Md. Reclamation Assoc. v. Harford Cnty.

Maryland Reclamation Associates, Inc. v. Harford County, Maryland, No. 52, September Term, 2019, Opinion by Booth, J. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES – Maryland Reclamation Associates (“MRA”) was required to exhaust its administrative remedies by submitting all constitutional claims to the Board of Appeals (“Board”). MRA’s unconstitutional takings claim was no exception to this settled principle. Under our established case law, where a property owner is asserting an unconstitutional taking of its property arising from the application of a zoning regulation, as part of the administrative proceeding, the property owner is required to establish that he or she will be deprived of all beneficial use of the property. Whether a property owner will be deprived of all beneficial use of a property is an initial factual determination that is within the original jurisdiction of the Board of Appeals, subject to judicial review.

MRA could not circumvent the exhaustion requirement by withholding its takings argument from the Board’s consideration and later presenting the claim to a jury under the court’s original jurisdiction. Because MRA never raised its takings claim in the administrative proceeding, the instant case should have been dismissed. Circuit Court for Harford County Case No.: 12-C-13-000509 Argued: March 10, 2020 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 52 September Term, 2019 MARYLAND RECLAMATION ASSOCIATES, INC. v. HARFORD COUNTY, MARYLAND Barbera, C.J. McDonald Watts Hotten Getty Booth Biran, JJ. Opinion by Booth, J. Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic.

Suzanne Johnson 2020-08-20 10:51-04:00 Filed: April 24, 2020 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk This case requires us to examine a property owner’s right to invoke the original jurisdiction of the courts by filing an inverse condemnation case pursuant to Article III, § 40 of the Maryland Constitution, where the constitutional claim was not raised during the administrative agency proceeding before the Harford County Board of Appeals. We consider these principles against the backdrop of 30 years of litigation between the parties. This is the fourth Court of Appeals case arising out of litigation between Maryland Reclamation Associates, Inc. (“MRA”), and Harford County, Maryland (“Harford County” or the “County”), in connection with MRA’s efforts to construct and operate a rubble landfill on approximately 62 acres of land (the “Property”) located on Gravel Hill Road, in Harford County. See Md. Reclamation Assocs., Inc. v. Harford Cty., 342 Md. 476 (1996) (“MRA II”);1 Md. Reclamation Assocs., Inc. v. Harford Cty., 382 Md. 348 (2004) (“MRA III”); Md. Reclamation Assocs., Inc. v. Harford Cty., 414 Md. 1 (2010) (“MRA IV”).

The earlier litigation between the parties concluded with this Court’s 2010 opinion in MRA IV, which rejected all of MRA’s substantive claims by upholding all the factual determinations and legal conclusions of the Harford County Board of Appeals (sometimes hereinafter referred to as the “Board”). See MRA IV, 414 Md. at 65 . After losing on each substantive claim, including the constitutional and non-constitutional claims that were 1 We refer to our first opinion as MRA II because there was an initial appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. See Holmes v. Md. Reclamation Assocs., Inc., 90 Md. App. 120 (1992), cert. dismissed sub nom.

Cty. Council of Harford Cty. v. Md. Reclamation Assocs., Inc., 328 Md. 229 (1992). The initial appeal has been referred to in our previous cases as “MRA I.” raised in the context of the administrative hearing and upheld by this Court, MRA filed a separate inverse condemnation case alleging that Harford County’s actions constituted an unconstitutional taking of its Property in violation of Article III, § 40 of the Maryland Constitution. Over the decades of litigation, conspicuously absent from the constitutional claims asserted by MRA was any allegation that the application of zoning regulations— Bill 91-10—to its Property, and the denial of a variance, would deprive MRA of all beneficial use of the Property, thereby creating an unconstitutional taking without just compensation.

We must determine whether, under our exhaustion of administrative remedies jurisprudence, a landowner may withhold a claim alleging an unconstitutional taking arising from the application of a zoning regulation from the administrative agency’s consideration and present the claim to a jury in a separate action invoking the court’s original jurisdiction. For the reasons set forth more fully in this opinion, we hold that, under our abundance of case law applying the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine in the context of a constitutional takings claim arising from the application of a zoning regulation, the property owner must raise its takings claims within the administrative agency proceeding prior to seeking judicial review or filing a separate legal proceeding. Our case law firmly establishes that under the Express Powers Act, Md. Code (1974, 2013 Repl. Vol., 2019 Cum.

Supp.), Local Government Article (“LG”) § 10-101, et. seq., the Harford County Board of Appeals had original jurisdiction to make the initial factual determination of whether there were any other beneficial uses that could be made of the Property, and to grant relief in the form of a variance to avoid an unconstitutional taking, if MRA had, in 2 fact, established that under the Harford County Code, there were no other beneficial uses that could have been made of the Property, other than a rubble landfill. By failing to raise these claims before the Board of Appeals, MRA did not exhaust its administrative remedies and dismissal of this case was required. I. BACKGROUND AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS On February 19, 2013, MRA filed a Civil Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial in the Circuit Court for Harford County alleging one count, which it titled “Violations of Article III, Section 40 of the Maryland Constitution, Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.” Over two years later, on June 15, 2015, MRA filed an Amended Complaint for Inverse Condemnation and Demand for Jury Trial, again alleging one count for inverse condemnation titled “Violations of § 40 of Article III of the Maryland Constitution and Articles 19 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.” The First Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) recites the same facts and procedural history concerning MRA’s attempt to obtain approvals to operate a rubble landfill on its property that were litigated by MRA in appellate proceedings before this Court. The facts alleged in the Complaint—which formed the basis for the jury’s $45 million plus verdict— were first summarized by Judge Eldridge on behalf of this Court in MRA II, 342 Md. at 480–87.

We repeat those facts once again, as follows. In August 1989, MRA contracted to purchase the Property. MRA intended to construct and operate a rubble landfill on the Property and began the process of obtaining a rubble landfill permit from the Maryland Department of the Environment (“MDE”) 3 pursuant to Maryland Code (1982, 1996 Repl. Vol), Environment Article §§ 9-204 through 9-210.

MRA II, 342 Md. at 480 . MRA first requested that Harford County include the Property in Harford County’s Solid Waste Management Plan (“SWMP”) as a rubble landfill. Id. By a vote of 4-3, the Harford County Council (the “Council”) amended its SWMP to include MRA’s Property as a rubble landfill.

The Property’s inclusion in the Harford County SWMP, however, was made subject to 27 conditions, including a minimum landscape buffer of 200 feet. Id. On November 16, 1989, Harford County advised MDE that MRA’s Property had been included in the County’s SWMP as a rubble landfill site. Id.

MRA next sought approval for its rubble landfill permit from MDE. Id. On November 20, 1989, MRA received Phase I permit approval from MDE. Id.

MRA then filed with MDE the necessary reports and studies for Phase II and Phase III approvals. Id. MRA had entered into a contract to purchase the Property in August 1989, before its inclusion in the SWMP. Id. at 481 .

Allegedly relying on the Property’s inclusion in the Plan, and on MDE’s Phase I approval, MRA consummated the purchase on February 9, 1990, for $732,500. Id. The settlement occurred on the last possible day under the terms of the contract of sale. Id.

Four days after the settlement date, the newly appointed Harford County Council President and a Council member introduced County Resolution 4-90, which provided for the removal of the Property from the County’s SWMP. Id. In the litigation that ensued over this legislation, the Court of Special Appeals held that Resolution 4-90 was invalid because it was preempted by the State’s authority over solid waste management plans and 4 the issuance of rubble landfill permits. Id.

(citing Holmes v. Md. Reclamation Assocs., Inc., 90 Md. App. 120 , cert. dismissed sub nom. Cty. Council of Harford Cty. v. Md. Reclamation Assocs., Inc., 328 Md. 229 (1992) (“MRA I”)). While the litigation over Resolution 4-90 was pending, in February 1991, Bill 91- 10 was introduced by the Harford County Council as an emergency bill.

