McCain v. State

KEHOE, J. Relying on vehicle registration information received from a mobile computer,' Baltimore City police officers stopped an automobile driven by appellant, Shelton McCain. Mr. McCain and the passenger in the vehicle, Mr. McCain’s wife, Tara McCain, were both arrested for violating provisions of Maryland’s motor vehicle law. The police conducted a warrantless search of the vehicle and found a handgun. Mr. McCain then made an inculpatory statement.

It transpired that the vehicle registration information may have been inaccurate and that the warrantless search of the vehicle may have been unreasonable under the Supreme Court’s holding in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 1710 , [ 173 L.Ed.2d 485 ] (2009), which was decided after the search occurred. Mr. McCain appeals his conviction by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of possession of a regulated firearm by a person convicted of a disqualifying crime in violation of Md. Code (2003), Pub. Safety § 5-133. He raises two questions, which we have rephrased: I. Did the suppression court err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress without making a factual finding as to whether the vehicle registration information the officers received from a mobile workstation and used to support the traffic stop was correct?

II

Should the case be remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings in light of Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1710 [ 173 L.Ed.2d 485 ] (2009)? As to the first question, we conclude that the suppression court did not err because, under the facts of this case, the police officers were justified in relying on the registration ²⁵⁹ information even if it ultimately would have been proven to have been inaccurate. As to the second, we conclude that the police officers had every reason to believe that their search, when it was conducted, was reasonable. As there was no police misconduct, application of the exclusionary rule would be inappropriate.

Therefore, we answer both questions in the negative and affirm the circuit court’s judgment. FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS The Suppression Hearing Appellant was charged with various firearms and traffic violations arising out of an incident occurring in Baltimore on October 11, 2007. Before his trial, he moved to suppress the evidence of a handgun and his statement to police that the handgun belonged to him. The following facts were adduced at the suppression hearing.

At approximately 9:30 p.m. on the night in question, Baltimore City Police Detectives Justin Stinnett and Stephan Robinson and Baltimore City Police Officer Dornsife 1 were patrolling East 28th Street in Baltimore City using their mobile workstation, an onboard computer that allowed them to access, among other databases, Motor Vehicle Administration vehicle registration information. While the officers were “running random tags” through the workstation, the license tag on a Chevrolet Cavalier came back as unregistered, or vehicle tag record not found. 2 The officers then stopped the Cavalier. Appellant, the driver, immediately pulled over. Stinnett approached the driver’s side of the vehicle and asked appellant ²⁶⁰ for his license and registration.

Appellant stated that he did not have his license, but he provided Stinnett with his name and date of birth. Upon running the name and birth date through the mobile workstation, Stinnett discovered that appellant’s Maryland driver’s license had been suspended. Stin-nett then asked appellant to exit the vehicle, and arrested him for driving on a suspended license. Appellant was patted down for contraband; none was discovered.

After the pat-down, appellant was seated on the curb while Robinson and Dornsife spoke with the passenger, appellant’s wife, Tara McCain. She gave the officers a rental agreement for the vehicle listing her as the only authorized driver. The officers then arrested Ms. McCain for permitting an unauthorized person to drive a rental vehicle, in violation of Md. Code (1977, 2009 RepLVoL), Transp. (“TA”) § 18-106(a).

The vehicle was then searched. 3 The search uncovered a purse in the passenger compartment with a handgun inside. When the handgun was discovered, appellant, without prompting by the police officers, immediately took responsibility for it, stating that he had placed it in his wife’s purse without her knowledge. At the suppression hearing, appellant and his spouse introduced into evidence a document from the MVA dated May 8, 2008, indicating that the registration for the rented Cavalier expired in February 2008 and that the registration was can-celled on December 12, 2007, two months after the traffic stop. It was thus possible, appellant argued, that the MVA information obtained through the officers’ mobile workstation was incorrect when it indicated the tag was not registered to a vehicle on October 11, 2007.

Stinnett acknowledged the MVA’s registration information was sometimes inaccurate. He estimated that such inaccura ²⁶¹ cies occur perhaps once a month. Robinson also testified that such errors were uncommon, as he had not experienced that type of MVA error many times in the thousands of tags he had run through the mobile workstation. Robinson also stated that the MVA document indicating that the registration was cancelled on December 12, 2007, two months after the traffic stop, did not demonstrate that the vehicle was registered on October 11th.

