Meeks v. Dashiell

MEREDITH, J. Charles E. Meeks, Jr. (“Meeks”), appellant, filed suit in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County, alleging legal malpractice on the part of his former attorneys, Charles R. Dashiell, Jr., and Dashiell’s law firm, Hearne and Bailey, P.A. (collectively referred to as “Dashiell” or “appellees”). Meeks alleged that he had engaged Dashiell to draft a prenuptial agreement in 1989, prior to his marriage to Melanie Davis (“Davis”). Meeks alleged that Dashiell reviewed with him a draft of the agreement that included, among other provisions, a waiver of alimony on the part of Davis.

Meeks further alleged that Dashiell, without consulting Meeks, deleted the alimony waiver from the final draft, and then directed Meeks to sign the agreement without rereading it. As a consequence, Meeks alleged, he did not learn until approximately 12 years later, when the marriage disintegrated, that his prenuptial agreement lacked a waiver-of-alimony provision. Nevertheless, during the course ⁴¹⁸ of the divorce proceedings subsequently initiated by Meeks, Meeks filed a motion for the court to declare the prenuptial agreement enforceable as executed. The motion was granted, and Meeks ended up paying alimony to Davis.

Meeks then sued Dashiell, alleging that Dashiell was negligent in deleting the alimony waiver and counseling Meeks to sign the prenuptial agreement without rereading it. Dashiell responded to the complaint with a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, arguing that the malpractice claim was barred by judicial estoppel, or barred by the three-year statute of limitations, or fatally defective in its allegations as to causation. After a hearing, the motion judge ruled that judicial estoppel did not bar the claim, but nevertheless granted appellees’ motion for summary judgment, ruling that the statute of limitations period had expired three years after the date Meeks signed the prenuptial agreement. This appeal followed.

Meeks contends that the motion judge erred in failing to apply the discovery rule. In response, Dashiell urges us.to affirm the motion court’s ruling that the malpractice claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Alternatively, Dashiell contends that, even if the motion court erred in granting the motion on the basis of the statute of limitations, we should nevertheless affirm the judgment for the appellees by ruling that the motion court erred in failing to grant, the motion based upon the doctrine of judicial estoppel. We shall hold that the motion court erred in ruling as a matter of law that the malpractice claim was barred by the statute of limitations; and we shall not disturb the motion court’s denial of the summary judgment motion based upon judicial estoppel.

Accordingly, we shall vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. BACKGROUND Because this case was decided by the Circuit Court for Wicomico County in a ruling upon Dashiell’s motion for summary judgment, we must consider the facts in a light most ⁴¹⁹ favorable to Meeks as the non-moving party. International Broth. of Teamsters v. Willis Corroon Corp., 369 Md. 724, 728 , 802 A.2d 1050 (2002). As this Court has stated many times, in our review of a summary judgment ruling, “we evaluate ‘the same material from the record and decider ] the same legal issues as the circuit court.’ ” Mitchell v. AARP, 140 Md.App. 102, 114 , 779 A.2d 1061 (2001) (quoting Lopata v. Miller, 122 Md.App. 76, 83 , 712 A.2d 24 , cert. denied, 351 Md. 286 , 718 A.2d 234 (1998)).

In his complaint filed against Dashiell in this case, which we will set forth in full, Meeks alleged the following: 1. In approximately mid-October, 1989, [Meeks] retained Charles R. Dashiell, Jr., principal, employee and agent of the law firm of Hearne & Bailey, P.A., to draw an antenuptial agreement between his fiancé, Melanie Davisf,] and himself. 2. The agreement, among other provisions, was to contain a waiver of alimony by Melanie Davis. 3. [I]n fact, an initial draft of the agreement contained a clause in which Ms. Davis waived her right to alimony. 4. [0]n or about November 3, 1989, the parties signed the antenuptial agreement and then married on the following day. 5. Prior to Mr. Meeks executing the antenuptial agreement, Mr. Dashiell assured Mr. Meeks that everything was fine and directed him to sign the same. 6.

Mr. Meeks, at all times during the drafting and execution of the agreement, relied upon the advice and representations of Charles R. Dashiell, Jr. 7. Unbeknownst to Mr. Meeks, the waiver of alimony provision that had been contained in the draft was not contained in the antenuptial agreement that was presented to the parties for signature. 8. On or about May 10, 2001, the Plaintiff and his wife, Melanie Davis Meeks[,] separated. ⁴²⁰ 9. As a result of the separation, Mr. Meeks turned his attention to the antenuptial agreement and discovered that he may be responsible for the payment of alimony because the waiver of alimony provision was not contained in the executed agreement. 10.

The Defendant, Charles R. Dashiell, Jr., was negligent in drawing the antenuptial agreement without a waiver of alimony provision; was further negligent in not being aware that the agreement did not have a waiver of alimony provision; and/or was negligent in not advising the Plaintiff that the agreement did not contain a waiver of alimony; and was negligent in directing the Plaintiff to sign the agreement when the [sic] Charles R. Dashiell, Jr. knew or should have known that the alimony waiver provision was not contained therein and knew or should have known that the Plaintiff did not know that the original draft had been modified. 11. The Plaintiff was not contributorily negligent. 12. As a result of the negligence of the Defendants, the Plaintiff has been caused to incur legal fees and has been required to pay alimony. Wherefore, the Plaintiff claims damages of Seven Hundred[] Fifty Thousand Dollars ($750,000.00) against both Defendants.

No answer was filed in the case. Instead, Dashiell’s initial response to Meeks’s complaint was a motion entitled “Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment.” Because the motion relied upon three attached exhibits that were not part of the complaint, we shall treat Dashiell’s motion as a motion for summary judgment. See Maryland Rule 2-322(c). In the motion for summary judgment, Dashiell asserted that “the material facts in this case are undisputed and judgment should be entered for the Defendants as a matter of law.” The motion set forth three alternative bases for entering judgment for Dashiell: “[1] The Plaintiffs claim is barred ⁴²¹ under the doctrine of judicial estoppel. [2] The Plaintiffs claim is also barred under the applicable statute of limitations. [3] The Plaintiffs cause of action fails since the Defendants did not cause the alleged damages.” Dashiell attached to the motion for summary judgment a supporting memorandum of points and authorities, as well as three exhibits.

There was no supporting affidavit filed with the motion, but in a footnote in Dashiell’s supporting memorandum, Dashiell urged the court to take judicial notice of the exhibits. The footnote stated: Maryland Rule 5-201 provides that “a judicially noticed fact must be one that is not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is ... capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned.” Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is the Complaint for Divorce in the matters styled as Meeks v. Meeks, Case No. 23-C-02-0156 in the Circuit Court for Worcester County. Exhibit 2 is the Motion to Enforce the Antenuptial Agreement in the matters styled as Meeks v. Meeks, Case No. 23-C-02-0156 in the Circuit Court for Worcester County. Exhibit 3 is the Docket Entries in the matters styled as Meeks v. Meeks, Case No. 23-C-02-0156 in the Circuit Court for Worcester County.

