McAlear v. McAlear

DAVIDSON, Judge. This case presents the question whether a person can be imprisoned for failure to pay a monetary award granted pursuant to Maryland Code (1974, 1980 Repl.Vol., & 1983 Cum.Supp.), §§ 3-6A-05 and 3-6A-08 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (monetary award). More particularly, it involves the question whether such a monetary award is a form of alimony and, therefore, not a debt within the scope of the Maryland Constitution, Art. Ill, § 38. Maryland Constitution, Art. Ill, § 38, ratified 2 November 1982, provides: “No person shall be imprisoned for debt, but a valid decree of a court of competent jurisdiction or agreement approved by decree of said court for the support of a spouse or dependent children, or for the support of an illegitimate child or children, or for alimony (either common law or as defined by statute), shall not constitute a debt within the meaning of this section.” 1 (Emphasis added.) ³²⁵ Section 3-6A-05 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article 2 provides in pertinent part: “(a)(1) In granting an absolute divorce or annulment . . . the court shall determine which property is marital property if the division of property is an issue. “(b) The court shall determine the value of all marital property.

After making the determination, the court may-grant a monetary award as an adjustment of the equities and rights of the parties concerning marital property, whether or not alimony is awarded. “(c) A monetary award made under this section may be reduced to a judgment to the extent that any part of the award is due and owing." (Emphasis added.) Section 3-6A-08 3 4 provides: “(a) An order, award, or decree entered under this subtitle may be enforced in accordance with the Maryland Rules.” 4 (Emphasis added.) ³²⁶ On 3 June 1981, the petitioner, James H. McAlear (husband), and the respondent, Anna J. McAlear (wife), were divorced. They had not previously reached an agreement concerning alimony or the disposition of property. The trial court, among other things, awarded the wife alimony in the amount of $700.00 per month “during the joint lives of the parties, or until the [wife] sooner remarries, all subject to further order of the court.” The trial court further determined that “post-marital appreciated interest” in two corporations was marital property and that the wife’s interest in that marital property was $64,000.00. The trial court ordered the husband to pay that amount in eight $8,000.00 annual installments, the first of which was due on 1 June 1981.

The husband failed to pay the initial installment. On 8 December 1981, a judgment in the amount of $8,000.00 was entered against him. That judgment was never paid. Thereafter, the husband failed to pay the second installment due on 1 June 1982.

On 2 June 1982, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, the wife filed a petition to “adjudicate the defendant in contempt of court” on the ground that he had failed to pay the previous judgment and the second installment. On 25 August 1982, the trial court determined that a monetary award granted pursuant to § 3-6A-05 “is a form of alimony and not a debt and therefore falls within the exception created by Section 38 of Article III of the Maryland Constitution. . . . ” It concluded that the husband was in contempt of court. The trial court ordered the husband incarcerated for a period of 90 days. The order did not provide for the husband’s release in the event that the arrearages were paid before the expiration of the fixed term of imprisonment.

The execution of sentence was stayed for 60 days to allow the husband to purge himself of contempt by payment of $8,000.00 to the wife. On 22 September 1982, the husband filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. On 9 December 1982, we issued a ³²⁷ writ of certiorari before consideration by that Court. We shall reverse the order of the trial court.

The husband contends that a monetary award is not a form of alimony and, therefore, is a debt within the scope of the Maryland Constitution, Art. Ill, § 38. He concludes that consequently a person cannot be imprisoned for nonpayment of a monetary award. The wife contends that a monetary award is “alimony in gross,” a form of alimony and, therefore, a court-ordered duty, not a debt, within the scope of the Maryland Constitution, Art. Ill, § 38. She concludes that a person can be imprisoned for the nonpayment of a monetary award.

We do not agree. I Historical Background In Maryland, the history of the evolution of alimony and property disposition incidental to a divorce demonstrates that the General Assembly and this Court have consistently distinguished between alimony and disposition of property incidental to a divorce. A. Alimony Divorce in Maryland is a statutory creation that was unknown to the common law. 5 In England during the 17th and 18th centuries, courts did not grant absolute divorces but the ecclesiastical courts could grant limited divorces. The ecclesiastical courts could award alimony to the wife but only incidental to a limited divorce.

