McCauley v. State

Christina Granados McCauley v. State of Maryland, No. 340, September Term, 2018. Opinion by Nazarian, J. CRIMINAL LAW – INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER – GROSS NEGLIGENCE The evidence was sufficient to support a finding of gross negligence where the defendant who sold drugs to the victim was an experienced drug dealer who knew the dangerousness of the drugs she sold. CRIMINAL LAW – RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT – MANUFACTURE, PRODUCTION, OR SALE OF A PRODUCT OR COMMODITY Carfentanil, a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, is not a “product or commodity” as envisioned by the General Assembly when it enacted Maryland Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.), § 3-204(c)(1)(ii) of the Criminal Law Article exempting the sale of a product or commodity from the crime of reckless endangerment.

Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County Case No. C-18-CR-17-000044 REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 340 September Term, 2018 ______________________________________ CHRISTINA GRANADOS MCCAULEY v. STATE OF MARYLAND ______________________________________ Nazarian, Beachley, Adkins, Sally D. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Nazarian, J. ______________________________________ Filed: April 29, 2020 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2020-09-09 11:50-04:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk Christina Granados McCauley was a drug dealer who knew the products she sold. On June 23, 2017, Ms. McCauley sold carfentanil to Joshua Wrightson and Mary Nell Miller. Mr. Wrightson and Ms. Miller both overdosed that night, and Ms. Miller died.

Ms. McCauley was charged and convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County of involuntary manslaughter, reckless endangerment, distribution of carfentanil, and possession of carfentanil. She was sentenced to ten years of incarceration (none suspended) for involuntary manslaughter, five years for reckless endangerment (merged into the involuntary manslaughter sentence), eight years for distribution of carfentanil (all suspended), and one year for possession of carfentanil (merged into the distribution sentence). Ms. McCauley argues on appeal1 that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for involuntary manslaughter because the State failed to prove she had acted with gross negligence and there were superseding causes for Ms. Miller’s death. She argues, relatedly, that the trial court erred when it denied her motion to dismiss the involuntary manslaughter and reckless endangerment charges.

We affirm. I. BACKGROUND A. The Events That Led To Ms. Miller’s Carfentanil Overdose and Death. Joshua Wrightson and Ms. McCauley had known each other for two years before the night Mr. Wrightson’s friend, Mary Nell Miller, died. Mr. Wrightson and Ms. McCauley met at a methadone clinic.

Eventually, he became one of her buyers, and 1 This Court stayed the appeal pending the Court of Appeals’s decision in State v. Thomas, 464 Md. 133 (2019). she would sell him what she said was a mixture of heroin and fentanyl. On June 23, 2017, Mr. Wrightson was experiencing bad withdrawal symptoms and sought drugs to tide him over. He sent a message to Ms. McCauley through Facebook Messenger and told her that he “could use a break” from withdrawal. She wrote back that she wouldn’t be home until 2:30 p.m., but that if he could find a ride to her place later, she had “a little” she would give him.

At 5:16 p.m., Mr. Wrightson messaged Ms. McCauley and said that “Mary” was driving him over and they would be there in “45 minutes to an hour.” Ms. McCauley testified that she didn’t recall seeing the 5:16 p.m. message and that she didn’t respond. According to Mr. Wrightson, he and Mary Miller went to Ms. McCauley’s house that day and they picked up what he believed to be “[s]ome of the heroin/Fentanyl.” He said that Ms. Miller understood that the drugs were going to be “obtained for the both of” them and she knew what they “were going to obtain.” After picking up the drugs, Mr. Wrightson and Ms. Miller drove back to the apartment Mr. Wrightson shared with Mark Bowers. Ms. McCauley disputes that any sale or transaction occurred. She testified that she didn’t meet Mr. Wrightson on June 23 and that she didn’t give Ms. Miller any drugs.

When Mr. Wrightson and Ms. Miller got back to Mr. Wrightson’s apartment, the pair “went into [his] bedroom and put the powder on the chest of drawers.” Immediately after “snorting some” of the drugs, Mr. Wrightson collapsed to the ground, hitting his head on the chest as he fell. Mr. Wrightson overdosed and passed out, rendering his remaining testimony on what happened that night unclear. He testified that he was unconscious for 2 “five hours.” He then gave conflicting testimony: he said on direct that when he came to, he saw that “Mary was standing at the doorway to [his] bedroom,” and then on cross- examination that when he awoke, Ms. Miller was dabbing his forehead. Regardless, some time after Mr. Wrightson awoke, he testified that he “called out for Mary” to ask where she was.

