Mazor v. State, Dep't of Correction

³⁵⁷ Levine, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal presents significant challenges to the constitutionality of Maryland Code (1957, 1964 Repl. Vol., 1972 Cum. Supp.), Art. 101, § 33, which reduces the workmen’s compensation award of a public employee if he also receives benefits under his employer’s pension plan.

The Court of Special Appeals, in Mazor v. Dep’t of Correction, 30 Md. App. 394 , 352 A. 2d 918 (1976), interpreted the statute to apply to the facts presented by this case'and further held' that the statute was constitutional. We then granted Mazor’s petition for a writ of certiorari and, since we agree with the Court of Special Appeals, we shall affirm. The facts are simple and undisputed. On July 17, 1972, appellant, Donald Louis Mazor, then a 50-year old penitentiary guard who had been employed by the Department of Correction for more than six years, suffered severe injuries when he was stabbed and beaten during an incident at the House of Correction.

Unable to return to work, Mazor retired on September 1, 1973. As a condition to employment with the state, Mazor had become a member of the Employees’ Retirement System of the State of Maryland. Code (1957, 1970 Repl. Vol., 1972 Cum.

Supp.), Art. 73B, §§ 1-3. Consequently, a contribution towards an annuity had been regularly deducted from his salary, while the Department of Correction for its part had contributed to a separate pension fund. Art. 73B, § 14. Having determined that Mazor was totally and permanently incapacitated for duty as a result of his injury, the retirement system awarded him, effective upon his retirement, an accidental disability pension of $421.59 and an annuity of $26.75, for a total of $448.34 per month or $5,380.08 per year.

Art. 73B, § 11 (6). Mazor was also eligible for benefits under the workmen’s compensation laws in the event he sustained injury in the course of his employment. Art. 101, §§ 21, 36. Workmen’s compensation benefits are supported exclusively by the employer, not by the employee.

Art. 101, §§ 15, 16, 51. If the employer carries insurance with the State Accident Fund, as ³⁵⁸ here, he pays premiums equal to a predetermined percentage of the payroll of his employees covered by Article 101, § 72. In any event, Mazor also applied for workmen’s compensation benefits. At a hearing before the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, Mazor’s employer and the State Accident Fund, who, together with the Subsequent Injury Fund, are the appellees here, claimed that pursuant to Art. 101, § 33, award of the pension discharged their obligation to provide workmen’s compensation benefits.

That section, in pertinent part, provided: “Whenever by statute, charter, ordinances, resolution, regulation or policy adopted thereunder, whether as part of a pension system or otherwise, any benefit or benefits are furnished employees of employers covered under § 21(a)(2) of this article, the dependents and others entitled to benefits under this article as a result of the death of such employees, the benefit or benefits when furnished by the employer shall satisfy and discharge pro tanto or in full as the case may be, the liability or obligation of the employer for any benefit under this article. Should any benefits so furnished be less than those provided for in this article the employer shall be liable to furnish the additional benefit as will make up the difference between the benefit furnished and the similar benefit required in this article. “The Commission shall have full power to determine whether any benefit provided by the employer is equal to or better than any benefit provided for in this article, and to render an award against the employers to furnish additional benefit or benefits to make up the difference between the benefit furnished by the employers and the benefits required by this article as the case may be....” 1 ³⁵⁹ Four issues were presented to the Commission. First, appellees claimed that Mazor’s pension benefits were equal to or better than any benefit provided by workmen’s compensation. Secondly, while recognizing that the statute is couched in terms of discharging only the employer’s obligation, appellees argued that § 33 also implicitly provided for discharge of the insurer’s obligation.

Thirdly, Mazor contended that as a matter of statutory interpretation, § 33 required a setoff only if the accident resulted in death. Lastly, Mazor contended that application of § 33 to his case would violate a number of his constitutional rights. In its October 1974 ruling, the Commission determined that Mazor’s pension benefits were equal to or better than those provided under the workmen’s compensation law, but rejected the contention that the insurer, as distinguished from the employer, was entitled to a discharge. Consequently, the Commission did not reach the last two issues.

Rather, it found that Mazor suffered a permanent 60% disability solely as a result of the 1972 incident, and therefore awarded him $65 a week or $3,380 per year, not to exceed $26,000. Art. 101, § 36 (4), (4a). 2 The employer and insurer appealed the decision of the Commission to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. After the case was removed to Harford County for trial, they moved for summary judgment. In granting the motion, the court (Close, J.) held that the insurer, as well as the employer, was entitled to a discharge of his obligation; that § 33 was not limited to death cases; and that the statute did ³⁶⁰ not violate any of Mazor’s constitutional rights.

