McQuay v. Schertle

BYRNES, Judge. Rebecca Lynn Wozniak was killed when an eight ton tractor load of wood pulp fell on the parked car in which she was sitting, crushing it. Michael John Schertle, Jr., a warehouseman employed by both Baltimore Forest Products and the Terminal Corporation, was driving the tractor when the accident happened. In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Pamela J. McQuay, Personal Representative of the Estate of Ms. Wozniak, and Ms. Wozniak’s four minor children, appellants, sued Mr. Schertle and his employers, appellees, in a survival claim and wrongful death action founded on negligence.

At the conclusion of a five-week trial, the jury found Mr. Schertle negligent and Ms. Wozniak contributorily negligent. On that basis, judgment was entered in favor of Mr. Schertle and his employers. The Estate of Ms. Wozniak and Ms. Wozniak’s children appeal the lower court’s judgment, presenting the following ⁵⁶⁴ questions for review, which we have reordered and slightly reworded: I. Did the trial court err in submitting the issue of contributory negligence to the jury?

II

Did the trial court err in instructing the jury that the violation of certain Maryland Port Administration parking regulations by Ms. Wozniak could be considered evidence of contributory negligence?

III

Did the trial court err in refusing to instruct the jury that Ms. Wozniak was presumed to have exercised due care for her own safety? For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the trial court properly submitted the issue of contributory negligence to the jury and properly declined to instruct the jury on the presumption of due care, but that it erred in instructing the jury with respect to two of the three parking regulations. Because we also conclude that this error was prejudicial, we vacate the judgment and remand the case for a new trial on the issue of contributory negligence and, if necessary, on damages. 1 FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS The tragic accident that gave rise to this case happened on June 20, 1996, on the grounds of the Dundalk Marine Terminal. That night, Mr. Schertle and a co-worker, Mark Stanley, were transporting bales of wood pulp from Shed 3B to Shed 4.

To accomplish this task, Mr. Schertle was using a heavy industrial machine known as a Taylor tractor, which is like a forklift except that it lifts loads by the sides with a clamp instead of from underneath with a fork. Mr. Schertle’s Taylor tractor was equipped with headlights and a bright yellow strobe light mounted on the top of the cab. Mr. Stanley was operating a similar but somewhat smaller tractor. By the time the accident happened, Mr. Schertle and Mr. Stanley had been working for three hours and had completed many round trips between the sheds. ⁵⁶⁵ Shed 3B and Shed 4 are connected by a 26-foot wide industrial two-way thoroughfare with two sets of railroad tracks (two rails each), one in each travel lane of the road.

A large warehouse with a loading dock is situated between the sheds and along the north side of the industrial road. The warehouse is equipped with exterior lights that illuminate the road. For each trip, Mr. Schertle loaded wood pulp onto the tractor in Shed 3B, drove his tractor to Shed 4, deposited the wood pulp, and then returned to Shed 3B to pick up another load. Mr. Schertle’s route took him out of the bay door of Shed 3B, left onto the industrial road, straight (with the large warehouse on his right) approaching Shed 4, and right into Shed 4.

The loads that Mr. Schertle was moving were made up of 32 bales of wood pulp arranged in 4 units of 8 bales each across the front of his tractor. Each load was wrapped in white paper and weighed more than 8 tons. Because the loaded wood pulp was wider than Mr. Schertle’s tractor and because the tractor’s cab, in which he was seated, was located behind the load, Mr. Schertle’s forward view was obstructed. He could not drive the loaded tractor and look ahead to see where he was going.

He could see the road, however, by looking at the ground as he was driving. For that reason, instead of driving the tractor in reverse from Shed 3B to Shed 4, Mr. Schertle maneuvered it by positioning it over one set of railroad tracks on the industrial road and driving over them, looking down to see that he was maintaining his position. In this fashion, he would run the tractor astride the railroad tracks until the tracks led him into Shed 4. Ms. Wozniak drove to the Dundalk Marine Terminal that night with her friend, Deborah Carakoulakis, and Ms. Wozniak’s boyfriend, Richard (“Ricky”) Wozniak, a longshoreman, so that Mr. Wozniak could pick up his paycheck from an office in Shed 3B. 2 There was conflicting evidence about whether Ms. ⁵⁶⁶ Wozniak had been drinking that night, and, if so, the amount of alcohol that she had consumed.

Ricky Wozniak occupied the front passenger seat of the car and Ms. Carakoulakis was seated in the middle of the back seat. 3 When the three arrived at Shed 3B, Mr. Wozniak exited the car. Ms. Wozniak then drove from near the side door to Shed 3B to a point parallel to and immediately adjacent to the railroad track that was closest to the bay door to Shed 3B. The front of her car was facing, and approximately 120 feet from, the bay door, which was on the north side of Shed 3B. The front right headlight was slightly north and to the west of the northwest comer of Shed 3B.

On the west side of Shed 3B, near the northwest corner of the building, was a faded sign attached to the wall of the shed. It read “No Parking Any Time.” Another “No Parking Any Time” sign was attached to the wall of the large warehouse, above the loading dock. Shortly before 10:00 p.m., Mr. Schertle and Mr. Stanley drove their empty tractors from Shed 4 along the railroad tracks on the industrial road and into Shed 3B to pick up loads of wood pulp. There were no other vehicles in the industrial road at that time.

