Mayor of Baltimore v. Stokes

HOTTEN, J. This appeal and cross-appeal stem from a Baltimore City automobile accident. Driver, appellee/cross-appellant, Agnes Stokes, and her passenger, appellee/cross-appellant, Bertha Stokes, brought a negligence action against the driver of the other vehicle, cross-appellee, Doreatha Maynor. Ms. Maynor filed a third-party complaint against appellant, the Mayor and the City Council of Baltimore. The City moved for summary judgment, or in the alternative, a dismissal of the claims by Ms. A. Stokes and Ms. B. Stokes (collectively “Stokes appellees”) for failure to comply with the notice provisions of the Local Government Tort Claims Act.

The trial court denied both motions and at the conclusion of the evidence, granted motions for judgment as to Ms. A. Stokes and Ms. Maynor. The jury returned a verdict against the City. The City noted an appeal against Ms. A. Stokes and Ms. B. Stokes, and presents the following three questions for our review 1 : 1. Did the lower court err in finding that Bertha Stokes and Agnes Stokes had substantially complied with the LGTCA’s notice requirement for their personal injury claims by relying on the notice of property damage claim filed by another party to satisfy a condition precedent? 2.

Did the lower court err in finding that Bertha Stokes had good cause for failing to comply with the notice requirement of the LGTCA when she failed to present evidence of good cause and did not file a request for judicial waiver of the notice requirement? ⁴⁷⁶ 3. Did the lower court err in considering the issue of whether the City was prejudiced by the lack of LGTCA notice before Agnes Stokes presented evidence of good cause for her failure to comply with the notice requirement? Ms. A. Stokes filed a cross-appeal, presenting the following question: 1. Did the trial court err in directing a verdict in favor of [c]ross-[a]ppellee, Doreatha Maynor, when there was credible evidence presented of her negligence?

Also on cross appeal, Ms. B. Stokes presents the following question: 1. Did the trial court err in directing verdicts in favor of [c]ross-[a]ppellees, Agnes Stokes and Doreatha Maynor, when there was credible evidence presented of their negligence? For the reasons that follow, we shall reverse the judgments of the circuit court. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On November 15, 2009, appellee/cross-appellee, Doreatha Maynor (“Ms. Maynor”), was driving her automobile in the 600 Block of North Mount Street in Baltimore City approaching Edmondson Avenue.

At the same time, appellee/crossappellant, Agnes Stokes (“Ms. A. Stokes”), was driving down Edmondson Avenue with a passenger, Bertha Stokes (“Ms. B. Stokes”). Ms. Maynor entered the intersection without stopping and struck Ms. A. Stokes’ vehicle, allegedly due to the fact that the stop sign at the intersection of North Mount Street and Edmondson Avenue was on the ground and not in the proper standing position. Police responded to the scene and took a police report, which noted that the stop sign that is normally at the intersection was on the ground instead of standing upright in its correct position. On December 11, 2009, Ms. Maynor’s insurance company, State Farm, sent a letter to the City Solicitor, informing the City of a potential claim Ms. Maynor had for property damages to her vehicle.

This letter was sent pursuant to the ⁴⁷⁷ Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”), Maryland Code, (2006, Repl.Vol. 2013), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article [hereinafter Cts. & Jud. Proc.] § 5-304(b)-(c)(3)(i), 2 which requires that a claimant file notice within 180 days of the date of the alleged tort. On February 24, 2012, Ms. A. Stokes filed a lawsuit in trial court against Ms. Maynor for injuries resulting from the automobile accident. Ms. Maynor filed a third-party complaint against the City, alleging negligence.

According to Ms. Maynor, the stop sign was on the ground as a result of a prior automobile accident that the City was aware of, yet it had not repaired the sign. Ms. B. Stokes filed a complaint against Ms. A. Stokes, Ms. Maynor and the City. In May 2012, the City moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, to dismiss, arguing that neither Ms. Maynor, nor Ms. B. Stokes properly complied with LGTCA’s notice requirement. Judge Nance denied the motion, finding that Ms. Maynor’s letter from State Farm satisfied the notice requirement for both her and Ms. B. Stokes because the letter was sufficient to inform the City of their claims.

