Mayor of Baltimore v. Schwing

DAVIS, Judge. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (the City) appeals from an Order of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City dated September 27,1996. The circuit court had remanded the case to the Workers’ Compensation Commission for further proceedings on a claim for benefits filed in 1983, which the circuit court held was not barred by the applicable limitations period and which rendered a claim, filed in 1994 for the same injury, superfluous and unnecessary. The court set forth its decision and reasoning in a Memorandum Opinion.

Joseph Charles Schwing, Jr., (the claimant or Schwing) the claimant of the benefits, cross-appealed from that Order. On December 17, 1996, the circuit court issued, sua sponte, a Memorandum Opinion Addendum that purported to supplement the original Order and Memorandum Opinion. The City presents the following questions for our review: I. Did the circuit court have jurisdiction to decide whether Claim No. A-895606, filed on June 23, 1983, was barred by the limitations provision of § 9-736 of the Workers’ Compensation Law of Maryland?

II

Did the circuit court have jurisdiction to issue its Memorandum Opinion Addendum of December 17, 1996? ⁴⁰⁹ III. Was the circuit court’s September 1996 opinion correct that Claim No. B-309534, filed March 10, 1994, is barred by limitations? 1 We answer the first and third questions in the negative. We need not address the second question. We reverse the decision of the circuit court.

FACTS The claimant contracted heart disease as a result of his duties as a fire fighter with the Baltimore City Fire Department. On December 2, 1982, at the age of forty-two, he suffered a heart attack. He was unable to work from December 2, 1982 until the first week of February, 1983. 2 In July, 1983, he underwent a cardiac catheterization and was again unable to work from July 12 to July 15, 1983. The City paid Schwing his full salary for the periods he was unable to work, under a collective bargaining agreement between the City and the fire fighters’ union, which provided for payment of full salary for six months from the date of the injury, regardless of whether the illness or injury was suffered in the line of duty.

The claimant’s medical expenses were paid by his health insurer. Schwing filed Claim No. A-895606 (Claim A) with the Workers’ Compensation Commission of Maryland (Commission) on May 23, 1983. He stated in Claim A that December 3, 1982 was the first day he could not work and that he performed no work during the “period of disability.” The City filed issues contesting the claim and impleading the Subsequent Injury Fund (Fund). ⁴¹⁰ On June 21, 1983, the Commission ordered Schwing and the City to file a stipulation that, inter alia, they had sent to the Fund Schwing’s medical records and copies of all filings in Claim A. The Commission’s Order stated that the matter would not be set for a hearing on the merits of the claim until the parties had filed the stipulation. This written Order is the last record of any action pertaining to Claim A. Schwing’s heart condition was monitored after his hospitalization, and although he was in general good health, his cardiac condition deteriorated.

Nevertheless, he performed his regular duties as a fire fighter until December 9, 1993, when, as a result of an abnormal stress thallium test, he underwent a catheterization. On December 16, 1993, he underwent quadruple bypass surgery. He was unable to work from December 9, 1993 until February 25, 1994, when he returned to duty as a fire fighter. On March 10, 1994, the claimant filed Claim B-309534 (Claim B) with the Commission, alleging that he suffered from an occupational disease—specifically, cardiovascular disease triggered by “artery blockage and heart damage from infarctions.” He stated on his claim that he had filed no previous claim for this occupational disease. 3 On April 18, 1994, the City filed issues on Claim B, alleging, inter alia, that Claim B was barred by limitations.

At the Commission hearing on July 25, 1994, the City argued that Claim B was barred by limitations because the claimant had filed Claim A in 1983 for the same occupational disease. The City contended that Schwing was obligated to proceed under Claim A, which was never resolved. For his part, the claimant contended that the heart attack that ⁴¹¹ prompted Claim A was not the cardiovascular disease that had slowly developed since then, for which Claim B was filed. His counsel argued: What happened in 1982 has nothing to do with the cardiovascular disease that has been developing over the course of time, for which he had his quadruple bypass and for which he had a second myocardial infarction recently, so I don’t think the ’82 claim has a thing to do with it.