Id. at 482. Bill 91-10 proposed to amend the requirements for a rubble landfill by increasing the minimum acreage requirements, buffer requirements, and height requirements. Id. The Bill, inter alia, would establish a minimum rubble fill size of 100 acres and a buffer zone of 1,000 feet.

Id. After public hearings, the County Council passed the Bill in March 1991. Id. In April 1991, Bill 91-16 was introduced by the Harford County Council.

Id. This Bill authorized the County Council to remove a specific site from the County’s SWMP if the site did not comply with certain zoning regulations, if a permit had not been issued by MDE within 18 months of the site being placed in the County’s SWMP, or if the owner of the site had not placed the site in operation within the same 18-month period. Id. Bill 91- 16 was also passed by the County Council.

Id. That same month, the President of the Harford County Council sent a letter to MDE enclosing a copy of enacted Bill 91-10 and advising the Department that the provisions of the Bill could call into question the status of sites which were in the process of obtaining rubble landfill permits. Id. at 483. MDE advised the County Council in May 1991 that if a permit were to be issued to MRA, such issuance would not authorize MRA to violate any local zoning or land use requirements.

Id. 5 Also in May 1991, the County’s Director of Planning sent a letter to MRA informing it of Bill 91-10, indicating that MRA’s Property would apparently fail to meet the requirements of Bill 91-10, stating that MRA should submit documentation showing that the Property could meet the requirements of the zoning ordinances, and stating that, if the site could not meet such requirements, MRA would need a variance to operate a rubble landfill on the Property. Id. at 483–84. MRA did not file for a variance in response to the Director’s May letter; however, MRA did file an “appeal” to the Harford County Board of Appeals from the “administrative decision pursuant to Section 267-7E in a letter dated 5/2/91,” requesting that the Board “review and reverse the decision of the Zoning Administrator interpreting that the standards of Council Bill 91-10 apply to the Applicant.” Id. at 484. The “application” to the Board of Appeals asserted that Bill 91-10 was inapplicable to the Property and that, if it was applicable, it was invalid.

Id. In May 1991, Resolution 15-91 was introduced in the Harford County Council. Id. at 485. This resolution purported to interpret Harford County law and determine that the Property was not in compliance with the county law.

Id. The resolution purported to remove the site from the County’s SWMP. Id. The County Council passed Resolution 15- 91 in June 1991.

Id. A. The Prequel—MRA II, MRA III, and MRA IV—A Procedural Labyrinth of Zoning History This case is procedurally unique given the related, tortuous litigation history that preceded the instant matter, involving the same underlying zoning regulation—the enactment of Bill 91-10—and its application to MRA’s Property. Because of the 6 relationship between the earlier cases and our analysis and holding in this case, it is necessary to summarize this “prequel.” As discussed in the ensuing chapters of the prequel, the very issues that were presented to the jury in this case were decided, or should have been decided, in the proceedings before the Harford County Board of Appeals and were finally adjudicated by this Court in MRA IV. Chapter 1 – MRA II MRA filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Harford County in June 1991, seeking a Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief against Harford County and the Harford County Council.

Id. MRA requested, inter alia, the following: (1) a declaration that Bills 91-10 and 91-16 and Resolution 15-91 were “null and void” as to MRA’s Property; (2) an injunction preventing the County from enforcing Bills 91-10 and 91-16 and Resolution 15-91 against MRA; and (3) an injunction staying all further action on MRA’s appeal to the Board of Appeals. Id. MRA advanced several legal theories to support its complaint for declaratory relief.

Id. In June 1991, the circuit court issued an interlocutory injunction preventing the enforcement of the local legislation against MRA. Id. The circuit court’s order expressly authorized MDE to continue its processing of MRA’s pending permit application.

Id. The order also stayed the processing of MRA’s administrative “appeal” of the Planning Director’s “decision” contained in the Director’s May 2, 1991 letter. Id. Finally, the interlocutory order prohibited MRA from commencing any construction without court approval.

Id. at 485–86. 7 While the parties were litigating the matter in the circuit court, in February 1992, MDE issued to MRA a permit to operate a rubble landfill on its property. Id. at 486. The MDE permit was expressly conditioned upon compliance with local land use requirements. Id.

After considering cross-motions for summary judgment, in May 1994, the circuit court filed an opinion and judgment, “declaring that Harford County was entitled to enact new zoning laws that may prevent MRA from operating a rubble landfill, and that Bills 91- 10 and 91-16 were not invalid on the grounds asserted by [MRA].” Id. The court declared that Resolution 15-91 was invalid on its face. Id. The circuit court determined that “the Harford County Council was acting as a legislative body when it passed the resolution” and that its passage “constituted an illegal attempt to interpret and apply the laws which the Council had previously enacted.” Id.

MRA filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Id. Before there were any further proceedings in that court, this Court issued a writ of certiorari. Id.

On appeal, MRA asserted state and federal constitutional challenges, as well as non- constitutional arguments. Id. at 486–87. Two of MRA’s arguments were grounded upon the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Id. at 487.

The primary argument advanced by MRA was that “it had a ‘constitutionally protectable property interest in the Harford County Solid Waste Management Plan’ and had ‘vested rights in the permit process’. . . and that Harford County had ‘retroactively’ abrogated those rights in violation of due process principles.” Id. MRA’s second constitutional argument was that the two 8 Harford County ordinances violated MRA’s “substantive due process rights because the ordinances [were][] arbitrary and capricious and unreasonable.” Id. (cleaned up). With respect to the two non-constitutional arguments, MRA: (1) urged the Court to adopt the doctrine of zoning estoppel and hold that Harford County is estopped from applying the ordinances to MRA’s Property; and (2) argued that the two Harford County ordinances, as applied to MRA’s Property, were preempted by the provisions of state law relating to solid waste disposal and the state permit issued to MRA.

Id. at 488. In MRA II, we explained that during oral argument, MRA’s contentions were “clarified somewhat” with respect to any potential takings claims that MRA may have been asserting. Id. at 488–90. Notably, the Court clarified that MRA was not alleging in the context of this case that the ordinances were unconstitutional as applied to its Property.

Id. at 489. Because the takings claim—and MRA’s failure to raise this claim in MRA II, MRA III, and MRA IV—is significant and relevant to our exhaustion analysis in this case, we reiterate Judge Eldridge’s summary and clarification of these matters as they appear in MRA II: Both in the circuit court and in its brief in this Court, [MRA] relied upon principles and cases relating to the question of whether particular governmental regulation of a landowner’s use of his property had gone so far as to constitute a “taking” of the property without just compensation in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment and/or Article III, § 40 of the Constitution of Maryland. In light of this reliance, the Court inquired whether [MRA’s] counsel was making a “takings” argument, and counsel stated that he was not. The following colloquy occurred: 9 “THE COURT: Mr. Grieber [Attorney for [MRA]], are you . . . one thing I’m not sure about, are you making . . . in addition to a substantive due process argument, are you making a takings argument under the [Just Compensation] Clause of the Fifth Amendment, or. . .

Mr. GRIEBER: No, I am not, your Honor. THE COURT: . . . under Article III, section 40, of the Maryland Constitution? Mr. Grieber: No, I am not, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GRIEBER: That’s, that’s a viable option later should this Court not agree with me. But at this point in time, no, we are not.” In addition, counsel for [MRA] confirmed that [MRA] was “not making a facial attack” upon the ordinances, but was “arguing that [they are] invalid as applied to” the . . . [P]roperty. Counsel for Harford County then argued that questions of validity as applied should initially be raised and decided in the appropriate administrative proceedings, and that [MRA] had failed to invoke and exhaust the administrative remedies available to it. [MRA’s] counsel responded that, because the same persons who are members of the County Council are also members of the Board of Appeals in Harford County, it would be futile to invoke and exhaust administrative remedies.