He also found that, in the alternative, Ms. B. Stokes had good cause for not strictly complying. Following this hearing, Ms. A. Stokes amended her complaint to include claims against the City. The City then moved for summary judgment, or in the alternative, to dismiss Ms. A. Stokes’ claims, asserting that she had failed to comply with the LGTCA’s notice requirement. Arguments were held before Judge Murdock, who denied the motion, finding that Ms. Maynor’s timely letter was sufficient to put the City on notice and that Ms. A. Stokes had therefore substantially complied with the notice requirement.

The case proceeded to trial on March 28, 2013. At the conclusion of the evidence, Ms. Maynor and Ms. A. Stokes moved for judgment. The trial court granted the motions. ⁴⁷⁸ Accordingly, the jury only decided whether the City was liable for the injuries suffered by the parties. The jury returned a verdict against the City.

The City noted a timely appeal against Ms. A. Stokes and Ms. B. Stokes, challenging the motions courts’ findings 3 that they had substantially complied with the LGTCA’s notice requirement. Ms. A. Stokes noted a cross-appeal against Ms. Maynor, challenging the trial court’s grant of Ms. Maynor’s motion for judgment. Ms. B. Stokes also noted a cross-appeal, against Ms. Maynor and Ms. A. Stokes, challenging the trial court’s grant of their respective motions for judgment. Additional facts shall be provided infra, to the extent they prove relevant in addressing the issues presented.

STANDARD OF REVIEW We review a trial court’s finding that there was substantial compliance with the LGTCA’s notice requirement or good cause for failing to comply with the notice requirement under an abuse of discretion standard. See Moore v. Norouzi, 371 Md. 154, 168 , 807 A.2d 632 (2002). “An abuse of discretion exists when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court [ ] ... or when the court acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles. An abuse of discretion may also be found where the ruling under consideration is clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court[ ] ... or when the ruling is violative of fact and logic.” Mitchell v. Hous. Auth. of Baltimore City, 200 Md.App. 176, 205 , 26 A.3d 1012 (2011) (citing Wilson v. John Crane, Inc., 385 Md. 185, 198 , 867 A.2d 1077 (2005)) (internal quotations omitted). /.

APPEAL DISCUSSION On appeal, the City contends that appellee’s claims are barred due to their failure to comply with the LGTCA’s notice ⁴⁷⁹ requirement. It advances three arguments in support. First, that the court erred in finding that both parties had substantially complied with the notice requirement. Second, that the court erred in finding that they had good cause for failing to comply.

Third, that the court erred in considering whether the City was prejudiced by the lack of notice before appellees had presented evidence of their good cause failure. 1. Was there substantial compliance with the LGTCA’s notice requirement? The City argues the motions courts erred in denying its motions for summary judgment against the Stokes appellees because they did not substantially comply with the notice requirement. The automobile accident occurred on November 15, 2009.

On December 11, 2009, Ms. Maynor’s insurance company filed a Statement of Claim as to property damage with the City. Neither Ms. A. Stokes nor Ms. B. Stokes filed a similar claim. Prior to trial, the City filed two separate motions for summary judgment or, in the alternative, motions to dismiss, against Ms. A. Stokes and Ms. B. Stokes respectively, asserting that their claims were barred for failure to comply with the statutory notice requirement. Each motion was heard before a different judge, yet both motions were denied after the respective judges found that both parties had substantially complied with the notice requirement, by virtue of the State Farm Statement of Claim.

The LGTCA was enacted to provide a remedy for members of the public who are injured by tortious acts of employees of local governments. See Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 107-08 , 660 A.2d 447 (1995). It requires that local governments in Maryland defend lawsuits resulting from torts committed by its officers and employees within the scope of employment. Cts. & Jud.

Proc. § 5-302(a). In order to maintain a civil action against a local government or its employees, an injured party must provide notice to the designated government official within 180 days of the injury. See Rios v. Montgomery County, 157 Md.App. 462, 480 , 852 A.2d 1005 (2004) (“Serving timely notice is essential to preserve a claimant’s right to file ⁴⁸⁰ suit at any time during the limitations period.”); see also § 5-304(b)(1). Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 5-304(b)-(c)(3)®, the LGTCA’s notice requirement, provides: (b) Notice Required.—(1) Except as provided in subsections (a) and (d) of this section, an action for unliquidated damages may not be brought against a local government or its employees unless the notice of the claim required by this section is given within 180 days after the injury.

