Matthews v. Housing Auth. Balto. City

WRIGHT, J. Appellant, Darlene Matthews (“Darlene”), appeals her termination from the Housing Choice Voucher Program ⁵⁷⁵ (“HCVP”) by appellee, the Housing Authority of Baltimore City (“HABC”), after the HABC learned that her husband, Gerald Matthews, Sr. (“Gerald”), had listed her HCVP residence as his mailing address, and it concluded that Gerald was residing in her household as an unauthorized occupant. Darlene received a HCVP termination notice dated April 4, 2012, and subsequently requested an informal hearing, which was held on May 16, 2012. By letter dated May 31, 2012, the HABC Hearing Officer informed Darlene that the HABC’s decision to terminate would be upheld. On June 14, 2012, Darlene filed a Petition for Administrative Mandamus in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, asking the circuit court to review the HABC Hearing Officer’s decision.

Following a hearing on December 11, 2012, the court affirmed the HABC’s decision. This timely appeal followed. Questions Presented Darlene asks: 1. Did the HABC Hearing Officer err as a matter of law when she concluded that allowing a non-household member to use the subsidized unit’s address to receive mail was a HCVP violation? 2.

Does the HABC termination hearing record lack substantial evidence to support a finding that [Gerald] was living in [Darlene’s] unit as an unauthorized occupant? In its brief, the HABC initially responds by arguing that this Court is “without jurisdiction to hear th[is] appeal” pursuant to Md.Code (1973, 2013 Repl. Vol.), § 12-302(a) of the Courts’ & Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”). We disagree as to the jurisdictional issue and, upon review of the merits of the case, reverse the Hearing Officer’s decision.

Facts and Procedural History The facts of this case are undisputed. 1 Darlene and Gerald married in August 2002. A few months later, they separated ⁵⁷⁶ and Gerald moved out of Darlene’s home at Chapel Apartments, 8221 Esther Place, Baltimore City. In 2004, when Chapel Apartments was sold, Darlene received a Section 8 2 voucher through the HABC’s HCVP. Until late 2011, her participation in the HCVP was without incident.

On December 6, 2011, Darlene went to the HABC and requested that her son be removed from her HCVP household. At the same time, she asked that Gerald be added to the voucher because they had reconciled. Gerald “signed some papers, including a Judicial Information System Screening Form, a Personal Declaration Form, an Authorization for the Release of Information/Privacy Act Notice, and a Citizenship Verification form,” allowing the HABC to conduct a criminal background check. By letter dated April 4, 2012, the HABC notified Darlene that her participation in the HCVP would be terminated “effective May 5, 2012.” (Emphasis omitted).

The letter went on to state, in pertinent part: The reason for the termination is Tenant Non-ComplianeeViolation of Family Obligations/Unauthorized Occupant ⁵⁷⁷ ... A background check from the Maryland Judiciary Case Search on Gerald Matthews Sr. lists his address as 3221 Esther Place, Baltimore, MD on three different occasions; January 5, 2004, January 3, 2011, and February 1, 2011.[ 3 ] All of the dates listed are incidents that happened prior to your attempt to add Gerald Matthews Sr. onto your subsidy. You failed to report to our office that Gerald Matthews Sr. reside [sic] in your household. Our records indicate that Gerald Matthews Sr. is not an authorized member of your household.

(Emphasis in original). Thereafter, Darlene exercised her right to request an informal hearing concerning the termination. A hearing was held on May 16, 2012. In attendance were: Hearing Officer Tishea Irving; HABC counsel Jon Offley; HCVP representative Patricia Boyd; Darlene; Karen Wabecke, counsel for Darlene; Gerald; and Mr. Coucci, a representative for the landlord who testified as a witness for Darlene.

Boyd confirmed that Darlene came to the HCVP office on December 6, 2011, to request that Gerald be added to her household. Boyd also presented Maryland Judiciary Case Search printouts to show that Gerald had used Darlene’s address on three occasions. Offley did not present any testimony or documents on behalf of the HABC. In response, Wabecke argued that Darlene’s participation in the HCVP should not be terminated because she had been a model tenant for eight years.

Wabecke noted that the HABC offered no evidence to show that Gerald “resided with [Darlene] without authorization” for seven years. Darlene testified that Gerald “did not live with her at Esther Place until she requested that he be added to her voucher.” Darlene explained that, while she and her husband were separated from 2002 until 2011, Gerald “used her subsi ⁵⁷⁸ dized address to receive mail from child support and VA[ 4 ] because he didn’t have a stable address.” Gerald corroborated Darlene’s testimony and added that he lived with his son, Gerald Matthews Jr., at 306 East 24th Street “for several periods of time, over the last 10 years” and with his other son, Shaun Matthews, for approximately three years between 2003-2011. 5 Gerald explained that he used Darlene’s address for child support because “his daughter’s mother did not know where he lived, [but] ... knew where [Darlene] resided.” In addition, Gerald stated that he used Darlene’s address because “he knew she would receive his mail.” After hearing all of the testimony, 6 the Hearing Officer found that the “HABC has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Darlene ... is not eligible for the HCVP because [she] failed to report change in family composition____” By letter dated May 31, 2012, the Hearing Officer elaborated on her findings as follows: [T]he HCVP presented three separate documents where [Gerald] used 3221 Esther Place, Baltimore, MD as his primary residence prior to [Darlene’s] attempt to add him. [Gerald] testified that he used [Darlene’s] address off and on for several years. The Visitor’s Policy in Chapter Six of The Administration Plan states that “use of the unit address as the visitor’s current residence for any purpose that is not explicitly temporary shall be construed as permanent residence.” The documents presented by the HCVP substantiated that [Gerald] used the address listed above for permanent mailing purposes; therefore, [Gerald] will be ⁵⁷⁹ considered to be living in the unit as an unauthorized household member. I further note that during the hearing, [Gerald] testified that he used [Darlene’s] address for mailing purposes because he knew he would receive his mail there and [Darlene] testified that she allowed her husband to use her address for mailing purposes because he didn’t have a stable address.

