Mayor of Annapolis v. Wimbleton, Inc.

Bishop, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Annapolis, collectively the appellant, appeals from an order of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. By that order, filed on November 20, 1981, the circuit court declared that: 1) Md. Ann. Code, Art. 23A, § 19 (u) is a valid and constitutional enactment; 2) Anne Arundel County Bill No. 152-80 is a valid enactment registering Anne Arundel County’s disapproval of a certain annexation resolution made by the City of Annapolis; and 3) A prayer by the City of Annapolis for injunctive relief, requesting that Anne Arundel County be precluded from submitting the annexation resolution to a referendum vote by the County electorate, was denied. On appeal the appellant asks inter alia: "Does Subsection (u) constitutionally comport with Sections 1 and 2 of Article XI-E of the Maryland Constitution when it legislates with regard to the organization, government, and affairs of municipal corporations in Anne Arundel County in a manner which impermissibly classifies those municipal corporations on a basis other than population?” For the reasons set forth in this opinion we answer ²⁵⁸ negatively this question and, therefore, reverse the order of the circuit court.

The Facts The City of Annapolis (the City) is a municipal corporation of the State of Maryland; Anne Arundel County (the County) is a Maryland charter county, and is one of the appellees. By a deed dated August 23, 1978, Wimbleton, Inc., the other appellee, owns a certain uninhabited and unimproved parcel of land containing approximately 188.35 acres. This land, referred to by the parties as the Wimbleton tract, is located between Spa Road, Harness Creek Road, and Forest Drive, and is contiguous to the boundaries of the City as they existed prior to August 11, 1980. Water service to areas adjacent to the tract is provided by the City’s facilities, while waste-water and sewage services are supplied by facilities jointly operated by the City and the County.

On or about April 9,1980, Wimbleton, Inc., duly petitioned the City to annex the Wimbleton tract to the property included within the City’s geographic and jurisdictional boundaries. After reviewing this petition, John C. Apostol, then Mayor of the City, introduced City Resolution R-35-80 before the City’s legislative body. This resolution proposed the annexation and change of municipal boundaries requested in the petition of Wimbleton, Inc. Following the introduction of this resolution, public hearings thereon were scheduled and advertised and the City informed the County of the time of one such hearing and of the nature of the annexation. On August 11, 1980, the Mayor and Aldermen of the City enacted Resolution R-35-80, and on September 30, 1980, the Wimbleton tract was annexed to the property included within the boundaries of the City.

At no time did the County ever file with the City any petition for a referendum on the issue of the annexation. On December 1, 1980 the County Council passed County Bill No. 152-80. This bill, which was approved by the County ²⁵⁹ Executive on December 2, 1980, registered the County’s disapproval of the City’s annexation resolution R-35-80. Moreover, the bill called for submission of the annexation resolution to a November 2, 1982 referendum of the Anne Arundel County electorate for their approval or rejection, and asserted that the "effectiveness of the annexation resolution” was suspended pending the referendum.

The appellant commenced this action against the appellees seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. This relief was denied by the circuit court’s order of November 20, 1981. I. Constitutionality of Md. Ann. Code, Art. 23A, § 19 (u) In its bill of complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief filed with the circuit court, the appellant alleged as grounds for relief: "19. The County’s authority to enact Bill No. 152-80 (and the effectiveness of said bill) is based exclusively on said subsection (u) of Section 19 of Article 23A of the Annotated Code of Maryland.

For the reasons hereinafter set forth, said subsection (u) of Section 19 of Article 23A of the Annotated Code of Maryland is unconstitutional, void, and of no effect; and, therefore, the County’s Bill No. 152-80 is likewise void and of no effect. 20. Subsection (u) of Section 19 of Article 23A of the Annotated Code of Maryland is unconstitutional, void and of no effect in that it constitutes local legislation prohibited by Section 1 of Article XI-E of the Constitution of Maryland.” The General Assembly is empowered under Article III, § 48 of the Maryland Constitution to form municipal corporations. The General Assembly’s regulation of these municipal corporations is restricted under Article XI-E, § 1 which provides: "Except as provided elsewhere in this Article, the ²⁶⁰ General Assembly shall not pass any law relating to the incorporation, organization, government, or affairs of those municipal corporations which are not authorized by Article 11-A of the Constitution to have a charter form of government which will be special or local in its terms or in its effect, but the General Assembly shall act in relation to the incorporation, organization, government, or affairs of any such municipal corporation only by general laws which shall in their terms and in their effect apply alike to all municipal corporations in one or more of the classes provided for in Section 2 of this Article. It shall be the duty of the General Assembly to provide by law the method by which new municipal corporations shall be formed.” (Emphasis added). 1 In Article 23A of the Code is Section 19 dealing with the powers of municipal corporations to enlarge their corporate boundaries by annexation.