Id. at 489 (footnotes omitted). Prior to reaching the merits of MRA’s substantive arguments, the Court explained that the “threshold issue in this case is whether, and to what extent, [MRA] was required to invoke and exhaust administrative remedies available under the Harford County Code and the Express Powers Act, Maryland Code . . . , Art. 25, § 5(U) (setting forth the 10 jurisdiction and procedural requirements with respect to boards of appeals in chartered counties).” Id. at 490. After discussing the applicable provisions of the Harford County Code and the Express Powers Act, we held that MRA had not exhausted its administrative remedies, including appealing the Zoning Administrator’s ruling to the Board of Appeals, and applying to the Zoning Administrator for variances. Id. at 492.

This Court then considered the consequence of MRA’s failure to exhaust its administrative remedies with respect to each legal argument. Id. Concerning any due process claim arising from the United States Constitution, we explained that such an action, which would arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , would not be subject to the state law requirements that administrative remedies must first be exhausted. Id.

We noted that the “Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff is entitled to maintain an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in a state court without having exhausted available administrative remedies.” Id. (citing Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 , 146–47 (1988)). Although we determined that the federal constitutional claims were not subject to the exhaustion requirement, we held that any potential federal takings claims were not ripe for judicial consideration until MRA applied for a variance and received a final decision from the Board. Id. at 505.

Turning to the remaining claims arising under the state constitution, as well as MRA’s non-constitutional claims, we held that the circuit court erred in considering the merits of MRA’s claims. Id. at 497. We cited several of our cases for the holding that “[w]here a legislature has provided an administrative remedy for a particular matter, even 11 without specifying that the administrative remedy is primary or exclusive, this Court has ‘ordinarily construed the pertinent [legislative] enactments to require that the administrative remedy be first invoked and followed’ before resort to the courts.” Id. at 492 (quoting Bd. of Educ. for Dorchester Cty. v. Hubbard, 305 Md. 774, 786 (1986)) (collecting cases).2 MRA argued that any exhaustion requirement under the circumstances would be futile because the Board of Appeals was comprised of the same members of the Harford County Council who opposed the rubble landfill on policy grounds. Id. at 495.

We rejected MRA’s contention, stating that “[t]his argument . . . furnishes no sound basis for a judicially created exception to the exhaustion requirement set forth in Art. 25A, § 25(U).” Id. We noted that in Turf Valley Associates v. Zoning Board, 262 Md. 632 , 643–44 (1971), we “held that ‘there is no fundamental barrier to conferring on the legislative branch of a chartered county the right to constitute itself a zoning body,’ and to delegate to that zoning body both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial zoning functions.” MRA II, 342 Md. at 495– 96. We also pointed out that in Klein v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 285 Md. 76 , 82–83 (1979), “this Court held that constituting the Harford County Council as the Harford County Board 2 In describing the requirement for exhausting administrative remedies, we noted that we recognized a limited “constitutional” exception, where the exhaustion principle does not apply “where the constitutionality of a statute on its face is challenged, and where there exists a recognized declaratory judgment or equitable remedy.” Md. Reclamation Assocs., Inc. v. Harford Cty., 342 Md. 476, 494 (1996) (“MRA II”) (quoting Ins. Comm’r v. Equitable, 339 Md. 595, 621 (1995)).

We did not consider this exception because counsel for MRA conceded that it was not making a facial challenge to the ordinances. Id. at 495. Rather, all four of MRA’s arguments related to the validity of the ordinances as applied to MRA’s Property. Id. 12 of Appeals was valid, and that the Harford County Board of Appeals was a board of appeals pursuant to [the Express Powers Act], and that the language of [the Act] expressly provides that a decision by the Harford County Board of Appeals is a prerequisite to an action in the circuit court.” MRA II, 342 Md. at 496 .

We explained that that it would undermine the holdings in these cases to adopt MRA’s reasoning “that the Harford County Board of Appeals can be by-passed whenever a case involves Harford County ordinances reflecting a policy which is arguably inconsistent with the plaintiff’s position, simply because the members of the County Council also constitute the Board of Appeals.” Id. We explained that: If [MRA] were to seek a decision or decisions by the Harford County Board of Appeals, the Board would be considering the issues raised by [MRA] in a quasi-judicial capacity, and its decision would be fully subject to judicial review in the Circuit Court for Harford County. If the Board of Appeals commits an error of law, if its rulings are arbitrary or capricious, or if critical factual findings are unsupported by substantial evidence, the Board’s decision will be reversed. Nevertheless, under [the Express Powers Act], the Board’s decision-making function cannot be circumvented.

Id. at 496–97. We held that the circuit court below should not have considered the merits of MRA’s state law and state constitutional challenges to the application of Bills 91-10 and 91-16 to the Property and vacated the judgment of the circuit court. Id. at 497 . Chapter 2 - MRA III Following just one part of this Court’s directive in MRA II, MRA filed requests for an interpretation of Bills 91-10 and 91-16 from the Zoning Administrator.

MRA III, 382 13 Md. at 350. After receiving unfavorable rulings, MRA appealed to the Board of Appeals. Id. However, MRA did not seek a variance from the strict application of the legislation which had been incorporated into the zoning provisions of the Harford County Code.

Id. at 360. The Board, through its Hearing Examiner, conducted a hearing and issued a decision in April 2002 that the application of Bill 91-10 to the proposed rubble landfill did not violate federal, state, or local laws. Id. at 359. As summarized by Judge Harrell writing for this Court in MRA III, the Hearing Examiner’s findings and conclusions underlying this decision were as follows: 1.

Bill 91-10 applies to MRA’s property on Gravel Hill Road. 2. The requirements of Bill 91-10 can be validly applied to MRA’s property on Gravel Hill Road under the circumstances of this case and in light of the Environmental Article of the Maryland Code as well as other principles of Maryland law. 3. MRA’s operation of a rubble landfill on its property at Gravel Hill Road pursuant to its state permit will violate applicable Harford County Zoning law . . . . Moreover, the Hearing Examiner questions whether the permit issued to MRA by MDE is validly issued as it was based on misinformation provided to the State by MRA regarding the conformance of the property and use with Harford County Zoning law. 4.

MRA cannot obtain a grading permit unless it can meet the requirements of Harford County Zoning law. To the extent MRA does not meet specific standards it must seek a variance and obtain a variance from provisions with which it cannot comply. MRA’s reliance on site plan approvals that pre-date the enactment of Bill 91-10 is without merit. 5. MRA’s operation of a rubble landfill on its property at Gravel Hill Road pursuant to its State-issued Refuse Disposal Permit No. 91- 12-35-10-D and as renewed by Refuse Disposal Permit 1996- WRF-0517 will violate applicable Harford County zoning law. 14 6.

Harford County is not prohibited by the principles of estoppel from applying the provisions of Harford County Bill 91-10 . . . to MRA’s property and specifically, to MRA’s operation of a rubble landfill on its property. 7. MRA’s rubble landfill did not acquire vested rights in its use that would insulate it from the application of Bill 91-10 to that use. It is the vested rights doctrine itself that allows a landowner to raise issues of constitutional protections. There is no constitutional infringement on the rights of MRA because a vested right was not established.

Applying the provisions of Bill 91-10 to MRA’s Gravel Hill Road property is, therefore, not prohibited by the United States Constitution and/or the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 8. Harford County is not preempted by the Environmental Article of the Maryland Code, particularly sections 9-201 et seq. and 9-501 et seq., from applying Bill 91-10 to MRA’s Gravel Hill Road property. 9. MRA’s operation of a rubble landfill on its Gravel Hill Road property is not a valid non-conforming use pursuant to Harford County Zoning Code. MRA III, 382 Md. at 359–60 (emphasis added).

In June 2002, the Board of Appeals adopted the Hearing Examiner’s decision. Thereafter, Harford County refused to issue MRA a grading permit or zoning certificate. Id. at 360. MRA did not file a request for a variance—either in response to the Board of Appeals’ final decision, or on a parallel course to its request for interpretation by the Zoning Administrator to its nine questions presented.