The Commission disagreed, concluding that the 1982 heart attack was caused by cardiovascular disease, and that this disease was the same occupational illness for which the claimant filed Claim B. The Commission expressly stated that its ruling stemmed from a “layman’s understanding” of the nature of cardiovascular disease; it urged the claimant to appeal the decision. Schwing did. After the Commission’s record was filed in the circuit court, the City filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. In its Motion, the City alleged that Claim B was time-barred by Md.Code (1991 RepLVol.), § 9-711 of the Lab. & Empl.

Art. (L.E.), which requires a covered employee to file a claim with the Commission within two years of, inter alia, a disablement suffered as a result of an occupational disease, or the date on which the covered employee first had actual knowledge that the disablement was caused by the employment. L.E. § 9-711(a). Arguing that Schwing’s current cardiovascular disease was an aggravation of the same condition he had in 1983, the City maintained that he was precluded from filing a new claim based on this preexisting, albeit aggravated, condition. The City also argued that Waskiewicz v. General Motors Corp., 342 Md. 699 , 679 A.2d 1094 (1996), prevented a claimant from basing a claim for benefits upon continuous exposures that caused the worsening of a preexisting disease, for which a claim had already been filed.

In response, the claimant argued that he suffered no disablement in 1983 that triggered the running of the two-year limitations period, because he was able to resume his duties after his heart attack and because he was paid wages under ⁴¹² the labor agreement, not as injured workers’ compensation. He also argued that Waskiewicz was inapposite because the Court of Appeals in that case addressed the issue of a new claim following an old claim for which benefits had been paid. Schwing had not received benefits under Claim A because his 1983 medical expenses were paid through private insurance and because his lost wage payments resulted from a labor agreement, not a workers’ compensation claim. On September 10, 1996, the circuit court determined that Schwing suffered a disability by virtue of the heart attack that caused him to miss work for approximately two months in 1982 and 1983.

Because he filed Claim A within six months after his disability, the court ruled that L.E. § 9-711 was inapplicable. In addition, the court ruled that Waskiewicz may not apply because a factual dispute existed as to whether the claimant ever claimed benefits under Claim A—that is, both parties disagreed as to the source of his payments for medical expenses, although they agreed that payments for lost wages resulted from a labor agreement rather than disability benefits. The court denied the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment as premature. Schwing filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on September 18, 1996, and the City filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

They renewed the arguments made during the first summary judgment hearing. The circuit court held a hearing on September 26, 1996. At the hearing, counsel for the City stated that there were no material disputes of fact, arguing that Schwing became “disabled” when he missed work in 1982 and 1983. The City also asserted that the viability of Claim A was not before the court; the appeal from the Commission’s decision in Claim B was the only matter at issue.

The court focused on two arguments by the claimant—first, that he had remained on active duty until his quadruple bypass operation and therefore suffered no “disablement” until 1993; and second, because there was never an award given under Claim A, Waskiewicz , which dealt with modifica ⁴¹³ tion of awards under L.E. § 9-736, is inapplicable. 4 The court issued an opinion orally on the record, reserving the right to make “nonsubstantive, editorial changes” before release. The court concluded that the claimant suffered his initial disablement in 1982, with the first heart attack and subsequent absence from work. His filing of Claim A tolled the two-year limitations period of L.E. § 9-711. The court concluded that Waskiewicz and L.E. § 9-736 were inapplicable because the Commission never made an award from which the claimant could have petitioned for a modification.

Thus, the court concluded that Claim B was unnecessary and superfluous, and Schwing was free to pursue Claim A unhindered by the limitations period of L.E. § 9-711. After both parties had appealed from this Order, the court, on December 19, 1996, filed a Memorandum Opinion Addendum that contradicted the reasoning given in the original Memorandum Opinion. Abandoning its earlier position on the issue of when the claimant became disabled, the court reasoned that he suffered no “disablement” as a result of the 1982 heart attack but only after he underwent quadruple bypass surgery and was unable to continue his duties as before. In the following passage, the court appeared both to conclude that the claimant was not disabled as a matter of law as a result of the 1982 heart attack, and to provide an alternative reason for recovery should the Commission decide that he did indeed suffer disablement from the heart attack: In summary, for the reasons set forth in the original opinion on the record, if it were to be decided that Mr. Schwing not only was diagnosed with an occupational disease in 1982 when he first had a heart attack but also was incapacitated, then he should be permitted to pursue his first claim as there was never any adjudication on it.