(2) The notice shall be in writing and shall state the time, place, and cause of the injury. (c) (1) The notice required under this section shall be given in person or by certified mail, return receipt requested, bearing a postmark from the United States Postal Service, by the claimant or the representative of the claimant. (2) Except as otherwise provided, if the defendant local government is a county, the notice required under this section shall be given to the county commissioners or county council of the defendant local government. (3) If the defendant local government is: (i) Baltimore City, the notice shall be given to the City Solicitor; ....

(emphasis added). Recently, the Court of Appeals addressed whether a plaintiff had substantially complied with the notice requirement in Housing Authority of Baltimore City v. Woodland, 438 Md. 415 , 92 A.3d 379 (2014). There, the plaintiff was a young child when she, her mother and her grandmother moved into a housing unit owned by the defendant. Id. at 422-23 , 92 A.3d 379 .

Ten years after they moved in, the plaintiffs blood was tested and revealed elevated lead levels. Id. Immediately after receiving the results, the plaintiffs mother met with the defendant to discuss the test results. Id.

The defendant tested the unit for lead, and after the tests came back positive, relocated the plaintiff and her relatives to a different housing unit. Twelve years later, the plaintiff brought suit alleging injuries from lead exposure. She also asserted that she had complied with the notice requirement and in the alterative, ⁴⁸¹ that she had good cause for failing to substantially comply. Id.

The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that she had failed to comply and lacked good cause for the failure. Id. The court denied the motion, finding that there was a genuine dispute of material fact. Upon the conclusion of the evidence, the defendant moved for judgment again arguing failure to comply with the notice requirement.

The court denied the motion, finding that the plaintiff had substantially complied and that even if she hadn’t, she had good cause for not doing so. Id. The defendant appealed and the Court of Appeals granted certiorari on its own initiative. Id. at 424-26 , 92 A.3d 379 .

The Court explained that even where a plaintiff fails to strictly comply with the notice requirement, if they can demonstrate substantial compliance, they may proceed with their lawsuit. Id. at 427-29 , 92 A.3d 379 . A plaintiff substantially complies when: (1) [T]he plaintiff makes “some effort to provide the requisite notice”; (2) the plaintiff does “in fact” give some kind of notice; (3) the notice “provides ... requisite and timely notice of facts and circumstances giving rise to the claim”; and (4) the notice fulfills the LGTCA notice requirement’s purpose, which is to apprise [the] local government of its possible liability at a time when [the local government] could conduct its own investigation, i.e., while the evidence was still fresh and the recollection of the witnesses was undiminished by time, sufficient to ascertain the character and extent of the injury and [the local government’s] responsibility^] Id. (quoting Ellis v. Hous.

Auth. of Baltimore City, 436 Md. 331, 341 , 82 A.3d 161 (2013)). The Court then cited several cases where it had found substantial compliance when a plaintiff had sent in a letter or some other form of communication, but the notice failed to meet the statutory requirements. Id. Because the plaintiff was a child when they lived at the defendant’s property, the Court considered her mother’s actions.

Upon receiving the elevated blood lead test results, the ⁴⁸² mother immediately contacted the defendant regarding them. However, it did not appear that the mother informed the defendant that she intended to sue. After noting that the plaintiffs mother did not make any kind of "written or oral threat of a lawsuit to the defendant, the Court held that she had not substantially complied with the notice requirement. Id. at 343-44 , 82 A.3d 161 .

In Halloran v. Montgomery County Dept. of Public Works, 185 Md.App. 171 , 968 A.2d 1104 (2009) the plaintiff tripped over irregular pavement in a crosswalk. Id. at 178 , 968 A.2d 1104 . Within days, she wrote a letter to the defendant, informing it that she had tripped over an area “that appeared to have been dug up previously and quickly ‘repaired.’ ” Id. She stated that she had injured herself, attached pictures of her injury, and requested that the city attend to the area before another pedestrian was also injured.

Id. The defendant responded, explaining that it was forwarding her letter to the highway administration maintenance office. Id. at 179 , 968 A.2d 1104 . Three days after her letter to defendant, the plaintiff filed a notice of claim form with the state of Maryland, requesting that her medical bills be paid in full.

Id. The State responded that it had investigated her claim, found that it was not at fault and referred her to Washington Gas, who it believed was at fault. Id. Nine months after the accident, the plaintiff sent a letter to the county executive, explaining the facts of her injury and inquiring as to whether the County was responsible.

Id. The County subsequently denied liability at which point the plaintiff filed a lawsuit two years after the accident. Id. at 180 , 968 A.2d 1104 . The County filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the LGTCA’s notice requirement.