Mr. Schertle parked his tractor in Shed 3B and then spent approximately 3 to 4 minutes assembling a load of wood pulp for transport. He testified that once the tractor was loaded up, he drove it out of the bay door, eased forward slowly, looked to his right and to his left, and, seeing no vehicles, lights, or people, moved forward at approximately 2 to 3 miles per hour. He turned left onto the railroad tracks on the industrial road and proceeded to drive toward Shed 4, looking down at the tracks to stay on course. After Mr. Schertle had driven about 110 feet (which took approximately 30 to 40 seconds), he spotted the front of Ms. Wozniak’s car in his immediate path of travel.

According to Mr. Schertle, the car’s headlights were off. He applied his ⁵⁶⁷ brakes and managed to bring his Taylor tractor to a halt without hitting the car. The sudden stop caused the tractor to tilt forward, however, and the wood pulp cargo toppled onto the car, crushing it and killing Rebecca Wozniak instantly. Both Mr. Schertle and Mr. Stanley testified that they had never seen a car parked in that area before.

Ms. Carakoulakis testified that when Ms. Wozniak stopped her car by the industrial road, she kept the motor running and the headlights on. Ms. Wozniak then turned around, facing the back seat, to talk. The two women did not see the tractor approaching them until seconds before the accident. Ms. Carakoulakis explained that once they realized their peril, it was too late.

Ms. Carakoulakis was trapped in the car until emergency workers arrived and cut her out of the vehicle. Ricky Wozniak testified that when he was inside Shed 3B picking up his paycheck, he could hear the tractors running “because it echoes in the whole shed.” He witnessed the accident as he was leaving Shed 3B. He ran to the car and attempted to extricate the women, but could not do so because the doors were jammed. He then noticed that the car engine was still running and that the headlights were on.

By reaching through a hole in the ear’s windshield, he turned the headlights off. Mr. Schertle’s co-worker, Mark Stanley, was inside Shed 3B when the accident occurred. As he was driving out of the bay door with his load, Mr. Schertle came running up to him, yelling. Mr. Stanley saw the accident scene and noticed Ricky Wozniak nearby.

According to Mr. Stanley, Ms. Wozniak’s car did not have its headlights on. Officer Sean K. Hames, who was assigned to the Maryland Port Administration Police, responded to the scene of the accident. He testified that as he approached, he could see the rear of the Taylor tractor and the front of Ms. Wozniak’s car. The car’s headlights were off but the motor was still running.

He saw Ricky Wozniak reach through a hole in the windshield and turn the ignition off. According to Officer Hames, the ⁵⁶⁸ switch for the car’s headlights would not have been accessible through the hole in the windshield. DISCUSSION I. Was Contributory Negligence a Jury Question? Appellants first argue that the trial court erred in denying their “motion for judgment” on contributory negligence and sending that issue to the jury. 4 They maintain that the evidence adduced at trial was not sufficient to make Rebecca Wozniak’s contributory negligence a jury question.

We disagree. “Contributory negligence is that degree of reasonable and ordinary care that a plaintiff fails to undertake in the face of an appreciable risk which cooperates with the defendant’s negligence in bringing about the plaintiffs harm.” County Commissioners v. Bell Atlantic, 346 Md. 160, 180 , 695 A.2d 171 (1997); Wegad v. Howard Street Jewelers, 326 Md. 409, 418 , 605 A.2d 123 (1992); Menish v. Polinger Co., 277 Md. 553, 559 , 356 A.2d 233 (1976); Hooper v. Mougin, 263 Md. 630, 633 , 284 A.2d 236 (1971); see also, Potts v. Armour & Co., 183 Md. 483, 490 , 39 A.2d 552 (1944)(“contributory negligence is the neglect of duty imposed upon all men to observe ordinary care for their own safety.”). The burden of proving all of the elements of contributory negligence is on the defense. Myers v. Bright, 327 Md. 395, 403 , 609 A.2d 1182 (1992); Sears v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R. Co., 219 Md. 118, 123 , 148 A.2d 366 (1959); Rosenthal v. Mueller, 124 Md.App. 170, 175 , 720 A.2d 1264 (1998), cert. granted, 352 Md. 617 , 724 A.2d 20 (1999); Batten v. Michel, 15 Md.App. 646, 652 , 292 A.2d 707 (1972). Although a defendant’s burden of production on the issue of contributory negligence is slight, he nevertheless must offer ⁵⁶⁹ more than a “mere scintilla of evidence, ... more than surmise, possibility, or conjecture that [plaintiff] has been guilty of negligence,” to generate a jury issue.

Rosenthal, supra, 124 Md.App. at 174 , 720 A.2d 1264 (quoting Fowler v. Smith, 240 Md. 240, 246-47 , 213 A.2d 549 (1965)). In deciding whether the trial court should have ruled as a matter of law that Rebecca Wozniak was not contributorily negligent, we must view the evidence and the reasonable inferences that might be drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to appellees. General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki, 286 Md. 714, 733 , 410 A.2d 1039 (1980); Impala Platinum Ltd. v. Impala Sales (U.S.A.), Inc., 283 Md. 296, 327 , 389 A.2d 887 (1978); Exxon Corp. v. Kelly, 281 Md. 689, 698 , 381 A.2d 1146 (1978); Azar v. Adams, 117 Md.App. 426, 435 , 700 A.2d 821 (1997), cert. denied, 348 Md. 332 , 703 A.2d 1264 (1998); Mallard v. Earl, 106 Md.App. 449, 455-56 , 665 A.2d 287 (1995). Ordinarily, contributory negligence is a question of fact that is for the jury to decide.

