Mayor of Rockville v. Stone

Digges, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. If variety is the spice of life, then it would seem that the zoning cases which originate in Montgomery County are certainly well peppered. The factual twists present in this action, which reaches us by certiorari to the Court of Special Appeals, 1 are ample support for this statement since this ⁶⁵⁷ case is unusual in two respects. First, the application which precipitated this litigation was filed by the City of Rockyille Planning Commission, a governmental agency, rather than by the joint owners, Mr. and Mrs. Raymond P. Stone and Mr. and Mrs. Ralph Bogart (the protestants), which is the usual course of things in zoning litigation.

Second, the controversy involves a request that two contiguous lots be returned to residential zoning, which was their designation in the 1957 comprehensive zoning ordinance adopted by the Mayor and Council of Rockville, rather than maintain the 1-1 (industrial) zoning they acquired as a result of our decision in England v. Rockville, 230 Md. 43 , 185 A. 2d 378 (1962). 2 In England , an application was filed by the property owner at that time seeking rezoning of these same lots from R-60 to 1-1 or 1-2. When the city denied this request, its action was appealed to the circuit court which affirmed. We reversed, and ordered that the request for rezoning be granted after holding that “[t]here was clear evidence of original mistake or change of condition, in addition to the evidence of practical inability to improve the lots for residential use, and that the granting of the application would conform the use to the recommended future use of the whole area, as set out in the proposed comprehensive plan.” England, supra at 46-47 . From analyzing the case now before us in the light of the voluminous decisions of this Court concerning zoning matters, we glean that, despite the intriguing factual and procedural posture present here, there is really very little new under the sun in this State as far as zoning cases are concerned.

Our careful review of the case law in this State and the works of text writers who have concentrated on this discipline has not resulted in the discovery of any rationale which would compel us to adopt a different standard for analyzing the appropriateness of rezoning simply because the application was brought by an arm of the government ⁶⁵⁸ rather than the property owner, or because the zoning being questioned was the result of a previous decision of this Court. R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning, § 4.33 (1968); A. Rathkopf The Law of Zoning and Planning, 27-23 (1972). 3 The same basic principles which have so often been set out before remain vital and control the decision here as well. In early February of 1972, the City of Rockville received an application filed by its planning commission which petitioned for the rezoning of the Stone-Bogart lots from 1-1 (Industrial) to R-75 (one-family detached residential). Following a hearing on this application, the city, on May 14, 1972, adopted Ordinance No. 12-73 which granted the requested zoning reclassification.

Rockville gave as reasons for this decision its determination that the applicant had demonstrated both a substantial change in the character of the neighborhood and a mistake in the original zoning, meeting the requirement of Maryland Code (1957, 1970 Repl. Vol.) Art. 66B, § 4.05 (a); Pattey v. Bd. of Co. Comm’rs for Worcester Co., 271 Md. 352 , 317 A. 2d 142 (1974), and that the owners, as protestants, had failed to prove that this rezoning ordinance would result in the unconstitutional confiscation of their property. The owners appealed from this action on the part of the Mayor and Council of Rockville to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. That court, though finding the question of “change” fairly debatable, reversed the action of the city after ruling that the ordinance amounted “to an unconstitutional deprivation of property without just compensation” in that it resulted in a “very substantial diminution of the actual and uninflated value of the property . . . .” Since we decide that the question of whether there exists “change” or “mistake” is fairly debatable, and do not see that the land owner was unconstitutionally denied all reasonable use of his property by the ordinance, we reverse.

The property in question is described as Lots 5 and 6, ⁶⁵⁹ Block 9, H. L. England’s Second Addition to Lincoln Park and has the street address of 607 and 609 North Stonestreet Avenue. The lots are situated across the street from, and in close proximity to, that parcel which was the subject of this Court’s opinion in Rockville v. Henley, 268 Md. 469 , 302 A. 2d 45 (1973) and lies directly across Stonestreet Avenue from a large tract which though zoned residential has been “used since 1959 by the Montgomery County Board of Education for warehousing, open storage of materials, school buses and trucks, and machine shops [, a permitted use by a governmental agency in a residential zone] .... Adjacent to the property ... is a substandard and dilapidated dwelling described as a ‘shack’ [which was, in 1972, under orders for demolition], . . . Nearby [, one block to the west,] is the main line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, paralleling Stonestreet Avenue.” England, supra at 45 .

The immediate area in which these lots are situtated was recently described by this Court in Henley as: “a residential community which extends for several blocks with small well kept homes. This entire expanse is zoned R-60 with the exception of . . . [two warehouses situated on realty zoned 1-2 (Industrial), an apartment house built on land zoned 1-2], a group of apartments one block east of the subject site, and two small lots .... On the west side of the tracks is land zoned for industrial and commercial use. While the area east of the railroad may not qualify for the appellation of Camelot, it has the appearance of a suburban residential neighborhood interspersed with minimal storage facilities and proximate to some commercial and light industrial development.” Henley, supra at 472 . 4 ⁶⁶⁰ Much ado has been made concerning whether the doctrine of res judicata would prevent this Court from altering the rezoning we ordered in England .

However, the facts as presented here make that doctrine, in this case, a “stern and simple irrelevancy.” 5 In Alvey v. Hedin, 243 Md. 334 , 221 A. 2d 62 (1966), a leading case in which the application of res judicata to zoning decisions was discussed, this Court held that the doctrine of res judicata was viable in zoning matters and prevented the relitigation of a zoning issue based on facts which existed at the time of the first decision in the case. Here, we are concerned only with the events which have developed during the ten years since the England decision, and, in this regard, we find the doctrine of res judicata, as recognized in Alvey , inapplicable. Thus, the investigation called for in this case is whether the applicant had adduced sufficient evidence of factors that have developed since our prior decision which would demonstrate that this action, though correct at the time, proved to be a mistake, “or else evidence of a change in conditions [since rezoning was directed in England] resulting in a substantial change in the character of the neighborhood.” Heller v. Prince George’s Co., 264 Md. 410, 412 , 286 A. 2d 772 (1972). Of course, in our consideration of these questions, we remain mindful of the fact that the rezoning as directed in England had to be based on evidence sufficient to overcome the strong presumption of correctness which is afforded to comprehensive zoning.

Pattey v. Bd. of Co. Comm’rs for Worcester Co., 271 Md. 352 , 317 A. 2d 142 (1974); Valenzia v. Zoning Board, 270 Md. 478 , 312 A. 2d 277 (1973); Trainer v. Lipchin, 269 Md. 667 , 309 A. 2d 471 (1973). Once that rezoning was accomplished, the presumption which accompanied the adoption of the comprehensive plan evaporated and the industrial classification was, before the legislative body, presumptively correct; and the party seeking a change had the burden of producing evidence sufficient to permit another alteration. Nevertheless, when the evidence offered ⁶⁶¹ convinces the legislative body that either change or mistake is present, its decision must be sustained by a court on appeal