It therefore reversed the Commission’s ruling. 3 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court judgment. I Because Mazor has conceded here that the benefits he receives from his disability pension are equal to or better than any benefits he could receive from workmen’s compensation, 4 we need consider only two issues of statutory interpretation: whether § 33 entitles the insurer, as well as the employer, to a discharge of its obligation and whether § 33 discharges the workmen’s compensation obligation when the employee’s injury does not result in death. We shall answer both questions in the affirmative. As we have so often said, the cardinal rule of construction of a statute is to ascertain and carry out the real intention of the Legislature.

State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 421 , 348 A. 2d 275 (1975); Fairchild v. Maritime Air Serv., 274 Md. 181, 185 , 333 A. 2d 313 (1975); Purifoy v. Merc.-Safe Dep. & Trust, 273 Md. 58, 65 , 327 A. 2d 483 (1974). The primary source from which we glean this intention is the language of the statute itself. State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. at 421 . And in construing a statute we accord the words their ordinary and natural signification.

Bright v. Unsat. C. & J. Fund Bd., 275 Md. 165, 169 , 338 A. 2d 248 (1975); Md.-Nat’l Cap. P. & P. v. Rockville, 272 Md. 550, 556 , 325 A. 2d 748 (1974); Grosvenor v. Supervisor of Assess., 271 Md. 232, 237-38 , 315 A. 2d 758 (1974). If reasonably possible, a statute is to be read so that no word, phrase, clause or sentence is rendered surplusage or meaningless.

Prince George’s Co. v. White, 275 Md. 314 , ³⁶¹ 319, 340 A. 2d 236 (1975). Similarly, wherever possible an interpretation should be given to statutory language which will not lead to absurd consequences. Fairchild v. Maritime Air Serv., 274 Md. at 186 . Moreover, if the statute is part of a general statutory scheme or system, the sections must be read together to ascertain the true intention of the Legislature.

Blumenthal v. Clerk of Cir. Ct., 278 Md. 398, 403 , 365 A. 2d 279 (1976); Thomas v. State, 277 Md. 314, 317 , 353 A. 2d 256 (1976); County Council v. Supervisor, 274 Md. 116, 120 , 332 A. 2d 897 (1975). Applying these principles, we conclude that § 83 not only provides for discharge of employers, but also applies in the same manner to insurers. Mazor recognizes that “when the Legislature by statute authorized employers to contract with insurance companies in order to cover possible claims under Article 101 it intended the insurance carrier to stand in the position of the employer.” Flood v. Merchants Ins. Co., 230 Md. 373, 377 , 187 A. 2d 320 (1963).

In an attempt to avoid application of this rule, Mazor contends that only by express provision may his benefits be reduced. He recognizes, however, that § 83 does discharge an employer’s obligation. To adopt Mazor’s interpretation here, then, would produce an anomalous consequence, whereby the insurer conceivably would pay benefits to the employee without receiving premiums from the . employer. For the same reason, the effect of such an interpretation on self-insured employers, see Art. 101, § 16 (3), would differ from that on employers who are not, self-insured.

By interpreting the statute to discharge also the obligation of insurers, we avoid such “absurd consequences.” Fairchild v. Maritime Air. Serv., 274 Md. at 186. The gist of Mazor’s second argument is that § 33 applies only where the injury results in the employee’s death. To sustain this position, as we understand it, he would have us parse the first sentence in this manner: “Whenever by statute, charter, ordinances, resolution, regulation or policy adopted thereunder, whether as part of a pension system or otherwise, ³⁶² any benefit or benefits are furnished employees of employers covered under § 21 (a) (2) of this article, [(1)] the dependents and [(2)] others entitled to benefits under this article as a result of the death of such employees, the benefit or benefits when furnished by the employer shall satisfy and discharge pro tanto or in full as the case may be, the liability or obligation of the employer for any benefit under this article. ...” Appellees, on the other hand, contend that the sentence should be read quite differently: “Whenever by statute, charter, ordinances, resolution, regulation or policy adopted thereunder, whether as part of a pension system or otherwise, any benefit or benefits are furnished [(1)] employees of employers covered under § 21 (a) (2) of this article [or] [(2)] the dependents and others entitled to benefits under this article as a result of the death of such employees, the benefit or benefits when furnished by the employer shall satisfy and discharge pro tanto or in full as the case may be, the liability or obligation of the employer for any benefit under this article.. ..” We agree with appellees’ interpretation and believe that the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, thus obviating the necessity of referring to any legislative history.