The Court may take judicial notice of these proceedings. In Dashiell’s supporting memorandum, he emphasized that Meeks’s Complaint for Divorce, filed in the Worcester County divorce action, included as one of its several prayers for relief a request that Davis “be awarded rehabilitative alimony.” Dashiell further emphasized that, in the divorce action, Meeks had filed a motion asking the Circuit Court for Worcester County to enforce the antenuptial agreement dated November 3, 1989. There was no mention in Meeks’s motion of any dissatisfaction on his part with the terms of that agreement. The docket entries from the divorce action reflect that after Meeks filed the motion to enforce the prenuptial agreement, the Circuit Court for Worcester County conducted a hearing and granted the motion.

The docket entry for June 11, 2003, states: “Court finds the Antenuptial Agreement to be a valid ⁴²² agreement, and Grants the Motion to Enforce the Antenuptial Agreement.” Meeks filed an opposition to Dashiell’s motion for summary judgment. Meeks asserted that there were genuine disputes of material facts, and that Dashiell was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Meeks supported his opposition with a legal memorandum and five exhibits. Two of the exhibits Meeks submitted were duplicates of two of the exhibits to Dashiell’s motion, namely, Meeks’s Complaint for Divorce and Meeks’s Motion to Enforce Antenuptial Agreement.

In addition, Meeks filed a copy of Davis’s answer to the complaint for divorce, in which Davis “admitted] ... that the parties entered into an Antenuptial Agreement on November 3, 1989, but [denied] the allegation that the Agreement is valid, enforceable or governs the distribution of the majority of the property owned by the parties.” Meeks also filed a copy of Davis’s Counter-Complaint for Absolute Divorce, in which she requested, among other relief, an award of pendente lite alimony, as well as rehabilitative and permanent indefinite alimony. Finally, Meeks filed an affidavit in which Meeks made oath as follows: 1. I am a competent person over 18 years of age. 2. In 1989, prior to my marriage to my wife, Melanie D. Meeks, I met with my attorney, Charles R. Dashiell, Jr., of Hearne and Bailey, P.A., and we reviewed a draft of the antenuptial agreement which contained a waiver of alimony provision. 3.

On November 3, 1989,1 executed the antenuptial agreement presented to me by my attorney, Charles R. Dashiell, Jr. of Hearne and Bailey, P.A. 4. I was not made aware of any negotiations that occurred between the time that I reviewed the draft of the antenuptial agreement and the execution of the final agreement that related to alimony. 5. Prior to executing the antenuptial agreement, I was not advised by my attorney, Charles R. Dashiell, Jr., or any other individual employed by Hearne and Bailey, P.A., ⁴²³ that the waiver of alimony provision had been removed from the agreement. 6. I first discovered that the waiver of alimony provision was not in the executed antenuptial agreement when I consulted with an attorney in 2001 regarding a divorce from my wife, Melanie D. Meeks. 7.

The inclusion of the rehabilitative alimony clause in the Complaint for Divorce filed on my behalf was an attempt to mitigate any alimony award given to my wife, Melanie D. Meeks. I had no interest and gained no benefit in having an alimony award granted to my estranged wife. No additional affidavits, transcripts, or exhibits were presented to the Circuit Court for Wicomico County by either party. 1 At the hearing on Dashiell’s motion for summary judgment, the motion judge took issue with Dashiell’s contention that Meeks was attempting to pursue a remedy in the malpractice action that was clearly inconsistent with Meeks’s successful efforts to enforce the prenuptial agreement, as executed, in the Worcester County divorce action. The following colloquy appears in the transcript from the hearing on Dashiell’s motion for summary judgment: [COUNSEL FOR DASHIELL]: In this court he says it wasn’t my deal.

THE COURT: No, wait a minute. But I don’t understand why his position is inconsistent. ⁴²⁴ [COUNSEL FOR DASHIELL]: It’s inconsistent, Your Honor, because in Worcester County he says to the Court in his motion to enforce the settlement, this was my agreement. THE COURT: He said I entered into a contract, and the contract did not provide for a waiver of alimony. [COUNSEL FOR DASHIELL]: And he says— THE COURT: That’s what he said. [COUNSEL FOR DASHIELL]: And he says to the Court, Judge, in Worcester County, this is my deal, specifically enforce it, honor it, meaning that it’s the full and final agreement of the parties. It’s everything that— THE COURT: Right, it was the agreement of the parties.

And the reason it was the agreement was because your client was negligent, is what he is saying, I don’t know if that fact is true but— [COUNSEL FOR DASHIELL]: I understand. THE COURT: — that’s what he is saying. He is saying this was the agreement that I entered into. And the only reason I have this agreement, though, is because your client was negligent.

THE COURT: Would the unilateral mistake of one party prevent the prenupcial agreement] from being enforceable? [COUNSEL FOR DASHIELL]: In a vacuum, no. But when the opposing party is saying, don’t enforce it, it’s not my deal, that wasn’t it, which is what she’s saying— THE COURT: Well, no, but he is saying, you know, I wanted what I got plus a waiver of alimony. [COUNSEL FOR DASHIELL]: And the argument I have for you is, if the Court in Worcester [County] has the facts that’s in this case before it, that is, it wasn’t my deal, I didn’t intend to sign that— THE COURT: So you are saying that he has to say, all right, I don’t want anything in the agreement, I’ll be a lot ⁴²⁵ worse off, not just don’t I have a waiver of alimony, I don’t have the waiver with respect to property and everything, I have to take everything bad, instead of just what your client did wrong. [COUNSEL FOR DASHIELL]: No. What I’m saying, Your Honor, is he has got to take a consistent position. If he tells the Court in Worcester that’s my deal, that’s what I intended— THE COURT: He said that’s the deal I entered into. He didn’t say that’s the one I wanted. [COUNSEL FOR DASHIELL]: Well, actually he did say that’s— THE COURT: No, no, he is saying that’s the contract, the agreement I entered into with my wife.

And in here he is saying that is the agreement I entered into with my wife, the reason I entered into it was because your client was negligent. THE COURT: He says this is the final agreement that we entered into. The reason we entered into it here he’s saying is because your client was negligent. [COUNSEL FOR DASHIELL]: He says to the Court in Worcester, I had offer, acceptance and consideration on these terms. He says to this Court I didn’t really mean to enter that agreement.

That wasn’t my agreement. That’s the distinction. THE COURT: He is not saying I didn’t enter into that agreement. He is saying I entered into that agreement because your client was negligent.

He is not saying that was not the agreement I entered into. After hearing further argument, the motion judge ruled from the bench: THE COURT: All right. I don’t think there is any judicial estoppel. However, this agreement was signed 11 years before[.] I believe the Defendant is charged with knowing the contents of the ⁴²⁶ document that he signed, and that his limitations would have begun [at] the time of the execution of the document.

And the Court is going to grant the motion to dismiss based on limitations. DISCUSSION 1. Standard of Review In this case, the motion judge essentially made two separate rulings with respect to Dashiell’s motion for summary judgment. The motion court denied Dashiell’s motion to the extent it was founded upon judicial estoppel; and the court granted Dashiell’s motion based upon the statute of limitations.

These two rulings regarding Dashiell’s motion for summary judgment — one refusing to grant the motion on one basis, but the other granting the motion on another basis — are reviewed under different standards on appeal. When a motion court grants a motion for summary judgment, we first review the record to determine whether there was a genuine dispute as to any material fact. In making that assessment, all facts, including all reasonable inferences therefrom, must be viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Teamsters v. Corroon Corp., supra, 369 Md. at 728 , 802 A.2d 1050 .