He posited that, within the two month period between October and December 2007, “anything coulda been done to renew the registration, get, fix the registration ... on the vehicle.” Appellant testified that, upon being stopped on the night in question, Stinnett pulled him out of the car before running his name and date of birth and that when removed from the car, he had not been informed why he had been stopped. While appellant admitted claiming ownership of the handgun, he said that he did so in an effort to protect his wife. He stated that he had not seen the handgun before that night and did not know it was in her purse. He further admitted to not having a valid driver’s license on the night in question and to having previous convictions for second degree assault, robbery, third degree burglary, and a handgun violation.

At the close of the testimony, the State argued that the traffic stop was valid because it was based on information derived from the MVA database, which the officers, in good faith, believed to be correct. Because the traffic stop was proper, the information learned by the police from their questioning of appellant and Ms. McCain supported their arrest. Since the arrest was valid, so too was the subsequent search of the vehicle for valuables, including Ms. McCain’s purse, which turned up the handgun. 4 The defense countered that the warrantless arrest was without probable cause because it was based on incorrect information and there was no applicable good faith exception ²⁶² to the exclusionary rule. Therefore, the handgun and the statement to police should be suppressed as fruits of a poisonous tree.

The suppression court ruled as follows: We have a contest of dueling MVA records where the State from that night shows no registration and the defense produces something subsequently to it that implies that perhaps registration was still current until December. It really doesn’t matter whether the information is correct or not, because as far as the Baltimore City Police Department is concerned, and as much control as they have over acting upon the information, they subjectively rely in good faith on the information and objectively are not charged with imputed ignorance because it’s not their act that acknowledges that the information is no longer operative and it’s not their duty to take the information out of the computer. Therefore, the initial stop was based on information that the officers had a right to rely on in the same way that in Michigan v. Defilipo[ 5 ] when the officers stop an individual for a statute that was in effect at the time, but was subsequently declared to be unconstitutional. It doesn’t matter if it turns out that the statute’s unconstitutional, just as it doesn’t matter if it turns out that the MVA made a mistake.

There’s nothing in this record that indicates that these officers knew that there were frequent occurrences of MVA mistakes, that they knew that the MVA wasn’t a hundred percent perfect, but they were reliable, and that most of the time when they act upon the information it’s correct to require them to inquire in the middle of the night when there’s probably nobody to talk to at MVA to double-check ²⁶³ and verify it is an impossible task to ask a police department to shoulder. So I find the initial stop that allows the police to talk to these individuals to be stamped with reasonable suspicion .... I find that it ripened into probable cause to arrest the male Defendant when it turned out that he was driving on a suspended license, and that when the rental agreement showed that she was the only person who was authorized under the contract to drive and she allowed her husband to drive, and the officers had both the probable cause under that statute to arrest.... The officers talk about an inventory search because internally that’s what they call it.

But the Baltimore City Police Department is totally incapable of using the inventory search exception to the warrant requirement because they don’t ... conduct inventories the way courts have indicated.... But that pocketbook was within her Shimmel 6 [sic] perimeter and the gun was taken incident to the arrest. Therefore, the motion to suppress the gun [and the statement] is denied. The Trial Appellant and Ms. McCain were tried together on August 4, 2008.

The parties presented a “miscellaneous agreement” meant to result in an abbreviated court trial on the charges against them. Appellant and Ms. McCain waived their right ²⁶⁴ to confront witnesses and incorporated by reference the testimony put forth at the suppression hearing. The prosecutor represented to the court that the handgun recovered from the vehicle had been tested and found to be an operable “high-power nine millimeter luger handgun.” In addition, the prosecutor proffered that appellant had been convicted of assault in the second degree in 1999. Neither proffer was contested by appellant.

The defendants moved for a judgment of acquittal based on their suppression motion, which the court denied. The trial judge found appellant guilty of possession of a regulated firearm by a person convicted of a disqualifying crime in violation of Public Safety Article § 5-133. 7 Appellant was sentenced to five years in prison without the possibility of parole. DISCUSSION The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable governmental searches and seizures. Subject to a few exceptions, warrantless searches, seizures, and arrests are unreasonable and violate the Fourth Amendment.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). A valid traffic stop involving a motorist and/or passengers is one such exception. Smith v. State, 182 Md.App. 444, 462 , 957 A.2d 1139 (2008) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). A traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the officer has probable cause to believe that the driver has committed a traffic violation or if the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that either criminal or motor vehicle laws are being violated.