In the alternative, in view of the fact that he was able to continue ⁴¹⁴ his employment for ten years and suffered no adverse change in wage earning, he did not become disabled or incapacitated because of the cardio-vascular disease until the by-pass surgery in December, 1993. Therefore, the second claim he filed in March, 1994, is not barred by the statute of limitations. For these reasons, albeit in the alternative, the decision of the Worker’s [sic] Compensation Commission is REVERSED. Neither party filed an appeal from this “Memorandum Opinion Addendum.” DISCUSSION Maryland Rule 2-501(e) (1997) states, in relevant part: The court shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

We review on appeal whether the lower court was legally correct. Heat & Power Corp. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 320 Md. 584, 592 , 578 A.2d 1202 (1990); Pope v. Board of Sch. Comm’rs, 106 Md.App. 578, 590 , 665 A.2d 713 (1995), cert. denied, 342 Md. 116 , 673 A.2d 707 (1996). The nonmoving party gets the benefit of ail favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the facts.

King v. Bankerd, 303 Md. 98, 111 , 492 A.2d 608 (1985). If any fact, or any inference of fact, is in dispute, and that dispute would affect the outcome of the controversy, then summary judgment is inappropriate. Id. This standard is akin to a directed verdict; i.e., whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented.

Seaboard Surety Co. v. Richard F. Kline, Inc., 91 Md.App. 236, 244 , 603 A.2d 1357 (1992). The City argues that we should not consider the circuit court’s Memorandum Opinion Addendum because jurisdiction had vested in this Court before its issuance. Schwing counters with an argument that the circuit court was merely acting within its power to preserve matters for appeal. We think it ⁴¹⁵ unnecessary to decide between these two arguments, however.

In its two opinions, the circuit court made basically three decisions. In the first Memorandum Opinion, which granted the claimant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, it decided that Schwing had suffered “disablement” from his occupational disease in 1982, and it decided that L.E. § 9-736 does not apply because there was no compensation paid to him. In its Addendum, the court changed its mind and decided that Schwing suffered compensable “disablement” in 1993. Both parties appealed from the first judgment, but not from the Memorandum Opinion Addendum.

Because the claimant appealed from the first judgment, the question of when he was “disabled” is squarely before us on his cross-appeal, if the question is one of law. If the court’s first decision on that issue is legally incorrect, we may reverse it. If the question of disablement is one of fact, however, the situation changes. If the circuit court had issued its memorandum opinions after a trial on the merits, we could safely ignore the issuance of the Addendum yet still utilize the reasoning within it, if correct, to affirm the court’s decision on a ground not relied upon by the circuit court.

Offutt v. Montgomery County Bd. of Education, 285 Md. 557 , 563 n. 3, 404 A.2d 281 (1979); Van Wyk, Inc. v. Fruitrade Int’l, 98 Md.App. 662, 669 , 635 A.2d 14 (1994). Because the appeal is from the entry of summary judgment, however, our review may be more limited. Ordinarily, we may not affirm an entry of summary judgment for reasons other than those relied upon by the circuit court, if the alternative reason is one upon which the circuit court had discretion to deny summary judgment. Blades v. Woods, 338 Md. 475, 478 , 659 A.2d 872 (1995); Brown v. Wheeler, 109 Md.App. 710, 717 , 675 A.2d 1032 (1996).

Further problems with alternative grounds for affirmance arise because a circuit court generally has the discretion to defer or deny a Motion for Siimmary Judgment even when material facts are undisputed. Presbyterian Univ. Hospital v. Wilson, 99 Md.App. 305, 313 , 637 A.2d 486 (1994), aff'd, 337 Md. 541 , 654 A.2d 1324 (1995). It is only when the motion is based upon a pure issue of law, and not properly ⁴¹⁶ submitted to a trier of fact, that we may affirm on an alternate ground.

Id. at 313-14, 637 A.2d 486 . In this case, however, the possible factual nature of the question presents no obstacle. Because the claimant appealed from the circuit court’s decision that he was disabled in 1982, we may review the correctness of the grant of summary judgment in the manner in which we review all grants of summary judgment—if the material facts are disputed (in this case, if the date of disablement is a factual, rather than legal question), then summary judgment was improperly granted. King, 303 Md. at 111 , 492 A.2d 608 . 5 That is, although the circuit court may have had the discretion to deny summary judgment even when the material facts are undisputed, the converse is not true.