Specifically, subsection (a) of this Section 19 expressly provides that "[t]he legislative body . .. of every municipal corporation in this State may enlarge the corporate boundaries thereof as in this subheading provided; ...” As noted by the Court of Appeals, Section 19 provides a procedure whereby "Every municipal corporation may annex contiguous land not within the boundaries of another municipality, either on the initiative of the city or town or of the residents of the area.... In every case the residents or the person, firm or corporation have a final veto by way of a referendum election.” Mayor and Council of Rockville v. Brookeville Turnpike Construction Co., Inc., 246 Md. 117, 129 , 228 A.2d 263, 270 (1967). In 1975, the General Assembly amended this procedure by enacting Laws of Maryland, 1975, Chapter 781 to add what ²⁶¹ is now Subsection (u). This Subsection gives Anne Arundel County the additional power to register its disapproval of an annexation resolution by one of the two municipal corporations located within its geographical boundaries and thereby to require a referendum of the electorate of the County.

In pertinent part, Subsection (u) provides: "(u) Referendum in Anne Arundel County. — (1) Anne Arundel County, by ordinance enacted according to its regular legislative procedure, may register its disapproval of the annexation resolution and provide for the submission of the resolution to a referendum vote of the electorate of the entire county at the next ensuing general election of the county for the members of the House of Representatives of the United States which is held at least 45 days after the enactment of the ordinance. The ordinance shall not be valid unless enacted . .. before the expiration of 120 days after the enactment of the annexation resolution by the municipal corporation if no petition for referendum is filed under either of these subsections. The county ordinance passed pursuant to this subsection shall have the effect of suspending the effectiveness of the annexation resolution until after the referendum. If no valid ordinance is enacted by the county pursuant to this section within the time herein specified, the annexation resolution of the municipal corporation shall have the same effect as if this subsection had not been enacted.” Addressing the issue of Subsection (u)’s constitutionality vis-a-vis Section 1 of Article XI-E of the Maryland Constitution, the Circuit Court held: "Article XI-E, § 1 prohibits the General Assembly from enacting any law 'relating to the incorporation, organization, government, or affairs’ of municipal corporations.

It is within the province of the court, viewing the totality of the circum ²⁶² stances, to determine whether any enactment of the General Assembly is a prohibited local law or a valid general law. Prince George’s County v. Laurel, 262 Md. 171 , 277 A.2d 262 (1971), and Birge v. Town of Easton, 274 Md. 635 , 337 A.2d 435 (1975). The Standard to be applied by the court in reaching this conclusion is clearly enumerated in the Birge case (supra), where the court held that: '[i]f the effect of local rules or municipal control is not great upon people outside the home-rule city, the matter is apt to be deemed local. Contrariwise, if the effect of the regulation or the administration of a particular matter is likely to be felt by a considerable number of people outside the city and in a rather strong degree, courts are probably going to conclude that the concern is for the state.’ Supporting the Birge holding are the decisions rendered in Dasch v. Jackson, 170 Md. 251 , 183 A. 534 (1936), where the Court held that a law which affects persons residing beyond a municipality could hardly be a local law, and Balto.

Transit Co. v. Metro Transit Auth., 233 Md. 509 , 194 A.2d 643 (1963), where the Court opined that although a law may apply to or in a municipality it is not for that reason a 'local law’ and thus barred by the constitution. In considering this matter, the Court has reviewed the aforementioned case law, the preamble to Chapter 781 of the Laws of 1975 which enacted subsection (u), wherein the legislature anticipated that municipal annexations could have far reaching impact, and the testimony of Ms. Becky Kurdle, County Planning and Zoning Administrator, who indicated that there would be substantial impact beyond the City if the proposed ²⁶³ annexation were carried out. On this bases [sic], the Court finds that Subsection (u), Article 23A, § 19 is a valid general law that has substantial impact beyond the City, and therefore does not violate Article XI-E, § 1.” The appellant contends