Mayor of Baltimore v. State

Eldridge, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns a variety of issues raised in connection with the State’s acquisition and proposed conversion of certain property in Baltimore City for use as a correctional institution. In the summer of 1976, due to serious overcrowding in the State’s prisons, an inter-agency committee was formed to examine various sites in the Baltimore metropolitan area for use as a State correctional institution. The committee included members of the Departments of State Planning, Public Safety and Correctional Services, and General Services, the Governor’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, and the Governor’s Office.

This inter-agency committee, after reviewing a substantial number of sites, recommended property at 3500 Biddle Street in Baltimore City, formerly the site of the Continental Can Company. Subsequently, the Board of Public Works authorized the Governor’s Chief Legislative Officer to conduct preliminary negotiations with the owners of the site. The result of these negotiations was a lease agreement which was ultimately approved and executed by the Board of Public Works. The lease was expressly contingent upon the appropriation of necessary funds by the General Assembly at its 1977 session.

In January 1977, Senate Bill 278, being the proposed General Construction Loan of 1977, and, inter alia, authorizing the acquisition of the Continental Can site, was introduced in the General Assembly. Prior to consideration of the bill, the State Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services prepared and distributed to the General Assembly an Environmental Assessments form which purported to satisfy the requirements of the Maryland Environmental Policy Act. According to the Senate Journal, the General Construction Loan was passed by the General Assembly on April 11, 1977, which was the ²²² last day of the legislative session. The bill was later signed into law by the Governor as Ch. 671 of the Acts of 1977.

On May 18,1977, the State of Maryland initiated a suit in the Baltimore City Court against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore and several city officials, seeking a declaration that the City’s zoning, building, fire, or similar codes could not be enforced against the State’s proposed use of the Continental Can site. Other issues were subsequently raised in this case. On the same day, John Douglass, a member of the House of Delegates, and certain residents of East Baltimore initiated a suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against various state officials, challenging the validity of Ch. 671 of the Acts of 1977 and raising other issues. On June 13, 1977, the Concerned Citizens of East Baltimore were allowed to intervene as defendants in the suit by the State and as plaintiffs in the action by Delegate Douglass and others.

Thereafter, motions for summary judgment by the State and the several state officials were granted, resolving all of the numerous issues raised in favor of the State and the state officials. Appeals were taken to the Court of Special Appeals, and this Court granted petitions and a cross-petition for writs of certiorari prior to any proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals. After the filing of briefs and oral argument, we filed a per curiam order on July 15, 1977, affirming the judgments below. We now set forth the reasons for our order.

(1) Initially, Baltimore City maintains that the State is bound to comply with the City’s zoning ordinance when building a public works project in Baltimore City. Until the City’s zoning ordinance was amended by Ordinance No. 272, a correctional institution in Baltimore City was a conditional use, and required the approval of the Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals. Baltimore City Ordinance No. 272, approved February 16, 1977, now provides that a correctional institution must be approved by an ordinance of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore. Thus, the City ²²³ contends that the State must procure an ordinance of approval from the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore before proceeding with its plans to convert the Continental Can site into a correctional institution.

Baltimore City derives its zoning power solely from the Zoning Enabling Act, Maryland Code (1957, 1970 Repl. Vol.), Art. 66B, § 2.01 et seq., and therefore it must act in the manner prescribed by the Act. Baltimore v. Swartz, 268 Md. 79, 91 , 299 A. 2d 828 (1973). The City maintains that subjecting the State to local governmental zoning powers is consistent with the terms of the Enabling Act, pointing out that the Enabling Act does not specifically exempt the State from the City’s zoning power.

Then, the City relies on Art. 66B, § 2.11, which states: “Wherever the regulations made under authority of this article require ... or impose other higher standards than are required in any other statute or local ordinance or regulation, the provisions of the regulations made under authority of this article shall govern.” The City argues that Ch. 671, which appropriates funds for the State’s acquisition of the Continental Can property, does not impose higher standards than those contained in Baltimore City’s Zoning Ordinance, and that, consequently, the State is subject to the local zoning ordinance. We disagree. Article 66B, § 2.01 et seq., which grants Baltimore City its zoning authority, neither specifically provides nor clearly implies that the State is intended to be subject to its provisions. In this regard, it is a basic and long-standing principle of statutory construction that the State is not deemed to be bound by an enactment of the General Assembly unless the enactment specifically names the State or manifests a clear and indisputable intention that the State is to be bound.