Id. at 361. MRA filed a petition for judicial review to the Circuit Court for Harford County. Id. at 360. In October 2003, the circuit court affirmed the decision of the Board of Appeals, concluding that “all nine requests for interpretation were answered correctly . . . in 15 accordance with the law, and based on substantial evidence, and the decision was also correct when it upheld the zoning administrator’s denial of [MRA’s] request for a zoning certificate.” Id. at 357–58.

MRA appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. Id. at 351. Prior to any proceedings before the Court of Special Appeals, we issued a writ of certiorari. Id.

Once again, we held that MRA had not exhausted its available administrative remedies. Id. at 361. We reiterated that “[a] fundamental precept of administrative law is the requirement that exclusive or primary administrative remedies ordinarily be exhausted before bringing an action in court.” Id. at 361–62 (collecting cases). We explained that, “[e]ight years ago in MRA II, this Court instructed MRA that before it may obtain judicial review in the Circuit Court for Harford County of any adverse administrative decisions in this case, it must exhaust its available administrative remedies under the applicable laws.” Id. at 363 (citing MRA II, 342 Md. at 497 ) (emphasis added).

We stated our directive in MRA II, that “this Court identified the administrative remedies available to MRA: (1) request an interpretive ruling from the Zoning Administrator and, if that ruling were adverse to MRA’s interests, appeal to the Board of Appeals; (2) if the Board of Appeals’ decision was adverse to MRA, it should apply for zoning variances or exceptions.” Id. at 363 (citing MRA II, 324 Md. at 501). MRA argued that the “proper application to its situation of the exhaustion of administrative remedies principle should permit a ‘two-step process’ by which it may pursue in turn judicial review of each discrete adverse administrative decision.” Id. We rejected MRA’s interpretation of the exhaustion requirements stating: 16 MRA believes that this Court must decide the issues it advances in the present case and, if decided adversely to MRA’s position, it retains “the option of seeking a variance from the application of Bill 91-10 and other Harford County regulations to its property.” We do not subscribe to this inefficient and piecemeal approach. Seeking zoning variances is not, as MRA contends, merely an “option.” The right to request zoning interpretations and a zoning certificate and, if denied, the right to seek variances are two parallel or successive remedies to be exhausted, not optional selections on an a la carte menu of administrative entrees from which MRA may select as it pleases.

Id. at 363–64 (emphasis added). We noted that “Judge Eldridge, speaking for this Court, pellucidly explained the doctrine of administrative remedies, as applied to the circumstances of this dispute, in MRA II. As MRA appears not to have appreciated completely the directions of MRA II, we can only reiterate the reasoning here.” Id. at 365 (emphasis added). Once again, we restated that: MRA’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies, before bringing this judicial review action, applies to the federal constitutional issues as well as state constitutional and non[-]constitutional issues . . . .

For the reasons extensively discussed in MRA II, supra., 342 Md. at 497–506, . . . we hold that the federal constitutional issues raised by [MRA] also are not now ripe for judicial decision. Id. at 366–67 (emphasis added). We also explained the process whereby a circuit court should stay final consideration of the merits of one matter where the resolution of said matter may depend upon the exhaustion of administrative remedies: Under the circumstances, a stay by the Circuit Court of final consideration of the merits of this petition for judicial review is the correct disposition for the present, rather than dismissal of the petition. When a litigant is entitled to bring two separate legal proceedings in an effort to obtain relief in a particular 17 matter, when the litigant institutes the first of those proceedings and the case is pending in a trial court, and when the trial court is unable to decide the merits of that case because of primary jurisdiction or exhaustion principles associated with the second proceeding, the trial court ordinarily should stay the first proceeding for a reasonable period of time.

During that period, the litigant may pursue and obtain a final administrative decision in the second proceeding. If still aggrieved, the litigant will be able to file an action for judicial review in the second proceeding, and the trial court may hear the two cases together. Id. at 367. By the conclusion of MRA II and MRA III, several legal principles should have been clear.

First, that MRA had to exhaust all its administrative remedies, including seeking a zoning variance from the application of Bill 91-10 prior to judicial review of the merits of any legal claims. Second, that the exhaustion requirement applied to MRA’s constitutional and non-constitutional claims. In other words, before proceeding with any judicial review or filing a separate judicial proceeding asserting that Bill 91-10 was unconstitutional as applied to MRA’s Property, MRA had to apply for a zoning variance and raise any constitutional and non-constitutional claims within the administrative agency proceeding. Chapter 3 - MRA IV In the final chapter of this prequel, once again, MRA proceeded to follow just one part of the Court’s directives enunciated in MRA II and MRA III.

In May 2005, MRA finally requested from the Harford County Hearing Examiner several variances from the provisions of Bill 91-10, which had been incorporated into the Harford County Zoning Code. MRA IV, 414 Md. at 15 . The variances sought were to permit: •the disturbance of the 30-foot buffer yard; 18 •the disturbance within the 200-foot buffer from adjoining property lines; •the operation of a rubble landfill on less than 100 acres; •the operation of a landfill without satisfying the buffer requirement; •the deposit of solid waste less than 500 feet from the flood plain district; •the disturbance of the 1,000-foot buffer from a residential or institutional building; •the use of a landfill within a Natural Resource District, to permit the disturbance of the Natural Resources District buffer, and to disturb the minimum 75-foot wetlands buffer in the Agricultural District; Id. Over the period of 10 months, the Hearing Examiner presided over 17 hearings, and heard testimony from MRA’s 11 witnesses, eight of whom were experts; six experts offered by a group of individuals who live in the neighborhood surrounding the proposed rubble landfill and who were opposed to its development (“Opponents”); 16 residents from the community and parishioners of the St. James African Methodist Episcopal (“AME”) Church; and the acting director of the Harford County Department of Planning and Zoning.

MRA IV, 414 Md. at 16–17. The Hearing Examiner issued a 78-page decision dated February 28, 2007 recommending that the Board deny MRA’s variance requests. Id. Notably, although MRA applied for a variance and argued that it satisfied the variance standards under the Harford County Code, it did not allege or assert before either the Hearing Examiner, or the Board of Appeals, that the application of Bill 91-10 to its Property, 19 and the denial of a variance, would deprive MRA of all beneficial uses of the Property, thereby creating an unconstitutional taking of its Property without just compensation.

The Hearing Examiner applied the variance factors under the Harford County Code3 and, inter alia, made the following findings: The proposed rubble landfill has the potential of causing a great impact on the neighbors who reside on Gravel Hill Road, and on users of Gravel Hill Road. * * * * [T]he disturbance of the 200-foot buffer during the rubble landfill operation would increase the disturbance to be seen and experienced by adjoining owners and residents. As a result, they would suffer an adverse impact. * * * * MRA’s parcel is 55 acres in size. Section 267-40.1(A) requires that the site be at least 100 acres. Obviously, the Applicant will not have a rubble-fill regardless of the finding on the other variances, unless it is granted a variance to the 100-acre requirement.

The variance requested is substantial, with the Applicant suggesting that an area of just slightly more than one-half of the minimum acreage requirement is sufficient for approval . . . . [T]he Applicant’s argument in favor . . . is that[,] “[e]nlarging the site to 100 acres would serve no purpose and would be a practical difficulty.” Again, no statutory or case authority exists which 3 Under the provisions of the Harford County Code, § 267-11(A), to obtain a variance from an applicable zoning provision of the Harford County Code, the applicant was required to demonstrate, and the Board was required to find, that: (1) By reason of the uniqueness of the property or topographical conditions, the literal enforcement of [the provisions of the Code] would result in practical difficulty or unreasonable hardship. (2) The variance will not be substantially detrimental to adjacent properties or will not materially impair the purpose of [the provisions of the Code] or the public interest. 20 would justify the granting of a variance based on a perceived lack of need for the requirement for which the variance is requested . . . . Furthermore, the Applicant cannot allege a disproportionate impact of the 100 acres requirement upon it. All properties of less than 100 acres in size are similarly impacted by the prohibition against rubble-fills on parcels of less than that size.