Thomas v. Thomas, 294 Md. 605, 609-10 , 451 A.2d 1215, 1217 (1982). ³²⁸ In Maryland, there being no ecclesiastical courts, the General Assembly granted divorces. The doctrine that alimony could be awarded only incidental to a limited divorce was, however, not followed in Maryland. The power to grant alimony, even when a limited divorce was not sought, was deemed to be within the inherent authority of Maryland equity courts and such courts regularly exercised that authority. See Thomas, 294 Md. at 614 , 451 A.2d at 1220 ; Wald v. Wald, 161 Md. 493, 500 , 159 A. 97, 100 (1931); Outlaw v. Outlaw, 118 Md. 498, 501-03 , 84 A. 383, 384-85 (1912); Galwith v. Galwith, 4 H. & McH. 477, 478 (1689).

By ch. 12, § 14 of the Acts of 1777, 6 which remains virtually unchanged and is now found in Md.Code (1974, 1980 Repl.Vol.) § 3-603(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, the General Assembly authorized equity courts to hear and determine alimony causes in the same manner as they were heard and determined by English ecclesiastical courts under English law. Nevertheless, the 1777 statute was construed as merely confirming the previously existing inherent authority of Maryland equity courts over alimony. It continued their power to award alimony, even though divorce was not sought, if sufficient grounds for a divorce were alleged and proven. Thomas, 294 Md. at 614 n. 16, 451 A.2d at 1220 n. 16; Outlaw, 118 Md. at 502-03 , 84 A. at 385 ; Helms v. Franciscus, 2 Bland 544, 565-74 (1830).

By ch. 262 of the Acts of 1841, 7 now § 3-603(a) of ³²⁹ the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, 8 and Md.Code (1957, 1981 Repl.Vol.), Art. 16, § 1(a), 9 equity courts were given authority to grant both absolute and limited divorces and to award alimony to the wife incidental to an absolute or limited divorce. Thomas, 294 Md. at 609-14 , 451 A.2d at 1217-20 . In the absence of a statutory definition of alimony, this Court repeatedly defined alimony as a money allowance payable under a judicial decree by a husband at stated intervals to his wife, or former wife, for her support and maintenance during their joint lives or until the remarriage of the wife, so long as they live separately. Thomas, 294 Md. at 615 , 451 A.2d at 1220 ; Grove v. Frame, 285 Md. 691, 695 , 402 A.2d 892, 895 (1979); Wallingsford v. Wallingsford, 6 H. & J. 485, 488 (1823).

Moreover, in the absence of statutory standards for the award of alimony, this Court repeatedly indicated the factors to be considered in determining the amount of alimony to be awarded. These factors included the wealth and earning capacity of the spouses, their station in life, their age, physical condition and ability to work, their needs at the time of the divorce, the length of time they lived together, and the circumstances leading to the divorce. Brodak v. Brodak, 294 Md. 10, 28 , 447 A.2d 847, 856 (1982); Wygodsky v. Wygodsky, 134 Md. 344, 346-47 , 106 A. 698, 698-99 (1919). Additionally, this Court repeated ³³⁰ ly determined that an award of alimony could be modified if the circumstances, needs, and pecuniary condition of the parties change.

Brodak, 294 Md. at 29 , 447 A.2d at 856 ; Winkel v. Winkel, 178 Md. 489, 500-01 , 15 A.2d 914, 919 (1940); McCaddin v. McCaddin, 116 Md. 567, 574 , 82 A. 554, 557 (1911). By ch. 332 of the Acts of 1975, and ch. 575 of the Acts of 1980, now Md.Code (1957, 1981 Repl.Vol.), Art. 16, §§ 1 through 5, the General Assembly expanded the authority of equity courts in divorce cases over the matter of alimony. Article 16, § 1(a) 10 authorized equity courts, for the first time, to award alimony to either spouse. Article 16, § 1(b) 11 authorized equity courts to determine the amount of alimony to be awarded after considering an enumerated set of factors, most of which had previously been specified by this Court.

For the first time, however, the monetary and nonmonetary contributions of the spouses to the well-being of the family and any monetary award granted pursuant to § 3-6A-05 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article were included as factors to be considered. Most important, Art. 16, § 1(c), 12 for the first time, authorized equity courts ³³¹ to award alimony for a definite period of time rather than during the joint lives of the spouses, or until the marriage of the spouse receiving alimony (recipient spouse). Additionally, Art. 16, § 5(a) confirmed the authority of equity courts to modify the amount of alimony awarded, 13 while Art. 16, § 5(b) 14 defined the time at which the obligation to pay alimony should terminate. B. Ownership and Disposition of Property In Maryland, the authority of equity courts to adjust the property rights of spouses incidental to either an absolute or limited divorce derives solely from statutes. 15 Although during the 17th and 18th centuries, Maryland equity courts had an inherent authority to grant alimony, such courts had no authority to divide property of the spouses or to transfer the property of either spouse to the other, or to otherwise dispose of it.