Unless the dispositive facts are free from genuine dispute, the motion court must deny the motion. Frederick Road v. Brown & Sturm, 360 Md. 76, 93-94 , 756 A.2d 963 (2000); Pittman v. Atlantic Realty, 359 Md. 513, 537-39 , 754 A.2d 1030 (2000). “In reviewing the propriety of [a judgment granting] a summary judgment motion, we cannot consider evidence or claims asserted after the motion court’s ruling.” Baltimore v. Ross, 365 Md. 351, 361 , 779 A.2d 380 (2001). See also Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. 116 , 139 n. 9, 492 A.2d 618 (1985) (appellate court disregards documents that were not before the court at the time of the ruling on the demurrer “[r]egardless of the persuasiveness of the documents”). Cf.

Maryland Rule 2-501(f) (“The court shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as ⁴²⁷ to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”) (emphasis added). If the motion court has granted the motion for summary judgment, after we confirm that there was no genuine dispute as to any fact, we then review the motion court’s ruling for legal error. “In appeals from grants of summary judgment, Maryland appellate courts, as a general rule, will consider only the grounds upon which the lower court relied in granting summary judgment.” PaineWebber v. East, 363 Md. 408, 422 , 768 A.2d 1029 (2001). In making our review of the grant of a motion for summary judgment, we need not defer to the motion court’s determination of questions of law. Helinski v. Harford Memorial, 376 Md. 606, 614 , 831 A.2d 40 (2003); Comptroller v. Gannett, 356 Md. 699, 707 , 741 A.2d 1130 (1999).

Upon an appeal challenging the denial of a motion for summary judgment, on the other hand, the appellate courts adopt a more deferential approach. The Court of Appeals explained in Metropolitan Mtg. Fd. v. Basiliko, 288 Md. 25, 28 , 415 A.2d 582 (1980): [Wjhereas a “court cannot draw upon any discretionary power to grant summary judgment” (6 Pt. 2 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.15(6], at 56-601 (2d ed.1980)), it, ordinarily, does possess discretion to refuse to pass upon, as well as discretion affirmatively to deny, a summary judgment request in favor of a full hearing on the merits; and this discretion exists even though the technical requirements for the entry of such a judgment have been met. In the Basiliko case, the Court of Appeals was urged by the appellant to reverse the denial of a summary judgment motion in a case that had been tided on its merits, resulting in a judgment adverse to the appellant.

The Court refused, stating, id. at 29 , 415 A.2d 582 : [W]e now hold that a denial (as distinguished from a grant) of a summary judgment motion ... involves not only pure legal questions but also an exercise of discretion as to ⁴²⁸ whether the decision should be postponed until it can be supported by a complete factual record; and we further hold that on appeal, absent clear abuse (not present in this case), the manner in which this discretion is exercised will not be disturbed. In Foy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 316 Md. 418, 424 , 559 A.2d 371 (1989), the case reached the Court of Appeals in a procedural posture somewhat similar to the present case. The circuit court had granted summary judgment for the defendants on one theory, and had denied the plaintiffs cross motion for summary judgment.

The plaintiff, as appellant, urged the Court of Appeals to rule that the motion court had erred in refusing to grant her motion for summary judgment. Declining to reverse the denial of a motion for summary judgment, the Court stated: It follows from our holdings in Fenwick [Motor Co. v. Fenwick, 258 Md. 134 , 265 A.2d 256 (1970),] and Basiliko that ordinarily no party is entitled to a summary judgment as a matter of law. It is within the discretion of the judge hearing the motion, if he finds no uncontroverted material facts, to grant summary judgment or to require a trial on the merits. It is not reversible error for him to deny the motion and require a trial.

Since the motions judge did not grant summary judgment in favor of [the appellant,] and ordinarily no party is ever entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, it would be improper for us to determine how the motions judge might have exercised his discretion and now determine that summary judgment should have been granted in favor of the plaintiff. Accordingly, in this case we shall ... remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Accord Mathis v. Hargrove, 166 Md.App. 286, 304-06 , 888 A.2d 377 (2005) (motion court has discretion to deny motion for summary judgment even when all technical requirements are met by movant). 2. Statute of Limitations The prenuptial agreement that is the basis of Meeks’s alleged legal malpractice claim against Dashiell was executed ⁴²⁹ by Meeks on November 3, 1989.

The complaint asserting the malpractice claim was filed on October 24, 2003. Dashiell asserted in the motion for summary judgment that “Maryland law presumes that [Meeks] knew the contents of the [prenuptial] contract he signed in 1989. The contract did not contain a waiver of alimony provision. Because thirteen years have passed from the date the contract was signed, and [Meeks] had knowledge of the lack of an alimony provision, this claim is barred under the applicable three-year statute of limitations.” In Meeks’s affidavit filed in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, however, Meeks asserted, under oath: “I first discovered that the waiver of alimony provision was not in the executed antenuptial agreement when I consulted with an attorney in 2001 regarding a divorce from my wife, [Davis].” Meeks further asserted in his affidavit that when he had, prior to the date of signing, reviewed a draft of the proposed prenuptial agreement, the draft “contained a waiver of alimony provision”; that he “was not made aware of any negotiations that occurred between the time [he] reviewed the draft of the antenuptial agreement and the execution of the final agreement that related to alimony”; and that “[p]rior to executing the antenuptial agreement, [Meeks] was not advised by [his] attorney, Charles R. Dashiell, Jr., or any other individual employed by Hearne and Bailey, P.A., that the waiver of alimony provision had been removed from the agreement.” The motion judge apparently discounted Meeks’s sworn statement that he had no actual awareness that the waiver-of-alimony provision had been deleted by his attorney without Meeks’s knowledge from the final draft of the prenuptial agreement.

The motion court accepted Dashiell’s argument, based upon Merit Music v. Sonneborn, 245 Md. 213, 221-22 , 225 A.2d 470 (1967), that Meeks was presumed to know the contents of the document he signed. The motion court treated such presumed knowledge as sufficient to establish as a matter of law that Meeks was on inquiry notice of his potential malpractice claim the day he signed the document in question. ⁴³⁰ Accordingly, the motion court ruled that Meeks was “charged with knowing the contents of the document that he signed, and that his [statute of] limitations would have begun [at] the time of the execution of the document.” We conclude that the motion court erred in so holding. The principle that a party to a contract is bound by his signature even if he neglects to read the contract is a point of contract law that precludes one party to a contract from denying that the terms of the contract are binding. It is not directly applicable to a negligence claim against a tortfeasor who was not a party to the contract; and it does not conclusively establish as a matter of law that the statute of limitations for a legal malpractice claim against the attorney who prepared the contract expires three years after the date the contract was signed.

This is particularly so when, as alleged in this case, the attorney assures the client that the document is ready for the client’s signature and advises the client to sign the document without rereading it. Meeks has alleged in this case that his attorney: reviewed with him a draft agreement; subsequently made a revision to the proposed agreement that made it more favorable to Davis; failed to advise the client of the change made by the attorney; and then directed the client to sign the contract without highlighting for the client a material change. Meeks alleged that, as a consequence of his reliance upon Dashiell, Meeks did not discover until 2001 that the agreement he signed did not contain the alimony waiver he had seen in the draft agreement. Such allegations were supported by affidavit, and if they can be proved, the statute of limitations for legal malpractice would not have begun to run at the time the client signed the document in reliance upon his attorney.