Campfield v. Crowther, 252 Md. 88, 92 , 249 A.2d 168 (1969); Southern Maryland Elec. Co-op. v. Blanchard, 239 Md. 481, 485 , 212 A.2d 301 (1965). Only when no reasonable person could find in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of contributory negligence should the trial court take the issue from the jury. Campfield v. Crowther, supra, at 92, 249 A.2d 168 ; Montgomery Cablevision Ltd. Partnership v. Beynon, 116 Md.App. 363, 371-72 , 696 A.2d 491 (1997), reversed on other grounds, 351 Md. 460 , 718 A.2d 1161 (1998).

In the case sub judice, the evidence favorable to appellees (quite apart from the evidence of parking regulation violations that we shall discuss in Part II, infra) was sufficient to make contributory negligence a jury question. Ms. Wozniak stopped her car in the travel portion of an industrial roadway at the marine terminal, in the dark. She switched her headlights off (according to three witnesses), and turned her gaze to the rear seat of her car to talk with her friend. From Mr. Schertle’s testimony that there was “nothing at all” in the roadway when he drove out of the bay door of Shed 3B, ⁵⁷⁰ reasonable jurors could infer that the slow moving tractor already had started its approach and was visible when Ms. Wozniak stopped her car in its path.

Even if jurors concluded that Ms. Wozniak had stopped her car before Mr. Schertle drove his' tractor out of Shed 3B, however, they could draw a rational inference from the evidence that she was so inattentive to her surroundings that she did not see the headlights and strobe light of the large tractor and failed to hear the noises that it was making, even though they were loud enough to be heard inside Shed 3B. Finally, Ms. Wozniak was “charged with seeing that which if [she] had looked [she] must have seen,” Baltimore & O. R.R. v. Plews, 262 Md. 442, 458 , 278 A.2d 287 (1971); see also, Dashiell v. Moore, 177 Md. 657, 667 , 11 A.2d 640 (1940)(the driver of an automobile is “conclusively presumed to have seen surrounding circumstances as he would have seen had he properly exercised his faculty of vision. Where there is nothing to obstruct the vision of a driver, it is negligent not to see who is clearly visible”). From the evidence presented reasonable jurors could find that the 30 to 40 seconds that it took for the tractor to traverse the 120 feet from the bay door of Shed 3B to the accident site provided ample time for Ms. Wozniak to recognize, appreciate, and avoid the danger that was in her path.

II

Did the Trial Court Err in Instructing the Jury that Violation of Certain Parking Regulations Could be Considered Evidence of Contributory Negligence? When the accident occurred, Ms. Wozniak’s car was situated nine feet from a fire hydrant, one foot from one of the sets of railroad tracks on the industrial road, and in the general vicinity of the faded “No Parking Any Time” sign affixed to the west wall of Shed 3B. It also was across the industrial road from the large warehouse on which a second “No Parking Any Time” sign was posted. Pursuant to Md.Code (1957, 1993 Repl.Vol.), § 6-211 of the Transportation Article (“T.A.”), entitled “Control of motor vehicles at port facilities,” the Maryland Port Commission ⁵⁷¹ (“Commission”) “may adopt and enforce regulations for the parking and operation of motor vehicles in and on its port facilities.” 5 T.A. § 6-211(a).

The regulations adopted by the Commission under T.A. § 6-211 are set forth in the Maryland Code of Administrative Regulations (“COMAR”), and include the following pertinent provisions: .05 Parking on [Maryland Port Administration] Property. C. Restrictions. ⁵⁷² (1) Except when permitted by official signs, or when permitted by a member of the [Maryland Port Administration] Police or required by a traffic control device, motor vehicles may not be parked, be permitted to stand, or be left unattended: * * * (b) Within 15 feet of any fire hydrant[;] * * * (f) Within 50 feet of the nearest rail or railroad, except in designated parking areas; (g) In an area where [ ... ] a prohibition is indicated by posting of other markings placed under authority of the MPA. COMAR 11.05.03.05. The trial court instructed the jury as follows: You are instructed that the violation of a statute which is a cause of the Plaintiffs injuries or damages may be considered as evidence of negligence.

And in this regard, under regulations of the Maryland Port Administration Authority, except when permitted by official signs or when permitted by a member of the Maryland Port Administration police, or required by a traffic control device, motor vehicles may not be parked, be permitted to stand, or be left unattended within 15 feet of a [ ... ] fire hydrant, within 50 feet of the nearest rail, except on designated parking areas, or in an area where a prohibition is indicated by posting or other ⁵⁷³ marking placed under the authority of the Maryland Port Authority. Appellants excepted to this instruction. Their counsel argued: It is plaintiff[s’] position ... that in order for the violation of a statute to be given, the violation must be the proximate cause or contribute, somehow have something to do with the accident. And the instruction that Her Honor gave pursuant to the violation of statute regarding the fire hydrant, the plaintiffs aren’t denying it was there; — we introduced pictures — however, there is no credible evidence that the presence of a fire hydrant in any way shape, or form contributed to this accident.

Also, the 50 feet railroad exception, I don’t know how that is relevant here, because we’ve had clear testimony that within 50 feet there were other vehicles parked, acknowledged by the defendant himself.... Prohibition about other markings. The markings, I would think the Court would be referring to the sign, “no parking at any time.” ... [C]learly, the sign was on the building. [But,] [t]he defendant acknowledged ... that vehicles were parked there.... So how can he say, “Well, vehicles shouldn’t be parked there” when he knew they were?

