Matthews v. State

Darrell Eugene Matthews v. State of Maryland, No. 12, September Term, 2023. Opinion by Eaves, J. MD. CODE ANN., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ARTICLE § 8-201 – POST- CONVICTION DNA TESTING – EVIDENCE PRESERVATION The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the State’s duty to preserve scientific identification evidence is limited to those crimes enumerated in § 8-201(j)(1)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”) and does not extend to all crimes for which a person is permitted to petition for DNA testing. Although there is a difference between the list of petition-eligible crimes in CP § 8-201(b) and the list of crimes in CP § 8-201(j)(1)(ii) for which evidence preservation is required, this difference does not constitute ambiguity.

The plain text of the statute, supported by its historical context, indicates that the General Assembly intended a broad category of crimes for which convicted persons could petition for DNA testing, but a narrower category of crimes for which evidence preservation is required. MD. CODE ANN., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ARTICLE § 8-201 – POST- CONVICTION DNA TESTING – EVIDENCE PRESERVATION – INCHOATE OFFENSES The Supreme Court held that the State’s duty to preserve scientific identification evidence does not apply to the inchoate offenses of those crimes listed under CP § 8-201(j)(1)(ii). Because the language of the evidence preservation requirement is clear and unambiguous, the Court declined to extend the requirement beyond the plain text to attempted murder or other inchoate offenses.

MD. CODE ANN., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ARTICLE § 8-201 – POST- CONVICTION DNA TESTING – EVIDENCE PRESERVATION – ATTEMPTED MURDER The Supreme Court held that the circuit court properly denied the Petition for Post- Conviction DNA Testing because the State was not required to preserve evidence related to Appellant’s attempted murder conviction for the duration of his sentence and because the evidence Appellant sought to test had been destroyed consistent with the police department’s evidence retention policy. Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. Circuit Court for Montgomery County Case No. 114155C Argued: December 5, 2023 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND No. 12 September Term, 2023 ______________________________________ DARRELL EUGENE MATTHEWS v. STATE OF MARYLAND ______________________________________ Fader, C.J. Watts Hotten Booth Biran Gould Eaves, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Eaves, J. ______________________________________ Filed: March 25, 2024 Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2024.03.25 13:23:21 '00'04- Gregory Hilton, Clerk This case stems from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County’s denial of Appellant, Darrell Eugene Matthews’s, second Petition for Post-Conviction DNA Testing (the “Petition”) of a black glove found at the scene of the crime of attempted murder for which Appellant was convicted.

During the trial that led to Appellant’s conviction, the glove was not marked for identification, offered or admitted into evidence, or discussed at length. In 2019, after the filing of Appellant’s first petition for DNA testing in 2014, but before the second petition for DNA testing in 2022, the glove was destroyed in accordance with the evidence retention policy of the Montgomery County Police Department (“MCPD”). We are asked to decide whether the circuit court correctly denied Appellant’s Petition. We hold that while the State’s duty to preserve scientific identification evidence is governed by § 8-201(j) of the Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”) of the Maryland Code, that duty does not extend to all crimes for which a person is permitted to petition for DNA testing, nor does it apply to the inchoate offenses of those crimes listed in CP § 8- 201(j)(1)(ii).

Further, the circuit court did not err when it denied Appellant’s Petition because the glove was properly destroyed under the MCPD’s evidence retention policy. Accordingly, for the reasons we outline below, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. I BACKGROUND A. Factual and Procedural History In May 2011, Appellant was convicted of attempted first-degree murder and four other charges stemming from an incident in Montgomery County, Maryland, in which the victim survived two gunshot wounds.1 At trial, the MCPD detective who served as the lead investigator for the shooting testified that the victim said that “he believed [the defendant] had a glove” during the incident. The lead investigator further testified that, on the night of the shooting, a citizen had turned over a glove to a patrol officer.

That officer then delivered the glove to a forensic technician who was present at the crime scene. On cross-examination, the lead investigator testified that her understanding of the glove’s significance was that “it might have . . . belonged to Darrell Matthews.” The investigator explained that she did not order forensic testing of the glove for two reasons: (1) it was not collected in a standard manner, and she did not know the glove’s origins, later clarifying, “[the glove] wasn’t recovered by an officer. I don’t know how many hands it had passed through before it had got into an evidence bag” and (2) she “had a victim and an eyewitness saying . . . who had shot [the victim].” The victim testified that he had known Appellant for approximately eight to 10 years, “maybe even longer,” before the shooting, Appellant was the shooter, he could see Appellant clearly when Appellant shot him, and he (the victim) had called two people shortly after the shooting and told them that Appellant was the shooter. The victim was also asked at trial about whether he saw a glove and testified, “I don’t remember seeing a glove.” Following his conviction, Appellant was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment for the attempted murder charge, along with 30 years consecutive for the 1 This trial was Appellant’s second; a 2010 trial on these charges resulted in a mistrial due to juror misconduct. 2 other charges.2 In October 2014, Appellant filed a pro se petition seeking testing of the glove for DNA and gunshot residue under CP § 8-201 (sometimes referred to herein as the “DNA Testing Statute” or the “Statute).

