Maury v. Coyle

Bartol, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This action was brought by the appellee, to recover the value of certain coupon bonds of the United States, which had been deposited by the plaintiff with the appellants, Maury & Co., bankers, for safe keeping, and which were abstracted from their custody by Leonard Huyck, and were lost to the plaintiff ; In the course of the trial below, a number of exceptions were taken by the appellants, which will be disposed of in their numerical order. The first exception was abandoned by counsel in the argument. The second bill of exceptions presents the question of the admissibility in evidence of the exemplification of the record of Annie S. Coyle’s appointment as guardian of the plaintiff But this question has been rendered immaterial by the corrected record, showing that the suit was instituted by the appellee, “by Annie 8.

Coyle, as his next friend;” the question, therefore, whether the record-evidence of her appointment as guardian was properly authenticated, was immaterial, and need not be decided. The third bill of exceptions raises the question of the admissibility of a part of the testimony given by the witness, McNair, in answer to the fifth interrogatory. After having stated that he called at the defendants’ bank, and as agent for Mrs. Coyle, the plaintiff’s guardian, had demanded the bonds, and was informed by Maury, one of the defendants, that Leonard Huyck had taken them, he then asked Maurv “ what right Mr. Huyck had to go info his vault and take them ?” Maury said, “ he was acting for Mr. Osbourn, one of the defendants, the partner of Mr. Maury, that Huyck had a power of attorney from Mr. Osbourn to act for him.” ²⁴⁴ Objection was made to the admissibility of that pai’t of Maury’s answer which stated that Huyele was acting for Osbourn, Maury’s partner, and had a power of attorney from Osbourn. The ground of the objection is, that the power of attorney, if one existed, ought to have been produced, and could not be proved by the parol admission of the defendant.

If the object of the testimony had been to prove the contents of the power of attorney, or to show the nature or extent of the powers thereby conferred, or to prove that Huyck was in fact empowered by Osbourn to act for him in the business of the firm, it is veiy clear that the written paper would be the only competent evidence for that purpose. But such was not the purpose or effect of the testimony. It was an admission or declaration made by one of the defendants, showing merely the character or capacity in which he understood Huyck was acting, and as explanatory of his own conduct in permitting Huyck to have access to the vault where the bonds were kept. For that pui’pose, it was clearly admissible.

It may be remarked further, that the fact itself was altogether immaterial; for the responsibility of the defendants in the action was in no way affected by the question whether Huyck was or was not the agent or attorney of Osbourn, or authorized to represent him in the business of the firm. It is unnecessary to express any opinion upon the points raised by the fourth and fifth bills of exceptions, as we consider them altogether immaterial to the decision of the case. The right of action against the defendants as bailees in this case was wholly distinct from and independent of any claim which the plaintiff may have against Huyck, and it is no answer, or defence to this action that collaterals had been placed in the hands of D. McNair, by Huyck, for the purpose of securing to the plaintiff the re-payment of the bonds. There is no evidence that the property and securities transferred by Huyck to D. McNair were accepted as payment or ²⁴⁵ satisfaction of the plaintiff’s claim ; they were mere collateral securities.

All that the defendants can claim here by reason of such collaterals, is to have applied in reduction of the plaintiff’s demand against them, such sum as he may actually have realized from those securities. It was not incumbent on the plaintiff in this suit to prove the exact state of Huyck’s title in the property conveyed.by him to D. McNair; and whether the deed offered for that purpose by the plaintiff, and objected to in the fourth bill of exceptions, was or was not authenticated according to law; and whether the parol evidence objected to by the appellants in the fifth bill of exceptions was or was not admissible, are questions wholly immaterial; and can furnish no ground for a reversal of the judgment. In support of these views we refer to Brewster & Spratt vs. Frazier, 32 Md., 302 , and the cases there cited in the opinion of the Court. The sixth and seventh hills of exceptions were not argued or relied on by the appellants’ counsel, and it is only necessary to say that there was no error in the ruling of the Circuit Court on the questions they present.

The eighth bill of exceptions brings before us for review, the rulings of the Circuit Court upon the prayers, and the instructions which were given to the jury. There can exist no well grounded objection to the propositions of law contained in the first instruction. It submits to the jury the question whether the deposit of the bonds was made on the terms of the agreement set out in the “ paper, marked A,” and instructs them, upon that hypothesis, as to the whole law of the case. The principles announced oil the instruction are well settled and elementary principles in the law of bailment, and need no argument or authority to be cited in their support.

The only objection to this instruction that was seriously urged by the