Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society of Maryland v. Davis

ELDRIDGE, Judge. This case presents the single question of when post-judgment interest begins to accrue on a money judgment for tort damages, based on a jury verdict, when the judgment is subsequently reduced, via a remittitur, by the trial court. The defendant, Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society of Maryland, asks us to determine whether the Circuit Court erred as a matter of law in awarding post-judgment interest, on the reduced judgment, from the date of the original judgment. The plaintiffs, Williette Davis and Massaquoi Kamara, filed in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County wrongful death and survivor actions against Doctor Vibhakar Mody, based on alleged negligence in connection with the birth of their son, Sana Kpehe Kamara.

The child died when he was about two years old, allegedly as a result of the negligence at the time of his birth. 1 On November 7, 1996, the jury found Dr. Mody negligent and returned verdicts in favor of Williette Davis and Massaquoi Kamara, individually, on the wrongful death claims, and a verdict in favor of the estate of Sana Kpehe Kamara on the survivor claim. On November 13,1996, ⁴⁷⁹ a judgment was entered on the Circuit Court’s docket as follows: Estate of Sana Kpehe Kamara: Medical Expenses $1,313,283.30 Noneconomic Damages $2,000,000.00 Williette Davis: Noneconomic Damages $1,000,000.00 Massaquoi Kamara: Noneconomic Damages $1,000,000.00. Two days later, on November 15, 1996, Dr. Mody filed a motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, for a remittitur. After numerous pleadings, replies, memoranda, and hearings, the Circuit Court filed an opinion and order on September 11, 1997, making the following determinations.

First, the court accepted the parties’ suggestion that the noneconomic damages awarded to the estate of Sana Kpehe Kamara be reduced from $2,000,000.00 to $350,000.00, in light of the then cap on noneconomic damages set forth in Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl.Vol.), § ll-108(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Second, the court “denied Defendants’ Motion for a New Trial, or in the Alternative, Motion for Remittitur, for the noneconomic award to the parents.” Thus, the court did not disturb the wrongful death judgments entered in favor of Williette Davis and Massaquoi Kamara, individually, because the court “found that the jury awarded these amounts based upon credible evidence and th[e] court was unwilling to invade the jury’s province in that regard.” 2 Third, the court granted in part the defendant’s motion for a new trial or a remittitur, limited to the issue of medical expenses awarded to the estate of Sana Kpehe Kamara. In light of the Circuit Court’s rulings, the clerk, on September 11, 1997, entered on the docket a “total judgment [of] $2,350,000.00 with costs” against the defendants, subject to the ⁴⁸⁰ estate’s 'acceptance of the remittitur. On September 25, 1997, the estate accepted a remittitur reducing the medical expense portion of the survivorship award to zero, and thus reducing the entire survivorship award to $350,000.00.

Therefore, the total judgment in favor of the plaintiffs for $2,350,000.00 became final on September 25,1997. The plaintiffs then sought payment of the judgment from Dr. Mody’s insurance carrier, Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society of Maryland (Medical Mutual). On February 19, 1998, Medical Mutual tendered payment of Dr. Mody’s insurance policy liability limit of $1,000,000.00 plus post-judgment interest in the amount of $95, 288.32. 3 The post-judgment interest was calculated from September 25, 1997, the date of the plaintiffs’ acceptance of the remittitur. The plaintiffs subsequently filed, directly against Medical Mutual, a “Request for Writ of Garnishment for Post Judgment Interest,” seeking additional post-judgment interest, on the reduced judgment, in the amount of $206,670.58. 4 They argued that post-judgment interest should accrue from the date of the original jury verdict assessing liability, which was November 7, 1996.

After a hearing, the Circuit Court awarded to the plaintiffs post-judgment interest on the reduced judgment amount but accruing from the date of the original judgment entered by the court on November 13,1996. Medical Mutual then filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Prior to argument in the Court of Special Appeals, this Court issued a writ of certiorari. Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society of Maryland v. Williette Davis, 355 Md. 610 , 735 A.2d 1105 (1999). ⁴⁸¹ As previously mentioned, Medical Mutual raises a single issue on appeal, namely whether the Circuit Court erred as a matter of law in making an award of post-judgment interest from the date of the original judgment after having reduced the judgment pursuant to Medical Mutual’s post-judgment motions.

