McIntyre v. Smyth

KRAUSER, J. When Marion I. Knott died, her Last Will and Testament named, as personal representatives of her estate, two of her children, appellees Patricia K. Smyth 1 and Francis X. Knott, and, among other things, left her “tangible personal property” to her ten surviving children. In dispute is the fate of that property and its implications for the standing of the decedent’s other children to request judicial probate. If, as appellees ²² Smyth and Knott contend, that property was adeemed, before her death, appellants, who comprise six of the decedent’s eight other children, had no standing to file a petition for judicial probate, and the decision of the orphans’ court, dismissing that petition on those grounds, must be affirmed. But if, as appellants claim, the ademption of that property was in dispute at the time that their petition was dismissed, then appellants did have standing, and the orphans’ court erred in dismissing their petition for judicial probate.

This matter commenced when, upon Mrs. Knott’s death, appellees Smyth and Knott filed a petition for administration of a small estate, together with the decedent’s Will and First Codicil (collectively, the “Will”), 2 with the Register of Wills for Baltimore City. The only asset of the estate, according to the petition, was a bank account, containing a little less than $13,000. No tangible personal property was listed. After admitting the Will to probate and appointing appellees, Smyth and Knott, as personal representatives of the estate, the register of wills sent notice of the appointment to all “interested persons.” In response to that notice, seven of decedent’s other children: Martin G. Knott, Sr. 3 and appellants Marion Knott McIntyre, Alice K. Voelkel, Margaret K. Riehl, Mary Stuart K. Rodgers, Sarah Lindsay K. Harris, and Rose Marie Porter, filed a petition for judicial probate in the Orphans’ Court for Baltimore City, requesting, among other things, a plenary hearing and the appointment of an independent personal representative to conduct an investigation into whether the actions purportedly taken by the decedent or by others on her ²³ behalf or on behalf of her estate “were in accord with her intent.” Appellees filed a response to that petition, requesting that the orphans’ court dismiss appellants’ petition and re-appoint them as personal representatives, as their administrative appointment ended, in accordance with ET § 6-307, 4 when appellants filed their Petition for Judicial Probate.

That response was followed by a motion to dismiss appellants’ petition for judicial probate, in which appellees, for the first time, sought dismissal on the grounds that appellants were no longer “interested persons” under the Will and therefore, under Maryland law, lacked standing to request judicial probate. The orphans’ court agreed, granted appellees’ motion, and dismissed appellants’ petition for judicial probate. Challenging that ruling, appellants present two issues for our review. Reordered, they are: I. Whether the orphans’ court erred when it held that appellants did not qualify as heirs under the definition of “interested persons” as set forth in section 1-101(i)(4) of the Estates and Trusts Article and as a result did not have standing to file the Petition for Judicial Probate.

II

Whether the orphans’ court erred when it held that appellants did not qualify as legatees under the definition of “interested persons,” as set forth in section 1- ²⁴ 101(i)(3) of the Estates and Trusts Article and as a result did not have standing to file the Petition for Judicial Probate. For the reasons that follow, we shall vacate the judgment of the orphans’ court and remand this matter to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. BACKGROUND Marion I. Knott, a Baltimore City resident, died testate on April 15, 2003. Before her death, in 1994, she executed both the will at issue and a power of attorney authorizing Patricia K. Smyth and Patricia’s now-deceased brother, Henry J. Knott, Jr., to create a revocable trust on the decedent’s behalf.

According to appellants, the decedent was to be the sole beneficiary of that trust, and upon her death, the assets were to be payable to her estate. 5 In her Will, the decedent left all of her “tangible personal property” to her surviving children. The property included her “furniture and furnishings, household and personal effects,” and was to be divided “among them in shares nearly equal in value as practicable.” She left the balance of her estate to the Marion I. and Henry J. Knott Foundation, Inc. (the “Foundation”) 6 and named two of her children, Henry J. Knott, Jr. and Patricia K. Smyth, as the personal representatives of her estate. She further provided in her Will that if Henry J. Knott, Jr. were to predecease her that Francis X. Knott was to serve as co-personal representative in his place. ²⁵ Shortly after Decedent’s death, appellees Smyth and Francis Knott (Henry J. Knott, Jr. having passed away) filed a petition, requesting administrative probate of a small estate, with the Register of Wills for Baltimore City. The decedent’s estate qualified as a small estate, they claimed, because its only estate asset was a checking account containing $12,344.

In that petition, they also requested that they be appointed, in accordance with the terms of the Will, personal representatives of the estate. After admitting the Will to administrative probate and appointing Smyth and Knott as personal representatives of the estate, the register of wills published, in a newspaper of general circulation, as required by Md.Code (1974, 2001 Repl. Vol.), § 7-103 of the Estates and Trusts Article (“ET”), notice of the appointment of appellees as personal representatives and sent a copy of that notice, as required by ET § 2-210, to appellants, as “interested persons” under ET § l-101(i). In response to that notice, appellants, as “interested persons,” filed a petition for judicial probate in the Orphans Court for Baltimore City.