The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff appealed. Id. Before this Court, the plaintiff asserted that she had substantially complied with the notice requirement. We noted that substantial compliance “requires some effort” to provide notice that the plaintiff is pursuing a claim.

Id. at 183 , 968 ⁴⁸³ A.2d 1104. Using Wilbon v. Hunsicker, 172 Md.App. 181, 191 , 913 A.2d 678 (2006), as illustration, we observed that substantial compliance must both inform the proper authorities of a claim for damages or an intent to file suit and it must give the officials time to conduct an investigation specific to the claims that are or will be asserted. Referring specifically to claims for damages in tort cases: [A]n investigation into a tort claim for damages involves different issues, including, among other things, legal defenses, the nature and extent of the actual injuries sustained, the causal relationship of the injures to the alleged misconduct, the likelihood of an award of compensatory and/or punitive damages, the necessity and cost of expert testimony, and litigation strategy. Id. at 186-87 , 913 A.2d 678 .

We concluded that the letter the plaintiff had sent to the defendant days after the accident did not constitute notice because it did not state a potential claim. Id. at 187 , 913 A.2d 678 . Additionally, it did not “apprise [the County] of its possible liability at a time when it could conduct its own investigation.” Id. at 188 , 913 A.2d 678 . Accordingly, the plaintiff did not substantially comply with the notice requirement and the court did not err in granting the motion for summary judgment.

Id. Maryland courts have not decided whether a party may rely upon a third-party’s notice as a means of complying with the LGTCA’s notice requirement. However, the U.S. District Court for Maryland has answered this question in the negative. See Quigley v. U.S., 865 F.Supp.2d 685 (D.Md.2012).

In Quigley , there were six individuals involved in an automobile accident that occurred due to the alleged negligence of the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission (“WSSC”). The plaintiffs brought three separate lawsuits asserting claims of negligence and strict liability against WSSC and the County. Id. at 689 . The U.S. District Court consolidated all the cases.

Five of the plaintiffs had provided the County with timely notice of their claims. The sixth plaintiff, Ms. Barbosa, did not. Id. at 691 . As a result, the County filed a motion to dismiss Ms. Barbosa’s claims on the grounds that she failed to ⁴⁸⁴ comply with the notice requirements.

In response, Ms. Barbosa claimed that she had substantially complied because her co-plaintiffs had provided notice to the County and included the police reports which included her name. Id. at fn. 1. The U.S. District Court rejected this argument. It explained that “it does not appear that any Maryland court has yet relaxed the basic requirement that notice be delivered ‘by the claimant or the representative of the claimant’ or that the notice specifically refer to the claim of the [pjlaintiff.” Id. at 692.

The court continued, noting that Ms. Barbosa did have not any legal relationship with the other plaintiffs that could overcome the fact that she or an agent of hers must provide notice. Id. It concluded that “Ms. Barbosa’s attempt to piggyback on the timely efforts of others is insufficient to find compliance, substantial or otherwise, with the LGTCA.” Id. Both Indiana courts and New Jersey courts have reached a similar conclusion regarding reliance upon the compliance of another party to satisfy the notice requirement.

In Rosga v. City of Hammond, 493 N.E.2d 787, 788 (1985 Ind.Ct.App.) the plaintiffs husband, along with three other individuals, were killed in an automobile accident. An attorney representing the three other deceased individuals filed a notice of claim with the City, but the plaintiff did not. The other parties’ notice referenced the plaintiff by name but did not assert a claim on her behalf. Id.

The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs complaint for failure to comply with the notice requirement. The appeals court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal, reasoning that it found no reason to permit “a party to rely upon the notice of claim given by some other party for that party’s claim arising out of the same occurrence.” Id. at 789 . The court concluded that the plaintiff had neither given notice, nor authorized a representative to provide notice and therefore, could not maintain her claim in court. Id.

Likewise, in Madej v. Doe, 194 N.J.Super. 580 , 477 A.2d 439 (1984), a woman slipped and fell on a sidewalk and filed a notice of claim with the City of Newark. She and her husband later sued the City for damages. Id. at 582 , 477 A.2d 439 . The City moved to dismiss the husband’s claims, arguing that he ⁴⁸⁵ failed to comply with the jurisdiction’s tort claims act notice requirement.

Id. at 583 , 477 A.2d 439 . It argued that the husband had not filed a notice of claim with the City and that it had no notice that he was alleging damages until he filed the lawsuit. Id. The husband argued that the wife’s claim put the City on notice and satisfied the notice requirement.

