Mauldin v. State

Hammond, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant Mauldin was convicted by a jury of manslaughter by automobile after he drove his car at terrific speed—well over eighty miles an hour—on the Jones Falls Expressway into the rear of another car and caused the death of a woman passenger in the car that was struck. He makes only one contention of error, a claim that he did not freely and voluntarily consent to take the “chemical test for intoxication” provided for by Code (1964 Supp.), Art. 35, Sec. 100, because he was so intoxicated as to be incapable of giving consent and that, therefore, the results of the test which showed him to be intoxicated improperly were admitted against him. Officer Gray, who took Mauldin into custody at the scene, said he was swaying, his speech was slurred and the odor of alcohol on his breath was noticeable.

While he was taking Maul-din to the chemical laboratory at the Central Police Station to undergo the test of his blood, Officer Gray followed the direction of paragraph g of Sec. 100 of Art. 35 of the Code to an arresting officer, “to advise the person so charged [with the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor] that he may, but need not, submit to a chemical analysis * * telling Mauldin “that he could take the test or refuse it, and that it could be used for him or against him.” Officer Brennan, who conducted the test (in which the suspect breathes into a machine which translates the alcohol detectable in the breath into the amount in the blood stream), ⁵⁹⁴ testified that he went through an elaborate explanation to Maul-din of the purposes and effects of the test, of the fact that a refusal to take the test is permissible and will not be used in any way against the suspect, that the results can be used in court for or against the suspect, and that Mauldin said he understood fully and signed a form which incorporated all the explanation of Officer Brennan and Mauldin’s replies and which Mauldin signed to indicate his agreement to take the test. This testimony of Officer Brennan and the form signed by Mauldin came into evidence without objection, as did the results of the test (which was taken about an hour and a half after the accident) which showed a concentration of alcohol in Mauldin’s blood of .20%—paragraph (a) 3 of Sec. 100 of Art. 35 of the Code provides that a concentration of .15% or more “shall be prima facie evidence that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor”—and as did Officer Brennan’s opinion as an expert that the concentration of alcohol in the blood was greater at the time of the accident than at the time of the test. Only after all the testimony as to the test and its results as applicable to Mauldin had come into evidence for consideration by the jury did appellant seek to keep it out by a motion to strike. The motion was refused by Judge Prendergast because there had not been compliance with Maryland Rule 522 d 2, which