McNaughton v. McNaughton

GARRITY, Judge. In this matter, we shall focus our attention primarily on the method of determining valuation of marital shares of stock in a closely held corporation. We shall also discuss whether the appreciation of non-marital stock in such a corporation may be considered a marital asset where the ⁴⁹² appreciation may be due to the efforts of the owner spouse during the marriage. Facts Kristina A. McNaughton, the appellant, and William Bruce McNaughton, the appellee, were married in 1967 and granted a divorce twenty years later by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (Beard, J.) on the grounds of a two-year separation.

Shortly after being married in Bethesda, the parties moved to Belgium for two years during Mr. McNaughton’s tour of duty in the armed forces. Upon their return to the United States in 1970, Mr. McNaughton started working in his father’s family businesses, two closely held corporations, G.D. Armstrong Co. Inc. (GDACo, a gas jobber dealing in petroleum products) and Armstrong Tire & Accessory Corp. (ATACo). At about the same time appellant gave birth to their first child, Lyle McNaughton. In 1971 the parties purchased the marital home, in part with money given to them by the appellee’s parents.

In 1972, Mrs. McNaughton gave birth to their second child, Heather. While Mrs. McNaughton assumed the role of a homemaker in nurturing the children and tending to the needs of the family, Bruce McNaughton continued to work in his family’s businesses. Since 1974, he has assumed various positions as an officer in both corporations. In 1980, the McNaughtons began having marital difficulties.

The factors leading to the breakdown of the marriage were highly disputed. On November 9, 1983, Mrs. McNaughton moved out of the marital home with the children. She then resumed employment, freelanced as a commercial designer, and pursued a bachelor’s degree in art. The chancellor found that at the time of the divorce Mrs. McNaughton was earning approximately $3,600 annually and Mr. McNaughton $31,000.

The chancellor determined the value of the marital property to be $198,721. He granted a monetary award to Mrs. ⁴⁹³ McNaughton in the amount of $60,000 in addition to awarding her alimony of $200 a month for 36 months and attorney fees and costs in the amount of $12,000. The chancellor further awarded joint custody of the children to the parties, allowed Mrs. McNaughton use and possession of the family home for a period of three years, and provided $150 per month for the support of Heather McNaughton who was to reside with her mother. Mrs. McNaughton presents the following issues, which we have reworded, for our determination. 1 I. Whether the chancellor erred in failing to consider the appreciated value of corporate assets when determining the value of jointly owned shares in a closely held corporation.

II

Whether the appreciation in value of non-marital stock held in a close corporation should be considered a marital asset where the increased value may have been due to the personal efforts of the owner spouse during the marriage.

III

Whether certain representations by the husband as to the nature, value and acquisition costs of a significant marital asset, constituted fraud.

IV

Whether the chancellor abused his discretion in limiting attorney fees and denying the award of suit expenses to the appellant for certain expert witnesses. Mr. McNaughton has filed a cross-appeal and requests our review of the following issue: Whether the granting of a monetary award in addition to the awards of alimony, counsel fees, suit money and costs, principal, interest, taxes and insurance during cross-appellee’s use and possession of the marital home and contents therein was an abuse of discretion by the trial court. ⁴⁹⁴ I. Valuation of Stock Mrs. McNaughton argues that the chancellor erred in relying on the testimony of Dr. David A. Walker who had been qualified to testify on behalf of the appellee as an expert in the area of the valuation of stock in closely held corporations. She bases this contention on the fact that the valuation approach utilized by Dr. Walker in determining the value of the minority shares of the two companies, G.D. Armstrong Co. Inc. and Armstrong Tire and Accessory Corp., was erroneous as it considered only the book value of the real estate owned by each corporation instead of its fair market value. Rather than consider the current value of assets owned by the corporations, Dr. Walker testified that he based his analysis on balance sheets and income statements, recent stock sale transactions between unrelated individuals, dividend declarations, and industry competition within the Washington area.

In assessing the specific value of the minority shares in the closely held corporations, Dr. Walker testified that he also considered factors generally recognized by the Internal Revenue Service in valuing corporate stock. These factors, as reflected in Rev.Ruling 59-60, require an appraiser to weigh all factors in arriving at market value including the nature of the business, the economic outlook in general, the book value of the stock and the financial condition of the business, the earning capacity of the company, the good will of the enterprise, and the size of the block of stock to be valued. As the shares in question were minority shares which lacked control and had no ready market for exchange, Dr. Walker discounted each share price to 40% of its book value. Dr. Walker opined that the fair market value of the minority shares of G.D. Armstrong Company was $58.50, and that the value of the Armstrong Tire and accessories stock was $24.84 per share.

Mrs. McNaughton’s expert, Mr. John Canto, a certified public accountant, dismissed the earnings approach used by ⁴⁹⁵ Dr. Walker as “totally useless because it is dictated by the owners of the company who control salaries, bonuses, dividends and retained earnings.” Mr. Canto further rejected the book value method “because it fails to recognize the fair market value of real estate and leases.” 2 Mr. Canto further stated that the practice of discounting the value of minority shares was inappropriate. Mr. Canto based his appraisal on an examination of the books and records of the corporations, appraisal of the assets, including that of the real estate, review of the corporate tax returns and audited financial statements, and analyses of the leases held, depreciation schedules, and various filings that the corporations had made with governmental agencies. Mr. Canto valued the stock of GDACo at $445 per share and the ATACo. stock at $180 per share. In his memorandum opinion, the chancellor stated: Having reviewed the record and particularly the fact that these are two very closely held corporations (GDACo and ATACo), it is the finding of this Court that the value of the stock, for purposes of the marital property determination, is Seventy-Five Dollars ($75.00) and Thirty-Seven Dollars ($37.00) per share, respectively.

