McCoy v. State

TTenejes, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The referendum provided by Chapter 30 of the Acts of 1016 of the General Assembly of Maryland resulted in the application to Washington County of the provision in the act that “it shall be unlawful for any person, persons, social club, firm or corporation to manufacture for sale, sell or purchase for sale, transport for sale, dispense or otherwise dispose of any alcoholic, spirituous, vinous, fermented, distilled or malt liquors or intoxicating bitters or liquid mixtures or preparations, whether patented or not, which will produce intoxication, * * * ” The appellant was indicted under that statute for the unlawful manufacture for sale of a certain quantity of alcoholic intoxicating liquor. A motion to quash the indict ³⁷⁴ ment and a demurrer to it Avere successively filed and overruled, and a plea of guilty Avas then entered. The appeal is from a judgment imposing a fine of fifty dollars and costs.

Both the motion to quash and the demurrer Avere filed upon the theory that no penalty is provided by laAV for the offense charged in the indictment. The penalties designated by the Act of 1916 for violations of its provisions Avere those prescribed, by existing or later statutes, “for manufacturing, selling, dispensing or disposing of alcoholic, spirituous, vinous, fermented, distilled, malt and intoxicating liquors Avithout a license.” The Act of 1908, ch. 380, sec. 3250, operative in Washington County, provides for the punishment, by fine or imprisonment, or both, of persons convicted of selling intoxicating liquors Avithout a license, but for the manufacture of such liquors Avithout a license no penalty is prescribed by that act nor by any other applicable license statute. It is therefore to be determined Avhether it Avas the purpose of the Act of 1916 that a violation of any of its prohibitions should be punishable only to the extent that a corresponding act might be 'penalized under the license laAvs, or -whether the act intended that any of the penalties prescribed by those laAvs should be available for any of the offenses Avhich it specified. According to the first interpretation, the manufacture for sale of intoxicating liquor in Washington County, although expressly prohibited by the act, could be conducted with impunity, since a common law penalty is precluded by the reference to statutory measures of punishment (Reynolds v. State, 141 Md. 637 ), but the second construction would justify the imposition of the sentence of which the appellant complains.

It was the declared purpose of the Act of 1916 to provide penalties for “manufacturing, selling, transporting, dispensing or disposing” of alcoholic liquors in any political subdivision in which its provisions were ratified by