The State filed a response in opposition, arguing that Appellant had not been convicted of any of the crimes for which a convicted person could petition for testing and that the Statute does not provide for gunshot residue testing.3 The circuit court denied Appellant’s request for testing in March 2015.4 Appellant filed a motion in August 2019 seeking the grand jury testimony transcripts from his case, which the circuit court granted. On August 5, 2022, Appellant filed the Petition that is the subject of this appeal. Therein, Appellant noted that several of his convictions, including attempted murder, made 2 Following an appeal, Appellant’s conviction for possession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited person under § 5-133(b) of the Public Safety Article of the Maryland Code was vacated, and his sentence was reduced to a life sentence with 25 consecutive years. See Matthews v. State, No. 1442, Sept. Term, 2011, slip op. at 7 (Md. Ct. Spec.

App. Feb. 22, 2013). That appeal and the subsequent resentencing are not relevant to the present appeal. 3 At the time of this pro se petition, attempted murder was not included in the list of crimes for which a person could petition for DNA testing. 2008 Md. Laws, ch. 337. 4 Along with his October 2014 petition seeking testing, Appellant filed a pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel and an amended petition through counsel in February 2015. Among other alleged examples of ineffective assistance, the petition asserted that trial counsel had failed to request DNA and gunshot residue testing of the glove. In April 2015, the circuit court denied relief based on the failure-to-test argument, stating that the decision not to request testing was not unreasonable.

However, the circuit court granted the petition in part on alternative grounds and allowed Appellant to file for review of his sentence by a three-judge panel. Ultimately, a three-judge panel affirmed the sentence without a hearing. 3 him eligible to petition for DNA testing under CP § 8-201. He sought DNA testing of the glove, arguing that such testing was in the interest of justice because “if DNA testing excludes [him], that evidence would be exculpatory.” In November 2022, the circuit court held a hearing on the Petition. While the parties agreed that Appellant was eligible to petition for testing based on his attempted murder conviction, the State nonetheless argued that Appellant could not meet the standard under the statute because any DNA results from the glove would not produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence.

Because the State did not know at that point whether the glove still existed, the court granted a continuance and ordered the State to determine the status of the glove. On January 5, 2023, the State filed an affidavit from the MCPD lead investigator, 5 which stated that the time limit under the MCPD’s evidence retention policy (seven years for attempted first-degree murder) had elapsed, the lead investigator had “authorized destruction of the glove[,]” and the glove had been destroyed as of November 1, 2019. One week later, the circuit court reconvened the hearing on the Petition, in light of the MCPD’s verification that the glove had been destroyed. Appellant’s counsel argued that the glove should have been preserved for the duration of Appellant’s sentence and that, because it had been intentionally and willfully destroyed, the court must reopen the post- conviction proceeding and order a new trial.

The State argued that the statute’s evidence preservation requirement does not cover attempted murder and reiterated its argument that, even if it did, the glove would not provide exculpatory or mitigating evidence. 5 The individual who filed the 2023 affidavit is the same detective who served as lead investigator for the 2009 shooting and who testified at Appellant’s 2011 trial. 4 In July 2023, the circuit court issued an opinion and order denying the Petition. The circuit court ruled that under the DNA Testing Statute, the State’s destruction of the glove was not wrongful because the evidence preservation requirement does not apply to attempted murder convictions. It further stated that under Maryland Rule 4-710, the court must deny the Petition because the State had searched for the glove, the glove no longer existed, and there was no evidence that the glove had been intentionally and willfully destroyed in contravention of the DNA Testing Statute or any applicable protocol. The court also denied Appellant’s oral motion to reopen a post-conviction proceeding and order a new trial.

Appellant noted his appeal from the order, and the Appellate Court of Maryland subsequently transferred the appeal to this Court. See CP § 8-201(k)(6). B. The DNA Testing Statutory Framework and Crimes of Violence An individual may petition for DNA testing in accordance with the following: (b) Notwithstanding any other law governing postconviction relief, a person who is convicted of a crime of violence under § 14-101 of the Criminal Law Article may file a petition: (1) for DNA testing of scientific identification evidence that the State possesses that is related to the judgment of conviction; or (2) for a search by a law enforcement agency of a law enforcement data base or log for the purpose of identifying the source of physical evidence used for DNA testing. CP § 8-201(b).