Id. at 584 , 477 A.2d 439 . The court disagreed, reasoning that the City had never received any information regarding the husband’s specific claim or allegations of injury. Id. In the instant case, Ms. Maynor provided timely notice to the City of her claim through a letter from her insurance company on December 11, 2009 within one month of the car accident.

Neither Ms. A. Stokes nor Ms. B. Stokes attempted to provide notice within the 180 day time period. During the summary judgment hearings and reflected in their briefs, Ms. A. Stokes and Ms. B. Stokes contend that the City had notice of their claims from the State Farm letter that outlined the accident between Ms. Maynor and Ms. A. Stokes. In the letter, State Farm indicated that Ms. Maynor had been involved in an accident with Ms. A. Stokes and it (State Farm) presented the City "with a claim for property damages to Ms. Maynor’s vehicle. The letter also stated that State Farm was exercising its subrogation rights.

Appellees assert that this case is distinguishable from Quigley because, unlike the plaintiffs there, they had a relationship with Ms. Maynor, because State Farm, her insured, had subrogation rights, which created a legal relationship between them. We are not persuaded. State Farm sent the letter as a result of its contractual relationship with Ms. Maynor, and thus, even if its notice on her behalf was sufficient, Ms. A. Stokes and Ms. B. Stokes had no legal relationship with State Farm such that it could provide notice on their behalf. Appellees also argue that because Ms. Maynor’s State Farm letter references the police report, which identified them both, that the City had notice of their possible claim.

The plaintiff in Quigley unsuccessfully advanced the same argument. The U.S. District Court dismissed that claim, reasoning that re ⁴⁸⁶ gardless of the fact that she was mentioned, notice requires that the claimant make some effort to provide notice. It is clear that neither of the appellees made an effort to notify the City of their claim. The earliest point which Ms. B. Stokes attempted to give notice was not until March of 2012—more than two years after the accident.

As illustrated in Woodland and Halloran , substantial compliance requires some act on the part of the claimant. Here, the Stokes appellees exerted no effort to attempt to strictly comply with the notice provision. Therefore, they cannot maintain that they substantially complied. Accordingly, we conclude that the court erred in finding that the Stokes appellees had substantially complied with the notice requirement. 2.

Was there good cause for the failure to comply with the LGTCA’s notice requirement? Although the Stokes appellees did not comply with the notice requirement, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-304 provides that a court may waive the notice requirement if a party demonstrates good cause for failure to comply. (d) Waiver of notice requirement.—Notwithstanding the other provisions of this section, unless the defendant can affirmatively show that its defense has been prejudiced by lack of required notice, upon motion and for good cause shown the court may entertain the suit even though the required notice was not given. “The test for whether good cause exists pursuant to section 5-304(c) is ‘whether the claimant prosecuted his claim with that degree of diligence that an ordinarily prudent person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances.’ ” Rios v. Montgomery Cnty., 386 Md. 104, 141 , 872 A.2d 1 (2005).

We have enumerated the factors that courts may consider in deciding whether a plaintiff acted as a reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances, which are: [1] excusable neglect or mistake (generally determined in reference to a reasonably prudent person standard), [2] serious physical or mental injury and/or location out-of-state, [3] the inability to retain counsel in cases involving ⁴⁸⁷ complex litigation, ... [4] ignorance of the statutory notice requirement^] or (5) misleading representations made by representative of the local government. Wilbon v. Hunsicker, 172 Md.App. 181, 205-06 , 913 A.2d 678 (2006). A trial court must examine these factors before making a determination that there was good cause. See Halloran, 185 Md.App. at 193 , 968 A.2d 1104 .

In Quigley , 865 F.Supp.2d, after finding that Ms. Barbosa could not rely on the notice of her co-plaintiffs to satisfy the notice requirement, the court turned to the above referenced factors to ascertain whether there was good cause for her notice failure. Id. at 692 . Ms. Barbosa argued that based on the first factor, her failure was excusable neglect. Id. at 693 .

She submitted an affidavit that she did not receive the police report until nine months after the accident and was therefore, unaware of the County’s potential negligence until then. Id. The U.S. District Court did not agree with these arguments. It found that there were “far too many gaps” for good cause to be found.

Id. It then discussed several questions that were not answered by Ms. Barbosa, including an explanation of