In State v. Milburn, 9 Gill 105, 118 (1850), this Court, quoting Mr. Justice Story, stated: “ ‘General Acts of the Legislature are meant to regulate and direct the acts and rights of citizens, ²²⁴ and in most cases, the reasoning applicable to them applies with very different, and often contrary force, to the government itself. It appears to me, therefore, to be a safe rule, founded in the principles of the common law, that the general words of a statute ought not to include the government, or affect its rights, unless that construction be clear and undisputable upon the text of the Act.’ ” Accord, Harden v. Mass Transit Administration, 277 Md. 399 , 354 A. 2d 817 (1976); Public Indemnity Co. v. Page, 161 Md. 239 , 156 A. 791 (1931); County Comm’rs of Balto. Co. v. Board, Etc., of Md. Hospital, Etc., 62 Md. 127 (1884); State v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 34 Md. 344 (1871). Thus, since the General Assembly has neither named the State nor manifested an intention that the State be bound in the provisions of the Zoning Enabling Act, Baltimore City has no authority to subject the State’s use of the Continental Can property to its zoning ordinance. 1 (2) Baltimore City next contends that the title of Ch. 671 of the Acts of 1977 violates Art. Ill, § 29, of the Maryland Constitution.

Art. Ill, § 29, requires that: “[E]very Law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but one subject, and that shall be described in its title.” The City argues that the title of the Act is misleading and thus does not adequately describe its subject matter. The title of Ch. 671 begins, in pertinent part, as follows: “FOR the purpose of authorizing the creation of a State debt in the amount of.. . $87,430,100, the ²²⁵ proceeds thereof to be used for certain necessary building, construction, demolition, planning, deferred maintenance and equipment purposes of this State, and for acquiring certain real estate and options in connection therewith; providing generally for the issue and sale of bonds evidencing said loan; providing, under certain circumstances, that general funds be used to pay the principal and interest of said bonds.” The City concedes that if the title had ended at this point, it would have satisfied the requirements of Art. Ill, § 29. The sufficiency of similar titles has in fact been established by this Court. 2 However, the title goes on to enumerate a substantial number of projects contained in the Act. The City argues that the inclusion of this list in the title would lead a reader to believe that the Act is limited to the enumerated projects, and no others.

Thus, since the authorization for the acquisition of the Continental Can site is not included in this list, the City urges that the title is misleading and the Act invalid. The purpose of the title requirement is to inform “ ‘the members of the legislature and the public of the nature of the proposed legislation.’ ” City of Bowie v. County Commissioners, 258 Md. 454, 467 , 267 A. 2d 172 (1970). However, this Court has repeatedly stated that the title of an act need not give an abstract of its contents. Madison National Bank v. Newrath, 261 Md. 321 , 275 A. 2d 495 (1971); Clinton Volunteer Fire Dept. v. Board of County Commissioners, 259 Md. 456 , 270 A. 2d 778 (1970); Leonardo ²²⁶ v. Board of County Commissioners, 214 Md. 287 , 134 A. 2d 284 , cert. denied, 355 U. S. 906 , 78 S. Ct. 332 , 2 L.Ed.2d 260 (1957); Pressman v. State Tax Commission, 204 Md. 78 , 102 A. 2d 821 (1954); Neuenschwander v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, 187 Md. 67 , 48 A. 2d 593 (1946).

Thus, the mere fact that a title goes on to mention many specific projects does not mean that it must therefore list all such projects, as long as the title of the act fairly informs the reader of its nature. The title of the subject Act accomplishes this. It begins with a broad statement of general purpose which sufficiently describes the contents of the Act. We find no suggestion in the title that this general purpose is meant to be limited to the enumerated projects which follow.