Appellants’ judicial probate petition requested “the appointment of an independent person selected by the Court to serve as Personal Representative of the Estate for purposes of conducting an independent investigation to assure that all actions taken by or on behalf of the Decedent, during her lifetime and on behalf of her estate, after her death, were in accord with her intent, without violation of a confidential relationship and without self-dealing or other conflict.” The petition also “demand[ed] a plenary hearing to determine testamentary capacity of the decedent, the validity and proper execution of the Will and Codicil, and for the appointment of an independent Personal Representative.” After filing their petition for judicial probate, appellants sent appellees interrogatories and requests for production of documents, seeking information regarding the decedent’s testamentary capacity; her execution of the will; the assets of her estate, including her tangible personal property; her ²⁶ revocable trust; and any “gift, distribution, transfer, exchange, [or] other disposition of any type” that appellees received from the decedent before her death. When appellees failed to respond to those requests, appellants moved for sanctions. Before the orphans’ court ruled on that motion, appellees filed a response to appellants’ petition, challenging its propriety, and, shortly after that, a motion to dismiss, disputing appellants’ standing to request judicial probate. The orphans’ court granted that motion, stating, in a written opinion, that appellants had “failed to show that they [were] Interested Parties to the Estate” and “thus that they ha[d] standing to bring the Petition for Judicial Probate.” It then dismissed appellants’ petition and upheld the register’s order admitting the decedent’s Will to administrative probate and appointing Smyth and Knott as personal representatives.

DISCUSSION Appellants contend that the orphans’ court erred in granting appellees’ motion to dismiss their petition for judicial probate on the grounds that they were not “interested persons,” as either heirs or legatees, and therefore, did not have standing to file a petition for judicial probate. Although appellees designated their motion as a “motion to dismiss,” and the orphans court not only accepted that designation but then “dismissed” appellants’ petition, the question arises whether the court’s references to facts, which did not appear in any of the pleadings filed by the parties, transformed its disposition of appellants’ petition from a dismissal to a grant of summary judgment. If it did, that would, of course, affect the standard of review we apply and, in this instance, the result we reach. Standard of Review Initially, we note that, under the Maryland rules, the orphans’ court has the authority to dismiss a petition for judicial probate for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, in accordance with Rules 2-322(b)(2) and 6—461(d), or to grant summary judgment, in accordance with Rules 2-501 ²⁷ and 6-46l(b).

Appellees chose to seek a dismissal of appellants’ petition under Rule 2-322(b). Claiming that appellants had no standing to request judicial probate, appellees asked the orphans’ court to dismiss appellants’ petition. The court granted that request and dismissed the petition. In so ruling, the court relied on unsworn representations in appellees’ motion to dismiss that the “tangible personal property” that appellants were to inherit as legatees under the Will, had been transferred by the decedent, before her death, to the revocable trust established for her by appellees.

Concluding that appellants’ only interest in the estate—the decedent’s tangible personal property—had been adeemed, the court dismissed appellants’ petition for lack of standing, without apparently considering appellants’ contrary claim that the property had never been transferred to the trust. Asking this Court to nonetheless affirm the orphans’ court’s ruling, appellees argue that it was entirely appropriate for that court, in granting their motion to dismiss, to go beyond the four corners of the petition for judicial probate and to consider extra-pleading sources. Relying on certain federal decisions, Phillips v. LCI Int’l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609 , 618 (4th Cir.1999); Parrino v. FHP, Inc. 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir.1998); Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir.1993), they assert that “it is widely recognized that where, as here, the initial pleading references a document that is integral to that initial pleading, a court may consider that document within the context of a motion to dismiss, even if the document is not attached to the pleading.” We agree that the court may consider such a document but disagree that such consideration may be done within the context of a motion to dismiss. While a court does indeed have the discretion to consider matters beyond the four corners of a complaint, when it does, it “transmutéis] the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment.” Hrehorovich v. Harbor Hosp.

Ctr., Inc., 93 Md.App. 772, 789 , 614 A.2d 1021 (1992). In Hrehorovich , Dr. Hrehorovich, a former member of Harbor Hospital’s medical staff, filed a complaint against the ²⁸ hospital, alleging, among other things, breach of contract and wrongful discharge. Id. at 778 , 614 A.2d 1021 . In that complaint, he referred to specific provisions of the “Medical Staff Bylaws” and the “Employee Policy Manual.” Id. at 779 , 614 A.2d 1021 .