Medical Mutual contends that interest on a tort judgment begins to run from the “date of entry of the judgment,” and that in the present case, such entry occurred on September 25, 1997, the date the plaintiffs accepted a remittitur on the jury verdict award and the date on which the judgment became final and appealable. The plaintiffs agree that interest on a tort judgment begins to run from the date of entry of the judgment. They contend, however, that in the present case such entry occurred on November 13, 1996, the date of the original entry of judgment upon the jury verdict. Under Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl.Vol.), § ll-107(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, and Maryland Rule 2-604(b), post-judgment interest accrues at the rate of 10% per annum “from the date of entry” of the judgment. 5 The “date of entry” of a judgment is the date on which the clerk of the court makes a written record of the judgment pursuant to Rule 2-601. 6 In this case, there were two differ ⁴⁸² ent times when “judgments” were entered on the docket: November 1996 and September 1997.

Nonetheless, as November 13,1996, was the first date on which there was “entry” of a money judgment, the language of Rule 2-604(b) indicates that post judgment interest would properly begin to run from that date. In support of its argument that post-judgment interest should not have begun to run until September 25, 1997, Medical Mutual relies on the definitions of “Judgment” and of “Money judgment” set forth in Rules l-202(n) and l-202(p). Those definitions are as follows: “(n) Judgment. ‘Judgment’ means any order of court final in its nature entered pursuant to these rules.” * * * “(p) Money judgment. ‘Money judgment’ means a judgment determining that a specified amount of money is immediately payable to the judgment creditor. * * * ” Medical Mutual contends that, “[f]or an order to be ‘final in its nature,’ it must be both appealable and enforceable under the Maryland Rules. * * * [W]hen a party files a motion for new trial in accordance with Maryland Rule 2-533, the Circuit Court retains jurisdiction to affirm, modify, amend, or vacate the judgment. Maryland Rule 8-202(c).

Therefore, the judgment cannot be considered ‘final in its nature.’ For this reason, the Court of Appeals held that the order disposing of the post-trial motion becomes the only final and appealable judgment in the case. B & K Rentals v. Universal Leaf ⁴⁸³ Tobacco Co., 319 Md. 127, 132 , 571 A.2d 1213 (1990)....” (Appellant’s brief at 6-7). The flaw in Medical Mutual’s argument is that the judgment of November 13, 1996, was final in its nature and was appeal-able at the time of its entry on November 13, 1996. Furthermore, absent any subsequent action being taken, it was “payable to the judgment creditor.” See Rule 2-632(b).

If no post-judgment motions were filed, it would be the only “money judgment” entered in the case. Consequently, on the date of entry, the November 1996 judgment would appear to have been a “judgment” within the definitions set forth in Rules 1-202(n) and l-202(p) and thus a “judgment” for purposes of Rule 2-604(b). Medical Mutual’s theory seems to be that any order of a court, which would be a “judgment” within the meaning of Rules l-202(n) and l-202(p) at the time of entry, is actually not a judgment within the meaning of those rules if any action is taken after the date of entry which has the effect of abrogating the order’s finality for purposes of appeal. In the case at bar, Medical Mutual’s motion under Rule 2-533 for a remittitur or new trial, filed within ten days of the November 13, 1996, judgment, rendered the November 13th judgment nonfinal for purposes of appeal.

See Rule 8-202(c); B & K Rentals v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., supra, 319 Md. at 132 , 571 A.2d at 1216 (“Consequently, ‘when a motion to alter or amend an otherwise final judgment [or a motion for new trial] is filed within ten days after the judgment’s entry, the judgment loses its finality for purposes of appeal,’’ ” quoting Unnamed Atty. v. Attorney Griev. Comm’n, 303 Md. 473, 486 , 494 A.2d 940 (1985), emphasis supplied, brackets in original). 7 ⁴⁸⁴ If Medical Mutual’s theory were correct, and if the word “judgment” in the Maryland Rules meant only a “judgment” not susceptible of losing its finality by subsequent action, numerous rules would make little or no sense. For example, Rule 2-533 itself, as well as Rules 2-532(b) and 2-534, all provide for various motions to be filed “within ten days after entry of judgment,” and, as pointed out above, such motions cause judgments to lose their finality for purposes of appeal. These rules obviously treat as “judgments” orders similar to the order entered in this case on November 13, 1996.

They specifically deal with “judgments” which lose their finality because motions are filed within ten days. Rules 2-532, 2-533, and 2-534 would be nonsensical if they were using the word “judgment” in accordance with Medical Mutual’s theory. Other rules also use the word “judgment” to include an order which is final at the time of entry even though subsequent action may cause the order to lose its finality for purposes of appeal. See, e.g., Rules 2-522(a), 2-535, 2-601, 2-611, 2-613(f), 2-614, 2-615, 2-622, 2-632.

Accordingly, the entry of judgment on