The court abuses its discretion when it grants a Motion for Summary Judgment in the face of disputed material facts. Id. In short, no matter how one views the procedural posture of the case, we may effectively consider the rationale set forth in the Addendum, either for the purpose of affirming the court’s grant of summary judgment to the claimant, or for the purpose of reversing its decision regarding disablement in the first Memorandum Opinion as either legally incorrect or as improperly granted in the face of disputed material facts. In addition, whether we reverse the court’s decision in the Addendum or affirm its first decision on the issue, we consider the same questions: are there material facts in dispute that determine when the claimant suffered a disability?

If so, the rationales of both opinions are incorrect on this issue, and the circuit court’s judgment rises and falls on its alternate ground for summary judgment. If not, the question is legal in nature, and the diametric opposition of both of the circuit court’s conclusions on disability compels an examination and resolution of the question as a matter of law. ⁴¹⁷ ANALYSIS I Once a payment is made on an award for a temporary disability, any reopening of the claim, even when the disability has since become permanent, is subject to the reopening provisions of L.E. § 9-736. Vest v. Giant Food Stores, Inc., 329 Md. 461, 476-78 , 620 A.2d 340 (1993). This has been established beyond question.

Nevertheless, in deciding that L.E. § 9-736 would not bar the pursuit of Claim A, the circuit court held that any payments made to the claimant under the collective bargaining agreement did not constitute “compensation payments” of an “award” that would trigger the application of L.E. § 9-736. The City argues that the circuit court had no authority to consider that question for three reasons. First, the issue was relevant to the viability of Claim A only, and the question of the viability of Claim A was not before the circuit court. Second, whether the payments under the Agreement were “compensation payments” within the scope of L.E. § 9-736 is a question of fact and, because the Commission made no findings on the issue, it should not have been decided by the circuit court.

Third, the City argues that the Fund was not a party to Claim B, only Claim A; should we allow the circuit court’s ruling on the applicability of L.E. § 9-736 to stand, the Fund would be denied all opportunity to defend on the issue of limitations as to Claim A. We agree with the City’s first and third arguments and need not discuss the second. Simply put, the hearings before the Commission and the circuit court were to determine the viability of Claim B, filed in 1994, not Claim A, filed in 1982. The City contended only that L.E. § 9-711 barred Claim B, not that L.E. § 9-736 barred Claim A and Claim B. 6 The City relies solely upon that argument in this Court, as well. ⁴¹⁸ Moreover, the Fund was impleaded on Claim A and must be given an opportunity to raise any defenses with regard to that claim, in an adjudication reserved for that claim. See Subsequent Injury Fund v. Ehrman, 89 Md.App. 741, 752 , 599 A.2d 875 (1992).

We shall assume, for the purposes of this appeal—and solely because The City has waived an objection to this assumption—that the payments under the Agreement were not compensation payments that would subject Claim B to the limitations provision of L.E. § 9-736(b)(3). The only questions before us, then, are whether the claimant suffered a disability in 1993 that was compensable under L.E. § 9-502(c), and if so, whether L.E. § 9-711 bars it. We address these questions together. II The limitations period of L.E. § 9-711 (which covers occupational diseases) runs, at the earliest, from the date of disablement, not from the date of the onset of the occupational disease.

Id. at 474. L.E. § 9-711 reads, in relevant part: (a) Filing claim.—If a covered employee suffers a disablement or death as a result of an occupational disease, the covered employee or the dependents of the covered employee shall file a claim with the Commission within 2 years, or in the ease of pulmonary dust disease within 3 years, after the date: (1) of disablement or death; or (2) when the covered employee or the dependents of the covered employee first had actual knowledge that the disablement was caused by the employment. (b) Failure to file claim.—Unless waived under subsection (c) of this section, failure to file a claim in accordance with subsection (a) of this section bars a claim under this title. At the hearing in the circuit court, Schwing conceded that his heart attack in 1982 and the quadruple bypass operation in ⁴¹⁹ 1993 stemmed from the same underlying heart disease. 7 His principal contention, below and on appeal, is that this incipient heart disease did not result in permanent partial disablement until 1993.