See Mumford v. Staton, Whaley and Price, 254 Md. 697, 714, 255 A.2d 359 (1969) (discovery rule applies to claims of legal malpractice). In Frederick Road, supra, 360 Md. at 94 , 756 A.2d 963 , the Court of Appeals noted that “[a] grant of summary judgment is appropriate where the statute of limitations governing the ⁴³¹ action at issue has expired.” But the Court also emphasized that the discovery rule generally requires factual determinations that are inappropriate for resolution by summary judgment. The Court stated, id. at 95-96 , 756 A.2d 963 : Recognizing the unfairness inherent in charging a plaintiff with slumbering on his rights where it was not reasonably possible to have obtained notice of the nature and cause of an injury, this Court has adopted the discovery rule to determine the date of accrual [of a cause of action], Hahn v. Claybrook, 130 Md. 179, 186-187 , 100 A. 83, 85-86 (1917). The discovery rule tolls the accrual of the limitations period until the time the plaintiff discovers, or through the exercise of due diligence, should have discovered, the injury.

Thus, before an action is said to have accrued, a plaintiff must have notice of the nature and cause of his or her injury. See, Pennwalt [v. Nasios], 314 Md. [433,] 453, 550 A.2d [1155, 1165-66 (1988) ] (holding that limitations do not begin to run until a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know the nature and cause of his or her harm.). See also, United, Parcel [v. People's Counsel], 336 Md. [569,] 579, 650 A.2d [226,] 231 [ (1994) ] (holding that “a cause of action ‘accrues’ within the meaning of [Maryland Code (1973, 1989 Repl.Vol., 1994 Cum.Supp.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,] § 5-101 when ‘the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury, its probable cause, and ... [the defendant’s] wrongdoing ....’ ”)(citing Hecht [v. Resolution Trust Corp.], 333 Md. [324,] 336, 635 A.2d [394,] 400 (1994)). Aware that the question of notice generally requires the balancing of factual issues and the assessment of the credibility or believability of the evidence, this Court in O’Hara v. Kovens, 305 Md. 280 , 503 A.2d 1313 (1986), made clear: “whether or not the plaintiffs failure to discover his cause of action was due to failure on his part to use due diligence, or to the fact that defendant so concealed the wrong that plaintiff was unable to discover it by the exercise of due diligence, is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury.” ⁴³² Id. at 294-295 , 503 A.2d at 1320 .

(citations and internal quotations omitted). Accord Supik v. Bodie, 152 Md.App. 698, 709-11 , 834 A.2d 170 (2003). Cf. Bank of New York v. Sheff, 382 Md. 235, 247 , 854 A.2d 1269 (2004) (“Limitations began to run when the [client] was on inquiry notice that financing statements may not have been filed, triggering a duty on [client’s] part to make an investigation that, if diligently pursued, would have revealed the sad fact [i.e., the alleged malpractice].”) In the present case there was a genuine dispute of fact regarding the date Meeks had notice of the nature and cause of his injury.

According to Meeks’s affidavit, he did not gain actual notice that the waiver-of-alimony provision had been deleted from the final draft of the prenuptial agreement until sometime in 2001. Although Dashiell argues that Meeks had an obligation to read the prenuptial agreement and learn of the omission at the time he signed the contract, as the Court of Appeals noted in Frederick Road, supra, 360 Md. at 101-03 , 756 A.2d 963 , a client has the right to rely upon his own attorney. And unlike the client in the Sheff case who received several post-settlement communications that put the client on inquiry notice of the alleged legal malpractice, 382 Md. at 246-47 , 854 A.2d 1269 , there was no evidence before the motion court in Meeks’s case that would support a finding as a matter of law that something happened prior to 2001 that would have put Meeks on inquiry notice to investigate whether the signed prenuptial agreement contained the waiver-of-alimony provision he had seen in the draft. The Court of Appeals reviewed the development of the discovery rule in Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corporation, 333 Md. 324, 336-37 , 635 A.2d 394 (1994), and noted that mere constructive knowledge is not adequate to start the running of the limitations period: The discovery rule requires that the plaintiff must have notice of a claim to start the running of limitations.

We defined such notice in Poffenberger [v. Risser, 290 Md. 631 , 431 A.2d 677 (1981),] as “express cognition[,] or awareness ⁴³³ implied from ‘knowledge of circumstances which ought to have put a person of ordinary prudence on inquiry [thus charging the individual] with notice of all facts which such an investigation would in all probability have disclosed if it had been properly pursued.’ ” 290 Md. at 687 , 431 A.2d 677 , quoting Fertitta v. Bay Shore Dev. Corp., 252 Md. 393, 402 [ 250 A.2d 69 ] (1969) (citations omitted). In Poffenber-ger, the defendant, a builder, conceded that the plaintiff did not have express knowledge of the defendant’s negligence, which resulted in plaintiff’s home being built in violation of set-back requirements, until some four years after the construction, when a neighboring lot was surveyed and plaintiff was informed that his home was too close to the dividing line between the two lots. 290 Md. at 633 , 431 A.2d 677 . However, the defendant argued that the plaintiff had constructive knowledge of the negligence at the time the house was built, because the plats and deeds were recorded.

We explicitly rejected this argument, holding that this type of knowledge did not constitute the requisite knowledge within the meaning of the rule. Id. at 637 , 431 A.2d 677 . We made it clear that merely constructive notice — which rests not on facts but on strictly legal presumptions— was insufficient, maintaining that it would “recreate the very inequity the discovery rule was designed to eradicate” 290 Md. at 637 , 431 A.2d 677 . (Emphasis added.) In the context of a negligence claim against an insurance agent made by an insured who failed to read the policy, the Court of Appeals has pointed out that, although there may be some circumstances in which that failure to read the insurance contract will bar recovery by the insured as a matter of law, see, e.g., Twelve Knotts Ltd. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins.

Co., 87 Md.App. 88, 104-05 , 589 A.2d 105 (1991), “the duty [of the insured] is not necessarily to read the policy but simply to act reasonably under the circumstances. In some settings, acting reasonably may well require the insured to check parts of the policy or accompanying documents; in many settings, it will not.” Teamsters v. Corroon Corp., supra, 369 Md. at 739 , 802 ⁴³⁴ A.2d 1050. The Court observed in Teamsters that the reasonableness of the insured’s conduct in failing to read the policy in such cases “normally will be fact-specific and therefore, where there is any genuine dispute of relevant fact, for the trier of fact to determine.” Id. at 740, 802 A.2d 1050 . Noting various factors that could enter into that determination, including the question of “how much reliance was justifiably placed in the agent or broker by the insured,” id., the Court concluded that “summary judgment was inappropriate” in that case.

