Mayor of Hyattsville v. Washington, Westminster & Gettysburg Railroad

Boyd, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This case was before us several terms ago and the conclusions then reached by us are reported in 120 JVId. 128. The question which then gave us most difficulty was whether the termini were sufficiently described to comply with our statute. After considering the various points presented, we said: “In our judgment, then, the general railroad law of this State requires the termini to be fixed in this State, and naming two cities out of the State as the termini would not ordinarily be sufficient to show a compliance with the statute in that respect.

But we are also of the opinion, as indicated and explained above, that if it be shown by evidence that a road running from Washington, D. 0., to Gettysburg, Pa., through the counties and at or near the towns mentioned in this charter, will cross the State lines within such distance that the points of crossing can be said to be fixed with reasonable certainty, in the light of the decisions above referred to and of what we have said, such points can be treated as the termini in this State, and hence, if such be the case, the description of the termini in this charter must be treated as a substantial compliance'with the requirement of the statute. And if it be shown that the lines of Washington and of the District of Columbia are co-extensive, that is sufficient for the southerly terminus.” ⁶⁶³ It was contended in the former case by the attorneys for the appellee that those lines were co-extensive, and it was for that reason that they were referred to. The testimony taken after the case was remanded does not sustain that contention. It may be true that there is but one government for the whole district, including the City of Washington, but. the limits of the city seem to be well established and. are practically the same they have been for many years, excepting that Georgetown is now a part of Washington.

If Washington and Gettysburg had been within the State of Maryland, naming them as the termini of the railroad would have been sufficient, without stating- from what part of the one the road was to begin, and at what part of the other it was to- terminate. The theory upon which we remanded the case, therefore, was that if it could be shown that a railroad constructed from the one place to the other, and passing through the counties and by or near the towns named, would cross the State lines within such distances on those lines as made those points of crossing reasonably certain and fixed then those points could be accepted as the termini of the road. It was determined in Union R. Co. v. Canton R. Co., 105 Md. 12 , that it was not necessary under our statute that a railroad company shall have its termini at or in a city, town or village, and in the charter involved in P. & C. Ry. Co. v. Speelman, 67 Md. 260 , the description of the one terminus was “beginning at a point in Allegany County, in said State, opposite to the junction of the West Virginia Central and Pittsburg Railway Company with the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company above Piedmont, in West Virginia.” Therefore reference to a point at either State line on a road to be built from Washington, D. C., to Gettysburg, Pa., would answer the requirement of the statute if such point could be made sufficiently definite.

It was said in Union R. Co. v. Canton R. Co., supra, that “In reqitiring that the termini shall be specified in its act of incorporation, it would seem that, the only reasonable intent, to be imputed to the law is that the railroad shall have such termini defi ⁶⁶⁴ nitely ascertained and fixed so as to indicate its general dire'ction and location.” That there can be no objection to a railroad being’ chartered in this 'State with the view to connect with and in effect form part of a road chartered by another State was decided in P. & C. Ry. Co. v. Speelman , and the conditions shown in that case still exist, just as in the part of the Western Maryland system east of Cumberland, where the road crosses and re-crosses the Potomac Bive-r a number of times. We said in the former opinion that if the lines of Washington were co-extensive with those of the District, a point on the dividing line between the District and Maryland “would be sufficient for the southerly terminus, for if, for example, one terminus of a railroad was Baltimore City, it would not be necessary to name the particular street or part of the city to or from which it ran.” We spoke of the fact that there were a number of special charters in this State in which there is more uncertainty as to one or both of the termini than in this charter, if we treat its termini, in this State, as the points where the route crosses the State lines from Washington and Gettysburg; and we referred to Spellman s case and that of Union R. Co. v. Canton R. Co., to show that this Court had in effect placed railroads chartered under the general law on the same basis as those having special charters, in respect to their termini and routes. The Baltimore & Ohio B. B. was not only one of the first built in this country, but its charter has been the guide in this State in granting charters to other railroads, in reference to the description of routes, the exercise of eminent domain and in other respects.

Chapter 158 of the Acts of 1830 was the original Act by which what is known as the Washington Branch of that company was authorized, being entitled “An Act to promote Internal Improvement, by the construction of a railroad from Baltimore to the City of Washington.” That company was empowered and authorized to construct that railroad “from such point or place on ⁶⁶⁵ that part of the Baltimore and Ohio Rail Road already constructed, and in use, not exceeding- eight miles from the City of Baltimore, as the said company may deem most convenient, to the line of this State adjoining- the District of .Columbia in a direction towards the City of Washington, along the most direct and suitable route that may be reasonably and conveniently practicable.” The precise point of crossing the State or District line was certainly as indefinite in the route of a road from the beginning named to the District line “in a direction towards the City of Washington,” as the point of crossing such line would be in the route of a road from the City of Washington to Gettysburg, through the counties and at or near the towns named in this charter. It is true that was a special charter, but in view of what was said in the cases above referred to we would not be at liberty to strike down this charter merely because the precise point of crossing the line was not fixed, when the general direction and location of the railroad are indicated by the description given, and that special charter, moreover, does show that the Legislature of this State did not deem it necessary to fix in advance the precise point of crossing State lines. Chapter 634 of Acts of 1900, which changed the name of the Frederick, Thurmont and Northern Railway Company to the Washington, Frederick and Gettysburg Railway Company, authorized that company to construct a railroad from some point in Frederick City “to some point at or near the boundary line between the State of Maryland and the State of Pennsylvania, and run through or near the towns of Thurmont and Emmittsburg, in said Frederick County, and to extend from Frederick City southerly through Frederick and Montgomery Counties to the boundary line of the District of Columbia, or to such point in Montgomery County as may, by said directors, be deemed most expedient to connect with some railroad entering said District of Columbia.” Other special charters might be cited, and while we do not mean ⁶⁶⁶ to say that the legislature could not, by a special charter,, grant some special powers which the general law does not, such designations of termini as those we have mentioned reflect upon the intent of the legislature in reference to them. We will repeat what we quoted in the other opinion from the case of Union R. Co. v. Canton R. Co., in speaking of the provisions of the general law as to termini.