In fact, all of the enumerated projects which follow the statement of general purpose are mentioned in connection with the amendment of earlier General Construction Loans. The title is, therefore, in no way misleading, and it satisfies the requirements of Art. Ill, § 29. (3) It is further claimed that Ch. 671 violates Art. Ill, § 52 (8)' (a), of the Maryland Constitution, which requires that every supplementary appropriation bill be “limited to some single work, object or purpose.” 3 Chapter 671 authorizes a State debt in excess of 87 million dollars by providing for the State’s issuance and sale of bonds. The Act complied with the provisions of Art. Ill, § 34, of the Maryland Constitution, relating to State debt.

The bond sale proceeds are appropriated by Ch. 671 for a variety of State capital projects. In addition, the Act provides for grants to non-profit institutions in Baltimore City and the City of Annapolis for certain specified projects. ²²⁷ Because the proceeds of the bond sale are appropriated for a variety of projects, the City argues that Ch. 671 is not “limited to some single work, object or purpose.” This Court, however, has previously construed the requirements of Art. Ill, § 52 (8) (a), with specific regard to supplementary appropriation bills which authorize the creation of State debts for a variety of projects. In Panitz v. Comptroller, 247 Md. 501, 513-514 , 232 A. 2d 891 (1967), this Court, speaking through Chief Judge Hammond, stated: “We think the creation of a State debt in a specified amount in the manner prescribed in § 34 of Art. Ill by a Supplemental Appropriation Bill gratifies the dictates of § 52 (8) (a) even though the cash which is to result is directed to be used for multiple purposes. “We think § 52 recognized that § 34 contemplated a bill which created a debt of the State and provided for the payment of the interest and principal as specified was a separate appropriation bill, a single package, which, in the later words of § 52 (8) (a), stated therein the ‘single work, object or purpose’ — the obtention of funds for State purposes from lenders — to which it was limited.” (Emphasis supplied.) This is dispositive of the issue. Even though Ch. 671 embraces a variety of projects, it falls squarely within the requirements of § 52 (8) (a) as interpreted in Panitz , and as such is limited to a “single work, object or purpose.” (4) It is also alleged that the members of the Board of Public Works and other state officials either violated or disregarded a number of statutory provisions concerning the acquisition of property in the negotiation and approval of the Continental Can site lease.

For example, it is asserted that there was a violation of Code (1957, 1975 Repl. Vol.), ²²⁸ Art. 78A, § 19A, which requires that “[l]and for all public improvements ... shall be negotiated exclusively by ... [the Land Acquisition Division of the Department of General Services].” Statutory requirements relating to appraisals, advertising, maximum rental, etc., were claimed to have been violated in connection with the lease for the Continental Can site. We assume for purpose of argument that the actions of various state officials relating to the lease would have violated certain statutory provisions absent the enactment of Ch. 671. However, Ch. 671 explicitly directs that “(IV) The State and the seller of the [Continental Can site] shall negotiate the price in accordance vnth the terms of the lease dated December 3,1976, but the price shall not exceed 2,900,000.” (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, Ch. 671 specifically authorized governmental action in accordance with the lease agreement.

By this authorization, the General Assembly, in effect, excepted the actions of the government officials in connection with this lease agreement from the particular statutory requirements relied on in this case. Intervenors, however, argue that the above-quoted provision of Ch. 671 is unconstitutional because it represents “an attempt to legislate in the budget in that it is an attempt to amend or repeal existing legislation governing acquisition of state property.” This argument is without merit. In support of their contention that the General Assembly may not “legislate in the budget,” intervenors refer to two opinions of the Attorney General, 37 Op. Att.

Gen. 139 (1952) and 59 Op. Att. Gen. 70 (1974). While not in any way binding on this Court, the opinions of the Attorney General deserve consideration.

Drug & Chem. Co. v. Claypoole, 165 Md. 250 , 166 A. 742 (1933). However, assuming arguendo that we fully agreed with the cited opinions of the Attorney General, intervenors’ reliance would still be wholly misplaced. The opinions of the Attorney General do not at all concern ²²⁹ supplementary appropriation bills.