The State is required to preserve certain scientific identification evidence in accordance with the following: (j)(1) The State shall preserve scientific identification evidence that: (i) the State has reason to know contains DNA material; and 5 (ii) is secured in connection with a violation of § 2-201 [first-degree murder], § 2-204 [second-degree murder], § 2-207 [manslaughter], § 3-303 [first-degree rape], or § 3-304 [second-degree rape] of the Criminal Law Article. (2) The State shall preserve scientific identification evidence described in paragraph (1) of this subsection for the time of the sentence, including any consecutive sentence imposed in connection with the offense. CP § 8-201 (j). CP § 8-201(j)(3) sets forth the procedure a court must follow if the State is unable to produce certain scientific identification evidence that it is required to preserve under subsection (j)(1).

It provides: (3)(i) If the State is unable to produce scientific identification evidence described in [CP § 8-201(j)(1)], the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the failure to produce evidence was the result of intentional and willful destruction. (ii) If the court determines at a hearing under subparagraph (i) of this paragraph that the failure to produce evidence was the result of intentional and willful destruction, the court shall: 1. order a postconviction hearing to be conducted in accordance with subparagraph (iii) of this paragraph; and 2. at the postconviction hearing infer that the results of the postconviction DNA testing would have been favorable to the petitioner. CP § 8-201(j)(3). Although this is the current version of the DNA Testing Statute at issue here, we start with a review of the history of the statute.

In 2001, the General Assembly enacted a law to permit people to petition for post- conviction DNA testing of scientific identification evidence related to seven specifically enumerated crimes: first-degree murder, second-degree murder, manslaughter, first-degree rape, second-degree rape, first-degree sexual offense, and second-degree sexual offense. 6 2001 Md. Laws, ch. 418. The original version of the Statute also required the State to preserve scientific identification evidence secured in connection with those crimes for three years after sentencing or for an additional period pursuant to an order from this Court or the Appellate Court. Id. The following year, the General Assembly revised the Statute to extend the length of time for which the State must preserve scientific identification evidence to “the time of the sentence, including any consecutive sentence imposed in connection with the offense.” 2002 Md. Laws, ch. 465.

This revision to the Statute, however, did not expand the list of crimes for which the additional length of time applied. In 2015, the General Assembly considered a bill to expand the scope of the DNA Testing Statute as it related to the list of crimes. S.B. 583, 2015 Leg., 435th Sess. (Md. 2015) (as introduced and assigned to the S. Jud.

Proc. Comm., Feb. 9, 2015). The bill originally proposed extending the ability to petition for DNA testing to convictions for any “crime of violence under § 14-101 of the Criminal Law Article.” Id. At the time of this bill’s introduction, § 14-101 included more crimes of violence or categories of crimes of violence than the seven crimes enumerated in the original DNA Testing Statute; in addition to murder, rape, first- and second-degree sexual offense, and voluntary manslaughter, the “crimes of violence” list included, and continues to include, abduction, first-degree arson, robbery, two carjacking offenses, several assault offenses, and other crimes.

Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law (“CR”) § 14-101(a) (2002, 2021 Repl. Vol.). Notably, the list of crimes of violence also includes attempt offenses for many of the enumerated crimes, including attempted murder.

Id. § 14-101(a)(19). 7 The bill as originally introduced also proposed extending the evidence preservation requirement to all of these crimes, including attempted murder. S.B. 583, 2015 Leg., 435th Sess. (Md. 2015) (as introduced and assigned to the S. Jud. Proc.

Comm., Feb. 9, 2015). During the legislative process, however, the bill was changed to reduce the list of crimes for which the State was required to preserve scientific identification evidence throughout the term of a sentence. S. Jud. Proc.

Comm. Rep. 32, 435th Sess. (Md. 2015). Specifically, the amendment limited the evidence preservation requirement to those crimes for which evidence preservation was already required under the statute (i.e., first-degree murder, second-degree murder, manslaughter, first-degree rape, second-degree rape, first-degree sexual offense, and second-degree sexual offense).

Id. Ultimately, while the final bill significantly expanded the list of offenses for which a person was eligible to petition for DNA testing, it left unchanged the list of offenses for which the State was required to preserve scientific identification evidence.6 2015 Md. Laws, ch. 369 (codified as revised at CP § 8-201(b), (j)). Therefore, since 2015, the DNA Testing Statute has permitted a person to petition for testing based on any crime of violence listed in CR § 14-101, including the inchoate offense of attempted murder. But the Statute requires the State to preserve scientific 6 There have been other revisions to the DNA Testing Statute beyond the ones summarized here.

See CP § 8-201 (2001, 2018 Repl. Vol.). Those amendments—which address technical revisions and expand the ability to petition to searches of law enforcement databases or logs, clarify the statute’s applicability to guilty pleas and other pleas, modify the requirements for a court to order testing and the requirements for a subsequent order, and establish the procedure following intentional and willful destruction of evidence—are, however, not relevant to this appeal. 8 identification evidence only for the duration of a convicted