The Applicant is treated no differently than any other similarly situated property owner[s]. Id. at 16–21 (italics in original omitted). With respect to the request for a variance to allow for the disturbance of the 1,000-foot buffer requirement from residential or institutional buildings, the Hearing Examiner noted that relaxing this requirement would have a severe impact upon the St. James AME Church and its congregation. Id. at 22.

There was considerable testimony in the record before the Hearing Examiner that the St. James AME Church and its graveyard had significance to the African-American community. Id. at 19. The Hearing Examiner stated that, “[b]eing the final resting place of African[-]American soldiers who fought in the Civil War is itself a factor sufficient to mandate that the Church and its graveyard be given all possible protections to help preserve their historical significance and the prominent place they continue to play in the history of our County and State.” Id. The Hearing Examiner found that MRA’s operations, including the use of the trucks operating five-and-a-half days a week, would have an adverse impact on the historic church, its congregation, and the surrounding residential properties.

Id. at 22. MRA appealed the Hearing Examiner’s decision to the Board. Id. at 23. On June 5, 2007, the Board voted 7-0 to deny the requested variances and adopted the Hearing Examiner’s decision.

Id. 21 MRA noted an appeal to the circuit court, which affirmed the findings of the Board of Appeals by order filed on July 11, 2008. Id. With the denial of the variance in hand, MRA also renewed its 2003 appeal in the circuit court. Id.

On September 3, 2008, the circuit court affirmed its October 2003 decision. Id. MRA filed an appeal of the denial of the variance and the circuit court’s affirmance of its 2003 decision to the Court of Special Appeals. Id.

Once again, on our own initiative, we granted certiorari on both matters. Id. On appeal, Judge Adkins, writing for this Court, addressed separately MRA’s claims related to the denial of the variance (“Case No. 143 Issues”) and its substantive claims associated with the Zoning Administrator’s determination, which were affirmed by the circuit court in its 2003 decision (“Case No. 144 Issues”). Case No. 143 Issues – Denial of the Variances Consistent with the presentation of its testimony and argument below, MRA failed to argue that it was entitled to a variance from the provisions of the Harford County Code because the effect of a denial would constitute an unconstitutional taking of its Property without just compensation.

Because the takings claim was not part of the case, this Court, in MRA IV, proceeded to determine only whether the Board erred in determining that MRA had not satisfied the requirements for a variance as set forth in Harford County Zoning Code, Chapter 267, Section 267-11(A). Id. at 24. After reviewing the testimony and evidence presented to the Hearing Examiner, we held that the Board did not err in finding that the requested variances would be substantially detrimental to adjacent properties. Id. 22 A. Proposed Rubble Landfill Adverse Impacts on St. James AME Church and its Historic Graveyard Our analysis of the Board’s denial of the variances began with the review of the variance factors under the Harford County Code, and the Hearing Examiner’s application of the factors to the evidence presented at the hearings.

Id. at 25. Under the Harford County Code, the Board’s denial of MRA’s requested variances “shall be upheld if the proposed rubble landfill will be ‘substantially detrimental’ to adjacent properties.” Id. (citing Harford County Code, Chapter 267, § 267-11(A)(2)).4 We concluded that the Board “did not err in denying the requested variances because there was sufficient evidence that MRA’s proposed rubble landfill will ‘adversely affect the public health, safety, and general welfare,’ will ‘jeopardize the lives or property of people living’ [in the surrounding area] and result [in] ‘dangerous traffic conditions’ in the Gravel Hill and St. James communities.” Id. In finding substantial evidence to support the Board’s findings, we noted that the Board had relied upon the expert testimony establishing the use of heavy equipment between the hours of 7:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., and the adverse impacts that the rubble landfill operation would have on the historic African-American church site, which lies 25 feet from the outer boundary of MRA’s property.

Id. at 26. The graveyard is a Harford County historic place because it serves as a resting place of soldiers who served in the United States Colored Troops (“U.S.C.T.”) during the Civil War. Id. at 28. We pointed 4 The Harford County zoning regulations are set forth in Chapter 267 of the Harford County Code.

For purposes of brevity, we omit additional Chapter references and shall cite only to the applicable section reference. 23 out that the Hearing Examiner’s findings of fact referenced the testimony that was provided by Carl Westmoreland, an expert in the preservation of historic African-American sites, to discuss the potential adverse effect that the rubble landfill would have on the historic preservation of the St. James site. Id. at 26. Mr. Westmoreland testified that: The imposition or the activation of a dump site would create an industrial environment that would be in conflict with the 18th and 19th century environment that predominates at this point and would compromise the historical integrity and the cultural legitimacy of this community that has existed for over 150 years and that has attempted to function within the mores and the cultural traditions of Maryland. To me, when you arrive there, if you didn’t know that it was a black church, it’s just a little modest church.

When you see the Civil War monuments, the only reason you know they’re black is because it says USCT, but it’s typical of what you would see in the Maryland landscape. And I think that’s what people in Havre de Grace and in Gravel Hill have struggled for, to become part of the American mainstream and this documents their efforts. Id. at 27. The Opponents also presented the testimony of an expert archeologist, Dr. James Gibb, who testified concerning the potential adverse impacts that a rubble landfill would have on the Church and its historic cemetery.

Id. at 28. Dr. Gibb, who holds a doctorate in anthropology, and had experience as an instructor in anthropology and archeology, “testified that dust will be permitted to blow onto the cemetery, which will destroy the historic setting of the cemetery. [Dr.] Gibb also testified that the slopes around the existing graves are stabilized with vegetation and that destabilizing the vegetation could be detrimental to the graves.” Id. 24 MRA argued that the Board should have relied upon its archeological expert, Michael Clem, who “opined that the proposed rubble fill would not adversely affect the historic cemetery located on the Church property and that the ‘graves will actually be better protected from erosional forces by filling.’” Id. at 29. We rejected MRA’s argument, explaining that “when there are differing opinions of two well-qualified experts and a zoning issue is fairly debatable, then the County Board could ‘quite properly’ accept the opinion of one expert and not the other.” Id. (citing Dundalk Holding Co. v. Horn, 266 Md. 280, 292 (1972)).

We reiterated our previous holding “that ‘[c]ourts, under these circumstances, should not substitute their judgment on a fairly debatable issue for that of the administrative body.’” Id. (quoting Dundalk Holding Co., 266 Md. at 292 ). We explained that, “[t]he Board was in the best position to evaluate the credible position of these two experts and it was within its bailiwick to give greater weight to the appellee’s expert’s opinion.” Id. We also rejected MRA’s contention that Dr. Gibb’s testimony was “devoid of substantial supporting facts,” noting that “he discussed the detrimental effects that would result from construction and operating the rubble fill”: So in order to use that quarry again, it will have to be deforested.

You have to remove the trees before you can get the trucks in; and that’s just logical. And that will be fairly extensive deforestation. So that will affect the setting. And as far as physical effects on the site, we’ve got dust, which is unavoidable in cases where any kind of clearing goes on.

And I presume . . . that problem will be exacerbated with trucks moving large quantities of rubble. 25 So dust is going to affect the fabric of the building, the church. It may [affect] the gravestones too. I haven’t really looked at it in those terms, but the dust will affect the building. Dust gets into all the cracks and crevices.

We’ve had a temperate winter, but sooner or later we’re going to have a cold, wet winter. That dust, once it gets into the crevices, will absorb water. It will expand and contract and cause deterioration of the building. Id. at 30 (emphasis in original).

We also pointed out that Dr. Gibb refuted Dr. Clem’s testimony that the filling activities associated with the proposed rubble landfill would create a positive impact by a better view shed and grave protection: [Gibb]: In the present condition of the land, I would say no because you would have to clear those slopes before you can fill them. Right now the slopes down from the cemetery, the quarry face, have stabilized. They’ve revegetated. There must be 30, 40 years of growth there at least.