When he didn’t hear a response, he went to the bathroom door, knocked, and after not hearing a response, entered the room. He found her lying on the floor by the toilet, unconscious. What happened next is unclear. Ultimately, Mr. Wrightson, his roommate Mark Bowers, and their neighbor John “Jack” Tangradi attempted to revive Ms. Miller.

Mr. Bowers testified that he had been on an evening walk, and when he returned around 10 p.m., he witnessed “pandemonium” as Mr. Tangradi and Mr. Wrightson tried to resuscitate Ms. Miller. Mr. Bowers asked Mr. Wrightson how long Ms. Miller had been on the floor, and he responded ten minutes. Mr. Bowers, who at that time was sober, testified that he thought Ms. Miller had been on the floor “much more than ten minutes” because she was “starting to turn gray.” Mr. Wrightson and Mr. Bowers administered Naloxone, but Ms. Miller didn’t wake up. Mr. Bowers called 911, and medical personnel declared Ms. Miller dead at 10:56 p.m.

B. Ms. McCauley’s Drug Transactions With Other Buyers. The State presented evidence of Ms. McCauley’s prior drug transactions. The testimony focused on Ms. McCauley’s prior relationship with Mr. Wrightson, Mr. Tangradi, Melissa Boswell, and Sergeant William Heath, a Maryland State Police officer who bought drugs from Ms. McCauley twice while undercover. 3 First, Mr. Wrightson and Ms. McCauley had used fentanyl and overdosed together in 2017. Mr. Wrightson testified that he had overdosed from fentanyl that he had bought from Ms. McCauley four times.

When he told Ms. McCauley about his overdoses, she told him “that’s horrible,” “be careful,” “don’t do too much,” and “it’s strong.” Next, Mr. Tangradi, Mr. Wrightson and Mr. Bowers’s neighbor, testified that he had bought heroin from Ms. McCauley before Ms. Miller died and that Ms. McCauley “said that it was not Fentanyl.” He stated that he overdosed from those drugs “for about 12 hours.” Melissa Boswell testified about unrelated drug purchases she made from Ms. McCauley. She met Ms. McCauley at a methadone clinic a year before Ms. Miller died. On June 18, 2017, five days before Ms. Miller’s death, Ms. Boswell sought drugs to use with her friends. She bought a mix of “pink Percosets” [sic] and what Ms. McCauley told her was fentanyl, but later was tested and found to be carfentanil.

Ms. McCauley warned her to “be careful” and not do “too much.” Then Ms. Boswell brought the drugs to her friends and echoed Ms. McCauley’s warning that the drugs contained fentanyl and not to “take too much.” Her friends took “a little scoop [of the drugs] out with a straw.” After her friends didn’t feel anything initially, Ms. Boswell gave them a bit more. Soon after, her two friends fell to the ground, “started seizing,” and became unresponsive, and Ms. Boswell called 911. The friends were revived after several attempts. Ms. Boswell reached an agreement with the State to work with the police and testify at Ms. McCauley’s trial.

Finally, Ms. Boswell testified that she coordinated with Sergeant William Heath to purchase drugs. On June 21, 2017, Sgt. Heath and Ms. Boswell drove to Ms. McCauley’s 4 house to buy fentanyl. After Sgt.

Heath, working undercover, was introduced to Ms. McCauley, she “immediately” told him “to be careful while using the [] Fentanyl, which she was about to provide.” She warned that he should “just start with a little bit,” “just a fucking flake,” because the drugs were “that strong.” She said, “please don’t die,” and gave him the drugs. Sgt. Heath testified that he believed she told him to use a “flake” of the fentanyl because the drugs were “so strong,” and if he “were to use what she believed to be [his] normal amount, that would certainly lead to an overdose.” Sgt. Heath and Ms. Boswell arranged one more buy on June 30, 2017, after Ms. Miller died.

Sgt. Heath bought $30 worth of what he and Ms. McCauley agreed was fentanyl. C. Expert Testimony at Trial Amber Burns, the State’s expert witness in forensic chemistry, testified that she tested the drugs Ms. McCauley sold to Ms. Boswell on June 18 that resulted in the overdose of two of Ms. Boswell’s friends. Ms. Burns stated that she found “a net weight of 0.66 grams of Carfentanil,” and that carfentanil is one of “45 known analogs” of fentanyl.

The State’s Medical Examiner, Dr. Russell Alexander, testified about Ms. Miller. He stated that her cause of death was “Carfentanil intoxication.” He also described the differences between fentanyl and carfentanil: Well Carfentanil and Fentanyl are both narcotics. Fentanyl is a very potent or very strong narcotic and Carfentanil is an even stronger or more potent narcotic. I’ve heard it estimated that Carfentanil is approximately 100 times more potent than Fentanyl, but the bottom line is Carfentanil is an analog or a variant of Fentanyl that is extremely potent.