Id. at 741 , 802 A.2d 1050 . Similarly, in Meeks’s case, it was not appropriate for the motion court to grant summary judgment on the statute of limitations issue merely because of the presumption in contract law that Meeks was on notice of everything that he could have known if he had read the prenuptial agreement at the time of signing the document. Considering the facts set forth in Meeks’s affidavit in the light most favorable to Meeks, who was the non-moving party, a finder of fact could infer: that Dashiell reviewed with Meeks a draft of the agreement that contained a waiver-of-alimony provision; that Dashiell made further revisions to the agreement, presumably to satisfy opposing counsel, before presenting it to Meeks for Meeks’s signature; that neither Dashiell nor anyone else advised Meeks before he signed the agreement that one of the revisions was the deletion of the waiver-of-alimony provision; that Meeks relied upon his attorney; that no subsequent event transpired that should have prompted Meeks to read the executed agreement before he did so in 2001; and that Meeks did not, in fact, discover the deletion of the alimony waiver until 2001. If the finder of fact makes such findings, then, in the absence of a finding of fact based on some evidence not before us that a reasonable person in Meeks’s position would have discovered the deletion of the alimony waiver at some point in time before 2001, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the discovery in 2001, and the malpractice suit filed against Dashiell in 2003 was not time-barred.

Accordingly, we hold that the motion court erred in granting ⁴³⁵ summary judgment for Dashiell because of the statute of limitations. In so ruling, we are not holding as a matter of law that Meeks’s cause of action did not accrue until he read the agreement in 2001. We hold instead that the motion court erred in ruling as a matter of law that the cause of action accrued on the date of execution of the prenuptial agreement, and, based upon the record that was before the motion court, we cannot say as a matter of law that Meeks’s cause of action accrued more than three years before suit was filed. Because our holding requires reversal, we need not address Meeks’s alternative argument that his cause of action could not accrue until he incurred damages beyond the attorney’s fee paid for preparing the prenuptial agreement. 3.

Judicial Estoppel Dashiell argues that, even if we reverse the motion court on the statute of limitations issue, we should nevertheless affirm the judgment in favor of the defendants. Dashiell contends that the motion judge erred in failing to grant the motion for summary judgment on the basis of judicial estoppel. On this issue, Dashiell urges us to reverse the denial of a motion for summary judgment. As indicated above, we ordinarily will uphold the discretion of a motion judge to deny a motion for summary judgment, Foy, supra, 316 Md. at 424 , 559 A.2d 371 , although, applying an abuse of discretion standard, we may reverse such a ruling where the facts are undisputed and there is clearly no other possible correct legal outcome.

See, e.g., Presbyterian Hospital v. Wilson, 99 Md. App. 305, 313-14 , 637 A.2d 486 (1994) (“Where, however, a motion for summary judgment is based upon a pure issue of law that could not properly be submitted to a trier of fact, as such, to resolve, the conclusion in Basiliko that the denial of summary judgment will not be reviewed on appeal is inapplicable.”), aff'd, 337 Md. 541, 548-49 , 654 A.2d 1324 (1995). See also Jones v. State, 379 Md. 704, 714 , 843 A.2d 778 (2004) ⁴³⁶ (“While the authority [of the appellate courts] to review unpreserved issues is discretionary, it should not be exercised where it will work an unfair prejudice to the parties.”). Based upon our review of the documents in the record that was before the motion, judge at the time he ruled upon Dashiell’s motion, we conclude that the motion judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Dashiell’s motion to grant summary judgment based upon judicial estoppel. Without prejudice to Dashiell’s right to continue to assert a claim of judicial estoppel upon a more fully developed record, we decline Dashiell’s invitation to reverse the motion court’s denial of the motion for summary judgment on that basis.

Cf. Mathis v. Hargrove, supra, 166 Md.App. at 306 , 888 A.2d 377 (“[R]efusal [to grant motion for summary judgment] is only reviewable upon an abuse of discretion standard.”). Although the phrase “judicial estoppel” was first used by the Court of Appeals in 1966, in Messall v. Merlands Club, Inc., 244 Md. 18, 29 , 222 A.2d 627 (1966), the doctrine that precludes a party from seeking an unfair advantage in the courts by asserting a position contrary to one previously taken in an earlier judicial proceeding was recognized by the Court of Appeals at least as early as 1877 in Edes v. Garey, 46 Md. 24, 41 (1877). In Edes , the Court noted that the plaintiffs had taken a position in prior judicial proceedings that was directly contrary to the claim they were seeking to assert against sureties on a bond.

The Court was “of opinion that under the facts and circumstances disclosed by the record, the [plaintiffs] are precluded from recovering against the ... sureties ....” Id. at 40 . After describing the inconsistent claims, the Court stated, id. at 41: This is certainly claiming at one time in one right, and then at another time setting up a claim not only inconsistent with, but in fact utterly denying the first. “A man shall not be allowed,” says the Court of Exchequer, in Cave v. Mills, 7 H. & W. 927 [ (1862) ], “to blow hot and cold, to claim at one time and deny at another.” ⁴³⁷ More recently, in Berrett v. The Standard Fire Ins. Co., 166 Md.App. 321, 340 , 888 A.2d 1189 (2005), this Court summarized the doctrine of judicial estoppel as follows: [T]he doctrine of judicial estoppel ... prohibits a litigant from “blowing hot and cold,” by taking one position that is accepted by one court and advocating a completely contrary position in another court, to try to gain advantage. Vogel v. Touhey, 151 Md.App. 682, 722 [ 828 A.2d 268 ] (2003) (citing Eagan v. Calhoun, 347 Md. 72, 88 [ 698 A.2d 1097 ] (1997)).

The purpose of the doctrine is to protect the integrity of the court system. Id. In WinMark Limited Partnership v. Miles & Stockbridge, 345 Md. 614, 628 , 693 A.2d 824 (1997), the Court of Appeals explained that the doctrine of judicial estoppel is not grounded in protection of the parties, but rather is intended to preserve the integrity of the judicial system: The policy underlying judicial estoppel and underlying the clean hands doctrine is the same. “The clean hands doctrine is not applied for the protection of the parties nor as a punishment to the wrongdoer; rather, the doctrine is intended to protect the courts from having to endorse or reward inequitable conduct.” [Quoting Adams v. Manown, 328 Md. 463, 474-75 , 615 A.2d 611 (1992).] We noted in Middlebrook Tech, LLC v. Moore, 157 Md.App. 40, 62-63 , 849 A.2d 63 (2004), and also in Gordon v. Posner, 142 Md.App. 399, 426-27 , 790 A.2d 675 , cert. denied, 369 Md. 180 , 798 A.2d 552 (2002), that courts have typically focused upon three factors in making the determination of whether a party’s claim should be barred by judicial estoppel in order to protect the integrity of the courts. In both of those cases we referred to the Supreme Court’s analysis in New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750-51 , 121 S.Ct. 1808, 1815 , 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001), which stated: Courts have observed that “[t]he circumstances under which judicial estoppel may appropriately be invoked are probably not reducible to any general formulation of principle,” Allen [v. Zurich Ins.

Co.], 667 F.2d [1162], []1166 ⁴³⁸ [ (C.A.4 1982) ]; accord, Lowery v. Stovall, 92 F.3d 219, 223 (C.A.4 1996); Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 212 (C.A.1 1987). Nevertheless, several factors typically inform the decision whether to apply the doctrine in a particular case: First, a party’s later position must be “clearly inconsistent” with its earlier position. United States v. Hook, 195 F.3d 299, 306 (C.A.7 1999); In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197, 206 (C.A.5 1999); Hos-saini v. Western Mo. Medical Center, 140 F.3d 1140, 1143 (C.A.8 1998); Maharaj v. Bankamerica Corp., 128 F.3d 94, 98 (C.A.2 1997).