Lopez v. Lopez, 206 Md. 509, 514-15 , 112 A.2d 466, 468-69 (1955); Gunter v. Gunter, 187 Md. 228, 232 , 49 A.2d 454, 456 (1946). By ch. 262 of the Acts of 1841, 16 which remains virtually unchanged and is now found in Md.Code (1957, 1981 Repl. ³³² Vol., 1983 Cum.Supp.), Art. 16, § 25, the General Assembly authorized equity courts, incidental to either a limited or absolute divorce, to award the wife such property or estate as she had when she married. This right existed with respect to both real and personal property. Reed v. Reed, 109 Md. 690, 692-94 , 72 A. 414, 414-15 (1909); Tyson v. Tyson, 54 Md. 35, 37 (1880); Tayman v. Tayman, 2 Md.Ch. 393, 394, 400-01 (1851); see Brucker v. Benson, 209 Md. 247, 250 , 121 A.2d 230, 232 (1956).

By ch. 220 of the Acts of 1947, 17 now Md.Code (1974, 1980 Repl.Vol.) § 3-6A-03 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, the General Assembly again expanded the authority of equity courts with respect to disposition of property incidental to divorce. It authorized such courts to decide any question between the parties in connection with the ownership of personal property, to divide such property between them, or to order a sale and divide the proceeds. That section, however, did nothing more than empower equity courts, incidental to an absolute or limited divorce, to determine the ownership of personal property and apportion it accordingly. It did not authorize such courts to transfer the personal property of either spouse to the other or to make an adjustment of personal property rights where the wife did not make a monetary contribution toward the ³³³ purchase of the property.

Brodak, 294 Md. at 12-13 , 447 A.2d at 848 ; Wimmer v. Wimmer, 287 Md. 663, 667 , 414 A.2d 1254,1257 (1980); Gebhard v. Gebhard, 253 Md. 125,130 , 252 A.2d 171, 174 (1969); Lopez, 206 Md. at 515-17 , 112 A.2d at 469 . The authority of equity courts over real property remained restricted to a return to the wife of such property as the wife owned when she married. By ch. 794 of the Acts of 1978, now Md.Code (1974, 1980 Repl.Vol., & 1983 Cum.Supp.) §§ 3-6A-01 through 3-6A-08 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, the General Assembly again expanded the authority of equity courts with respect to the disposition of property incidental to divorce. Section 3-6A-03 18 authorizes equity courts, incidental to either a limited or absolute divorce, to determine and state the ownership or ownership interest of each spouse in personal property and to order a sale of jointly-owned property and a division of the proceeds.

That section expressly provides that in such cases equity courts may not transfer ownership of personal property from one spouse to the other. Section 3-6A-04, 19 for the first time, authorizes ³³⁴ equity courts, incidental to an absolute divorce, to determine and state the ownership or ownership interest of each spouse in real property and to order a sale of jointly-held property and a division of the proceeds. Again, that section expressly provides that such an equity court may not transfer ownership of real property from one spouse to the other. Section 3-6A-05(a), for the first time, authorizes equity courts, incidental to an absolute divorce, to determine which property is marital property. 20 Most important, § 3-6A-05(b) authorizes equity courts to determine the value of all marital property and to grant a monetary award as an adjustment of the equities and rights of the spouses concerning marital property whether or not alimony is awarded.

Section 3-6A-05(b) 21 enumerates a set of relevant factors to be considered in determining the amount of the monetary award including the award of any amount of alimony and the monetary and nonmonetary contribution of the spouses ³³⁵ to the well-being of the family. Section 3-6A-05(c) authorizes a monetary award to be reduced to judgment to the extent that any part of the award was due and owing. Although §§ 3-6A-01 through 3-6A-08 do not permit the court to transfer personal or real property from one spouse to the other, the statute does permit the court for the first time to adjust the marital property interests of spouses fairly and equitably, giving careful consideration to both monetary and nonmonetary contributions to the marriage. Wimmer, 287 Md. at 667 n. 2, 414 A.2d at 1257 n. 2.