Id. at 31. Accordingly, we concluded “that there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the Board’s finding that the rubble landfill activities will be ‘substantially detrimental’ to the St. James church and graveyard.” Id. B. Detrimental Impacts on the Health and Welfare of the People in the Gravel Hill Community. In the proceedings before the Board, the Opponents averred that the rubble landfill would adversely affect the property in the surrounding area.

Id. We described testimony before the Hearing Examiner, concluding that “[t]he evidence of decreased vegetation and increased diesel fumes is sufficient to support a finding that the rubble landfill would negatively affect the health and welfare of the individuals in the surrounding area.” Id. at 33. Concerning the testimony from 14 individuals who live or attend church in the area of Gravel Hill Road, we found the Opponents’ characterization to be accurate: “[t]he 26 individuals who testified explained how permitting a rubble landfill to operate in their community will interfere with the enjoyment of their homes and yards through the introduction of increased traffic, noise, dust, vermin, and general unpleasantness of having a landfill in close proximity to their homes.” Id. C. Traffic Conditions Along Gravel Hill Road.

Concerning traffic impacts, we commented that “[a]ccording to the parties’ stipulation of facts, ‘MRA anticipates that approximately 50 trucks per day will enter Gravel Hill Road[,]’” which, according to the County, represented “virtually a 50-fold increase from the non-existent [traffic] that presently exists on the road.” Id. We noted that although MRA’s traffic expert, Jeffrey Lawrence, testified that the increased truck traffic “would only add a 12.5 second increase to time spent at the traffic intersection and would not jeopardize the safety of the community[,]” Mr. Lawrence admitted that he did not know how many children lived along the road, did not know where and how many school buses stopped along the road, and testified that in reaching his conclusion, he did not take into consideration any activities that take place at the public park, St. James AME Church, or graveyard. Id. at 33–34. From the testimony, we discerned that the “school bus issue—rather than the sheer number of vehicles passing through— . . . formed a key component of the hearing.” Id. at 34.

We commented that one resident testified that “four different school buses stop along Gravel Hill Road” at least twice a day, and that parents and grandparents testified that “they fear for the safety of their children crossing the street in light of the 50 additional trucks crossing their road.” Id. at 34. We noted that MRA failed to address the child safety 27 concerns, and we determined that “there was sufficient evidence to support the Board’s findings and conclusion in favor of the Appellees.” Id. D. Conclusions with Respect to the Variance Standards. In conclusion, we noted that the “Board rested its decision to deny all of these requested variances because [MRA] did not meet the second requirement of [the Harford County Code][] Section 267-11(A)(2) that each ‘variance will not be substantially detrimental to adjacent properties.’” Id.

We concluded “that there was sufficient evidence, with respect to each requested variance, to support the Board’s conclusion.” Id. Accordingly, we upheld the Board’s denial of the variances. Id. Case No. 144 Issues – Preemption, Constitutional Claims, and Estoppel Claims In Case No. 144, MRA advanced several legal theories as to why, under the circumstances, Bill 91-10 could not be applied to the Property.

Id. at 35. We summarize each argument presented by MRA in MRA IV, and our analysis and holdings, as follows.5 A. Preemption. First, MRA contended that Harford County was preempted from enacting zoning laws that conflict with the state’s comprehensive statutory scheme for permitting rubble landfills. Id. at 36–37.

We rejected this contention, explaining that MRA’s argument conflates zoning with permitting. Id. at 37–41. We explained that although state law gives 5 We have not summarized MRA’s contentions that the rubble landfill use constituted a valid non-conforming use, that it was entitled to a grading permit, or that its 1989 site plan approval caused its rights to vest. These arguments were summarily discussed and rejected (see Md. Reclamation Assocs. v. Harford Cty., 414 Md. 1 , 63–64 (2010) (“MRA IV”)) and are not germane to the issues presented in this case. 28 the State government the authority to issue permits for rubble landfills, the Express Powers Act “clearly contemplates zoning as an activity that exists in a sphere separate from the operations of State level regulation.” Id. at 38 .

We concluded that MRA’s preemption argument failed because it did not account for the dual nature of the zoning and permitting processes. Id. at 40–41 (citing Ad + Soil, Inc. v. Cty. Comm’rs of Queen Anne’s Cty., 307 Md. 307 (1986)). We recognized that zoning and permitting “perform different functions and can occur in tandem and with different results.” Id. at 44.

We concluded that the “County’s right to enact and enforce zoning regulations is not preempted by the state statute governing landfills.” Id. B. Constitutional Issues. 1. Vested Rights. MRA contended that Harford County was precluded by the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , and the Maryland Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights, from applying county zoning regulations enacted or revised after MDE began processing Phase II of MRA’s rubble landfill permit application for its Property.

Id. at 35 . MRA’s contention rested on its argument that it had a vested right in its prior county zoning approval to proceed with Phases II and III of MDE’s rubble landfill permitting process. Id. at 45–46. Based upon the facts that were established in the record, we held that the Board applied the correct principles of law in determining that MRA had not established a vested right to use its property for a rubble landfill under the applicable zoning laws when the permitting process had commenced.

Id. at 45–50. Writing for this Court, Judge Adkins 29 noted that the Court has set forth a “clear standard for determining when a person has obtained a vested right in an existing zoning use:” Generally, in order to obtain a vested right in an existing zoning use that will be protected against a subsequent change in a zoning ordinance prohibiting that use, the owner must initially obtain a valid permit. Additionally, in reliance upon the valid permit, the owner must make a substantial beginning in construction and in committing the land to the permitted use before the change in zoning ordinance has occurred. Id. at 44–45 (citing Powell v. Calvert Cty., 368 Md. 400 , 411–12 (2002)) (quoting O’Donnell v. Bassler, 289 Md. 501, 508 (1981)).

MRA argued that it had a vested right to use its property for a rubble landfill because it: (1) “made a substantial change of position in relation to the land (i.e., it purchased the land after it received zoning and [SWMP] approval)”; (2) “made substantial expenditures (it spent over a million dollars in land acquisition, engineering and legal fees)”; and (3) “incurred substantial obligations [by] proceed[ing] with the engineering development plans for Phases II and III of the State’s permitting process[].” Id. at 45. We held that the Hearing Examiner correctly rejected MRA’s contention that its previous expenditures created a vested right, and that the Examiner relied upon “clear Maryland precedent on the issue.” Id. (citing Ross v. Montgomery Cty., 252 Md. 497 , 506– 07 (1969) (holding that expenditures on architectural planning do not create vested rights) and Cty. Council for Montgomery Cty. v. District Land Corp., 274 Md. 691, 707 (1975) (holding that one million dollars in expenditures and a valid building permit did not create a vested right in a previous zoning classification of the land at issue)). 30 We observed that MRA “attempts to carve out a new category of use that will grant it ‘a vested right in a County zoning approval in the context of a State-controlled permitting process,’” which is in essence, a vested right in zoning approval.

Id. Rejecting MRA’s argument that it had a vested right in the zoning in effect at the time that it sought its initial permit, “[w]e follow[ed] many decades of Maryland law in holding that MRA needs more than a state permit and site plan approval in order to have a vested right.” Id. at 46. We concluded that the Hearing Examiner’s findings, which were subsequently adopted by the Board, were supported by substantial evidence in the record, and both applied the correct principles of law to determine that MRA had no vested right to use its Property as a rubble landfill. Id. at 49–50. 2.

Whether the Application of Bill 91-10 to MRA was Arbitrary and Capricious. MRA contended that Bill 91-10 unfairly targeted MRA and that Harford County’s application of Bill 91-10 to MRA was arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 50. We rejected this argument, holding that there was “sufficient evidence on the record to support the Board’s factual findings under the ‘substantial evidence’ standard.” Id.

We noted that there were four other proposed landfill projects at the time Bill 91-10 passed, some of which were also negatively affected. Id. at 50–51. We observed that “the record is replete with complaints of residents who lived near these [other] landfills. It is not surprising that the result of this public outcry was a tightening of the zoning laws with respect to rubble landfills.” Id. at 51.