Second, courts regularly inquire whether the party has succeeded in persuading a court to accept that party’s earlier position, so that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later proceeding would create “the perception that either the first or the second court was misled,” Edwards [v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.], 690 F.2d [595], [ ]599 [ (C.A.6 1982) ]. Absent success in a prior proceeding, a party’s later inconsistent position introduces no “risk of inconsistent court determinations,” United States v. C.I.T. Constr. Inc., 944 F.2d 253 , 259 (C.A.5 1991), and thus poses little threat to judicial integrity.

See Hook, 195 F.3d at 306 ; Maharaj, 128 F.3d at 98 ; Konstantinidis [v. Chen], 626 F.2d [933], [ ]939 [ (C.A.D.C. 1982) ]. A third consideration is whether the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on' the opposing party if not estopped. See Davis [v. Wakelee ], 156 U.S. [680], [ ]689, 15 S.Ct. 555 , 39 L.Ed. 578 [ (1895) ]; Philadelphia, W., & B.R. Co. v. Howard, 13 How. 307, 335-337 [ 14 L.Ed. 157 ] (1852); Scarano [v. Central R. Co.], 203 F.2d [510], [ ]513 [ (C.A.3 1953) ] (judicial estoppel forbids use of “intentional self-contradiction ... as a means of obtaining unfair advantage”); see also 18[C.] Wright[, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure] § 4477, p. 782 [ (1981) ]. In enumerating these factors, we do not establish inflexible prerequisites or an exhaustive formula for determining the applicability of judicial estoppel.

Additional consider ⁴³⁹ ations may inform the doctrine’s application in specific factual contexts. The Court of Appeals gave a similar description of judicial estoppel, albeit in dicta, in Pittman v. Atlantic Realty, supra, 359 Md. at 529 n. 9, 754 A.2d 1030 , a case that addressed the use of “sham affidavits.” The Court stated: The application of judicial estoppel requires: (1) the assertion of a factual “position inconsistent with that taken in prior litigation”; (2) that the “prior inconsistent position must have been accepted by the court”; and (3) that “the party sought to be estopped must intentionally have misled the court to gain unfair advantage.” Sedlack v. Braswell Servs. Group, Inc., 134 F.3d 219 , 224 (4th Cir.1998). As we stated in Roane v. Washington County Hospital, 137 Md.App. 582, 592 , 769 A.2d 263 , cert. denied, 364 Md. 463 , 773 A.2d 514 (2001): The gravamen of a judicial estoppel claim is one party’s inconsistency prejudicing his or her opponent’s case.

Wilson v. Stanbury, 118 Md.App. 209, 215 , 702 A.2d 436 (1997). The doctrine in no way hinders parties from vigorously pursuing their claim, including alternative theories of the case. In the Dashiell case, it appears from the comments made by the motion judge during the hearing on the motion for summary judgment that the judge was not persuaded, based upon his review of only the documents in the motion court’s file, that Meeks’s claim of malpractice was irreconcilably inconsistent with Meeks’s successful motion to enforce the executed antenuptial agreement in the divorce litigation in the neighboring county’s circuit court. From our review of the exhibits that were before the motion court at the time of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, see Rule 8-413, we cannot say that the motion judge committed legal error on this point, or that he abused his discretion by refusing to grant Dashiell’s motion for summary judgment.

Mathis v. Har-grove, supra, 166 Md.App. at 306, 888 A.2d 377 . ⁴⁴⁰ In his motion for summary judgment, Dashiell argued that Meeks’s malpractice claims were inconsistent with the position Meeks had pursued during the Worcester County divorce litigation in two regards. (1) In Meeks’s complaint for divorce, he specifically included among his prayers for relief a request that Davis “be awarded rehabilitative alimony”; Dash-iell asserted that it is inconsistent for Meeks to now allege in his malpractice complaint that, “[a]s a result of the negligence of [Dashiell], [Meeks] has been ... required to pay alimony.” (2) In the divorce proceedings, Meeks filed a Motion to Enforce Antenuptial Agreement, which was granted by the Circuit Court for Worcester County; but in the malpractice complaint, Meeks alleged that he did not intend to sign an antenuptial agreement which did not contain a waiver of alimony. Given the facts in the record at the time the motion judge ruled upon Dashiell’s motion for summary judgment, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny Dashiell’s motion that summary judgment should be granted for these reasons. With respect to Meeks’s request in his complaint for divorce that affirmatively asked the court to award Davis rehabilitative alimony, Meeks filed an affidavit in the malpractice case offering this rationale: “The inclusion of the rehabilitative alimony clause in the Complaint for Divorce filed on my behalf was an attempt to mitigate any alimony award given to my •wife, Melanie D. Meeks.

I had no interest and gained no benefit in having an alimony award granted to my estranged wife.” Meeks’s argument seems to be that, because Dashiell had placed him in a position of seeking a divorce without any waiver-of-alimony provision in the only prenuptial agreement signed by his wife, he was not likely to avoid alimony entirely, and his best litigation strategy was to stake out a position urging the court to award rehabilitative alimony only. This argument is not so implausible for us to conclude that the motion judge committed reversible error in failing to reject it. Accordingly, the motion judge did not abuse his discretion by refusing to grant Dashiell’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of Meeks having included a prayer that Davis be ⁴⁴¹ awarded rehabilitative alimony. Cf.

Crowley v. Harvey & Battey, P.A., 327 S.C. 68 , 488 S.E.2d 334, 335 (1997) (“[T]he fact the client has accepted the benefits of the settlement and judicially sought to enforce its terms are not bars to maintenance of a malpractice claim. To hold otherwise would absolve the client of the duty to mitigate damages, and to require her to forego whatever benefit she is entitled to under the settlement in order to maintain a suit against her attorney----”). The Motion to Enforce Antenuptial Agreement that Meeks filed in the divorce proceedings did not include any explicit allegations that the executed prenuptial agreement included all of the terms that Meeks personally believed were in the agreement at the time of signing. The verified motion did, however, aver that the agreement was executed by both parties on November 3, 1989, with both parties having been represented by counsel.

The motion to enforce further asserted that each of the parties had “made full and complete disclosure” to the other of the value of all assets owned by each, and that “[t]he terms and provisions of the Agreement control the disposition of several assets presently in possession of the parties[,] including business interests, real estate and pensions.” In Dashiell’s memorandum in support of the motion for summary judgment, Dashiell urged the court to rule that the malpractice action was barred by judicial estoppel because of the inconsistency between Meeks insisting upon enforcement of the agreement in the divorce litigation and then alleging that it was not the agreement Meeks believed it to be in the malpractice suit. Dashiell argued: “[I]n this proceeding, having previously taken advantage of the beneficial provisions in the antenuptial agreement, the Plaintiff [Meeks] alleges that the November [3], 1989 antenuptial agreement was not the final agreement. The Plaintiff now asserts that he never agreed to execute an agreement without a waiver of alimony provision.” ⁴⁴² . Based upon Meeks’s affidavit and the exhibits in the file, the motion judge rejected Dashiell’s characterization of Meeks’s claim with regard to the viability of the agreement.