Smith, 182 Md.App. at 462 , 957 A.2d 1139 (citing Lewis v. State, 398 Md. 349, 362 , 920 A.2d 1080 (2007)). 8 ²⁶⁵ Without at least a reasonable, articulable suspicion on the officer’s part, however, the stop is illegal and any arrest arising from it is unlawful. A search incident to an illegal arrest is also illegal. Evidence resulting from an illegal stop or search is subject to exclusion from evidence at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 , 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); Balote v. State, 411 Md. 104, 112 , 981 A.2d 1247 (2009).

There are exceptions to the exclusionary rule. In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule did not apply when police officers, acting in good faith, executed a legally defective search warrant. 468 U.S. at 913 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 . The Court based its holding on three factors: first, the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct. Id. at 916 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 .

Second, there was no basis to conclude that “judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment.” Id. Finally, and in its eyes most important, the Supreme Court noted that “[j'ludges and magistrates are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team; as neutral judicial officers, they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions. The threat of exclusion thus cannot be expected significantly to deter them.” Id. Leon involved police officers’ good faith reliance upon a search warrant issued by a judicial officer.

Since Leon , the Supreme Court has extended the good faith exception in different contexts. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 40, 99 S.Ct. 2627 (ordinance subsequently held to be unconstitutional); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 346 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987) (statute later found to be unconstitutional); and Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 16 , 115 S.Ct. 1185 , 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995) (error in court records). The most recent instance is ²⁶⁶ Herring v. United States, 555 U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 695, 700 , 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009) (error in police records). We will discuss Evans and Herring in greater detail later in this opinion.

Finally, because the exclusionary rule is intended to deter future misconduct by police officers, courts weighing the application of the good faith exception focus primarily not upon the mental state of the officers actually involved but rather on knowledge that can be imputed to a “reasonably well-trained officer.” As the Supreme Court explained in Herring : The pertinent analysis of deterrence and culpability is objective, not an inquiry into the subjective awareness of arresting officers.... We have already held that “our good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal” in light of “all of the circumstances.” 129 S.Ct. at 703 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n. 23, 104 S.Ct. 3405 ) (some internal quotation marks and citations deleted). However, courts will consider evidence pertaining to an officer’s personal knowledge when that knowledge raises questions as to the officer’s good faith. For example, in cases involving officers’ good faith reliance on a defective search warrant, a court can consider whether the officers executing the warrant were aware that the application for the warrant had been rejected by previous judges before being approved.

See Agurs v. State, 415 Md. 62 , 74 n. 8, 998 A.2d 868 (2010), (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 -23 n. 23, 104 S.Ct. 3405 ; and United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591 , 599 (6th Cir.2004) (Gilman, J., concurring)). The good faith exception is firmly ensconced in Maryland’s search and seizure law, at least with regard to good faith reliance upon search warrants. See Agurs, 415 Md. at 79-83 , 998 A.2d 868 (surveying cases). ²⁶⁷ I. The Stop Appellant first contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress without making a factual finding as to whether the information the officers relied upon in stopping appellant’s vehicle was correct. He reasons that, if the information was incorrect, the initial stop, the arrest, and the subsequent search of the vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment.

He requests a remand to the circuit court for a finding as to whether the stop was based on incorrect information because, in his view, if it was, exclusion of the evidence would be the proper sanction. The State disagrees, contending that, even if the information the officers relied on to support the traffic stop was incorrect, they acted in good faith upon information they reasonably believed to be accurate. Therefore the traffic stop was valid, and any evidence discovered as a result therefrom would be admissible. When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, this Court looks solely at the record of the suppression hearing, extending great deference to the factual findings of the suppression judge with respect to determinations regarding witness credibility.

Prioleau v. State, 411 Md. 629, 638 , 984 A.2d 851 (2009); Cooper v. State, 163 Md.App. 70, 84 , 877 A.2d 1095 (2005). Such determinations will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. Prioleau, 411 Md. at 638 , 984 A.2d 851 (citing State v. Tolbert, 381 Md. 539, 548 , 850 A.2d 1192 (2004)). All facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party on the motion.