Rather, they concern the extent to which the General Assembly may make alterations or attach conditions to the annual Budget Bill submitted by the Governor. The opinions of the Attorney General are based on the unique constitutional provisions which pertain to the Budget Bill. In particular, the Budget Bill, unlike other bills, becomes law upon the mere approval of the General Assembly, and is not subject to the Governor’s veto. On this ground, the Attorney General believed that conditions attached to the Budget Bill by the General Assembly which repealed pre-existing statutes were not valid.

But Ch. 671 of the Acts of 1977 is manifestly a supplementary appropriation bill, Panitz v. Comptroller, supra, 247 Md. at 514 ; McKeldin v. Steedman, 203 Md. 89, 100-103 , 98 A. 2d 561 (1953). As such, it must be submitted to the Governor for his signature and is subject to his veto, Art. Ill, § 52 (8) (d), of the Maryland Constitution. However we might regard the Attorney General’s opinions concerning the annual Budget Bill, it is obvious that they have no application to a supplementary appropriation bill. (5) The provisions of Ch. 671 concerning a prison at the Continental Can site are also challenged on the ground that the State Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, in connection with the request to the General Assembly for an appropriation for the prison, had failed to comply with the Maryland Environmental Policy Act, Code (1974, 1976 Cum.

Supp.), § 1-301 et seq., of the Natural Resources Article. The Environmental Policy Act requires a state agency to prepare an “environmental effects report” for each “proposed state action” significantly affecting the environment. This report must include a discussion of the effects of the proposed state action on the environment. As we stated in Pitman v. Wash.

Sub. Sanitary Comm’n, 279 Md. 313 , 368 A. 2d 473 (1977), the types of “proposed state actions” which require the filing of these reports are limited ²³⁰ to requests to the General Assembly for appropriations or other legislative actions. 4 The Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services did file an environmental effects report, but it is claimed that the report was insufficient and did not comply with the requirements of the Environmental Policy Act. It is first argued that this alleged non-compliance renders Ch. 671, insofar as it authorizes the prison, invalid. This argument is obviously without merit.

Absent some constitutional infirmity, a court has no power to declare void an act of the General Assembly. The mere fact that officials of the Executive Branch of the government may have failed to comply with a previously enacted statute furnishes no basis for invalidating a subsequent enactment by the Legislative Branch of the government. The contention that the General Assembly might have been misled by the absence of a proper environmental effects report is of no avail. See Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U. S. 441, 451 , 57 S. Ct. 842, 847 , 81 L. Ed. 1210 (1937).

Cf Calder v. People of State of Michigan, 218 U. S. 591, 598 , 31 S. Ct. 122, 123 , 54 L. Ed. 1163 (1910); County Council v. District Land, 274 Md. 691, 704 , 337 A. 2d 712 (1975); Mayor of Balt. v. State, 15 Md. 376, 461 (1860). It is apparently argued, in the alternative, that even if Ch. 671 is valid, the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services should be enjoined from further action concerning the prison until a proper environmental effects report is filed. We disagree. This alleged non-compliance affords no basis on which to enjoin the acts of an agency undertaken pursuant to a legislative directive.

As we noted in Pitman v. Wash. Sub. Sanitary Comm’n, supra, 279 Md. at 315 n. 1, the definition of “proposed state action” in the Maryland Environmental Policy Act is a narrow one. It concerns only requests made by state agencies to the ²³¹ General Assembly for legislative action.

It does not include actions taken by state agencies in accordance with legislative directives. Thus, the conversion of the Continental Can site, undertaken pursuant to the provisions of Ch. 671 of the Acts of 1977, does not require the filing of an environmental effects report under the clear terms of the Environmental Policy Act. (6) Article III, § 15 (1), of the Maryland Constitution provides that the “General Assembly may continue its session .. . for a period not longer than ninety days in each year.” The 1977 session of the General Assembly could not constitutionally continue beyond midnight of April 11. Chapter 671 was the next to last bill considered by the Senate, and it was argued in the trial court proceedings that it was finally passed by the Senate after