It is evident, as the chancellor recognized, that the task of appraisal is not aided by an exact science. It is equally clear that the chancellor placed great reliance upon the testimony of the appellee’s expert witness who failed to consider the appreciated value of corporate real estate holdings when valuing the current worth of the corporate shares. ⁴⁹⁶ The opinion of the chancellor reflects his reasoning for not considering the appreciation of corporate assets as marital property. He stated, in pertinent part: Hence, in the absence of some clear indication by Maryland appellate courts, this Court is not persuaded by the foreign authorities cited by Defendant that it is or should be the law of Maryland that, on these facts, the appreciation in the corporate assets and stock should be marital property. Although the example set forth in Schweizer v. Schweizer, 301 Md. 626 , 484 A.2d 267 (1984), dealt with the appreciation of real property purchased by a husband and wife, we believe that the principle is equally applicable to the appreciated value of a marital corporate share of stock which has increased due to appreciation of the corporate assets.

Writing on behalf of the Court, Chief Judge Murphy reiterated the principles enunciated in Grant v. Zich, 300 Md. 256 , 477 A.2d 1163 (1984), and Harper v. Harper, 294 Md. 54 , 448 A.2d 916 (1982): We illustrated the proper application of these principles with this example: A husband and wife acquired real property for a purchase price of $40,000. The wife contributed a down payment of $10,000 from property that she acquired prior to marriage. The remaining $30,000 was financed by a mortgage signed by both the husband and the wife. One-quarter of the value of the property is the wife’s nonmarital property and three-quarters of the value of the property is marital property.

If, at the time of dissolution of the marriage, the property has appreciated in value to a fair market value of $60,000 and the mortgage indebtedness has been reduced to $20,000 by the payment of $10,000 of marital funds, the following division would be appropriate. One-quarter of the $60,000 fair market value of the property, or $15,000, would be the wife’s nonmarital property, not subject to equitable distribution. From the remaining $45,000, $20,000, representing the unpaid ⁴⁹⁷ mortgage balance, would be deducted leaving $25,000 as the net value of the marital property subject to equitable distribution. Id. 300 Md. at 276-77 , 477 A.2d 163 .

As the chancellor failed, when determining the value of the marital stock, to take into consideration the fair market value of the corporate assets from the time the stock became marital property until the time of the issuance of the decree of divorce, we must remand for his reconsideration of value. 3 See Dobbyn v. Dobbyn, 57 Md.App. 662 , 471 A.2d 1068 (1984).

II

Increase in Value of Non-Marital Assets Marital property under Md. Family Law Code Ann. § 8-201 of the Marital Property Act, is defined as: (e) Marital property.—(1) “Marital property” means the property, however titled, acquired by 1 or both parties during the marriage. (2) “Marital property” does not include property: (i) acquired before the marriage; (ii) acquired by inheritance or gift from a third party; (iii) excluded by valid agreement; or (iv) directly traceable to any of these sources. At trial, Mrs. McNaughton contended that the definition of marital property should include not only the stock acquired by the parties during the marriage but also any increase of value of all non-marital stock Mr. McNaughton had acquired by gift from his parents both before and during the marriage. She bases her contention on the theory that her non-monetary contribution allowed Mr. McNaughton to increase the work efforts he expended during their marriage. ⁴⁹⁸ The chancellor made the following determination of facts pertinent to our discussion: At various times both prior to and during the marriage of the parties, the elder McNaughtons, both jointly and individually, gave gifts of stock in these corporations to the Plaintiff (Mr. McNaughton) and Defendant (Mrs. McNaughton), both jointly and individually.

The efforts of the entire McNaughton family have made GDACo and ATACo prosperous businesses. Indeed the Plaintiffs employment, along with that of his father and mother, have contributed to the appreciation of the corporations’ assets and stock. Substantial time and effort were expended in this case by the Defendant’s attempt to prove, and the Plaintiff’s corresponding attempt to disprove, that the increase in the corporations’ net worth was marital property. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has never owned anything more than a minority interest in either GDACo or ATACo.

At all times during the marriage, the Plaintiff always received a fair and reasonable salary, full benefits and profit sharing as compensation for his work for these corporations. As a stockholder, the Plaintiff, along with all other stockholders, always received dividends whenever they were declared. It is readily apparent that the plaintiff was just one of many people whose work, along with a variety of other factors beyond the control of the Plaintiff and his family, contributed to the appreciation and increase in value of these business enterprises. The chancellor thereupon determined that on the basis of the facts and circumstances presented to him, the appreciation of the gifts of corporate stock should not be considered marital property.

We agree, and explain. Mr. John McNaughton testified that he had purchased the controlling interest in the G.D. Armstrong Co. in 1953. Mr. McNaughton testified that he had subsequently acquired the Armstrong Tire and Accessory Co. and had developed five locations in the State of Maryland and employed ap ⁴⁹⁹ proximately 75 people. In 1975, however, when the gasoline shortage started, the tire business depreciated to such an extent that he was forced to consolidate into one location.

Mr. McNaughton named numerous employees whom he considered assets to the corporation and who worked for him on an average of 15 years. The major assets of the corporations were and are its real estate acquisitions. The great majority of these interests had been acquired prior to Bruce McNaughton’s employment, and all had been acquired under the leadership of John McNaughton. Additionally, much of the corporate growth and increase in the value of corporate assets in stock was attributable to the unprecedented inflation between 1973 and 1974, the oil embargo of 1974, and the energy crisis of 1979.

In Wilen v. Wilen, 61