He stated that “there are no approved uses for Carfentanil in [] humans in this country” and 5 that it’s only approved for “veterinary purposes.” Ms. McCauley moved for acquittal, which the court denied. The jury convicted Ms. McCauley of all charges. She appeals. We supply additional facts as needed below.

II

DISCUSSION Ms. McCauley raises three questions on appeal that we rephrase.2 First, was the evidence sufficient for a jury to find Ms. McCauley guilty of involuntary manslaughter? Second, did the trial court err when it denied Ms. McCauley’s motion to dismiss the involuntary manslaughter charge? Third, did the court err when it denied Ms. McCauley’s motion to dismiss the reckless endangerment charge? A. The Evidence Was Sufficient To Support A Finding That Ms. McCauley Acted With Gross Negligence.

First, Ms. McCauley argues that under the Court of Appeals’s decision in State v. Thomas, 464 Md. 133 (2019), her sale of carfentanil to Mr. Wrightson and Ms. Miller does 2 Ms. McCauley raised three Questions Presented: 1. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction for involuntary manslaughter? 2. Was it error to deny the motion to dismiss the charges of involuntary manslaughter? 3. Was it error to deny the motion to dismiss the charge of reckless endangerment?

The State rephrased those Questions Presented as: 1. Was the evidence sufficient to support McCauley’s conviction for grossly negligent involuntary manslaughter? 2. Did the circuit court properly deny McCauley’s motion to dismiss the charge of reckless endangerment? 6 not rise to the level of gross negligence involuntary manslaughter. Second, she argues further that Ms. Miller, not Ms. McCauley, “knowingly and recklessly play[ed] the narcotic version of Russian Roulette.” Finally, she argues that Ms. Miller’s life could have been saved by Mr. Wrightson, Mr. Bowers, and Mr. Tangradi, after she overdosed, and their failure to save her life was a superseding cause that interrupted the causal connection between Ms. McCauley’s drug sale and Ms. Miller’s death.

The State responds that “there was substantial evidence that Ms. McCauley was aware of the extraordinarily dangerous nature of the substance she was distributing” and that the evidence was sufficient to find her guilty. The State is correct. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we ask “whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Roes v. State, 236 Md. App. 569, 582 (2018) (quoting Grimm v. State, 447 Md. 482 , 494–95 (2016)) (emphasis added). We don’t have to believe that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt—we determine instead whether there was enough evidence for a jury to come to that conclusion.

The jury, as the trier of fact, weighs the evidence, and we don’t question its conclusions “where there are competing rational inferences available.” Roes, 236 Md. App. at 583 (quoting Smith v. State, 415 Md. 174, 183 (2010)). Accordingly, for sufficiency of the evidence, we review “(1) the ‘essential elements’ of the crime; and, (2) whether the State has met its burden of production.” Id. The elements of involuntary manslaughter were met. State v. Thomas, 464 Md. 133 (2019), is the seminal Maryland case on the standard for gross negligence involuntary 7 manslaughter resulting from a fatal heroin overdose.

This Court applied Thomas for the first time in Johnson v. State, 245 Md. App. 46 , No. 109, Sept. Term 2018 (filed Jan. 31, 2020). Thomas held that to support a conviction for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter from the sale of heroin, (1) the defendant must have known, or should have known under the reasonably prudent person standard, that the underlying act of selling heroin carried a severe risk of harm, and (2) the sale of heroin must be the actual and legal cause of the victim’s death. Id. at 171, 173 . The first half of the analysis itself has two components: the activity must be inherently dangerous and environmental risk factors must elevate that risk to rise to gross negligence.

Johnson, 245 Md. App. at 57 -58 (citing Thomas, 464 Md. at 171, 173 ). The Court of Appeals’s analysis in Thomas began from the premise that selling heroin is inherently dangerous. Thomas, 464 Md. at 169 . But selling heroin is not enough in itself to support a finding of gross negligence involuntary manslaughter, and the Court of Appeals declined to recognize “a per se rule providing that all heroin distribution resulting in death constitutes gross negligence . . . .” Id. at 167, 169 (“[D]istribution, alone, does not always amount to gross negligence.”).

Instead, Thomas weighed “the inherent dangerousness of the act and environmental risk factors” to decide whether the sale amounts to a “high degree of risk to human life.” Id. at 161 (emphasis added). The evidence adduced at trial in this case included environmental risk factors that a reasonable jury could find had raised the baseline risk from a mere drug sale to a grossly 8 negligent