Maryland case law › Mayor of Baltimore v. Ritchie

Mayor of Baltimore v. Ritchie

51 Md. 233 (1879) · Court of Appeals of Maryland
Court of Appeals of MarylandDisposition: ReversedBowie, J.✓ Good law
HoldingThe City of Baltimore appealed a judgment for its City Solicitor, Ritchie, who sued for compensation for legal services rendered in fifteen condemnation inquisitions taken before the Sheriff of Baltimore County at Lake Roland and on the 'Temporary Supply' line.

Bowie, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The subject of this appeal is a suit brought by the appellee against the appellant, for services rendered by the plaintiff for the defendant, at its request, and for money received by the defendant for the use of the plaintiff. The case was submitted to the Court below without a jury, on the following agreement, viz: “This suit is brought to recover $100, with interest from June 25th, 1874, and $1400, with interest from July 22nd, 1875, for services rendered defendant by plaintiff, in the matter of fifteen inquisitions taken before the Sheriff of Baltimore County, in condemnation proceedings in said county, at Lake Roland, and on the ‘ Temporary Supply ’ line; that at the time said services were rendered, plaintiff held the office of City Solicitor; that all Ordinances and Acts of Assembly relating to the subject, are to be taken as in evidence, and may be read from the printed volumes; all errors in pleading waived, and the question submitted is whether or not such services as were rendered, were within the official duties of the plaintiff, under Art. 12, sec. 3 of the Baltimore City Code of 1869, and it is agreed that if the Court shall be of opinion that it was not the official duty of the plaintiff, under said Article and section, to per 242 form such services, judgment shall be entered for the plaintiff for the amount claimed, otherwise for defendant, the Court being at liberty to draw such inferences of fact from the facts stated, as a jury might draw.” At the trial the cause being submitted to the Court without a jury, and upon the statement of facts agreed upon by counsel and filed in the cause, the appellee offered the following prayer: “ On the facts stated and agreement of counsel, the plaintiff prays the Court to find for the plaintiff.” To the granting of which prayer the defendant excepted, and the verdict and judgment being entered for plaintiff, the defendant appealed. The nature of the services rendered in the statement of facts, is not set forth, and but for the liberty given the Court in the concluding sentence, “to draw such inferences of fact from the facts stated, as a jury might draw,” it might be questionable whether there would be any evidence in the case upon which the prayer could be founded or the verdict rendered.

Assuming that the services rendered were legal services, such as a person occupying the office of City Solicitor, might be expected or required to render, if they were within the scope of his official duty, the question submitted to us, is, in the terms of the agreement, “whether or not such services as were rendered, were within the official duties of the appellee, under Art. 12, sec. 3, of the Baltimore City Code of 1869.” The section referred to provides: “The Solicitor shall be the attorney of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, and it shall be the duty of the Solicitor to try all cases in which the city is interested, in any of the Courts of the City of Baltimore, except the Superior Court, and in all other Courts of the State of Maryland, except those mentioned in the preceding section, (the Court of Appeals and United States Courts sitting in Maryland,) and act as junior counsel to the 243 counsellor, in any Court in which his services may be required.” This Article of the Baltimore City Code is to be interpreted as all other statute laws; the words are to be construed in their popular sense, according to the subject-matter. The plaintiff appears to have been one of a class of legal officers, counsellor and solicitor, etc., whose duties were generally defined in the Article or Ordinance providing for their appointment. The scope of these duties, must in a great measure depend upon the nature of the office, the powers and duties of the government creating it, as well as the language of the law by which it is created. The relations of the City of Baltimore are not circumscribed by its corporate limits.

Its municipal powers invest it with rights beyond those limits necessary to be exercised for the benefit of the community embraced within its bounds. Among these rights and duties, the exercise of which is of vital, primary importance, is the supplying the city with water, for the use of said city, and for the health and convenience of the inhabitants. The Mayor and City Council are therefore invested with all the rights and powers necessary for the introduction of water into the city, and to enact and pass all ordinances, from time to time, which shall be deemed necessary and proper, to exercise the powers and effect the objects specified. See Code of Pub.

Loc. Laws, Tit. City of Baltimore. These powers are only to be exercised by purchase or agreement between the Mayor, etc., and the proprietors of the land and water required, or by the process of condemnation by inquisition of a jury, as prescribed by the laws enacted for that purpose; a strictly legal form of proceeding, recognized and established by our laws and Courts.

Inquisitions, as is well known, are commenced by warrant issued by a justice of the peace, to the sheriff of the 244 county, who is required to

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