Both of these testimonies conflict with Exhibit 12, [Gerald’s] award letter issued by the Social Security Administration listing 5002 Anthony Avenue, Baltimore, MD.[ 7 ] This is a violation of part 15 of the Administrative Plan. The composition of the assisted family residing in the unit must be approved by the HABC.... Therefore, it is the decision of this hearing officer to uphold the HABC’s decision to terminate. This means Darlene [ ] is no longer a participant in the HCVP.

(Emphasis in original). Discussion At the outset, we address the HABC’s contention that CJP § 12-302(a) divests this Court of jurisdiction to hear Darlene’s appeal. That section states: Unless a right to appeal is expressly granted by law, § 12-301 of this subtitle does not permit an appeal from a final judgment of a court entered or made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in reviewing the decision of the District Court, an administrative agency, or a local legislative body. CJP § 12-302(a).

According to the HABC, Darlene “attempts] to appeal a final judgment of the circuit court made in the exercise of its statutory appellate jurisdiction under Maryland Rule 7-401 et seq.” and, thus, this case is not properly before this Court. In advancing its argument, the ⁵⁸⁰ HABC creates a distinction between common law mandamus actions—which the HABC concedes are reviewable by this Court—and administrative mandamus actions—which the HABC contends is the type of action found here. The HABC avers that, “because no further appeal right is granted to [Darlene] ..., her appeal must be dismissed.” In response, Darlene argues that mandamus actions are an exercise of original jurisdiction by the circuit courts and, therefore, are not subject to the limitations of CJP § 12-302(a). Darlene also notes that administrative mandamus remains a common law action that has not been codified in a statute and, accordingly, is reviewable by this Court.

We agree with Darlene. We have previously stated that “review of [a hearing officer]’s decision is possible through both administrative mandamus under Md. Rule 7-401(a) and the common law writ of mandamus.” Madison Park N. Apartments, L.P. v. Comm’r of Hous. & Cmty. Dev., 211 Md.App. 676, 694 , 66 A.3d 93 cert. granted, 434 Md. 311 , 75 A.3d 317 (2013). 8 This is distinguishable from circuit court statutory review cases, which are not reviewable by appellate courts. See id.

(‘Where ‘the substance of the circuit court action was a common law mandamus action’ and not a statutory action for judicial review, the decision is ‘appealable to the Court of Special Appeals under § 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.’ ”) (Citations omitted). See also Rogers v. Eastport Yachting Ctr., LLC, 408 Md. 722, 734 , 971 A.2d 322 (2009) (affirming dismissal for lack of appellate jurisdiction where the circuit court proceeding was “a statutory judicial review action” and Petitioner did not seek “ ‘mandamus’ relief’ from the circuit court); Murrell v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 376 ⁵⁸¹ Md. 170, 185-86, 829 A.2d 548 (2003) (stating that this Court has no jurisdiction over “a statutory judicial review action” but can entertain “a common law mandamus action”); Prince George’s Cnty. v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 358 Md. 166, 183 , 747 A.2d 647 (2000) (concluding that CJP § 12-302(a) precluded an appeal where the case involved “a typical statutory judicial review action” and not a mandamus proceeding); Bucktail, LLC v. Cnty. Council of Talbot Cnty., 352 Md. 530, 542 , 723 A.2d 440 (1999) (allowing appeal of circuit court’s judicial review of county council’s decision to deny a zoning amendment ordinance as it substantially sought a common law writ of mandamus); Gisriel v. Ocean City Bd. of Sup’rs of Elections, 345 Md. 477, 500 , 693 A.2d 757 (1997) (holding that this Court had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal under CJP § 12-301 where the action was, in substance, a common law mandamus action); and Perry v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 201 Md.App. 633 , 30 A.3d 262 (2011) (reviewing administrative mandamus case filed pursuant to Md. Rule 7-401). The cases cited by the HABC, Dvorak v. Anne Arundel Cnty.

Ethics Comm’n, 400 Md. 446, 456 , 929 A.2d 185 (2007), and Healthcare Strategies, Inc. v. Howard Cnty. Human Rights Comm’n, 117 Md.App. 349 , 700 A.2d 278 (1997), both involved statutory judicial review and are, therefore, distinguishable. Alternatively, the HABC attempts to support its argument by creating a distinction between “common law mandamus,” which it admits is appealable to this Court, and “administrative mandamus,” which it contends is the type found in this case and which we have no jurisdiction to review. As Darlene points out, however, this attempt by HABC lacks any legal support.

The two types of common law mandamus actions— administrative and traditional—arise when there is no statutorily-granted right to judicial review. Arnold Rochvarg, Principles and Practice of Maryland Administrative Law § 13.15 (2011). Administrative mandamus, which is set forth in Md. Rule 7-401, et seq., “is the proper mandamus action when the agency decision being challenged is ... from a contested case.” Id. (internal footnote omitted).

By contrast, a traditional mandamus action “is used to review an agency action ⁵⁸² that is not the product of a contested case.” Id. Both types, however, have specific rules of procedure which govern in circuit court, and both are subject to review by this Court. See id. at §