed of as provided by this sub-title. "The application therefor, may be made by next friend, shall be by petition under oath, accompanied by certificates, sworn to and subscribed by two medical doctors * * *, one of whom shall have attended the alleged incompetent within the ten days before the filing of the petition. "Such certificate shall set out the cause, nature, extent and probable duration of the incompetency. ¹⁸⁵ The petition shall set out the reasons for the application and the kind, quantity and value of the property to be cared for and managed.

The Court shall pass an order, (a) directing the alleged incompetent to be summoned within ten days, (b) requiring that within