And the sign was applicable not to — it was not a sign or post where Rebecca Wozniak was parked, it was on the wall. (Citations omitted). The trial court overruled appellants’ exception, explaining that “a central issue in this case is whether it was foreseeable, or a reasonable person in Mr. Schertle’s shoes should have foreseen that a car would be where Rebecca Wozniak’s car was at 10:00 in the evening.” (Emphasis supplied). In this Court, appellants contend that the trial court erred in giving the quoted instruction because: 1) Rebecca Wozniak was not a member of the class of people that the parking regulations at issue were designed to protect and the regulations were not intended to prevent death or personal injury, as ⁵⁷⁴ a matter of law; 2) any violation of the parking regulations was not a proximate cause of the accident, as a matter of law; and 3) the instruction was not generated by the evidence because on the facts viewed most favorably to the defense, the parking regulations did not apply.

Appellees counter that the first and third issues were not preserved for review. In the alternative, they argue that the trial court did not err in its instruction to the jury because the parking regulations were applicable to the facts in evidence and have safety as their purpose, and moreover reasonable jurors could have found that Ms. Wozniak’s violation of one or more of the regulations proximately caused the accident. We agree with appellants that their first argument was preserved for review. In excepting to the instruction, appellants’ counsel cited Slack v. Villari, 59 Md.App. 462 , 476 A.2d 227 (1984), in which we held that for the violation of a statute to be evidence of negligence, the person injured must be in the class of people the statute was intended to protect and the injury must be the sort of harm the statute was intended to prevent.

In addition, appellants’ counsel argued that, as a matter of law, the alleged violation by Ms. Wozniak of any one of the referenced regulations could not have been the proximate cause of her death. From the colloquy that took place when appellants lodged their exception, it is clear that both the court and opposing counsel understood the reasons for the exception and that the “class of person, class of risk” argument, though not phrased that way, was one of them. See Exxon Corp. v. Kelly, 281 Md. 689 , 694 n. 6, 381 A.2d 1146 (1978)(“[w]here the record makes clear that all parties and the court understood the reason for the objection,” the grounds need not be stated). Moreover, because foreseeability is a component of proximate causation, only by considering the purpose of a statute or regulation may a trial judge determine whether its violation may constitute a breach of duty proximately linked to the harm complained of.

On the other hand, we agree with appellees that appellants’ second argument was not preserved for review. At an ⁵⁷⁵ earlier point in the trial, appellants raised the question whether, on the evidence adduced, Rebecca Wozniak could be found to have violated any of the three parking regulations about which the jury was later instructed. This point was not repeated when appellants took exception to the instruction, however, and it is evident from the record that it was not embraced by any of the reasons given when the exception was taken. Because the issue will in all likelihood resurface on remand, however, we will discuss it infra, for guidance.

Md. Rule 8-131(a). We note, preliminarily, that the instruction as given plainly required the jury to consider in its deliberations on contributory negligence whether Ms. Wozniak had violated any one of the three parking regulations described. The instruction was not linked to the issue of primary negligence. The court’s rationale for the instruction, however, was that the existence of the parking regulations might have had a bearing on whether Mr. Schertle would have anticipated that a car would be in his path as he drove his tractor along the rails on the industrial road and whether he acted reasonably under that circumstance.

That is, if Mr. Schertle knew about the parking regulations, the jury could weigh that factor in considering whether his conduct constituted negligence. Yet, there was no evidence elicited to show that Mr. Schertle knew of the parking regulations. 6 Moreover, as we have observed, the instruction about the regulations did not concern Mr. Scher-tle’s negligence in any event. Even though the trial court’s reason for giving the statutory violation instruction was incorrect, it does not follow necessarily that it was improper for the jury to have considered the parking regulations in deciding whether Ms. Wozniak was contributorily negligent. Our review is confined to the points considered by the trial court, not to the reasoning offered to support those points.

Sothoron v. Weems, 3 G. & J. ⁵⁷⁶ 435, 441-42 (1831); Ellicott v. Turner, 4 Md. 476, 481 (1853); see also, In re Michael G., 107 Md.App. 257, 265 , 667 A.2d 956 (1995)(appellate review on purely legal grounds is expansive); Jensen v. Jensen, 103 Md.App. 678, 687 , 654 A.2d 914 (1995)(chancellor’s ruling on a purely narrow issue of law is not entitled to deference). In Hartford Ins. Co. v. Manor Inn, 335 Md. 135 , 642 A.2d 219 (1994), the Court of Appeals explained: “The violation of a statute may furnish evidence of negligence.” Atlantic Mutual v. Kenney, 323 Md. 116, 124 [ 591 A.2d 507 ] (1991). It may be actionable when it causes harm to a person within the class of persons the statute seeks to protect and the harm is the kind that the statute was designed to prevent.

Although the violation of a statute is evidence of negligence it “is not per se enough to make a violator thereof liable for damages.” Liberto v. Holfeldt, 221 Md. 62, 65 [ 155 A.2d 698 ] (1959). For that to occur, the plaintiff must show that the violation was a proximate cause of his or her injury ... that “had not been interrupted by a break in the chain of causation.” Holfeldt, 221 Md. at 65 [ 155 A.2d 698 ]. Id. at 155-56 , 642 A.2d 219 (citations omitted). See also Owens v. Simon, 245 Md. 404, 409 , 226 A.2d 548 (1967); Hammond v. Robins, 60 Md.App. 430, 435 , 483 A.2d 379 (1984); Slack v. Villari, 59 Md.App. at 471 , 476 A.2d 227 .

