May Department Stores Co. v. Harryman

⁵³⁷ ROBERT M. BELL, Judge. The issue presented for decision on this appeal is whether an employee who parks in an area of a shopping center parking lot, which is neither owned, maintained nor controlled by her employer, and who is injured by the intentional acts of a third party, is entitled to receive worker’s compensation benefits? We hold that under the facts of this case, she is and, therefore, we will affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. The facts are largely not in dispute.

Muriel E. Harry-man, appellee, an employee of the May Department Stores Company, d/b/a the Hecht Company, 1 appellant, was injured when she was accosted by a mugger on a shopping center parking lot. The portion of the parking lot on which the mugging occurred was under the arcade, a covered portion of the parking lot surrounding the Golden Ring Mall where appellee had been parking for approximately two years. Moreover, it was across from the Hecht Company’s employee entrance, through which the Hecht Company employees were required to enter for work. On this day, appellee arrived for her scheduled noon shift at approximately 11:45 a.m.

The Golden Ring Mall parking lot provided the only parking for the shopping center. Thus, employees of the Hecht Company and other businesses located in the mall parked their cars there while at work. Customers of the mall stores also used the parking lot. At the hearing before the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, testimony as to the ownership of the mall parking lot was presented by appellee.

That evidence tended to prove that, although apparently part of the parking lot was jointly owned by Montgomery Ward, Hechts and the Golden Ring Management Company, the portion of the lot on which appellant was injured was owned solely by the Mall Management Company. ⁵³⁸ The Workmen’s Compensation Commission determined that appellant sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of her employment. Upon Hecht’s appeal, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment and thereby affirmed the action of the Commission. Although on its appeal to this Court, Hecht’s presented two questions, we need only consider the first: 2 Is ownership of a parking lot a material fact in a workmen’s compensation claim filed by an employee who was assaulted in the parking lot? A motion for summary judgment is not a substitute for trial or a vehicle to decide disputed facts.

Coffey v. Derby Steel Company, Inc., 291 Md. 241, 247 , 434 A.2d 564 (1981), Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 302, 304 , 413 A.2d 170 (1980), Sterry v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 64 Md.App. 175, 188 , 494 A.2d 748 cert. granted 304 Md. 362 , 499 A.2d 191 (1985). Rather, it permits the trial judge to determine if there is a genuine dispute as to any material fact and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Md. Rule 2-501; Kletz v. Nuway Distributors, 62 Md.App. 158, 161 , 488 A.2d 978 (1985); Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. v. Rairigh, 59 Md.App. 305, 313 , 475 A.2d 509 (1984). Even when there are no disputes of facts, but more than one inference may be drawn from the facts, such inferences being resolved against the moving party, summary judgment is inappropriate.

Honaker v. W.C. & A.N. Miller Development Company, 285 Md. 216, 231 , 401 A.2d 1013 (1979), Fenwick Motor Company v. Fenwick, 258 Md. 134, 138 , 265 A.2d 256 (1970). The function of appellate review of a ruling on a motion for summary judgment is to decide whether disputed issues of material fact exist, not to decide those issues or determine their credibility. James v. Tyler, ⁵³⁹ 269 Md. 48, 54 , 304 A.2d 256 (1973), Howard Cleaners v. Perman, 227 Md. 291, 296 , 176 A.2d 235 (1961); Sanitary Facilities, II, Inc. v. Blum, 22 Md.App. 90, 100 , 322 A.2d 228 (1974). Hecht’s proffers that the evidence concerning the ownership of the mall parking lot, viewed in the light most favorable to appellee, gave rise to a genuine dispute as to a material fact.

Therefore, it contends that appellee was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ordinarily, an employee who sustains injuries going to or returning from his place of employment is not entitled to receive compensation under Workmen’s Compensation Law. Wiley Manufacturing Co. v. Wilson, 280 Md., 200, 206 , 373 A.2d 613 (1977); Kendall Lumber Co. v. State, 132 Md. 93, 100 , 103 A. 141 (1918); Miller v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 57 Md.App. 135, 138 , 469 A.2d 466 (1984). Such injuries do not arise “out of or in the course of” 3 employment, Wiley Manufacturing Co. v. Wilson, 280 Md. at 206 , 373 A.2d 613 , because, as we said in Miller v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 57 Md.App. at 138, 469 A.2d 466 , “[gjoing to or from work is not the same as being on the job____” On the other hand, injury caused by the willful or negligent act of a third person directed against the employee, even though not arising out of employment, is compensable if the injury was sustained “in the course of” employment.