In response, Harbor Hospital filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, citing other provisions in those documents. Id. at 779-80 , 614 A.2d 1021 . When the circuit court granted that motion, id. at 778 , 614 A.2d 1021 , Hrehorovich noted an appeal, arguing, among other things, that, in granting the hospital’s motion to dismiss, the circuit court erred in relying on “the facts set forth by appellees that went beyond [his] complaint.” Id. at 779 , 614 A.2d 1021 . “[S]uch consideration,” he maintained, “is not proper for a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 780 , 614 A.2d 1021 . The hospital, on the other hand, argued, as appellees do now, that “the trial court could properly examine the documents that form the basis for appellant’s complaint.” Id. “[T]hey had the right,” the hospital insisted, “to ‘complete’ the pleading by providing additional portions of the documents relied on by [Hrehorovich].” Id.

We rejected that reasoning but not the right of the court to consider documents outside of the pleadings. Citing Maryland Rule 2-322(c), we held that the circuit court did not err in considering those documents, but that, in doing so, it had transformed a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 789 , 614 A.2d 1021 . That rule provides: If, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a clam upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 2-501, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 2-501.

Md. Rule 2-322(c). Although framing its ruling in terms of a motion to dismiss, the orphans’ court considered, as did the trial court in ²⁹ Hrehomvich, matters presented by extra-pleadings sources and thereby turned a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See Hrehorovich, 93 Md.App. at 789 , 614 A.2d 1021 . Accordingly, we shall review the orphans’ court ruling as a grant of summary judgment.

The standard for reviewing a grant of summary judgment requires us to “determine if there is a genuine dispute of material fact and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Crews v. Hollenbach, 126 Md.App. 609, 624 , 730 A.2d 742 (1999), aff'd, 358 Md. 627 , 751 A.2d 481 (2000). If, after construing all facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, we conclude that a genuine dispute as to a material fact exists, we must vacate the grant of summary judgment. See Bank of N.Y. v. Sheff 382 Md. 235, 244 , 854 A.2d 1269, 1275 (2004). In this instance, we find that such a dispute does exist and shall therefore vacate the judgment of the orphans’ court.

Administrative and Judicial Probate Because substance without its procedural context can be confusing, if not misleading, we begin our analysis of this standing dispute by placing it within its procedural context. To do so, we shall briefly outline the differences between administrative and judicial probate and the rules that govern standing to participate in either proceeding. Administrative probate “[i]s a proceeding instituted by the filing of a petition for probate by an interested person before the register for the probate of a will or a determination of the intestacy of the decedent, and for the appointment of a personal representative.” ET § 5-301. Such proceedings “may be conducted without notice, to the extent provided in § 5-304, subject to the right of an interested person to require judicial probate....” Id.

Judicial probate is “a proceeding instituted by the filing of a petition for probate by an interested person, or creditor, with the court for the probate of a will or a determination of the intestacy of the decedent, and for the appointment of a ³⁰ personal representative.” ET § 5-401. It “is conducted after notice as provided in § 5-403, and is final except as provided in ET § 5-406.” Id. Thus, the principal difference between the two forms of probate is that the former is an administrative proceeding before the register of wills while the latter is a judicial proceeding before the orphans’ court. In conducting judicial probate, the orphans’ court may hold plenary proceedings, ET § 5-404(b), call witnesses, ET § 2-102(a), and resolve issues of fact, ET § 2-105(a).

After doing so, the orphans’ court “shall determine the testamentary capacity of the decedent if he died testate,” and “shall appoint one or more personal representatives.” ET § 5-404(a). If appropriate, the court may “revoke, modify, or confirm action taken at the administrative or any prior judicial probate.” Id. The Estates & Trusts Article imposes limits on who has standing to file a petition for judicial probate: only “interested persons” and creditors may file such a petition. ET § 5-402.

An “interested person” is defined by ET § l-101(i) as: (1) A person named as executor in a will; (2) A person serving as personal representative after judicial or administrative probate; (3) A legatee in being, not fully paid, whether his interest is vested or contingent; (4) An heir even if the decedent dies testate, except that an heir of a testate decedent ceases to be an “interested person” when the register has given notice pursuant to § 2-210 or § 5^03(a). And a “legatee” is defined as “a person who under the terms of a will would receive a legacy,” ET § l-101(m), that is, “any property disposed of by will.” ET § 1—101(Z). An heir, on the other hand, is defined as “a person entitled to property of an intestate decedent.” ET § l-101(h). The orphans’ court ruled that, under these subsections, appellants were without standing to file the petition as either heirs or legatees. ³¹ Heirs Appellants claim that the orphans’ court erred in ruling that, as heirs of a testate decedent, they were not “interested persons” under ET § l-101(i) with standing to request judicial probate, once the register of wills gave notice of probate and the appointment of the personal representatives, under ET § 5-403.