Many times the Court of Appeals has held in automobile tort cases that evidence of a violation of a duty imposed by a “Rules of the Road” 7 statute is evidence of negligence when the violation was a proximate cause of the accident. Norris v. Wolfensberger, 248 Md. 635, 640-41 , 237 A.2d 757 (1968)(violation of statutory duty to turn left from left lane is evidence of negligence if violation was proximate cause of the accident); Miller v. Mullenix, 227 Md. 229, 232-33 , 176 A.2d 203 (1961)(violation of statutory duties not to pass within 100 ⁵⁷⁷ feet of intersection and not to cross double line is evidence of negligence when violation proximately caused collision); Brown v. Bendix Aviation Corp., 187 Md. 613, 619 , 51 A.2d 292 (1947)(violation of statutory duty to yield right of way to pedestrian is evidence of negligence). See also Whitt v. Dynan, 20 Md.App. 148, 154 , 315 A.2d 122 (1974)(violation by pedestrian of the statutory duty to walk on the left side of the highway, facing traffic, is evidence of contributory negligence in a wrongful death action arising out of collision between driver/defendant and pedestrian/decedent). As Judge McAuliffe explained in Atlantic Mutual v. Kenney, supra, however, while some “Rules of the Road” statutes are designed to protect people from harm, others may not have such a purpose. 323 Md. at 124 , 591 A.2d 507 .

The purpose of a statute, including who it was designed to protect and from what it was intended to protect them, is a legal determination. Slack v. Villari, 59 Md.App. at 471 , 476 A.2d 227 . T.A. § 6-211 provides, under the subsection heading “Scope of rules and regulations,” that “[t]he rules and regulations shall: (1) Be reasonably necessary for the safety of persons and property or for the efficient operation of the port facilities.” T.A. § 6-211(b). (Emphasis added).

COMAR 11.05.03.04, entitled “Motor Vehicle Operations,” incorporates by reference all provisions of titles 11 through 27 of the Transportation Article, see 11.05.03.04 A(l), and provides that, “The portions of these regulations that are identical with or included by reference with corresponding portions of the Maryland Vehicle Law shall be interpreted and construed to make uniform these regulations, except that these regulations may supplement the Maryland Vehicle Law,” see 11.05.03.04(A)(2)(a), and that, “If the regulations conflict with the Maryland Vehicle Law and cannot be reconciled with the law as provided, the Maryland Vehicle Law prevails and controls.” See 11.05.03.04(A)(2)(b). With those principles in mind, we turn to the regulations in question. ⁵⁷⁸ Fire Hydrant Parking Regulation Appellants argue that the obvious purpose of the regulation prohibiting parking within 15 feet of a fire hydrant is to ensure free access to water in fire emergencies, not to protect occupants of vehicles on the adjacent roadway from harm. In Whoolery v. Hagan, 247 Md. 699, 706 , 234 A.2d 605 (1967), the Court of Appeals held that because bridges are known to become “bottlenecks,” it was “virtually axiomatic” that the statute prohibiting stopping, standing, or parking on any bridge was intended by the Legislature “only [for] the facilitation and expedition of traffic and not for the protection of users of the bridge.” 8 In so concluding, the Court discussed with approval a case in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed as follows in holding that a statute prohibiting parking within 15 feet of a fire hydrant was not enacted for reasons of safety: “No profound analysis of the statute is required to show that the restriction upon parking within fifteen feet of a fire hydrant was intended to assure immediate availability in case of a fire in the vicinity and not to aid in regulating traffic as an aid to highway safety.” Id.(quoting Ennis v. Atkin, 354 Pa. 165, 169 , 47 A.2d 217 (1946)). Likewise, it is readily apparent that the purpose of the fire hydrant parking regulation at issue here is to provide access to water in the case of fire and is not to protect people in Ms. Wozniak’s (or Mr. Schertle’s) position from injury on the roadway.

Moreover, to the extent that the regulation confers a secondary safety benefit on the occupants of burning buildings and on firefighters, and may have been intended to do so, it is evident that neither Ms. Wozniak nor Mr. Schertle were within either class of persons. ⁵⁷⁹ In addition, and for a logically related reason, the court erred in giving this instruction because any violation of the fire hydrant parking regulation by Rebecca Wozniak was not a proximate cause of the accident, as a matter of law. As we have indicated, contributory negligence is “some negligence on the part of the plaintiff which, whether great or small, directly contributes to the happening of the accident. ...” Bull S.S. Line v. Fisher, 196 Md. 519, 524 , 77 A.2d 142 (1950). A defendant who sets about proving that by violating a statute, the plaintiff failed to exercise due care for his own safety, must prove also that the statutory violation was a proximate cause of the accident: It is a rule in this State that the mere violation of a statute will not support an action in damages, even though it may be evidence of negligence, unless there is legally sufficient evidence to show the violation was a proximate cause of the injury. Peterson v. Underwood, 258 Md. 9, 15 , 264 A.2d 851 (1970)(quoting Austin v. Buettner, 211 Md. 61, 70 , 124 A.2d 793 (1956)).

See also Myers v. Bright, 327 Md. 395, 405 , 609 A.2d 1182 (1992)(evidence that plaintiff was violating the law by speeding will not bar recovery unless accident was “at least partly attributable to [plaintiffs’] rate of travel”). In Rosenthal v. Mueller, 124 Md.App. 170 , 720 A.2d 1264 , Judge Moylan explained that when a plaintiffs violation of a “Rules of the Road” statute is merely coincidental, having only the effect of placing him “at the wrong place at the wrong time,” it is “non-contributory” as a matter of law. Id. at 181 , 720 A.2d 1264 . In that case, the defendant’s vehicle struck the plaintiffs car from behind after the plaintiff had tried to pass on the right a truck that was stopped to make a left turn.