It was there said: “The language of the provisions in question may be somewhat lacking in clearness, but the question here is not one of philological accuracy in the expressions employed 1 herein, but of legislative intent upon a view of, the whole statute, and of the object of it. This Court has said that the statute in question is of remedial character and to be liberally construed; Piedmont and Cumb. Ry. Co. v. Speelman, 61 Md. 260 .

Its object is to promote and facilitate the organization of corporations for the building of railroads and supplying means of transportation as the necessities and convenience of any community in the State and its industrial and commercial development may require. Where doubt may be. suggested as to the construction of the law, it ought to be resolved with a view of bringing the practical operation of the law into harmony with its purposes.” In determining the sufficiency of the description of the termini in this charter, we must be controlled by the former decisions of this Court and particularly by what we believe the legislature intended to require. Some cases in other jurisdictions have, it seems to us, announced stricter rules in reference to the description of the termini than are necessary for the protection of the public or those interested in railroad companies. It is generally conceded that the precise route between the termini must to a great extent be left to the discretion of the company' — it may be above or below, or partly above and partly below, or close to or some distance from a direct line between the termini, unless otherwise fixed in the charter, and yet some authorities would seem to limit the termini to very circumscribed spaces.

The better rule is ⁶⁶⁷ to require them to be designated and fixed with, reasonable certainty, and what is reasonable certainty must depend upon circumstances. It might he well to require a map> or maps to be filed of the proposed location of a railroad within some designated time after a charter is takén out, but it would be practically impossible to definitely locate the precise route before the company is incorporated, as that must depend upon circumstances which may arise after the company is chartered, and we have quoted above from Union R. Co. v. Canton R. Co., to show the intent of the law in requiring the termini to- be fixed in the charter. But having already held that if the lines of Washington aro co extensive with those of the District that would be sufficient for the southerly terminus, it would seem that logically the District line should be held te» be sufficient. Ho greater distance is covered by it as the District line than would have been if it had been found to be a line of Washington City.

The map of the route of the railroad is now in the case, and that not only shows the point on the District line, but the route of the road to the Pennsylvania lino. In order to pass through Prince George’s, Montgomery, Howard, Carroll and Frederick counties, by what would approach anything like a direct line to Gettysburg, the road must cross the District line and the Pennsylvania line within such reasonable distances as to satisfy us the termini so fixed are a sufficient compliance with our statute. Westminster is almost due north of Sandy Springs, and the route from the District to Westminster, via Sandy Spring, is about as direct as a railroad usually is in such a country as this passes through— especially where there are other railroads to be taken into consideration. The distance from Westminster to' the Pennsylvania line is a little over sixteen miles, and from that line to Gettysburg a little over. thirteen miles, according to the evidence of the general manager of the road, who said it was practically an air line.

So without pursuing the subject ⁶⁶⁸ further we are satisfied that treating the termini in the charter as the points of crossing the two State lines, they are sufficiently designated. It only remains to- consider the exceptions presented by the record. The first was to the refusal of the Court to have a trial by jury. At the time the appellant filed its election for a trial by a juiy the pleadings did not raise any issue of fact which a jury could pass on.

It was for the Court, and not for the jury, to determine whether the charter was a valid one, and the evidence to be offered on that subject was for the Court. If the termini were sufficiently described, a copy of the charter duly certified by the Secretary of State is made evidence of the existence of the company, section 261 of Article 23, and by section 2G2, when the provisions of section 261 have been complied with, the persons named as corporators in the certificate are authorized k> carry into effect the objects named therein, and they and their associates, successors and assigns, shall thereafter be deemed a body corporate, etc. When a corporation is formed under the general law no further proof is required to show that the persons who signed the articles and applied for the charter have accepted it, other than their compliance with the provisions of the statute. Glymont Co. v. Toler, 80 Md. 278 . Eor the reasons stated in the opinion in the former appeal, we deem.ed it proper to1 have evidence, so that the Court could determine the sufficiency of the description of the termini in the charter, as without the evidence it was not satisfactorily informed as to where the proposed road would cross the State lines, but it was not intended that a jury should pass on such questions, as whether there was such a corporation, the distance from the point where the proposed road crossed the State line to Gettysburg, whether or not the lines of Washington and the District were co^-extensive, etc. Hor do we think that any of the other questions of fact suggested by the appellant were at issue at the time the jury was' asked for. ⁶⁶⁹ The second exception was taken to the refusal of the Court to allow the appellant to amend its answer so as to plead as matter of defense an order of the Public Service Commission, passed since the pleadings in this case were filed, whereby said commission suspended until its further order the operation and effect of its previous order referred to in the petition of the appellee.

As the Court subsequently permitted the appellant to file the order no injury was done it by refusing to allow it to amend, if it he conceded that such action is subject to review. In the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth exceptions there were no reversible errors. Some of them are wholly immaterial as they relate to the question whether the lines of the City and the District were co-eixtensive, and we have already said we are satisfied they are not. It was proper to have the officers of the company explain to the Court the route of the proposed road, and there could he no valid objection to the use of maps by way of illustration in doing so.

It was competent for the officers to give the distances between Westminster and the State