Prioleau, 411 Md. at 638 , 984 A.2d 851 (citing Tolbert, 381 Md. at 548 , 850 A.2d 1192 and Rucker, 374 Md. at 207 , 821 A.2d 439 ). Although we afford great deference to the suppression court in relation to its factual findings, we “ ‘undertake our own independent constitutional appraisal of the record by reviewing the law and applying it to the facts of the present case.’” Prioleau, 411 Md. at 638 , 984 A.2d 851 (quoting Tolbert, 381 Md. at 548 , 850 A.2d 1192 ). ²⁶⁸ The issue before us is whether the police officers who stopped appellant had a legally sufficient basis to suspect that he was violating the law. If they did, the traffic stop was lawful, and when the officers thereafter discovered that appellant was driving on a suspended license, their reasonable, articulable suspicion ripened to probable cause to arrest him. 9 Appellant does not contend that the car he was driving when stopped was, without a doubt, legally registered on October 11, 2007. Instead, he asserts that the true-test MVA document introduced at the suppression hearing indicated that the vehicle was legally registered and that the suppression hearing judge erred in upholding the validity of the initial traffic stop without specifically determining whether the MVA information relied upon by the officers, i.e., that the vehicle was unregistered, was correct at the time of the stop.

Implicit in the argument is the assumption that, if the vehicle had in fact been properly registered, the police officers acted unreasonably in making the traffic stop. Appellant’s argument is based upon Ott v. State, 325 Md. 206, 223 , 600 A.2d 111 (1992). In that case, the Court of Appeals held that the good faith exception does not apply when the evidence in question resulted from an arrest made by a police officer in good faith reliance upon incorrect information in his department’s records. Writing for the Court, Judge (now Chief Judge) Bell explained: In the ease sub judice, whether probable cause existed depended upon the accuracy of the outstanding warrant information in the Sheriff Department’s computer.

Placing accurate and current information into the computer, just as ²⁶⁹ taking inaccurate or outdated information out, is a function performed by personnel in the Sheriffs Department. Allowing outdated, inaccurate information to remain in the computer, thus, placing citizens at risk of being deprived of liberty, without legal basis, ..., therefore, is the fault of the Sheriffs Department. The arresting officer had no actual knowledge that the warrant on which he amsted petitioner was no longer outstanding. In that sense, then, he acted in subjective good faith.

Nevertheless, he was chargeable with knowledge of the warrant’s invalidity. Since an officer in the Sheriffs Department had previously served the warrant, that department must have known that it was outdated. Id. at 219 , 600 A.2d 111 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The Court further stated that there was a “significant” distinction between cases such as the one before it and those cases in which “the information in the police department’s possession was erroneous, [and] that fact was known, not to a police officer, but, rather to a third party who did not inform the police that the information was erroneous____” Id. at 222 n. 3, 600 A.2d 111 .

Since Ott , the Supreme Court decided Evans and Herring . Like Ott, Evans and Herring involved warrantless arrests and subsequent searches based upon erroneous records. Each case reflects upon a different aspect of the arguments presented by appellant. The issue in Evans was whether the good faith exception should apply when the arrest in question was made by a police officer in reliance on a court record that later turned out to be erroneous.

The Supreme Court held that the exception applied, thus permitting admission of evidence stemming from the arrest. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated: [T]here is no basis for believing that application of the exclusionary rule in these circumstances will have a significant effect on court employees responsible for informing the police that a warrant has been quashed. Because court ²⁷⁰ clerks are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime, ... they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions.... The threat of exclusion of evidence could not be expected to deter such individuals from failing to inform police officials that a warrant had been quashed____ 514 U.S. at 14-15 , 115 S.Ct. 1185 (emphasis added and internal citations omitted).

Evans specifically did not address “whether the evidence should be suppressed if police personnel were responsible for the error.” Id. at 16 n. 5, 115 S.Ct. 1185 . The Supreme Court addressed that issue in Herring. In Herring , a police officer arrested the defendant based upon outdated information from a neighboring jurisdiction regarding an outstanding warrant. 129 S.Ct. at 698. A search pursuant to the arrest uncovered a handgun and illicit drugs.

Id. In considering Herring’s appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that the arresting officer was acting in good faith and that the incorrect information from the neighboring county was the result of negligence. It concluded that the good faith exception should apply. United States v. Herring, 492 F.3d 1212, 1219 (11th Cir.2007).