Meeks did not allege, in either court proceeding, that the signed agreement was not final and binding upon himself and Davis. To the contrary, because the change he complained of was made by his own attorney, and was agreed to by Davis, Meeks could not rely upon his own failure to read the final draft as an excuse to avoid or reform the agreement. See Merit Music, supra, 245 Md. at 221-22 , 225 A.2d 470 (“the law presumes that a person knows the contents of a document that he executes and understands at least the literal meaning of its terms”); Binder v. Benson, 225 Md. 456, 461 , 171 A.2d 248 (1961) (“[I]f there is no fraud, duress, or mutual mistake, one who has the capacity to understand a written document who reads and signs it, or, without reading it or having it read to him, signs it, is bound by his signature as to all of its terms.”). At the argument on the motion for summary judgment, Dashiell’s counsel appropriately conceded that a unilateral mistake by Meeks would not prevent the prenuptial agreement from being an enforceable agreement.

See Creamer v. Helferstay, 294 Md. 107, 121 , 448 A.2d 332 (1982) (“a unilateral mistake is ordinarily not a ground for relief from a contract”); Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Voland, 103 Md.App. 225, 234-35 , 653 A.2d 484 (1995) (same). The motion judge was not persuaded that a party whose attorney neglected to advise the client of a change to the final execution draft was limited to either rejecting the entire agreement or waiving the alleged error of the attorney. Cf. Sonnenberg v. Security Management, 325 Md. 117, 125 , 599 A.2d 820 (1992) (“where the allegedly defrauded party has affirmed the contract by conduct and then sued for damages, our cases have permitted a deceit action even though the fraud was discovered while the contract was executory.”).

See also Thomas v. Bethea, 351 Md. 513, 521 , 718 A.2d 1187 (1998) (“The issue in the second case is the attorney’s negligence, which, ordinarily, was neither raised nor resolved in the action that was settled.”). ⁴⁴³ Upon weighing the value of the property settlement provisions against the possibility of an alimony award, it was not inconsistent for Meeks to take the position that, as between himself and Davis, the signed agreement was an enforceable contract, and also take the position that his attorney either mishandled the preparation of the final agreement or failed to properly advise Meeks of the ramifications of signing the final version. Based upon the record before the motion court in this case, the motion judge did not err in concluding: “[Meeks] is not saying I didn’t enter into that agreement. He is saying I entered into that agreement because your client was negligent. He is not saying that was not the agreement I entered into.” In light of the facts in the record at the time of the ruling on Dashiell’s motion, we conclude that the motion judge did not abuse his discretion in declining to grant summary judgment on the basis of Dashiell’s claim that Meeks has taken totally inconsistent positions. 2 That said, we observed in the briefs filed by Meeks in this Court occasional statements made by appellant’s counsel that suggested the deletion of the alimony waiver from the final agreement was solely Dashiell’s act, and that such revision was not in accord with the negotiated terms to which Davis had agreed.

If that is in fact what happened, such circumstances may demonstrate that there was a mutual mistake that would have supported a claim for reformation, which is ⁴⁴⁴ something never pursued by Meeks in the divorce litigation. Under that scenario, his current claims against Dashiell would appear to be inconsistent with the action he took to enforce the agreement as signed. Similarly, if the factual assertions made by Meeks in support of his claim against Dashiell were to establish that there was never any meeting of the minds between Meeks and Davis, such that the antenuptial agreement was unenforceable, then such assertions would be clearly inconsistent with the action taken by Meeks in the divorce litigation to enforce the agreement. The documents before the motion judge, however, did not assert that the signed prenuptial agreement was contrary to the terms to which Davis had agreed.

To the contrary, the exhibits filed with the motion for summary judgment and response supported a factual inference that the deletion was made at Davis’s request during negotiations between counsel, but never communicated to Meeks. Accordingly, the motion judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to grant Dash-iell’s motion on this basis. In further proceedings in the present case, however, Dashiell will have the opportunity to develop the facts surrounding this possible inconsistency in Meeks’s factual assertions, and the court may revisit this issue as necessary. As we have tried to make plain throughout this opinion, we do not hold that the denial of Dashiell’s motion for summary judgment is necessarily the final word on the merits of the question of whether Meeks’s claims against Dashiell should be barred by judicial estoppel.

In deference to the discretion of a motion judge to deny a motion for summary judgment, we have viewed the record as it was presented to the motion judge. We leave open the possibility that additional evidence from the Worcester County divorce proceedings and from other witnesses may ultimately lead to a different view of, and outcome on, this issue. Cf. Eagan v. Calhoun, 347 Md. 72, 86-88 , 698 A.2d 1097 (1997) (Court of Appeals imposed bar of judicial estoppel based upon evidence in the record of case that had been fully litigated). ⁴⁴⁵ We have considered the option of undertaking our own independent review of the Worcester County divorce proceedings to analyze in more detail the degree of any inconsistency between the positions asserted by Meeks in that litigation and the claim he now asserts against Dashiell, but we have rejected that course of action for a number of reasons.

First and foremost, the complete record of those proceedings was not available to, or considered by, the motion court in this case. Consequently, except for the five specific exhibits submitted by Dashiell and Meeks in connection with the motion for summary judgment, the records from the Worcester County divorce proceedings are not part of the record in this case. See Rule 8-413(a). The divorce court’s records were not even in the same courthouse as the one in which the motion was being argued, let alone part of the same court file.

Cf. Baltimore v. Ross, supra, 365 Md. at 361 , 779 A.2d 380 (“In reviewing the propriety of a summary judgment motion, we cannot consider evidence or claims asserted after the motion court’s ruling.”). In Fletcher v. Flournoy, 198 Md. 53, 60-61 , 81 A.2d 232 (1951), the Court of Appeals expressed the view that an appellate court should travel outside the record only in exceptional cases in which the demands of justice require such extraordinary action. The Court stated: We are asked to say that the lower court — and this court— may take judicial notice of the record in that case in Montgomery County, in the court in which the instant case was instituted and from which it was removed to Howard County.

In a recent case of the present plaintiff against Judge Bryan, (Fletcher v. Bryan, 175 F.2d 716, 717 [ (4th Cir.1949) ]) the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit quoted and followed a statement in its opinion by Judge Soper in Morse v. Lewis, [ ] 54 F.2d 1027, 1029 ((4th Cir.1932) ], “The general rule undoubtedly is that a court will not travel outside the record of the case before it in order to take notice of the proceedings in another case, even between the same parties[] and in the same court, unless the proceedings are put in evidence; and the rule is ⁴⁴⁶ sometimes enforced with considerable strictness. * * * But in exceptional cases, as high authority shows, the dictates of logic will yield to the demands of justice, and the courts[,] in order to reach a just result, will make use of established and uncontroverted facts not formally of record in the pending litigation.” In the instant case, the demands of justice do not suggest an exception to settled rules. Accord Byron Lasky & Assoc. v. Cameron-Brown, 33 Md. App. 231, 239 , 364 A.2d 109 (1976); but cf. Daniel v. Kensington Homes, 232 Md. 1, 5 , 192 A.2d 114 (1963) (court considered documents outside the record where it appeared that they had been considered by the lower court although not formally moved into evidence); Temoney v. State, 290 Md. 251, 259-60 , 429 A.2d 1018 (1981) (“judicial notice cannot be taken of the testimony or factual statements made in unrelated trials in other jurisdictions”). A good illustration of a case “in which the demands of justice do suggest an exception to settled rules [regarding judicial notice of proceedings outside the record]” is James v. State, 31 Md.App. 666, 685 , 358 A.2d 595 , cert. denied, 278 Md. 725 (1976), where we described the justification for us to travel outside the record as follows: Here, we are confronted with an appeal in a case which has been tried twice, the first resulting in a mistrial. The second trial consumed ten days and some 23 witnesses testified.