Md. Code Ann. Art. 101, § 67(6), 4 Giant Food, Inc. v. Gooch, 245 Md. 160, 169 , 225 A.2d 431 (1966). “Course of employment” refers to the “time, place and circumstances under which the accident occurred.” Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Miller, 23 Md.App. 271, 272 , 326 A.2d 186 (1974). See Proctor-Silex v. DeBrick, 253 Md. 477, 480 , 252 A.2d 800 (1969). ⁵⁴⁰ Thus, the rule is not absolute. The courts have fashioned several exceptions to this general rule, most notably, the “proximity rule” and the “premises rule.” Miller v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 57 Md.App. at 138 , 469 A.2d 466 . The “proximity rule”, a geographical extension of the “premises rule,” applies to injuries which “occur at a point where the employee is within range of dangers peculiarly associated with the employment,” Wiley Manufacturing Co. v. Wilson, 280 Md. at 208 , 373 A.2d 613 , or where “the risks incurred by the employee [are] incidental to the employment and [are] annexed as an implied term” of that employment.

Miller v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 57 Md.App. at 140 , 469 A.2d 466 , quoting Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 159 , 48 S.Ct. 221, 222 , 72 L.Ed. 507 (1928). On the other hand, an employee injured on the premises of the employer while going to or from his or her job may invoke the “premises exception.” Id., 57 Md.App. at 138 , 469 A.2d 466 . See, Wiley Manufacturing Co. v. Wilson, 280 Md. at 206 , 373 A.2d 613 , Proctor-Silex Corp. v. DeBrick, supra. In ruling on appellee’s motion for summary judgment, the trial judge said: There is no question in the Court’s mind that the motion for summary judgment should be granted in the case.

I don’t think there is any dispute that the employee had, in fact, gone to that lot to park her car as she did everyday she had to go to work. She was on the parking lot where she is normally permitted to park by the employers. She is on the employer’s business from the moment she is on that lot, and she gets mugged as she is going from her car to her job. (emphasis added) ⁵⁴¹ This ruling undoubtedly relied upon the “premises rule”, the focus of the parties’ arguments both below and in this Court.

Consequently, we too will confine our analysis to the application of that rule 5 to the facts sub judice. That analysis necessarily involves determining what constitutes the “premises” of the employer and considering when an employee is “in the course of employment.” An employee, when he “has arrived on his employer’s premises as usual, in preparation for beginning his day’s work, is considered to be on the premises and therefore covered by workmen’s compensation even though his actual employment has not begun,” Salomon v. Springfield Hosp., 250 Md. 150, 155 , 242 A.2d 126 (1968). Such an employee may be said to be “in the course of employment.” “Premises” are broadly defined as including the entire area devoted by the employer to the industry with which the employee is associated and to include parking lots owned, controlled or maintained by the employer. 1 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 15.41, Department of Correction v. Harris, 232 Md. 180, 186 , 192 A.2d 479 (1963). Although recognizing that they do not necessarily include all property owned by the employer, Salomon v. Springfield Hosp., 250 Md. at 155 , 242 A.2d 126 , premises have been held in Maryland to include parking lots owned, maintained or provided by employers.

Proctor-Silex Corp. v. DeBrick, 253 Md. at 479 , 252 A.2d 800 ; Giant Food v. Gooch, 245 Md. at 162 , 225 A.2d 431 ; Smith v. General Motors Assembly Division, 18 Md.App. 478, 480 , 307 A.2d 725 (1978) Pappas v. Modern Mfg. Co., 14 Md.App. 529, 531 , 287 A.2d 798 (1972). In Proctor-Silex Corp. v. DeBrick, an employee was injured when she slipped and fell on an icy sidewalk as she proceeded from the employer’s leased parking lot to the plant in which she worked. The Court of Appeals, in finding that the employee’s injuries were compensable, said: ⁵⁴² Where ... the claimant had arrived on the premises of her employer and was proceeding without deviation of any kind directly to her work, it would be unreasonable to hold that injuries sustained by her on the parking lot or between the building entrance and the time clock would be compensable, but injuries sustained between the parking lot and the building entrance would not be compensable.

Therefore, we hold the injuries sustained by Mrs. DeBrick to have arisen out of and in the course of her employment. Id., 253 Md. at 489 , 252 A.2d 800 . In Giant Food v. Gooch, an employee, a parking lot attendant, arrived early for work. Before starting work, but while on the employer owned parking lot, he was assaulted and shot by an individual who believed him to be the paramour of that individual’s wife.

Finding the injuries thus incurred to be compensable because arising in the course of employment, the Court observed: We think it clear that the commission and the reviewing court