The jury found against the plaintiff on the issue of contributory negligence. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court had erred in sending that issue to the jury. The defendant countered that the issue had been properly submitted because reasonable jurors could find that the plaintiff had violated T.A. § 21-304(c), which prohibits driving off the trav ⁵⁸⁰ eled portion of the roadway. We reversed, noting that even assuming that the plaintiff had violated that statute by her conduct, the only connection between the statutory violation and the accident was that by random chance, it placed her in harm’s way.

We held that such a fortuitous link between a statutory violation and the happening of an accident is legally insufficient to satisfy the proximate cause element of contributory negligence. Likewise, if Rebecca Wozniak ran afoul of the fire hydrant parking regulation by parking within 15 feet of a fire hydrant, her doing so was not a proximate cause of the fatal accident. As we have discussed, reasonable jurors could have found on the evidence, presented that Ms. Wozniak did not exercise due care for her own safety in several ways, including by choosing to stop her car on the travel lane of an industrial roadway at night, and that her decision to stop her car where she stopped it proximately caused her death. Yet, the distance in feet from the point at which Ms. Wozniak stopped her car and the nearest fire hydrant had no bearing on the happening of the accident, except in the most random and attenuated way.

To be sure, had Ms. Wozniak diligently eliminated all points within a 15 foot radius of the fire hydrant in choosing a spot to park, her car would not have been in the Taylor tractor’s path when it emerged from Shed 3B. Accordingly, her failure to park at a point that was not more than 15 feet from the fire hydrant may have been a “cause in fact” of the accident — just as the fact that she drove to the marine terminal that day at all was such a cause — in that, “but for” that conduct, the accident would not have happened. See BG & E v. Lane, 338 Md. 34, 51 , 656 A.2d 307 (1995)(holding that proximate cause element of negligence is satisfied if the negligence “is 1) a cause in fact of the injury and 2) a legally cognizable cause.”). See also Robb v. Wancowicz, 119 Md.App. 531, 545 , 705 A.2d 125 , cert. denied, 350 Md. 278 , 711 A.2d 869 (1998)(holding that for wrongful conduct to be a proximate cause of the injury, it first must be a cause in fact of the injury; i.e., but for the ⁵⁸¹ wrongful conduct, the injury would not have occurred.) 9 It was not, however, a legally cognizable cause of the accident.

As the Court of Appeals has explained, whether a cause is “legally cognizable” is essentially a question of “fairness and social policy.” BG & E v. Lane, supra, at 51, 656 A.2d 307 . In this case, while the precise location at which Ms. Wozniak stopped her car played a central role in the happening of the accident, and while it may have been careless for her to have stopped her car where she did, the proximity of her car to the fire hydrant outside of Shed 3B was irrelevant to the occurrence of the accident. It would be unfair under that circumstance to permit the jury to draw a legally meaningful causal link between Ms. Wozniak’s violation of the fire hydrant regulation and her death. See Northern Central Railway Co. v. Geis, 31 Md. 357, 365 (1869)(holding that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that violation by the defendant of an ordinance prohibiting parking on a sidewalk could be evidence of negligence: “There was no evidence showing, or tending to show, that the accident was occasioned by the act or from the fact of violating the City Ordinance by the defendant, even if it be conceded that the car in which the deceased was injured, occupied at the time, a forbidden place on the street.

The whole subject of this instruction was apart from the real questions involved in the case, and, therefore, calculated to mislead the minds of the jury ... ”). Moreover, being caught in the oncoming path of a tractor is not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of parking within 15 feet of a fire hydrant. No Parking Within 50 feet of Nearest Rail Regulation Appellants argue that the regulation prohibiting parking “(wjithin 50 feet of the nearest rail or railroad, except in ⁵⁸² designated parking areas,” was designed to promote the free flow of traffic within the port facility, not to protect drivers in the position of Ms. Wozniak, and, moreover, that because the accident in this case did not involve a motor vehicle and a train, even if the regulation were intended to protect drivers from harm it was not meant to protect them from injury (or death) in an accident of this sort. Appellees counter that given that the port facility is used at all hours for “dangerous, heavy stevedoring and warehousing activity,” one purpose of the regulation is to protect people in the position of Ms. Wozniak by prohibiting the parking of vehicles near rails that are used for such activity.

Atlantic Mutual v. Kenney, supra, 323 Md. 116 , 591 A.2d 507 , arose out of an automobile accident that occurred when two vehicles (one owned an operated by the plaintiff) collided because each driver’s ability to observe the other was significantly impaired by the presence of a tractor trailer (owned and operated by the defendant) in an area designated “no parking.” The case, which sounded in negligence, was taken by the Court of Appeals on certiorari from the circuit court, after that court reversed a district court judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The parties devoted much of their argument on appeal to whether the defendant had violated T.A. § 21-1003(aa), which provides that “[a] person may not park a vehicle at any other place where parking is prohibited by an official sign,” and thus was properly found by the district court to have been negligent. The Court of Appeals held that the issue had not been addressed below. It nevertheless observed that even if the defendant had parked illegally, “that would not have ended the inquiry:” The violation of a statute may furnish evidence of negligence, but only where the person alleging negligence is within the class of persons sought to be protected, and the harm suffered is of the kind which the statute was intended, in general, to prevent.