C. The Distinction Between Alimony and Disposition of Property As previously stated, in the absence of a statutory definition of the term “alimony,” this Court repeatedly defined alimony as a money allowance payable under a judicial decree by a husband at stated intervals to his wife, or former wife, for her support and maintenance during their joint lives or until the remarriage of the wife, so long as they live separately. E.g., Thomas, 294 Md. at 615 , 451 A.2d at 1220 ; Grove, 285 Md. at 695 , 402 A.2d at 895 ; Knabe v. Knabe, 176 Md. 606, 612 , 6 A.2d 366, 368-69 (1939); Wallingsford, 6 H. & J. at 488 . Moreover, this Court repeatedly recognized a distinction between alimony and disposition of property incidental to a divorce. Courson v. Courson, 213 Md. 183, 186 , 129 A.2d 917, 919 (1957); Roberts v. Roberts, 160 Md. 513, 523 , 154 A. 95, 99 (1931); Bushman v. Bushman, 157 Md. 166, 172-73 , 145 A. 488, 491 (1929); Emerson v. Emerson, 120 Md. 584, 590-91 , 87 A. 1033, 1036 (1913); Wallingsford, 6 H. & J. at 488 .

As long ago as 1823, in Wallingsford v. Wallingsford, 6 H. & J. 485 (1823), a wife filed a petition seeking, among other things, a “proper and reasonable allowance for her support.” Wallingsford, 6 H. & J. at 485 . In his answer, the husband stated that he was willing to allow her $2,000.00 “for a maintenance” from “such of his property that she might choose.” Wallingsford, 6 H. & J. at 485 . The husband moved to quash the proceedings on the ground that the wife had “left his bed and board, without any just cause or ³³⁶ provocation, and that he was perfectly willing that she return and live with him if she chose to do so.” Wallingsford, 6 H. & J. at 486 . The husband’s motion was overruled.

The trial court ordered that a part of the husband’s real estate be sold and the proceeds paid to the wife. In concluding that the order could not be sustained because it constituted a disposition of property over which equity courts had no authority and not an award of alimony over which equity courts did have authority, this Court said: “Alimony is a maintenance afforded to the wife, where the husband refuses to give it, or where from his improper conduct compels her to separate from him. It is not a portion of his real estate, to be assigned to her in fee simple, subject to her control, or to be sold at her pleasure, but a provision for her support, to continue during their joint lives, or so long as they live separate. Upon the death of either, or upon their mutual consent to live together, it ceases, and the amount of this allowance must depend upon the value of the husband’s estate.

The decree does not direct an income to be paid for the maintenance of the wife. It does not create a personal liability in the husband to pay any sum of money, but orders in the first instance his land to be sold.” Wallingsford, 6 H. & J. at 488-89 (emphasis added). Thus, this Court established that in divorce cases alimony and disposition of property were separate and distinct. An award of a specified sum of money resulting from a court-ordered sale of a husband’s property constituted a disposition of property.

It did not constitute alimony. The distinction between alimony and disposition of property was again considered in Emerson v. Emerson, 120 Md. 584 , 87 A. 1033 (1913). There the trial court incorporated into the divorce decree an agreement that provided that “the husband shall pay the wife $28,800.00 per annum, in monthly installments, during her life.” Emerson, 120 Md. at 586 , 87 A. at 1034 . This Court determined that the trial ³³⁷ court’s order, incorporating agreed upon money payments that were not made terminable upon the remarriage of the wife or the death of the husband, did not constitute an award of alimony and, therefore, could not be modified.

In reaching this result, this Court construed ch. 262, § 3 of the Acts of 1841, which authorized equity courts to award alimony to a wife incidental to divorce. The Court’s construction of that Act was premised upon the rationale that in Maryland there is a distinction between alimony and disposition of property. There this Court said: “We think it is clear, then, that the Act providing for alimony upon this decree, new to the Courts, was intended to provide for alimony of the same character and limitations as the alimony the Courts had for so long dealt with. In a great many of the States statutes provide that the Court shall award to the wife by way of alimony upon a decree for divorce a portion of the property held by the husband and wife or a sum of money in lieu of the property, to be absolutely hers.