Noting that other “courts have required exclusion of evidence obtained through similar police errors,” the Supreme Court grant certiorari “to resolve the conflict.” 129 S.Ct. at 699. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts began his analysis by noting that a violation of the Fourth Amendment “does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies.” Id. at 700. Instead, the exclusionary rule is “ ‘designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 , 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974)).

In reviewing the development of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the Court identified certain underlying principles. First, the exclusionary rule is not an individual right but rather a means by which courts attempt to deter' law ²⁷¹ enforcement misconduct. Id. Second, in applying the exclusionary rule, courts must weigh the deterrent effect against the substantial social consequences incurred by “letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free — something that ‘offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system.’ ” Id. at 701, (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 908 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 ).

The Chief Justice concluded his survey with the following observation: The extent to which the exclusionary rule is justified by these deterrence principles varies with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct. As we said in Leon , “an assessment of the flagrancy of the police misconduct constitutes an important step in the calculus” of applying the exclusionary rule. 468 U.S., at 911 [ 104 S.Ct. 3405 ].... 129 S.Ct. at 701. Turning to the case before it, the Supreme Court concluded that mere negligence in record-keeping by law enforcement agencies did not justify application of the exclusionary rule. Chief Justice Roberts explained: We do not suggest that all recordkeeping errors by the police are immune from the exclusionary rule.

In this case, however, the conduct at issue was not so objectively culpable as to require exclusion____ If the police have been shown to be reckless in maintaining a warrant system, or to have knowingly made false entries to lay the groundwork for future false arrests, exclusion would certainly be justified under our cases should such misconduct cause a Fourth Amendment violation. Petitioner’s claim that police negligence automatically triggers suppression cannot be squared with the principles underlying the exclusionary rule as they have been explained in our cases. In light of our repeated holdings that the deterrent effect of suppression must be substantial and outweigh any harm to the justice system, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S., at 909-910 [ 104 S.Ct. 3405 ], we conclude that when police mistakes are the result of negligence such as that ²⁷² described here, rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements, any marginal deterrence does not “pay its way.” Id., at 907-908, n. 6 [ 104 S.Ct. 3405 ] (internal quotation marks omitted). 129 S.Ct. at 703-04. In Ott , the Court of Appeals held that the good faith exception did not apply to an arrest made pursuant to an error in the police department’s records because knowledge of the error must be imputed to the arresting officer. 325 Md. at 220 , 600 A.2d 111 .

The Court of Appeals drew a distinction between a police officer’s reliance upon his or her department’s records and an officer’s reliance on records maintained by a third party, without deciding whether the good faith exception would be applicable in the latter situation. Id. at 222 n. 3, 600 A.2d 111 . The Supreme Court in Evans held that the good faith exception could apply in the context of reliance upon court records because courts “have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions.... ” 514 U.S. at 14-15 , 115 S.Ct. 1185 . We hold that the same reasoning should apply to the MVA’s license and registration records in this case.

The Baltimore City Police Department has no control over those records and the MVA has no interest, that we can conceive, in maintaining inaccurate or outdated records. Our conclusion is consistent with those of other courts. See, e.g., United States v. Miguel, 368 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir.2004); State v. Muller, 698 N.W.2d 285, 292 (S.D.2005); State v. Lanoue, 156 Vt. 35 , 587 A.2d 405, 406 (1991). There is another step in the analysis.

The arresting officers’ reliance upon the information must also be reasonable. Herring informs us that reliance is reasonable even if there are occasional mistakes, arising from negligence, but unreasonable if mistakes are frequent enough to indicate gross negligence or “systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements.” Appellant contends that “the record ... demonstrates that errors in the mobile workstation computer database occur ²⁷³ often enough to render the information in the database unreliable. Reliance by police officers on such a recordkeeping system is unreasonable.” Based upon our independent review of the evidence at the suppression hearing, we reach the opposite conclusion. The suppression court found that “[tjhere’s nothing in this record that indicates that these officers knew that there were frequent occurrences of MVA mistakes.... ” We agree.

Detectives Stinnett and Robinson testified that, between them, they had used the MVA database thousands of times. Stin-nett testified that he encountered inaccurate information “[m]aybe once out of the month, maybe. It’s not that often.” Robinson testified that, although he could not give an estimate, “I haven’t