A statute prohibiting parking within a specified distance from an intersection or crosswalk is obviously" intended to protect motorists and pedestrians from risks associated with obstruction of visibility. A stat ⁵⁸³ ute or ordinance prohibiting parking at a specified location may or may not have a similar objective. Id. at 124, 591 A.2d 507 (citations omitted). See also Maggitti v. Cloverland Farms Dairy, 201 Md. 528, 532 , 95 A.2d 81 (1953)(“The legislative purpose [of the statute prohibiting “double parking”] was obviously to expedite traffic, as far as possible”).

In determining the purpose of the regulation prohibiting parking within 50 feet of the nearest rail or railroad, we may consider its similarity to provisions in the Transportation Article. Moreover, just as we must read provisions of the Transportation Article that have been incorporated by reference into the port facility regulations by interpreting them “in the context of MPA property,” COMAR 11.05.03.04(A)(2)(c), we must keep that context in mind in deciding the purpose of the regulations themselves. The rail/railroad parking regulation at issue here is similar to T.A. § 21-1003(t), which prohibits “[a] person [from parking] a vehicle within 50 feet of the nearest rail in a railroad grade crossing,” and is not inconsistent with it. They differ, however, in that the rail/railroad parking regulation makes it illegal to park a vehicle within 50 feet of the nearest rail regardless of whether the rail intersects a road.

That difference can be accounted for when considered “in the context of MPA property.” Because roadways in port facilities such as the Dundalk Marine Terminal serve not only as transportation arteries for people but also as industrial routes for moving cargo by vehicle and by train, the points at which the paths of vehicles and trains may intersect are not limited to grade crossings, as they usually are outside that setting. In that setting, it is more likely that parked vehicles will interfere with rail traffic, and that occupants of those vehicles will be harmed in encounters between their vehicles and trains or other vehicles using the rails for the movement of cargo. When considered in this context, we conclude that the rail/railroad parking regulation serves the dual purpose of maintaining orderly and efficient operations at port facilities and protecting the safety of occu ⁵⁸⁴ pants of parked vehicles who are subject to additional danger because the facility is used for multiple transportation purposes. We disagree with appellant that even assuming, as we have concluded, that Ms. Wozniak was within the class of people meant to be protected by this regulation, she did not suffer the kind of harm the regulation was meant to protect against because her parked car encountered a tractor using the railroad line, not a train.

The regulation is intended in part to protect occupants of parked cars from serious injury and death that can ensue when parked cars interfere with the movement of vehicles that occupy the rails. This purpose applies whether the vehicle in question is a train or another vehicle using the rail. The trial court did not err in instructing the jury that a violation of the rail/railroad parking regulation could be considered evidence of negligence on the part of Rebecca Wozniak. On remand, however, the court must, take into account that certain predicate factual determinations need to be made by the jury before it may conclude that Ms. Wozniak violated this regulation (and hence whether such violation is evidence of contributory negligence).

It is for this reason that we shall address, for purpose of guidance, the unpreserved issue raised by appellants. As we have indicated, the regulation at issue provides that “motor vehicles may not be parked, be permitted to stand, or be left unattended” within fifty feet of the nearest rail or railroad. Because the regulation must be interpreted in conformity with the incorporated portions of the Maryland Vehicle Law, whether at the time of the accident Ms. Wozniak had “parked” her vehicle or had “permitted it to stand” turns upon the definitions of the terms “park” and “stand” set forth in T.A. §§ 11-144 and 11-160, respectively. Those definitions read as follows: “Park” means to halt a vehicle, whether or not it is occupied, other than temporarily: ⁵⁸⁵ (1) When necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic or in compliance with the directions of a police officer or a traffic control device; or (2) For the purpose of and while actually engaged in loading or unloading property or passengers. “Stand” means to halt a vehicle, whether or not it is occupied, other than temporarily: (1) When necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic or in compliance with the directions of a police officer or a traffic control device; or (2) For the purpose of and while actually engaged in receiving or discharging passengers. [10] Whether Ms. Wozniak halted her vehicle “temporarily” and whether she halted her vehicle for the purpose of and while actually engaged in loading or unloading or receiving or discharging a passenger are questions of fact about which the jury must be instructed.

Likewise, whether Ms. Wozniak left her vehicle “unattended” is a question of fact. See May v. Giant, 122 Md.App. 364, 376 , 712 A.2d 166 (1998). Only if, after considering those factual issues, the jury determines that Ms. Wozniak parked her vehicle, permitted it to stand, or left it unattended, may it then consider the violation of the regulation as evidence of negligence. No Parking Regulation The “no parking” regulation that the trial court included in its contributory negligence instruction forbids parking in any area “where ... a prohibition is indicated by posting or other ⁵⁸⁶ markings placed under authority of the [Maryland Port Authority].” The lack of specificity in this regulation means that its purpose cannot be determined outside of the context in which it was applied.

Prohibitions against parking in certain areas may be intended to further safety and to protect against harm, while prohibitions against parking in other areas may not serve that goal. Atlantic Mutual v. Kenney, supra, 323 Md. at 124 , 591 A.2d 507 It is clear from the configuration and setting of the loading dock and Shed 3B, to which the “No Parking Any Time” signs were affixed, and the locations of the signs on those buildings, that they are posted to promote ease of access to the buildings, not to protect drivers or occupants of vehicles on the adjacent roadway from injury or death. The sign closest to the accident site is attached to the wall of Shed 3B, next to the side door and in front of an area in which drivers who intend to stop and enter that building naturally will be inclined to park- their cars. In fact, it was undisputed that(as depicted in the photographs that were placed into evidence) several cars were illegally parked against that wall when the accident occurred.