Only when he was hospitalized for the quadruple bypass surgery, Schwing argues, did the limitations period of L.E. § 9-711 begin to run, for after that date he never resumed his full duties as a tire fighter and suffered permanent partial disablement. L.E. § 9-502(c) states that an employer must provide compensation to a covered employee for disability resulting from an occupational disease. Id. Section 9-101(g), which defines an “occupational disease,” specifies that incapacitation is an integral element of a compensable occupational disease, and “may take on four main forms: (1) temporary partial incapacitation; (2) temporary total incapacitation; (3) permanent partial incapacitation; and (4) permanent total incapacitation.” Helinski v. C & P Tel.

Co., 108 Md.App. 461, 470 , 672 A.2d 155 (1996); L.E. § 9-101(g). Accord Bowen v. Smith, 342 Md. 449, 456 , 677 A.2d 81 (1996). “Disablement,” the triggering event for the limitations period of L.E. § 9-711 and a necessary precondition for compensation under L.E. § 9-502(c), is equivalent to incapacitation in the occupational disease context. Helinski, 108 Md.App. at 471 , 672 A.2d 155 . The following definitional section links the two terms: (a) “Disablement” defined.—In this section, “disablement” means the event of a covered employee becoming partially or totally incapacitated: (1) because of an occupational disease; and (2) from performing the work of the covered employee in the last occupation in which the covered employee was injuriously exposed to the hazards of the occupational disease. ⁴²⁰ L.E. § 9-502(a).

The incapacity, as is evident from L.E. § 9-502(a)(2), must relate to the requirements of the job last performed under the hazards of the disease. The questions posed by the City are whether the claimant suffered a temporary total disability within the meaning of L.E.,§ 9-502 when he was hospitalized in 1982 after his heart attack, and whether this disability started the clock on a limitations period that, when expired, forever foreclosed a claim for another kind of disability caused by the same occupational disease. We conclude first, as a matter of law, that he did suffer a temporary total disability in 1983. The facts are undisputed.

Schwing conceded in the circuit court, although he briefly argued differently before the Commission, that he suffered from cardiovascular disease that resulted in a heart attack in 1982. He was hospitalized for approximately two months, from the beginning of December 1982 to the beginning of February 1983. During this time, he performed no duties as a fire fighter. Based on the plain language of the statute, the claimant suffered a temporary, total incapacitation during this brief period.

That he returned to his former duties, with no reduction in capability, is of no consequence. See Helinski, 108 Md.App. at 470 , 672 A.2d 155 (“[A] covered employee may ... progress from [temporary total incapacitation] to full health.”). Indeed, as the City aptly argues, any other conclusion would be inconsistent with the statutory provisions providing for benefits in cases of temporary and partial disability. The very existence of these provisions contemplates benefits to covered employees who are temporarily incapacitated and who then return to work in their former capacity.

That the claimant suffered no wage loss because of the labor agreement is similarly irrelevant. “Absent any other evidence of actual incapacity, a showing of lack of wage loss might justify a fact-finder in concluding that there was no actual incapacity. But proving actual wage loss is not a sine qua non of obtaining compensation for occupational disease.” ⁴²¹ Miller v. Western Electric Co., 310 Md. 173, 188 , 528 A.2d 486 (1987). Ill It is crucial at this point to focus the analysis that we are about to undertake. Schwing filed claims within two years of both the 1982 temporary total disability and the disability suffered in 1993.

He tolled the limitations period of L.E. § 9-711 as to both claims. Thus, L.E. § 9-711, by its very terms, cannot operate to bar Claim B. It is equally clear—and undisputed—that the claimant required quadruple bypass surgery as a result of his occupational heart disease and that, as a result, he was again disabled from performing his duties as a fire fighter. 8 In addition, it is undisputed that, had the claimant not suffered a heart attack in 1982, the disability he suffered as a result of his 1993 surgery would be compensable under L.E. § 9-502. Thus, it appears that the only barrier to compensability is L.E. § 9-736—not, as we have discussed, in the sense that L.E. § 9-736 may strictly apply to bar Claim B (for the City has waived this argument on appeal), but in a