MRA argued that “because of the animus towards the proposed rubble landfill, the County singled out MRA’s proposal when passing Bill 91-10 and point[ed] to testimony 31 indicating that the County was poised to stop MRA in its efforts.” Id. We pointed out that we had previously rejected this argument in MRA II and brought cases to MRA’s attention regarding the motivation of legislators. Id. (citing MRA II, 342 Md. at 505 n.15).

We reiterated that “‘a judiciary must judge by results, not by the varied factors which may have determined legislators’ votes. We cannot undertake a search for motive.’” Id. (quoting Daniel v. Family Sec. Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 224 (1949)).

We also pointed out that: “It is well-settled that when the judiciary reviews a statute or other governmental enactment, either for validity or to determine the legal effect of the enactment in a particular situation, the judiciary is ordinarily not concerned with whatever may have motivated the legislative body or other governmental actor.” Id. (quoting Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Driver, 336 Md. 105, 118 (1994)). Based upon established case law, we repeated that “we shall not delve into the motives of legislators when there is ample evidence that Bill 91-10 was directed at landfills in general and was emergency legislation because of the great public concern over all of the proposed landfills at the time.” Id.

C. Estoppel. MRA argued that Harford County was estopped from applying Bill 91-10 to its Property, resting its argument both on principles of equitable estoppel and zoning estoppel. Id. at 52. 1. Equitable Estoppel.

Turning to MRA’s equitable estoppel contention, we noted that in Hill v. Cross Country Settlements, LLC, 402 Md. 281, 309 (2007), we provided the general definition of equitable estoppel: 32 Equitable estoppel is the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which might perhaps have otherwise existed, either of property, of contract, or of remedy, as against another person, who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse and who on his part acquires some corresponding right, either of property, of contract, or of remedy. MRA IV, 414 Md. at 52 . We observed that, although there are cases where estoppel may be applied to a municipal corporation, such “examples are scarce.” Id. We further determined that MRA’s reliance on Rockville Fuel & Feed Co. v. City of Gaithersburg, 266 Md. 117 (1972), was misplaced.

MRA IV, 414 Md. at 52 . We explained that the Court’s primary analysis in that case was that the “doctrine of estoppel would appear applicable to this case only if . . . Plaintiff had a vested right . . . .” Id. at 53 (quoting Rockville Fuel, 266 Md. at 135 ) (emphasis in original). Once again, we reiterated our vested rights holding that “with only a permit, land purchase, and engineering studies, MRA has no vested rights in the property at issue.

As such, Rockville Fuel does not support the notion that the county is estopped under the circumstances of this case.” Id. (emphasis added). We explained that Rockville Fuel did not stand for the proposition that “the mere purchase of land in reliance on existing zoning is itself sufficient to create an estoppel that would preclude a change in the zoning, regardless of whether the zoning authority knew of the landowner’s plans. Indeed, . . . we consider such a proposition unwise.” Id. 2.

Zoning Estoppel. MRA urged us to hold that specific principles of zoning estoppel applied thereby preventing Harford County from applying Bill 91-10 to its Property. Id. at 54. We noted 33 that in Sycamore Realty Co. v. People’s Counsel of Baltimore County, 344 Md. 57, 64 (1996), we acknowledged the application of the doctrine of zoning estoppel in some other states, without recognizing it in Maryland: A typical zoning estoppel scenario arises when the government issues a permit to a citizen that allows him or her to develop property in some way.

Commonly, after the citizen has incurred some expense or has changed his or her position in reliance upon the permit, the property for which the permit was granted is rezoned so that the citizen’s intended use is illegal. In such a situation, many courts allow the citizen to assert zoning estoppel as a defense to the government’s attempt to enjoin the property use that violates the new zoning scheme. The traditional, “black-letter” definition of zoning estoppel is: “A local government exercising its zoning powers will be estopped when a property owner, (1) relying in good faith, (2) upon some act or omission of the government, (3) has made such a substantial change in position or incurred such extensive obligations and expenses that it would be highly inequitable and unjust to destroy the rights which he ostensibly had acquired.” Id. at 54 (quoting David G. Heeter, Zoning Estoppel: Application of the Principles of Equitable Estoppel and Vested Rights to Zoning Disputes, 1971 Urb. Law Ann. 63, 66 (1971)).

Although we recognized that there may be a circumstance for which the application of zoning estoppel is warranted, we declined to adopt the doctrine in MRA IV: We have not explicitly adopted the doctrine of zoning estoppel, but we recognize that as zoning and permitting processes become more complex, the need for such a doctrine grows. 34 Today, land use is much more highly regulated than it was fifty years ago—environmental concerns abound, and vehicular traffic demands seem to mushroom every year. Thus, a property owner who seeks to build or develop may well incur sizable expenses for experts in engineering, various environmental fields, traffic flow, archeology, etc., before putting a spade into the ground. With increasing public appreciation for open space and environmental protection causing apprehension about new construction, the likelihood a developing landowner will face serious opposition is high. Indeed, a developer faces quite a tortured process. . . .

But we also cannot ignore a local government’s responsibility to its residents, and thus, Maryland courts should not apply the doctrine casually. As open space disappears, and scientific knowledge about the adverse environmental impact from people’s use of land grows, local governments struggle to balance the legitimate interests and rights of land owners wishing to develop against equally legitimate environmental and community concerns. Due to the delicacy of this balancing act, and the overriding need to protect the public, local government cannot always chart a steady course through the Scylla and Charybdis of these disparate interests. Land developers must understand that, to a limited extent, the local government will meander, and before they incur significant expense without final permitting, they must carefully assess the risk that the government will shift course.

On the other hand, there may be situations in which the developer’s good faith reliance on government action in the pre-construction stage is so extensive and expensive that zoning estoppel is an appropriate doctrine to apply. Id. at 56–57 (emphasis in original). Despite our recognition that there may be circumstances where we would apply the doctrine, we stopped “short of adopting zoning estoppel in this case as the facts set forth in this record do not support its application.” Id. at 57–58. We noted that “[f]or decades Maryland has maintained a stricter stance than most states in protecting government’s right to downzone in the face of planned construction.” Id. at 57–58 (citing 9-52D Patrick J. 35 Rohan & Eric Damian Kelly, Zoning and Land Use Controls § 52D.03 (2009)).

We explained that “[a]lthough we may sometimes adopt a new principle of law in a case in which the facts do not fit the doctrine, the doctrine of equitable estoppel is so fact-specific that it would be imprudent to depart from this history before we are faced with a case presenting circumstances for its application.” Id. at 58. We stated that “zoning estoppel must be applied, if at all, sparingly and with utmost caution . . . . Squaring with this cautious approach, we conclude that the burden of establishing the facts to support that theory must fall on the person or entity claiming the benefit of the doctrine.” Id. Reviewing the facts in the record, we concluded that “zoning estoppel does not fit these facts because there was no substantial reliance by MRA.” Id.

We noted that “[u]nder the theory of zoning estoppel, if the developer ‘has good reason to believe, before or while acting to his detriment, that the official’s mind may soon change, estoppel may not be justified.’” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Robert M. Rhodes, et al, Vested Rights: Establishing Predictability in a Changing Regulatory System, 13 Stetson L. Rev. 1 , 4 (1983)). “At the heart of establishing ‘good faith’ is proof that the claimant lacked knowledge of those facts that would have put it on sufficient notice that it should not rely on the government action in question.” Id. (citing Heeter, 1971 Urb. Law.

Ann. at 77–82). We determined that “[m]any facts were available to MRA at the time of its February 1990 purchase of the Property that should have alerted them to the real possibility that its plans for a rubble landfill would not come to fruition.” Id. at 59 . Specifically, we pointed out that, on November 14, 1989, when the County Council voted for the inclusion of the Property into the SWMP by a favorable vote of four council members, two members 36 abstained because they felt that they had inadequate information, and one member abstained because his son was the president of MRA. Id.