Although this is designated as alimony it is totally different from the theory of alimony as recognized in Maryland. One is a division of property, while the other is the maintenance of the wife out of the income of the husband.” Emerson, 120 Md. at 590-91 , 87 A. at 1036 (emphasis added). Thus, this Court reiterated that in divorce cases alimony and disposition of property were separate and distinct. An award to the wife of property held by the husband and wife, or an award of a specified sum of money in lieu of such property, constituted a disposition of property.

It did not constitute alimony. The distinction between alimony and disposition of property was again emphasized in Bushman v. Bushman, 157 Md. 166 , 145 A. 488 (1929), a case with facts strikingly similar to those here. There, a divorce decree incorporated an agreement between a husband and a wife for the payment of $40,000.00 in four equal installments. The decree, in accordance with the agreement, provided that the four installments would be “in full satisfaction and discharge of any ³³⁸ and all claims by way of alimony....” Bushman, 157 Md. at 171 , 145 A. at 491 .

The husband failed to pay some of the installments and was held in contempt of court. This Court considered the question “whether the [equity] court had jurisdiction to enforce payment of the sums awarded by the decree by an order committing the defendant to prison for contempt of court.” Bushman, 157 Md. at 170 , 145 A. at 490 . This Court noted that “[t]he answer depends upon whether the decree is for alimony, because alimony does not constitute a debt within the meaning of that term in the constitutional prohibition of imprisonment for debt.” Bushman, 157 Md. at 170 , 145 A. at 490 . Commenting upon its previous construction in Emerson of ch. 262, § 3 of the Acts of 1841, which distinguished between alimony and disposition of property, this Court said: “This is a clear and pertinent construction of the Maryland statute, empowering the allowance of permanent alimony in a decree dissolving the bond of marriage.

Whatever may be the statutory rule and construction in other jurisdictions, in this state the allowance of alimony in cases of separation or either kind of divorce is of the nature and in the form according to the practice derived from the English ecclesiastical courts. The rule is thus stated in Bishop on Marriage and Divorce: ‘The court cannot decree to the wife as alimony, a gross sum, or absolute title in specific property, or a sale of a part of the husband’s estate for her use. But we have statutes, to be explained in future chapters, allowing this sort of provision, and sometimes it is termed alimony.’ “If a gross sum were allowable in the discretion of the court as a substitute for regular payments, the gross sum would represent the capitalization of a proportion of the husband’s income; and a compliance with the decree would immediately reduce his principal or property by that amount, and transfer a specific proportion of the husband’s estate absolutely to the wife. 2 Bishop on Marriage and Divorce, secs. 1030-1036; Ricketts v. Ricketts, 4 Gill 105,109 . In the event of her death a day later, ³³⁹ the lump sum, undiminished by any appropriation to her maintenance, would pass to her personal representatives for distribution as part of her estate; and, if she lived, it was her absolute property to do with as she liked.

In no true sense would the award of a gross sum be alimony, since it could neither be increased nor be reduced according to the exigency of circumstances; nor would the obligation to pay it as decreed be affected by the death of either the husband or the wife. “Since the decree in this case was not for alimony within the meaning of the statute, but was for the payment of a specified sum of money in accordance with the agreement of the parties, the defendant could not be punished by imprisonment because of his refusal to pay the money as decreed.” Bushman, 157 Md. at 173-74 , 145 A. at 491-92 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Thus, this Court again reiterated that the award of a specified sum of money, even when required to be paid in installments, did not constitute alimony. Indeed, it concluded that “[i]n the absence of special agreement of the parties or of statutory authorization the [equity] court may not decree alimony in gross.” Bushman, 157 Md. at 172 , 145 A. at 491 . II Present Legislative Enactments There is nothing in the legislative history of § 3-6A-05 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article or Art. 16, §§ 1 through 5 to indicate that the General Assembly intended to abolish Maryland’s traditional distinction between alimony and disposition of property, and to authorize equity courts, in the absence of an agreement between the parties, to award “alimony in gross.” A. Property Disposition in Divorce and Annulment Act Maryland’s Property Disposition in Divorce and Annulment Act (Property Disposition Act), Md.Code (1974,1980 ³⁴⁰ Repl.Vol., & 1983 Cum.Supp.) §§ 3-6A-01 through 3-6A-08 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article constitutes the initial phase of a comprehensive revision of Maryland’s domestic relations law.