They argue that, as heirs of the decedent, they were indeed interested parties, under ET § 1—101(i)(4), and thus had standing to request judicial probate. They are at least correct in asserting that they are the decedent’s heirs. An “heir,” under Maryland law, is “a person entitled to property of an intestate decedent pursuant to §§ 3-101 through 3-110.” ET § l-101(h). Section 3-101 simply introduces the subtitle on intestate succession, while ET § 3-110 provides that certain heirs, who do not “survive the decedent by 30 full days ... shall be considered to have predeceased the decedent for purposes of intestate succession, and [are] not to be entitled to the rights of an heir.” ET § 1-101(h).

As the Decedent’s children, or “issues,” see ET § 1-209, appellants would have been entitled to the decedent’s property, had she died intestate. See ET § 3-103. Thus, appellants are indeed her heirs. But that does not mean that they are ipso facto “interested persons” with standing to seek judicial probate.

Although an heir, upon the death of the decedent, is an interested person, he or she loses that status, according to ET § 1—101(i)(4), “when the register has given notice pursuant to § 2-210 or § 5-403(a).” Section 2-210 requires that the heirs and legatees of an estate are to be given personal notice of the appointment of the estate’s personal representatives by the register of wills, while ET § 5-403(a) prescribes when notice of judicial probate should be given to “all interested persons” and in what form. “All persons having any objection to the appointment (or to the probate of the will of the decedent)” by the register of wills must “file the same with the register of wills on or before six months from the date of the appointment.” ET § 7-103(b). But, when small estates are involved, ³² that time period is reduced from six months to thirty days. ET § 5-603(b)(l). Here, the register of wills gave notice of probate and appellees’ appointment as personal representatives in May 2003.

On June 11, 2003, appellants, claiming to be “interested persons,” filed their petition for judicial probate. Because appellants received their notice of probate and appointment of appellees as personal representatives before that time, the orphans’ court, relying on ET § 1—101(i)(4) (“a testate decedent ceases to be an ‘interested person’ when the register has given notice pursuant to § 2-210----”), concluded that appellants, as heirs, were no longer interested persons. That conclusion stands. Section 1—104(i)(4) plainly states that an heir’s status as an interested person ends when the register of wills gives notice of probate and appointment of the personal representative.

See ET § 1—101(i)(4). And, given the clear and unambiguous language of that subsection, that ends our inquiry. As the Court of Appeals observed, “[w]hen the words are clear and unambiguous, there is no need to search further.” Medex v. McCabe, 372 Md. 28, 38 , 811 A.2d 297 (2002). While acknowledging that, if given a “literal” reading, that subsection does provide that heirs cease to be “interested persons” when the register of wills sends notice of probate and appointment, appellants insist that such a construction of ET § 1-101(4) is “nonsensical.” And, were they correct, we would be required to reject the orphans’ court conclusion as every statute is entitled to “a reasonable interpretation, not one that is illogical and incompatible with common sense.” State v. Thompson, 332 Md. 1, 8 , 629 A.2d 731 (1993); see Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 145 , 626 A.2d 946 (1993).

But they are not. Denying heirs standing to petition for judicial probate, once they receive notice of administrative probate, makes sense. If an heir is to receive nothing under the terms of a will offered for probate, he or she has no interest in the probate of that will and certainly no interest in petitioning the orphans’ court ³³ to accept that document as a decedent’s last will and testament. And that principle has been adopted, in one form or another, by other state courts, see, e.g., Smith v. Negley, 304 S.W.2d 464, 468 (Tex.Ct.App.1957) (“An heir ... is interested only in opposition to the will.”); In re Aberman’s Estate, 412 N.Y.S.2d 572 (N.Y.Surr.Ct.1979), and endorsed by at least one legal treatise.

See 95 C.J.S. Wills § 468 at 492 (2001) (“[X]t is necessary that a person show that he or she has some interest in the matter before they will be allowed to become a proponent, since one who has no sufficient interest in the will or estate, such as a pecuniary interest which will be benefitted and affected by the probate of the will and one which will be materially impaired in the absence of its probate, cannot petition for probate.”). Similarly, a person who receives nothing under the terms of a will has no interest in the administration of the estate, including the appointment of the personal representative. See, e.g., McClinton v. Sullivan, 263 Ga. 711 , 438 S.E.2d 71, 73 (1994) (Having “no legal right to be appointed administrator and no interest in the estate; [the petitioner has] no standing to challenge the probate court’s appointment of the ... administrator.”); In re Alstock, 230 La. 167 , 88 So.2d 14, 15 (1956) (“Throughout our jurisprudence is the well-accepted principle that one without a pecuniary interest has no judicial standing to interfere with the administration of a succession.”); In re Lyons’ Estate, 132 Cal.App.2d 790 , 283 P.2d 66, 68 (1955) (“One must be a ‘person interested’ in the estate in order to oppose a petition for letters of administration.”). That does not mean that, once they cease to be “interested persons,”