We noted that the inclusion in the SWMP “was achieved by a fragile majority, and MRA knew, as did the Council when it voted, that MRA had no permit from MDE and many additional steps had to be taken before MRA could actually construct the rubble landfill.” Id. We commented that “[i]nclusion of the Property in the County SWMP was a necessary, but not a sufficient step in the process of obtaining a state rubble fill permit from MDE.” Id. Indeed, we noted that at the November 14 hearing, the Council President told MRA that “what we are doing tonight is approving a process. We are not exactly approving the landfill site.

We are approving a step in a process.” Id. We pointed out that MRA’s president acknowledged that at the public hearing before the Hearing Examiner “there was ‘strong’ public opposition to the rubble landfill by ‘hundreds’ of persons at the November 7 and 14, 1989 hearings.” Id. We observed that the composition of the Council changed, and that these events occurred before MRA closed on its purchase on February 9, 1990. Id.

We also noted that the Hearing Examiner found that the inclusion of the Property in the SWMP was debated further at a County Council meeting on February 6, 1990—three days prior to MRA’s settlement. Id. at 60 . Additionally, we explained that “the closing on MRA’s purchase of the Property is not the definitive mile-marker in a zoning estoppel analysis. Generally, purchase of land, by itself, is insufficient to constitute substantial reliance.” Id at 60–61 (internal citations omitted).

We reasoned that “[t]o hold otherwise would mean that a purchaser could lock 37 in the zoning of any parcel simply by the act of purchasing property and asking for a permit.” Id. at 61 . We stated that: For us to decide that the good faith reliance element of zoning estoppel is established by proof that an entity purchases land for the purpose of constructing a highly controversial rubble landfill based on a vote by the County Council approving one step in the State permitting process, while knowing that the new membership of [the] County Council likely opposes that use, would disregard the caution with which we approach such a doctrine. Id. We concluded that MRA “must prove substantial reliance by something other than its purchase of the [Property].” Id.

MRA attempted to do so by “focusing on the expenses it incurred for engineering fees during the period of its alleged good faith reliance.” Id. We noted that “[a]lthough MRA asserts in its brief that, relying on the County’s action, it ‘proceeded to spend over a million dollars on the purchase of the property and on engineering fees[,]’ it gives us no extract references to support this statement.” Id. Specifically, we pointed out that the land purchase cost of $732,500 was insufficient to prove detrimental reliance, and that MRA “gives us no specifics about the balance of the alleged costs.” Id. Indeed, we added that we had “searched the record extract ourselves,” and could only definitely point to $25,000 that had been spent on engineering fees between August 1989 and November 20, 1989, and that the record “does not suggest, let alone prove, that the $25,000 was spent in reliance on the vote for inclusion in the SWMP at the November 14 hearing.” Id. at 61–62. 38 We stated that: In short, all we glean from the record is that MRA closed on the land on February 6, 1990, after the [C]ouncil’s November 14, 1989 vote to include the Property in the SWMP.

There was insufficient evidence to show how much, if any, of the engineering fees were incurred after and in good faith reliance upon the results of the November 14 hearing. Bald allegations and general testimonial statements that MRA spent $300,000 on engineering fees are simply insufficient to meet MRA’s burden to prove the fact and extent of its reliance on the County Council’s action. Id. at 63 . Accordingly, we held that “MRA has failed to establish the necessary good faith reliance on the County Council’s vote to include the Property in its SWMP either through purchase of the property or engineering expenses, or both.” Id.

Therefore, we concluded that “MRA has not proven zoning estoppel against the County according to the criteria used in states that have adopted that doctrine.” Id. The Epilogue to Our Prequel To summarize our holdings in MRA IV on MRA’s substantive claims, we held that: (1) Harford County was not preempted from enacting zoning laws addressing rubble landfills; (2) MRA did not have a constitutionally protected vested right to operate a rubble landfill based upon prior county zoning approval; (3) the application of Bill 91-10 to MRA’s Property was not arbitrary or capricious, and MRA did not have any substantive or procedural due process right in a rubble fill operation under the Maryland Constitution, the Maryland Declaration of Rights, or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; and (4) the County was not estopped from applying Bill 91-10 to MRA’s Property because MRA had no vested right. Additionally, we declined to adopt the zoning estoppel doctrine, and further determined 39 that, even if we were inclined to adopt the doctrine, MRA had not proven the zoning estoppel elements according to the criteria used in states that had adopted the doctrine. MRA IV, 414 Md. at 36–64.

This Court also upheld the Board’s denial of the variance requests, under the variance standards set forth in the Harford County Code. Id. at 24–35. As first noted by Judge Eldridge in MRA II, conspicuously absent from the host of claims asserted by MRA was any claim that the application of Bill 91-10, and a denial of a variance to operate a landfill, would deprive MRA of all beneficial use of its Property, thereby creating an unconstitutional taking without just compensation in violation of § 40 of Article III of the Maryland Constitution. MRA II, 342 Md. at 489 .

B. Proceedings in this Case Almost six years after the denial of its variance by the Board of Appeals and over two-and-one-half years after this Court’s decision in MRA IV, in February 2013, MRA filed suit against Harford County. The Complaint alleges a “cause of action for inverse condemnation” arising from the County’s actions precluding MRA from operating a landfill. MRA sought just compensation from a jury pursuant to Article III, § 40 of the Maryland Constitution, based upon “the deliberate actions of the County Council and the County which unlawfully deprived MRA of the beneficial use of its Property by precluding it from utilizing its MDE permit to operate a rubble landfill on its Property in Harford County.” A review of MRA’s Complaint, and the testimony, evidence, and arguments presented to the jury over the course of a two-week trial, reflect that the building blocks of MRA’s “takings” claim arise out of the same operative facts and legal arguments, which 40 this Court specifically rejected in MRA IV. In a nutshell, MRA’s “takings theory” is that: (1) MRA had a constitutionally protected right to operate a rubble landfill and the County’s adoption of Bill 91-10 interfered with that right, thereby entitling MRA to compensation for its “investment-backed expectation to build a rubble fill on the property”; and (2) the County’s actions in adopting Bill 91-10 were undertaken with an express intention to deprive MRA of its protected interest in operating a rubble landfill.

Below, we point out a few examples of MRA’s claims, testimony, and argument presented in this case that are in direct contrast with our express holdings in MRA IV. MRA’s Theory Submitted to the Jury was that Bill 91-10 was Arbitrary and Capricious MRA alleged in its Complaint that Bill 91-10 was “made applicable to the Property for the purpose of depriving MRA of the beneficial use of its Property” and that the “County’s actions over many years constituted arbitrary and capricious post hoc zoning changes specifically and intentionally targeted and aimed at MRA to prevent MRA from operating a rubble landfill on its Property.” MRA further alleged that the County violated its due process rights arising under the Maryland Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights, asserting that: The County’s actions and inactions . . . were outrageous, egregious, callous, irrational, arbitrary[,] capricious[,] and deliberately indifferent governmental acts in violation of the due process clauses of the Maryland Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which assure MRA, as a property owner, the right to be free from arbitrary or irrational zoning and government actions. 41 At trial, MRA called its expert Robert Lynch, a former Harford County employee and a practicing attorney, to testify that in his view, he considered the adoption of Bill 91- 10 as “targeting MRA.” During closing arguments, counsel for MRA argued to the jury that the adoption of Bill 91-10 “was a devious scheme concocted by the County to make sure that [MRA’s President,] Mr. Schaefer, and MRA would never have a rubble fill on this property. But the County was careful. They were trying to cover it up.

But we figured it out.” The allegations in MRA’s Complaint, as well as testimony, and arguments presented at trial, which included its characterization of the County’s application of Bill 91-10 to MRA’s Property, and its assertions of improper legislative motives, were unequivocally rejected by this Court and were inconsistent with our holding in MRA IV. MRA IV, 414 Md. at 50–51