It represents a new legislative approach to the rights and obligations associated with marriage and its dissolution. It embodies a significant modification of the property rights of spouses incidental to an absolute divorce by allowing equity courts to equitably distribute property acquired during the marriage and to grant a monetary award adjusting the interests of the spouses in such marital property. In determining the amount of such a monetary award, equity courts are required, in accordance with the announced policy of the General Assembly, to give careful consideration to both monetary and nonmonetary contributions of the spouses. Harper v. Harper, 294 Md. 54, 63 , 448 A.2d 916, 920-21 (1982); Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115,117 , 437 A.2d 883, 884 (1981); Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 24-25 , 410 A.2d 1052,1055 (1980); Wimmer, 287 Md. at 667 n. 2, 414 A.2d at 1257 n. 2.

The Property Disposition Act was proposed by The Governor’s Commission on Domestic Relations Laws (Commission). In its “Report Accompanying the Commission’s Proposed Bill on the Disposition of Property in Connection with a Divorce or Annulment,” the Commission repeatedly indicated that the Property Disposition Act was intended to deal with the disposition of property and not with the subject of alimony, maintenance or spousal support. Report of The Governor’s Comm’n on Domestic Relations Laws, at 1, 14,18 (1978). 22 Thus, in a prefatory statement, the Commission said: “The Governor’s Commission on Domestic Relations Laws was established by Governor Marvin Mandel on February 27, 1976. He defined the scope of its responsi ³⁴¹ bilities as being ‘to undertake a complete study of the constitutional, statutory, and common law concerning domestic relations, including the laws concerning marriage, the dissolution of marriage, the rights and obligations attendant upon or accruing from each, and the procedures for resolving and adjudicating domestic disputes.’ After a series of meetings described in the Chairman’s letter to the Acting Governor under date of January 9, 1978, in which the Commission detailed the tasks before it and considered their respective priority and urgency of accomplishment, it turned its attention to the subject matter which it considered to be most urgent of review: the disposition of property upon the dissolution or annulment of marriage.

The Commission proposes to deal separately with the subject of alimony, maintenance, or spousal support, with which the subject at hand is of course closely related.” Report of The Governor’s Comm’n on Domestic Relations Laws, at 1 (1978) (emphasis added). According to the Commission, the Property Disposition Act was designed to cure “the perceived existing inequity in present Maryland law governing the disposition of real and personal property upon divorce or annulment.” Report of The Governor’s Comm’n on Domestic Relations Laws, at 2 (1978). The Commission, recognizing that “non-monetary contributions within a marriage are real,” stated as its purpose that such nonmonetary contributions “should be recognized in the event that the marriage is dissolved or annulled.” Report of The Governor’s Comm’n on Domestic Relations Laws, at 3 (1978). The Commission then concluded: “[WJhat was needed in fact was a definition of the rights of the parties, in the disposition of property upon divorce or annulment, which would correct those inequities that uncorrected historical development of the law had wrought, and which would comport with what the Commission perceives as a reasonable and workable system of such property disposition for the people of this State.” ³⁴² Report of The Governor’s Comm’n on Domestic Relations Laws, at 14 (1978).

More particularly, the Commission said that the Property Disposition Act “does relate, as its Title indicates, only to the disposition of property between spouses....” Report of The Governor’s Comm’n on Domestic Relations Laws, at 17 (1978) (emphasis added). Finally, in response to objections that the Property Disposition Act related only to property rights in divorce actions and did not propose changes in the law relating to other subjects such as alimony, the Commission said: “[T]he fact is that other subjects within the scope of the Commission’s charter, such as alimony and grounds for divorce, are related to the legal provisions relating to the disposition of property — and that whatever action the General Assembly takes regarding the subject of this [Act] ... will strongly influence the action .. . which the General Assembly may take, with respect to those related subjects. It seems clear that the question of property disposition is central to any general revision of the divorce and annulment law of this State, and that we had better get on with settling the law on that subject so that we may move ahead with a concomitant adjustment in law on related subjects.” Report of The Governor’s Comm’n on Domestic Relations Laws, at 18 (1978) (emphasis added). Thus, the Commission indicated in a variety of ways that the purpose of the Property Disposition Act was to provide for a fair and equitable distribution of property.

It was not intended to alter Maryland’s traditional concept of alimony or to authorize the award of “alimony in gross.” The General Assembly’s awareness that the scope of the Property Disposition Act was restricted to the disposition of property is equally manifest. The stated purpose of the Property Disposition Act is to grant equity courts “the authority to make monetary awards and provide for the disposition and use of