The other “No Parking Any Time” sign is posted on the wall of the loading dock, which is elevated and is across the industrial road and on the other side of two sets of railroad tracks from the accident site. Its most obvious purpose is to assure free access to the loading dock. Because the apparent purpose of the no parking regulation, when considered in the context of this case, is to keep certain areas to which access is needed free of parked vehicles, its violation could not have been a proximate cause of Ms. Wozniak’s death, and the jury should not have been instructed about it. Moreover, and equally important, when the accident occurred, Ms. Wozniak’s car was not in a location controlled by either of the “No Parking Any Time” signs.

Her car was not among the several that were parked by the side wall of Shed 3B. (Ironically, if the owners of those vehicles had not violated the no parking regulation, it may well be that Ms. Wozniak could have stopped her car temporarily by the side door while ⁵⁸⁷ Ricky Wozniak picked up his paycheck without violating any regulation and outside of the path of Mr. Sehertle’s tractor). Her car also was not in the vicinity of the loading dock. Because the signs at issue did not proscribe parking at the location at which Ms. Wozniak stopped her car, the jury should not have been permitted to consider the violation of the no parking regulation as evidence of Ms. Wozniak’s contributory negligence.

Prejudice In a civil case, we only will reverse a judgment if the complaining party on appeal shows error and prejudice. Harris v. Harris, 310 Md. 310, 319 , 529 A.2d 356 (1987); Beahm v. Shortall, 279 Md. 321, 330 , 368 A.2d 1005 (1977); Kapiloff v. Locke, 276 Md. 466, 472 , 348 A.2d 697 (1975); Toft v. State of Nev. ex rel. Pimentel, 108 Md.App. 206, 217, 219 , 671 A.2d 99 (1996). As the Court of Appeals observed in Beahm , “[p]recise standards for the degree of prejudice required for reversal, have not been, and perhaps cannot be established.” 279 Md. at 331 , 368 A.2d 1005 .

Ordinarily, a civil judgment will not be reversed unless the error on the part of the trial court “was both manifestly wrong and substantially injurious,” id. (quoting Rotwein v. Bogart, 227 Md. 434, 437 , 177 A.2d 258 (1962)), or the error is established to have had “a prejudicial effect on the outcome of the case.” Id. (quoting Kuenne, supra, 240 Md. at 235 , 213 A.2d 567 ); see also Harris, supra, 310 Md. at 319 , 529 A.2d 356 (error is prejudicial if it “influenced the outcome of the case.”). What constitutes prejudice warranting- reversal is to be determined on the circumstances of each case.

Harris, supra, at 332 , 529 A.2d 356 ; State Roads Comm. v. Kuenne, 240 Md. 232, 235 , 213 A.2d 567 (1965). Appellees maintain that even if the trial court erred in granting the jury instruction respecting the parking regulations, the evidence that Ms. Wozniak violated those regulations was but a “small portion” of all of the evidence introduced to show contributory negligence, and that because the ⁵⁸⁸ rest of the evidence, standing alone, was “ample” to support the jury’s finding on that issue, there was no prejudice. As our discussion in Part I makes plain, we agree that there was evidence other than that relating to the parking regulation violations from which reasonable jurors could have found that Rebecca Wozniak did not exercise due care for her safety and that her conduct in that regard proximately caused the accident. We are not persuaded, however, that the jury based its finding of contributory negligence solely on that “other evidence,” or on the violation of the rail/railroad parking regulation aspect of that instruction.

Indeed, a finding based on a violation of that regulation would be problematic in any event because, as we have explained, the jury was not instructed about the predicate factual findings necessary for it to conclude that Ms. Wozniak violated the rail/railroad regulation at all. Moreover, with respect to the fire hydrant regulation, because the distance between Ms. Wozniak’s car and the fire hydrant outside of Shed 3B was undisputed, the instruction as given gave the jury little choice but to find that she violated that regulation. The jury improperly was permitted to conclude, from that undisputed fact, that Ms. Wozniak was negligent and that her negligence proximately caused her death. Given that the jury also was instructed, correctly, that any negligence on Ms. Wozniak’s part, no matter how small, would operate as a complete bar to recovery, it is likely that the jury’s decision about the fire hydrant regulation signaled an end to its inquiry.

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court’s error in instructing the jury was prejudicial.

III

Did the Trial Court Err in Declining to Instruct the Jury About the Presumption that a Decedent Exercised Due Care for her Own Safety? (i) Because the third question presented by appellants raises an issue about a requested jury instruction that will no doubt ⁵⁸⁹ be raised again in the retrial on contributory negligence, we exercise our discretion to address it. Md. Rule 8~131(a). Appellants asked the trial court for an instruction that would have told the jury that the decedent, Ms. Wozniak, was presumed to have exercised due care for her own safety. 11 The trial court acknowledged the existence of such a presumption in Maryland law but declined to grant the instruction, reasoning that under Md. Rule 5-301(a) and Bratton v. Smith, 256 Md. 695 , 261 A.2d 777 (1970), it is not proper to instruct on that presumption when contributory negligence is a jury issue. 12 ⁵⁹⁰ Appellants contend that the trial court erred in refusing to grant the requested instruction because it was a correct statement of the law that was generated by the evidence, and that the court misinterpreted Bratton v. Smith, supra, in ruling as it did.

Not surprisingly, appellees take the opposite position, emphasizing that in Bratton , even though contributory negligence was a jury question, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s ruling denying the instruction. In short, while the parties agree that the Court of Appeals long has