It would defy logic and any notion of fundamental justice and of judicial economy if this case were to be reversed solely on the ground of a violation of the Burgett principle [Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 , 88 S.Ct. 258 , 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967) ], when it is a fact of public record that appellant was represented by counsel in connection with the prior conviction and, as appears from the decision of the Court of Appeals in Gill v. State, 265 Md. 350 , 289 A.2d 575 (1972), reversing Gill v. State, 11 Md.App. 378 , 274 A.2d 667 (1971), we are not permitted the alternative of a remand, without affirmance or reversal, for the limited purpose of receiving in evidence the docket entries in the prior case. ⁴⁴⁷ Under such circumstances, we concluded that refusing to take judicial notice of official records of the circuit court that indisputably established the defendant had been represented by counsel in the prior proceedings would “be contrary to the demands of logic and justice.” Id. at 687, 358 A.2d 595 . The present appeal presents no such compelling justification for us to supplement the record by taking judicial notice of other court proceedings. In the Meeks-Dashiell litigation, the parties were represented by skilled litigation counsel who made a strategic decision to submit only five excerpts from the divorce action. Counsel for each party could have sought to have the entire court file from the Worcester County divorce action made available to the Wicomico County motion judge, but did not do so.

It is not the proper function of an appellate court to override such tactical decisions and seek out additional evidence to supplement the record in order to support better arguments than those that were in fact raised and decided in the circuit court. Cf. Matthews v. Matthews, 112 Md. 582, 588-89 , 77 A. 249 (1910) (“The proceedings in the first case were not therefore properly before the Court below in this case, and not being in the record, are not before us on this appeal.”); Anderson v. Cecil, 86 Md. 490, 492 , 38 A. 1074 (1897) (“this Court cannot look outside the record for the facts of the case”). Even though this Court has the authority to take judicial notice nostra sponte of other court proceedings, we have historically exercised such authority only in exceptional cases to prevent an unjust result, and there is no pressing reason for us to do so under the circumstances of this case.

We have been unable to find a case in which either this Court or the Court of Appeals exercised this authority for the purpose of supplementing the record that was before the circuit court when that court denied a motion for summary judgment. Dashiell has not asserted any argument that causes us to fear that a grave injustice will result if we follow our normal ⁴⁴⁸ appellate procedures and remand this civil action to the circuit court for further proceedings. In the absence of any compelling circumstances that would support us taking the extraordinary action of making an unguided review of another court’s file that was not reviewed by the motion judge, we will leave to litigation counsel and the circuit court the task of analyzing the impact of the Worcester County court records upon Meeks’s Wicomico County malpractice claim. The purpose of imposing judicial estoppel to preclude certain claims is to preserve the integrity of the courts.

WinMark, supra, 345 Md. at 628 , 693 A.2d 824 . There is no reason for us to distort our normal appellate procedures in this case in the name of preserving the integrity of the court system. JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR WICOMI-CO COUNTY VACATED. CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

APPELLEES TO PAY THE COSTS. Dissenting Opinion by DEBORAH S. EYLER, J., in which MURPHY, C.J., SALMON, JAMES R. EYLER, and KRAUSER, JJ., join. I respectfully dissent. In my view, the summary judgment in favor of Dashiell and Hearne & Bailey, P.A., in the legal malpractice case should be affirmed on the ground of judicial estoppel.

In Meeks’s legal malpractice action against Dashiell and his law firm (“Dashiell”), he alleged negligence in the preparation of a prenuptial agreement in 1989. Dashiell moved to dismiss or for summary judgment, on two grounds: statute of limitations and judicial estoppel. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Dashiell on the ground of limitations. Meeks noted an appeal, asking whether the court erred.

The case was argued before a three-judge panel of this Court. Thereafter, it was set in for en banc review, due to the important issues it raises. As I shall discuss in greater detail ⁴⁴⁹ below, after the en banc argument, this Court, on its own motion, directed that the record in the 2002-2003 divorce case between the Meekses in the Circuit Court for Worcester County be delivered to this Court; and that the record include transcripts of a hearing in the divorce case on a motion that had been filed by Meeks to enforce the prenuptial agreement. The Court also gave the parties an opportunity to submit supplemental briefs, which they did.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS Overview This case stems from the unraveling domestic situation of Meeks and his now ex-wife, Melanie Davis Meeks (“Davis”). The two were married on November 4, 1989, when Meeks was 24 and Davis was 23. The day before their wedding, they signed a prenuptial agreement. The agreement was drafted by Dashiell, who represented Meeks.

Davis was represented by Walter (“Bud”) Anderson, Esquire, who is since deceased. Davis had a young child, Kaitlind, from a previous marriage. After she and Meeks married, Meeks adopted the child. Meeks and Davis went on to have two more children.

On May 10, 2001, Meeks and Davis separated. On February 7, 2002, Meeks filed a complaint for limited divorce in the Circuit Court for Worcester County. Davis filed a counter-complaint. Eventually, they both filed amended complaints for absolute divorce.

Meeks filed a motion to enforce the prenuptial agreement. Davis opposed the motion. On October 28, 2002, the court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion. It ruled in Meeks’s favor, finding that the agreement was valid and enforceable.

A month later, on November 26, 2002, the parties and counsel appeared before a domestic relations master and read the terms of a settlement into the record. The terms included that Meeks would pay Davis nonmodifiable, fixed-term alimony of $6,000 per month for eight years. The parties were ⁴⁵⁰ questioned by their lawyers and each acknowledged entering into the agreement voluntarily and knowingly. The lawyers were supposed to cooperate in putting the agreement into writing.

They disagreed about the language to be used. Meeks filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement, which Davis opposed. Ultimately, the language disagreement was resolved and a final written settlement agreement was prepared and signed on May 21, 2003. The settlement agreement in final form called for the same non-modifiable, fixed-term alimony payment as put on the record before the domestic relations master. 3 The parties expressly acknowledged that they were entering into the agreement freely and voluntarily with the intention of fully settling and determining their rights and obligations pertinent to their marriage.

The settlement agreement was incorporated into the court’s final divorce decree, which was issued on June 11, 2003. 4 A few months later, on October 24, 2003, Meeks sued Dashiell for legal malpractice, in the Circuit Court for Wicomi-co County. He alleged that he had retained Dashiell to prepare a prenuptial agreement; that Dashiell had given him a draft prenuptial agreement that included a waiver of alimony clause; that he (Meeks) signed the agreement very soon thereafter; and that Dashiell failed to inform him that the final draft he was signing was different