Mayor of Baltimore City v. White

Markell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On March 6, 1946, William H. Hague and his wife, Francis E. Hague, died of gas poisoning. They were found dead or near death in their apartment. He was about 86 years old, she about 82.

He left no relations, she left nephews and nieces. They left identical wills, his dated February 28, 1920, hers February 2, 1920, each leaving everything to the other. Excluding any interest of either in the other’s estate, he left about $50,000, she about $1,000, all personal property. Her nephews and nieces (appellees) contend that he survived her and that under his will they, as her next of kin, take the estates of both husband and wife.

The City of Baltimore (appellant) contends that there is no sufficient evidence that the two died otherwise than simultaneously and that under the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, Code 1943 Supplement, Art. 35, secs. 89-96, Acts of 1941, ch. 191, the husband’s estate must be paid to the School Board. Code, Art. 93, sec. 143; P. L. L. 1938, Art. 4, secs. 1002-1006. The administrator c. t. a. of each filed bills for directions in the administration of the estates. The lower court found from the evidence that the husband in fact survived the wife and held that her nephews and nieces are entitled to the estates of both.

The City appeals. We find it unnecessary to decide the question of fact as to survival. Whether either or neither survived we think the nephews and nieces are entitled to the estates of both. This conclusion depends upon construction of ⁵⁷⁴ the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act and the lapsed legacy statute.

Art. 93, sec. 340. The Uniform Simultaneous Death Act provides: “Where the title to property or the devolution thereof depends upon priority of death and there is no sufficient evidence that the persons have died otherwise than simultaneously, the property of each person shall be .disposed of as if he had survived, except as provided otherwise in this sub-title.” Section 89. The lapsed legacy statute provides: “No devise, legacy or bequest shall lapse or fail of taking effect by reason of the death of any devisee or legatee * * * in the lifetime of the testator, but every such devise, legacy or bequest shall have the same effect and operation in law to transfer the right, estate and interest in the property mentioned in such devise or bequest as if such devisee or legatee had survived the testator”. The City contends that when section 89 is applicable, the lapsed legacy statute is not applicable, because the former is applicable only when there is no sufficient evidence of survival and the latter only when the testator survives.

This contention is untenable. Section 89 provides for disposition “as if” the testator had survived ; consequently it incorporates by reference the provision in the lapsed legacy statute if the testator survives. The two statutes, thus construed together, may produce a different result than either standing alone. The lapsed legacy statute has been in force, without change now material, since 1810.

Many states have narrower statutes. “Some of them only save the legacies for the benefit of children or descendants, others for the benefit of descendants or designated