Cf. Blumenthal v. Clerk of Cir. Ct., 278 Md. at 403 (ambiguity found). To agree with Mazor’s position would require us to read this portion of § 33 as a grammatically incorrect English sentence whereby the phrase, “the dependents and others entitled to benefits under this article as a result of the death of such -employees,” would have absolutely no structural function. As a corollary of the rule that we accord words their ordinary meaning, we must accord sentences an ordinary grammatical structure.

In ³⁶³ short, Mazor’s position would create a forced and strained interpretation of the statute. We regard as persuasive the decision of the Court of Special Appeals in Nooe v. City of Baltimore, 28 Md. App. 348 , 345 A. 2d 134 (1975), cert. denied, 276 Md. 748 (1976), where it considered the identical question presented here. There, the court also held that death of the employee is not a condition precedent to the discharge of the employer’s obligation to provide workmen’s compensation benefits. As the court in Nooe aptly recognized, adoption of the employee’s position would lead to consequences not intended by the Legislature: the rights of widows and orphans of a deceased employee would be severely restricted, while an employee who sustained relatively minor injuries resulting in a disability pension award would be entitled to double benefits.

Id. at 356 . Our holding recognizes that workmen’s compensation is one facet of an overall system of wage-loss protection, and that the underlying principle of the system is to restore to the worker a portion of wages lost by physical disability, unemployment, or old age. It follows that although two or more causes of wage loss may coincide, the benefits need not cumulate, for the worker experiences but one wage loss. 4 Larson, Law of Workmen’s Compensation §§ 97.00, 97.10 (1976). A majority of American jurisdictions provide some form of setoff in the area of wage-loss legislation. 4 Larson, supra, § 97.20; cf. Social Security Act § 224, 42 U.S.C. 424a (1970) (reduction of Social Security benefits where individual is entitled to workmen’s compensation).

The cases cited by Mazor for the proposition that one may receive full workmen’s compensation benefits while receiving other disability payments are distinguishable because all of the cases involved a meshing of federal and state programs. 5 ³⁶⁴ Concededly, the statutory schemes throughout the country evidence a variety of approaches, but in any event, the express provision in our statute is controlling here. II Secondly, Mazor contends that even if we interpret the statute as discharging the obligation of the employer and insurer to provide him with workmen’s compensation benefits, the statute violates several of his constitutional rights. Since the protection afforded by some of these rights overlaps, we need not treat all of them separately. We hold, however, that the statute infringes on none of his rights and is thus constitutional.

A We turn first to Mazor’s contentions that the statute deprives him of property without just compensation in contravention of Art. Ill, § 40 of the Maryland Constitution, and without due process of law contrary to both Art. 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. The due process violation, Mazor claims, lies not in the procedures employed, but in the substantive effect of the statute. Manifestly, these contentions are one and the same, since “the Fourteenth Amendment, Art. 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and Art. 3, Sec. 40 of the Maryland Constitution have . .. the same meaning and effect in reference to an exaction of property .. . Allied American Co. v. Comm’r, 219 Md. 607, 615-16 , 150 A. 2d 421 (1959) (citation omitted). 6 Accordingly, we shall treat these contentions together.

Because the workmen’s compensation laws protect workers and their families from the hardships inflicted by work-related injuries, they represent an exercise of the ³⁶⁵ police power. County Council v. Investors Funding, 270 Md. 403, 429 , 312 A. 2d 225 (1973); Solvuca v. Ryan & Reilly Co., 131 Md. 265, 284 , 101 A. 710 (1917). To decide whether the exercise of that power violated the Due Process Clause in this instance, we must determine whether the statute “provides a real and substantial relationship to the public health, morals, safety, and welfare of the citizens of this state.” Md. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Sav-A-Lot, 270 Md. 103, 106 , 311 A. 2d 242 (1973) (citations omitted); accord, Md. St. Bd. of Barber Ex. v. Kuhn, 270 Md. 496, 511 , 312 A. 2d 216 (1973). Inclusion of public employees within the coverage of workmen’s compensation, as provided in § 21 (a) (2), is manifestly a legitimate exercise of the police